Institutional balance and democratic legitimacy in the decision-making process of the EU by Sariyiannidou, Eve
                          
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been





Institutional balance and democratic legitimacy in the decision-making process of the
EU
General rights
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author, unless otherwise identified in the body of the thesis, and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. It is permitted to use and duplicate this work only for personal and non-
commercial research, study or criticism/review. You must obtain prior written consent from the author for any other use. It is not permitted to
supply the whole or part of this thesis to any other person or to post the same on any website or other online location without the prior written
consent of the author.
Take down policy
Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions prior to it having been deposited in Explore Bristol Research.
However, if you have discovered material within the thesis that you believe is unlawful e.g. breaches copyright, (either yours or that of a third
party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation,
libel, then please contact: open-access@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:
• Your contact details
• Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
• An outline of the nature of the complaint
On receipt of your message the Open Access team will immediately investigate your claim, make an initial judgement of the validity of the
claim, and withdraw the item in question from public view.
INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY IN THE 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF THE EU 
Eve Sariyiannidou BA (Thess) LL. B, LL. M (Aberd) 
A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the 
requirements of the degree of PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) in the Faculty of 
Social Sciences and Law 
July 2006 
ninety thousand words 
Author's Declaration 
I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the 
Regulations of the University of Bristol. The work is original, except where 
indicated by special reference in the text, and no part of the dissertation has been 
submitted for any other academic award. Any views expressed in the dissertation 








List of Abbreviations 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
CHAPTER 2: Democratic Legitimacy: The European Debate 9 
Introduction 9 
From policy to polity: democratic legitimacy and European integration 10 
The constitutional transformation of the `new' legal order 14 
The Union's legitimacy based on the `rule of law' principle 19 
Democracy: a pillar of legitimacy? 23 
Democratic deficit as a crisis of legitimacy 29 
Institutional balance and democratic legitimacy in the changing constitutional 
arrangements 34 
Conclusion 39 
CHAPTER 3: An Initial Assessment of Decision-Making in the Union 41 
Introduction 41 
Reflections on the Council 42 
The parameters of decision-making in the Council 48 
The empirical reality of the evolving EU architecture 55 
The European Council's strategic leadership in decision-making 59 
Interinstitutional dynamics and the use of `soft' law 63 
The debate on transparency: simplified and open decision-making 69 
Conclusion 78 
CHAPTER 4: The European Parliament as `Repository' of Democratic 
Legitimacy 81 
Introduction 81 
Parliamentary participation in the legislative process: the constitutional 
significance of codecision 83 
The EP: a vehicle for citizen representation at EU level? 88 
The European Parliament's ability to act as `opposition' 94 
The EP as a multifunctional legislature 96 
Conclusion 100 
CHAPTER 5: The Judicialisation of Law-Making 103 
Introduction 103 
Judicial review of EU acts: setting constitutional constraints on legislative 
freedom 104 
Adjudicating `institutional balance' 106 
Adjudicating `fundamental human rights' 114 
The institutional implications of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 119 
Access to judicial review 125 
Judicial review vs judicial activism: when the `judicial' becomes` political' 137 
Conclusion 148 
CHAPTER 6: EU Decision-Making: Preserving or Perverting Democratic 
Legitimacy within the Member States? 149 
Introduction 149 
The impact of EU decision-making on the institutional balance in the internal 
legal orders of the Member States 150 
The erosion of the constitutional autonomy of subnational actors 155 
The advent of the European Convention 162 
The Commission's `EU governance' initiative: reaching out to national and 
subnational democracies 169 
`EU governance' debate: endorsing a broader conception of `regime' 
legitimacy 173 
Conclusion 179 
CHAPTER 7: The Constitutional Convention and the Democratic 
Challenge 181 
Introduction 181 
The `Convention' method: reinventing institutional reform? 182 
Institutional balance and democratic legitimacy in the TeCE 187 
The democratic underpinnings of the Union's institutional system 193 
Is the ratification crisis a challenge to the democratic legitimacy of the 
Union's regime? 198 
Conclusion 205 
CHAPTER 8: Conclusion 207 
Bibliography i xlviii 
ABSTRACT 
Since Maastricht, the `Europeanisation' of decision-making means that the locus 
of political control has shifted and the borders of the democratic (Member) State 
no longer embrace the whole spectrum of individual activity. As a result, the EU 
legislative process creates a system of legal acts adopted usually by qualified 
majority voting by institutions that are distant from the citizens of the Member 
States, but which still directly affect their lives. Inevitably, the redefinition of 
political boundaries created public anxieties about the legitimate and democratic 
underpinnings of the Union's decision-making process. The thesis sets out to 
explore the democratic legitimacy of the EU institutional system with reference 
to the two overriding principles found in the national political orders, that is, the 
`rule of law' and democracy and by focusing on government structures and their 
interrelationship. In this context, the relationship between the issue of 
institutional balance and democratic legitimacy is relevant to the issue of how the 
EU institutions interact in the decision-making process. In the absence of clear 
separation of powers in the EU treaties, the principle of institutional balance has 
acted as a substitute with the aim to provide a system of checks and balances that 
ensures that the system of governance and the exercise of power, therein, respect 
the `rule of law' and democracy or, in other words, are both legally and publicly 
controlled, thus preserving the democratic legitimacy of a legal order. Namely, 
whether the way legislative power is allocated and exercised is confined within 
constitutional limits, based on a set of fixed and identifiable rules and principles 
and judicial remedies are available to ensure respect for such rules and 
principles. Also, whether the way legislative power is attributed and exercised 
allows for the participation of people in the legislative process. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The willingness to be ruled is agcarontee of the freedom to rule. " 
Aristotle, The Politics. 
One would agree with Joseph Weiler' that Maastricht, and its aftermath, is one of 
the greatest constitutional `moments' in the history of the European Union, not 
because of the achievements of the economic and monetary union or the 
unprecedented opportunities the transformation of the single market created for 
Europe's citizens. Maastricht was one of the greatest constitutional `moments' 
due to the debate that followed the ratification process which had in itself a 
transformative impact; public opinion in the Member States was no longer 
willing to tacitly accept the orthodoxies of European integration and the choices 
of the European political classes. And this was due to Maastricht's one further, 
very significant implication; the European Union's evolution into a `regime' of 
multilevel governance with a deepened and widened policy remit raised concerns 
about its legitimate and democratic underpinnings. 
In the Member States there is a presumption that national governments are 
democratically legitimate, despite the fact that they depict, at least in some 
Member States, formal and informal arrangements which are democratically 
deficient? If democratically deficient arrangements are found both at EU and 
national levels, why it is the Union's - and not the Member States' - democratic 
legitimacy that is called into question? In the EU, the system of governance is 
based on the `institutional triangle' of the Commission, the Council and the 
European Parliament, flanked by two more institutions: the European Court of 
' J. H. H. Wcilcr, The Constitution of Europe. Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 34. 2 Notably, in the UK, legislation passes through a second, unelected chamber (the House of 
Lords) for amendments and approval. In Greece, unelected academics often become members of 
the Government as ministers. 
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Justice and the European Council. The Commission traditionally upholds the 
interests of the Union and initiates legislation with no responsibility for its 
outcome, the national governments are represented in the Council, the major 
legislator applying qualified majority voting in many policy areas, and the 
European Parliament which is directly elected by citizens but with legislative 
functions far from assuming the overall responsibility of national parliaments. As 
Karlheinz Neunreither rightly points out, ' the main shortcoming of the Union is 
that, unlike national governments, there is no political leadership that is 
popularly authorised, no executive that depends on a majority and no formal 
function of opposition which forces the government - or the system of 
governance- to elaborate alternative policies within the sets of institutions 
provided to this end. Whereas national politics are dominated by the choice of 
governments within more or less agreed political systems, the EU periodically 
calls upon the public or its representatives to authorise redesigns of its 
institutional system. 4 Therefore, a key difference between the Member States 
and the EU consists in the fact that, while in the national political orders there are 
periodic opportunities to express consent by choosing leaders through voting, the 
EU focuses the politics of consent rather on institutional design and the 
attribution of powers under that design. 
As the Union accrues powers to produce legislative acts that directly affect the 
lives of citizens, there are public anxieties defined primarily by the complaint 
that the EU institutions and decision-making are far removed from its citizens 
and are devoid of public influence and involvement. Therefore, the debate on the 
lack of democratic input narrows down to the institutional setting of the Union, 
where the focus is on government structures and their interrelationship. The 
relationship between institutional balance and democratic legitimacy is relevant 
to the issue of how the EU institutions interact in the decision-making process. 
In the absence of clear separation of powers in the EU treaties, the principle of 
institutional balance has acted as a substitute with the aim to provide a system of 
`checks and balances' that ensures that the system of governance and the exercise 
3 K. Ncunrcithcr, `Govcrnancc without Opposition: The Case of EU', (1998) 33 Govcnnncnt and 
Opposition 419-441, at pp. 420-423 and 434. 
Ch. Lord, A Democratic Audit of the European Union, Palgravc, 2004, p. 75. 
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of power, therein, are both legally and publicly controlled, thus preserving the 
democratic legitimacy of the legal order. Namely, whether the way legislative 
power is allocated and exercised is confined within constitutional limits, based 
on a set of fixed and identifiable rules and principles and judicial remedies are 
available to ensure respect for such rules and principles. Also, whether the way 
legislative power is allocated and exercised allows for the participation of people 
in the legislative process. 
The thesis will attempt an internal evaluation of the European Union's 
institutional system with specific reference to the institutional relations of the 
five `cardinal' institutions (the Council, the Commission, the European 
Parliament, the Court of Justice and the European Council). The analysis will 
focus on how these are organised, function and interact in their legal capacity. 
Whether the manner in which power is shared in the decision-making process 
privileges particular institutions over others, especially executive (the Council, 
the Commission and the European Council) over parliamentary and what the 
implications are. Certainly, the thesis is a reaction to the perception that greater 
involvement of the European Parliament in the legislative process will enhance 
its democratic legitimacy, since it is the only publicly elected EU institution. 
Moreover, as the Union is a multilevel system of governance, decision-making at 
the EU level exists in tandem with the lower tiers. What will further be explored 
is how constitutional rules on the attribution of powers and the requirements of 
decision-making at EU level have impacted on the competence exercise within 
the national legal orders, with specific reference to national and regional 
parliaments. 
Institutional balance will be studied both as a political and legal principle. As a 
political principle, it reflects the empirical reality of the Union's institutional 
structure which is characterised by a proliferation of actors. The premise of this 
approach is that since each institution, at least in theory, represents a different 
constituency, the notion of institutional balance can be presented as a way of 
ensuring adequate participation and representation of different constituencies 
within the EU. As a legal principle, it was developed by the Court of Justice to 
regulate interinstitutional relations. Along with fundamental rights, institutional 
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balance is part of the Court's adjudication on `principles' with the aim to provide 
procedural guarantees of legality and subjective guarantees of democracy. The 
thesis will explore how this jurisprudence has led to the judicialisation of law- 
making and how that has affected democratic legitimacy. The issue of 
institutional balance can also be traced in the procedural mechanisms, found in 
the treaties, through which powers are exercised in the EU. It is further 
characterised by an inherent institutional tension between intergovernmentalism 
and supranationalism. The tension is reflected in features such as the complicated 
voting rules, the maze of intricate procedures, the pillared structure, which partly 
determine the influence of the different institutional actors. In addition to formal 
rules, it is further defined by informal institutional practices which may occur 
outside the constitutional framework of the EU. Therefore, an examination of the 
formal and, in places, informal aspects of the Union's institutional structure is 
attempted with the aim to identify salient features of the legislative process that 
affect its democratic legitimacy. 
The issue of `legitimacy' generally and especially within the EU context is 
multifaceted and wider than the issue of democratic legitimacy and has been the 
subject of research across disciplines. Most contributions are from the political 
science and analyse legitimacy in the context of performance, efficiency, 
effectiveness, identity or concentrate on a comparison of these different `vectors' 
of legitimacy. They further evaluate legitimacy in terms of an `input/output' 
dichotomy. ' Also, a plethora of political science and constitutional theory exists 
on the topic in terms of `polity' legitimacy. Polity legitimacy concerns the 
subjects (how citizens are defined) and the sphere (the policy areas and the 
geographical boundaries where political power is exercised) of a polity, as well 
s Input legitimacy refers to who is involved or represented in an institutional system and output 
legitimacy refers to the outcomes or results of an institutional system, in terms of their 
appropriateness and acceptability. II. Wallace, `Designing Institutions for an Enlarging European 
Union', in Ten Reflections on the EU Constitutional Treaty for Europe, B. deWittc (cd. ), 2003, 
p. 88, CONV 703/03, Study by the EUI presented by Vice-President Amato, 02.04.2003. 
D. Bectham and Ch. Lord, Legitimacy and the EU, Longman, 1998. D. Obradovic, `Policy 
Legitimacy and the European Union', (1996) 34 JCMS 191-221. ClLLord and D. Bectham, 
'Legitimizing the EU: Is there a "Post-parliamentary Basis" for its Legitimation? ', (2001) 39 
JCMS 443-462, pp. 444-5. F. Scharpf, `Economic Integration, democracy and the welfare state', 
(1997) 4 JEPP 18-36. M. Jachtcnfuchs, ThDiez and S. Jung, `Which Europe? Conflicting Models 
of a Legitimate Political Order', (1998) 4 European Journal of International Relations 403-445. 
Ch. Lord and P. Magnctte, `E Pluribus Unum? Creative Disagreement about Legitimacy in the 
EU', (2004) 42 JCMS 183-202. 
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INTRODUCTION 
as the need to justify the existence of a polity. It relates to the extent to which 
entities meet certain minimal conditions of political community. The present 
analysis will be confined to the issue of 'regime' legitimacy, a narrower concept 
that refers to the nature and the workings of the institutional structure. 6 Although 
`regime' legitimacy has an undeniable correlation with `polity' legitimacy, any 
account of the evolution of the EU as a polity, any analysis on its constitutional 
finality, is beyond the intended scope of the current work. 
And within the context of `regime' legitimacy, the examination will be based on 
the explicit comparative pattern of institutional balance and democratic 
legitimacy. Admittedly, institutional balance is a threefold concept; it refers to 
the relationship between the Member States and the EU, among the Member 
States in the EU institutions (patterns of influence between the small and larger 
Member States) and between the EU institutions. Despite the abundant and 
versatile nature of the topic, the author is compelled, by restrictions of space and 
time, to focus only on particular aspects of the relationship between the Union's 
institutions, leaving the prospects open for future analysis. Any reference to the 
national (and subnational) orders is only indicative of the very essence of the 
Union's multilevel governance system. As European integration is entangled in 
the mainstay of national democracy, one cannot establish the democratic 
legitimacy of the Union's institutional framework without taking into account the 
lower tiers of governance. It is not treated as an examination of the allocation of 
competences between the EU and its Member States, but rather of how the 
allocation of powers within the Union affects the attribution of powers within the 
national legal orders, because the object of the study is purely the relationship 
between the EU and its citizens. 
The thesis sets out to explore the democratic legitimacy of the Union's regime 
with reference to the two overriding principles found in the national political 
orders, that is, the `rule of law' and democracy. So, the first theoretical 
6 The distinction between regime legitimacy and polity legitimacy (sec below) was advanced by 
R. IIcllamy and D. Castiglionc, `Normative Theory and the EU: Legitimising the Euro-Polity and 
its Regime', inAJterNational Democracy, L. Tragardh (cd), Hart Publishing, 2004, pp. 12-13 and 
N. Walkcr, `The White Paper in a Constitutional Context', this paper is a part of contributions to 
the Jean Monnct Working Paper 6/01 Symposium: Mountain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of 
tc Commission White Paper on Governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
assumption is that legitimacy needs normative justification. 7 Legitimacy as a 
`rule of law' principle is important, because law has always been a basic 
instrument of the national political system and a symbol of the development of 
the European integration. Law is the basis of the Union's institutional system, as 
it lays down the procedures for decision-making and regulates the relationship 
between the institutions. However, norms are not value free; hence, the second 
theoretical assumption is that norms have to be underpinned by the value of 
democracy. In order to explore if and to what extent the Union is democratic as a 
regime, the democratic standard will be identified on the basis of defining 
features and principles. 
Democracy is a highly elusive concept; it is contested and highly controversial. It 
means different things to different people. As a result, there is no shortage of 
scholarly literature on democracy, or disagreement for that matter over how it 
should be defined. 8 Due to the inherent difficulty in the lack of academic 
consensus as to the conceptual ambit of democracy and in the fact that these 
studies must reinforce that particular conception of democracy which they 
embrace, unravelling concepts of democracy or the complexity that underlies 
academic debates is beyond the scope of this thesis. Besides, there is hardly any 
consensus among scholarship about the model of democracy appropriate for the 
peculiar EU system of governance and such scholarship has as an object the 
ultimate evolution of the EU as a polity. Besides, as the current study is not about 
the finality of the Union and the models it should embrace, including the 
democratic model appropriate for a post-national political entity (the Union), the 
notion of democracy employed is rather akin to the one found in western liberal 
democratic states. 
It is not always simple to apply statal features of democracy to the EU, a non- 
state political system. However, there is often the temptation in scholarly and 
political debate to move too quickly from the reasonable claim that the EU is a 
non-state political system to the conclusion that the EU, due to its special nature, 
Fr. IIarnard, Democratic Legitimacy-Plural Values and Political Power, McGiII-QuCcn'S 
University Prcss, 2001, p. 30. 
A. Verhoeven, The EU in Search of Democratic and Constitutional Theory, Kluwer Law 
International, 2002, p. 3. D. Obradovic, op. cit. n. 5, p. 194. 
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should conform to a `philosophical' standard of democracy, in order to reach an 
acceptable democratic state. Apart from being elitist and highly `utopian', such 
standard does not correspond to the everyday reality of the EU governance. 
Above all, the EU is a polity in which authority and decision-making is shared 
across multiple levels of government. Governing institutions in the Member 
States are limited in how they can shape the standards by which they are judged. 
There would be little pragmatism in adapting democratic ideas to the EU content, 
if these were seriously at odds with the way in which national polities actually 
operate and the way people have accepted that their systems operate. ' These 
considerations are significant, when one comes to think about the nature of the 
democratic regime which does and should operate in the EU. Besides, when one 
refers to the democratic legitimacy of the system, the Union's regime, this 
possesses an important formal-institutional dimension. Hence, the examination is 
intended as a testimony of the routes taken by the EU itself; the choices made by 
the EU regarding the nature of democracy appropriate for its legal order, the 
democracy as reflected in its formal and empirical institutional reality. 
Ultimately, these are the choices made and endorsed by the Member States 
themselves. 
Although it is not always feasible to avoid some degree of theoretical 
commentary due to the very nature of the topic (democratic legitimacy), a 
conscious effort has been made not to engage in any theoretical approach to the 
issue. A formal, legalistic approach will be adopted instead, focusing on 
questions of structure and procedure in the formulation of laws. Institutional 
reforms will be unfolded in a legal setting and according to formal constitutional 
arrangements, relevant court judgments and informal processes, the interplay of 
interinstitutional relations as well as informal politics. The task will take the form 
of a case study of the Treaty of Nice with an occasional retrospective reference to 
the Maastricht and Amsterdam provisions, whenever it is deemed necessary to 
illustrate the innovations brought about by the 1996 and 2000 Intergovernmental 
Conferences. The task will also project the legal analysis into the recent post- 
Ch. Lord and D. Bectham. op. cit. n. 5, pp. 443-5. P. Craig, "IIc Nature of Community: Integration, 
Democracy and Legitimacy', in The Evolution of EU Law, P. Craig and G. de Burca (eds), OUP, 
1999, pp. 16 and 22. 
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Nice constitutional and EU governance debates to assess whether the new 
constitutional and institutional environment infused the Union's legislative 
process with democratic legitimacy and whether it achieved popular consent as 
to the redesign of the regime and the attribution of powers therein. A general 
reference will be made to the pillared structure of the EU, but the analysis will be 
confined to the first pillar, which will serve as the testing ground. Also, due to 
restrictions, the analysis will not include any comitology considerations. 
The law is stated as approximately at the end of March 2006. 
8 
D _A, IOCR4 TIC F 
GITIMACY 77! ROPE W MATE 
CHAPTER 2 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: THE EUROPEAN DEBATE 
2.1 Introduction 
As with any political system, the European Union (EU) has the power to make 
laws and devise policies that affect the lives of citizens, the Union citizens. Yet, 
it is difficult to place the EU legal order in the international arena as well as 
define its boundaries and relationship with other legal orders. As to the 
perception of the Union by the public, opinion polls indicate that its institutional 
system is too intricate and elite-driven. There is very little awareness about EU 
policies and decision-makers. ' The EU was created by democratic sovereign 
states with the purpose of bringing peace and stability in the world and for a long 
time it derived its legitimacy as an international organisation indirectly from the 
Member States. However, its development into a `regime' with a deepened and 
widened policy remit raised concerns about its legitimate and democratic 
underpinnings. Are the Union, its objectives and policies shaped by the two 
overriding principles found in the national political orders, that is, the `rule of 
law' and democracy? In this context, the debate on the democratic legitimacy of 
the EU legislative process becomes relevant, as legitimacy is not an issue of 
compliance solely with the `rule of law' principle, but also with the institution of 
democracy. 
This chapter will examine the relevance of the `rule of law' and democracy to the 
Union's institutional system and decision-making process. It will explore the 
constitutional and public anxieties with respect to the democratic legitimacy of 
the EU institutional structure as well as the reasons why the manner in which 
t Now Europeans sec thcrosclvcs"Looking through the mirror with public opinion surveys. 
European Documentation Series, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
Luxembourg, 2001. Eurobarometer 56, Public Opinion in the European Union, European 
Commission, April 2002. Flash Eurobarometer 159, The Future European Constitution, February 
2004. 
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legislative powers are allocated among the EU institutions matters to the 
democratic quality of the Union legal order. 
2.2 From policy to polity: democratic legitimacy and European 
integration 
Widespread preoccupation with democratic legitimacy is a fairly recent 
phenomenon. The issue burst suddenly on the agenda of the Union's institutional 
reform subsequent to the Maastricht ratification crisis of the early 1990s, 2 but 
was not in fact expressly identified as a priority by the 1996 and 2000 
Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs). Enhancement of the legitimacy of the 
EU was not part of the 1996 IGC agenda, although it would appear as a central 
theme in the reports of the institutions to the Reflection Group which shared a 
concern, largely a response to the TEU ratification process, about the standing of 
the European project in the eyes of the European citizen. 3 Indeed, in the 
Reflection Group's Report to the Conference `the objective of the 1996 reform, 
given the challenge of enlargement, was to ensure that the Union functioned 
efficiently and with legitimacy: in short, the purpose was to improve the quality 
of the way the Union works'. 4 The 2000 IGC set out to resolve the institutional 
issues left open by Amsterdam and that needed to be settled before enlargement. 
Hence, the agenda revolved around reforms that would pertain to the efficient 
operation of the institutions and the effectiveness of decision-making in an 
enlarged Europe. There are very few express references to legitimacy, while 
`acceptability' appears as a standard for the operation of both the Union 
institutions and decision-making. 5 
2 Ch. Lord, A DemocraticAudit of the European Union, Palgravc, 2004, p. 3. G. Majonc, 'Europe's 
"Democratic Deficit": The Question of Standards', (1998) 4 EU 5-28, p. 12. 
3 G. dcBurca, 'T1he Quest for Legitimacy in the EU', (1996) 59 MLR 349-376, p. 355. 
4 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Reflection Group Report. General Secretariat of the 
Council of the European Union, Brussels, December 1995. 
s Portuguese Presidency Rcport, SN/1080/1/00. Santa Maria Da Fcira European Council 
Conclusions, Nr 200/l/00. J. Woutcrs, `Institutional and constitutional challenges for the EU- 
some reflections in the light of the treaty of Nice', (2001) 26 ELR 342-356, pp. 344-5. 
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Eventually, official acknowledgement of the significance of an active citizenry in 
endorsing the policy choices made at Union level marked a direct link between 
democratic legitimacy and institutional reforms. Events like the low turn-out in 
European Parliament (EP) elections and the rejection of the Treaty of Nice in the 
first Irish referendum led to the relaunching of the debate on the future of the EU 
with a view to bringing the Union closer to its citizens via the consolidation and 
strengthening of democratic legitimacy. ' The 2000 Nice European Council in its 
Declaration 23 recognised the need to improve and monitor the democratic 
legitimacy and transparency of the Union and its institutions in order to bring 
them closer to the citizens of the Member States. The signatories of the Laeken 
Declaration, annexed to the Conclusions of the European Council, aware of the 
close link between the legitimacy of the European project and the democratic 
guarantees to its exercise, invited the Convention to reflect on different ways to 
increase the democratic legitimacy of the Union. 7 In this context, a review of the 
EU decision-making process and the way the institutions function was 
considered necessary to overcome the increasing citizen alienation. 
Although the Union has always been a contested political entity, it is largely 
since Maastricht that the debate on the EU has been in terms of a `crisis' of 
legitimacy exacerbated by the public opposition reflected in the results of the 
Maastricht referenda. The Treaty of Maastricht and the difficulties experienced in 
subsequent referenda raised fundamental questions about the ultimate goals and 
methods of European integration, while the crisis of the Santer Commission -in 
1999 - created unease over the propriety of the institutional mechanisms 
employed to govern it. 8 To Paul Craig, integration and democratic legitimacy are 
related. The latter only becomes relevant according to the nature of EU 
integration. Indeed, as long as there was technocratic, intergovernmental 
6 Cardiff European Council Conclusions of 15-16 June 1998, Nr. 00150/1/98 REVI. EP 
Resolution B4-0966 on preparations for the meeting of the heads of state and government on the 
EU's political future to be held in October 1998, OJ 041/128,09.11.1998. 
7 Nice European Council Conclusions, Nr. SN400/1/00,08.12.2000. Lackcn Declaration-Annex 
1, Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting in Lackcn, 14 and 15 December 2001, SN 
300/1/01 REV 1. KLcnacrts and D. Gcrard, `Tlhe structure of the Union according to the 
Constitution for Europe: the emperor is getting dressed', (2004) 29 ELR 289-322, p. 318. 8 G. dcBurca, op. cit. n. 3, pp. 349-50. A. Folicsdal, `Legitimacy Theories of the European Union', 
ARENA WPO4/15. R. Bcllamy and D. Castiglionc, 'Normative Thcory and the EU: Legitimising 
the Euro-Polity and its Regime, in AJIer National Democracy, L. Tragardh (cd), Bart Publishing, 
2004, p. 9. J. Woutcrs, op. cit. n. 5. 
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cooperation based largely on economic apolitical objectives with peace, stability 
and welfare as overall benefits to citizens, the integration process derived its 
indirect legitimation from the democratic character of the Member States, 
diminishing the importance of democratic institutions at EU level. 9 For many 
decades, this elitist project failed to raise basic questions about its democratic 
and legitimate underpinnings. As long as people did not perceive themselves as 
being directly affected by European decisions, they were willing to uncritically 
accept, although not necessarily embrace, EU policies. Hence, European 
governments had long pursued integration assuming that the public gave them a 
`permissive consensus' toward deeper cooperation. 1° But this state-centric 
approach was challenged by the new EU regime of multilevel governance 
created at Maastricht by the Treaty on European Union (TEU), where the EU 
institutions gained independent influence in policy-making far from their 
previous role as agents of state executives. The popular and legal reception of the 
Maastricht Treaty challenged the assumption that policy makers could assume 
the `permissive consensus' of the public. " 
Just what kind of political and legal order is emerging from the process of 
integration? The distinctive nature of decision-making, particularly within the 
first Union pillar, indicates that the EU is perceived as something more than a 
traditional international organisation. As Brigid Laffan observes, scholars of 
integration have always been confronted and challenged by the `betweenness' of 
the EU, `as it hovers between politics and diplomacy, between government and 
governance while it is characterised by a considerable ambiguity '. 12 But if the 
Union is not a typical international organisation, then what exactly is it? 
Existential questions about its nature have failed to produce a single definition. 
To set the conceptual framework of the current analysis, the EU is seen as a 
supranational entity. It is not easy to determine with certainty what 
P. Craig, `The Nature of Community: Integration, Democratic and Legitimate', in Evolution of 
EULaw, P. Craig and G. dc Burga (cds), OUP, 1999, pp. 2,11 and 17. K. Lcnacrts and M. Dcsomcr, 
`New Models of Constitution-Making in Europe: The Quest for Legitimacy', (2002) 39 CMLR 
1217-1253, p. 1223. G. Majonc, op. cit. n. 2. 10 D. Obradovic, `Policy Legitimacy and the EU', (1996) 34 JCMS 191-221, p. 192. A. Follcsdal, 
op. cit. n. 8. 
P. Craig, op. cit. n. 9. CkLord, op. cit. n. 2. 12 B. Laffan, "The EU: a distinctive model of internationalization', (1998) 5 JEPP 235-253, pp. 236 
and 24 1. 
12 
supranationality is, a notion, arguably, as elusive as the EU polity itself . 
13 It 
could be defined as an arena of policy-making with autonomous institutions that 
adopt binding decisions whose enforcement is not dependent on the peculiarities 
of the constitutional orders of the Member States (monist and dualist systems). 
The Union is also a polycentric polity possessing a multilevel policy `regime'. 
EU integration could, therefore, be seen as a polity creating process in which 
authority and decision-making are shared across multiple levels of government - 
subnational, national and supranational. '4 While national governments are 
formidable participants in EU policy-making, control has slipped away from 
them to supranational institutions, so national institutions have lost some of their 
former authoritative control over individuals and their respective territories. In 
short, the locus of political control has changed. Such limitation of sovereignty or 
transfer of powers from the Member States to the Community was said to be 
`within limited fields'. 's Still, individual state sovereignty is diluted by collective 
decision making among national parliaments and the autonomous role of the EP, 
the Council, the Commission and the Court of Justice. f ' We have a redefinition 
of political boundaries in Europe, or the `Europeanisation' of decision-making, 
where the European and not the national political system becomes the unit of the 
policy process. The Union is not just a policy generating process, but a polity, a 
form of direct governance in its own right. Hence, the Union deals with issues 
and policies at the heart of government, " it is a well-developed legal system with 
its own legislature, a comprehensive set of rules on how legislation is to be made 
and judicial bodies with exclusive jurisdiction to interpret Community law. 
13 The term 'supranational' was used in the original ECSC Treaty. Article 9(5) provided. inter 
alia, that the members of the High Authority `shall refrain from any action incompatible with the 
supranational character of their functions'. It was later repealed by the 1965 Merger Treaty. Such 
obscure an expression was said to have been used to avoid controversial expressions, like 
`federal'. H. Schermers and N. Blokker, International Institutional Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2001, p. 41. 
14 RBcllamy and D. Castiglione, op. cit. n. 8, p. 10. 15 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der I3elastingen [ 19631 ECR 1. 
Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964j ECR 585. However, tlx ECJ referred to the limitation of 
sovereign rights `in ever wider fields': Opinion 1/91 Draft agreement between the Community, on 
the one hand and the countries of EFTA, on the other, relating to the creation of the EE 4,1199 11 
ECR 1-6079, para. 21. 
16 G. Marks, L. Ilooghc and K. Blank, 'European Integration from the 1980s: State Centric v. 
Multi-level Governance', (1996) 34 ]CMS 341-378, pp. 342-3. 
17 D. Obradovic, op. cit. it 10, pp. 207-8. 
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With the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, European integration 
has amassed an ever-widening range of policy competence18 and expanded 
dramatically both in scope and into new policy areas to embrace every aspect of 
the economic, political and social life of the Member States, followed by the 
extension of qualified majority voting. Quite apart from the traditional treaty 
amendments, legislative powers have been further increased by court judgments, 
like, for instance, by creating the doctrine of implied powers which has rendered 
it increasingly difficult to delineate competences between the EU and the 
Member States. 19 Moreover, the Treaties have unique constitutional attributes 
akin to the supranational nature of the Union. These include the preemption of 
national by supranational competence in a wide range of areas, the supremacy of 
EC law over national law and the bestowing onto all legal and natural persons 
rights which can be enforced by the ECJ and national courts. 20 As a result, the 
legislative process at EU level creates a system of legal acts adopted usually by 
qualified majority voting, which is externally imposed on Member States by 
institutions that are distant from their citizens, whereas the ever-expanding policy 
fields at EU level require a continuous process of institutional reform to cope 
with such expansion. 
2.2.1 The constitutional transformation of the `new' legal order 
The scope of the Union's normative authority has increased steadily since its 
inception in the 1950s through a piecemeal, but continuous, process of treaty 
reform and the expansive interpretation of Community competences by the ECJ. 
By describing the Union as something more than a mere international 
organisation, a constitutional polity in its own right, a self legitimating, 
18 Ibid, p. 192. 
19 Doctrine of 'parallelism' or ERTA doctrine which assorts that the competence of the 
Community to cntcr into international agreements should run in `parallci' with the dcvclopmcnt 
of its internal competence: Casc 22/70 Commission v Council [1971J ECR 263. 
20 M. L. Fcrnandcz-Estcban, The Rule of Law in the European Constitution, Kluwcr Law 
Intcrnational, 1999, pp. 12-13. 
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autonomous level of governance, the ECJ effectively defined the 
constitutionalisation of the EU? ' It declared early in the integration process that 
the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law `for the benefit 
of which the states have limited their sovereign rights'. 22 By contrast will, - 
emphasis added - ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty created the 
Community which is an autonomous legal system, emancipated from 
international law, with its own institutions and powers to produce law, that is 
said to be directly applicable and supreme over national law and which bestows 
rights and imposes obligation on both the Member States and their citizens. 
Crucial to the `transformation argument' is not just the express reference to its 
constitutional character by the Court, but mostly the latter's dialectics beginning 
with the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect and proceeding to the 
interpretation afforded to article 234 (ex 177) EC. The doctrine of supremacy 
lays down the rule that in any conflict between a directly effective EC legal norm 
and a norm of national law, the EC norm must be given primacy. The doctrine of 
direct effect holds that a provision of EC law can confer on individuals rights that 
public authorities must respect and which must be protected by national courts. 23 
During this period, the Court declared that treaty provisions24 and directives25 
21 By 'constitutionalisation' is meant the process by which the treaties evolved from a set of legal 
arrangements binding upon sovereign states into a vertically integrated legal regime conferring 
judicially enforceable rights and obligations on all legal persons, and entities, public and private 
within EC territory. Put differently, it is the process by which the sources of EU law - the 
treaties, secondary legislation, and the jurisprudence of the ECJ - have penetrated into national 
legal systems. A. Stonc-Swcet, `Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community', in The 
European Courts and National Courts-Doctrine and Jurisprudence, A. M. Slaughter et. al. (cds), 
Hart Publishing, 1998, p. 306. RIIcllamy and D. Castiglionc, op. cit. n. 8, p. 29. F. R. Liorcntc, 
`Constitutionalism in the "Integrated" States of Europe', JMWP 5/98. P. Lindscth, 'Democratic 
Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the EC', 
(1999) 99 Columbia Law Review: 628-738, pp. 635-6. 
22 Case 26/62, op. cit. n. 15. Case 6/64, op. cit. n. 15. Opinion 1/91, op. cit. n. 15. The Court has been 
criticised for rephrasing ordinary principles of international law due to its inadequate idea on the 
latter. Van Gend was not merely about the Court's idea of the Community legal order. It was also 
about the Court's idea of international law. Direct effect made the Community legal order 'new' 
because, in the Court's view, international law did not have direct effect. Yet, direct effect has 
always been a principle found in international law and therefore does not render the EC unique 
and separate from international law. O. Spicrmann, `The Other Side of the Story: An Unpopular 
Essay on the Making of the European Community Order', (1999) 10 EJIL 763-791, p. 766- 
23 A. Stone-Sweet, op. cit. n. 21. 24 Case 26/62, op. cit. n. 15. Case 6/64, op. cit. n. 15. Case 70/77 Simmenthal v Amministrazione 
delle Finanze dello Slato 119781 ECR 1453. In the TcCE the primacy of EU law is 
constitutionaliscd and reflects existing case law of the Court of Justice and the Court of First 
Instance: Declaration on Article 1-6. 23 Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974) ECR 1337. 
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were directly effective and underlined the direct effect of regulations. 26 In 
1983,27 the doctrine of indirect effect was established followed, in 1990, by the 
doctrine of governmental liability. 28 In Les Verts, 29 it emphasised that the 
Community is based on the `rule of law' and, therefore, the Member States and 
the EC institutions may not avoid (judicial) review to determine whether the 
measures adopted by them are in conformity with the `constitutional charter', the 
Treaty. Therefore, the Union is portrayed as a constitutional order with the `rule 
of law' as a basic constitutional guarantee. 
Although the EU's legitimacy rests on successive amendments of the founding 
treaties and their subsequent ratification by the Member States in accordance 
with their constitutional requirements, the troubling aspect of the 
constitutionalisation process of the EU by the Court is the absence of a 
democratic relationship with the peoples of the various Member States. The 
transformation of the European legal system was orchestrated by the ECJ 
through bold legal interpretation by asserting the direct effect and supremacy of 
European law over national law. The critical change involved the `special' and 
`original' nature of the Treaty of Rome which created a new legal order. 
30 The 
ECJ attempted to circumvent the absence of democratic legitimacy in the EC 
through the rhetoric of its constitutional character `based on the rule of law', in 
which the Court itself served as the ultimate legitimating mechanism, rather than 
on democratic control. 31 In effect, the Court asserted that institutional legitimacy 
results primarily from forms of legal rather than democratic control. This alleged 
26 Case 39/72 Commission vItaly 119731 ECR 161. 
21 Case 14/83 Von Colson [ 19841 ECR 1891. 
23 Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy [19911 ECR 1-5357. 
29 Case 294/83 Les Verts v. European Parliament [19861 ECR 1339, para. 23. J. C. Piris, `Does the 
EU have a Constitution? Does it Need One? ', JMWP 5/00. 
30 K. Altcr, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law, OUP, 2001, pp. 1-2 and 208. 31 Opinion 1/91, op. cit. n. 15. A. Verhocven, The EU in Search of Democratic and Constitutional 
Theory, Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp. 63-4. To RBcllamy and D. Castiglione, the Court 
wished to make itself the guarantor of external polity and regime legitimacy of EC law, taking for 
granted that the EC possessed internal legitimacy as a distinct sphere (legal order) with a 
determinate aim to secure internal market operation: RBcllamy and D. Castiglionc, op. cit. n. 8, 
pp-26-7. The level of constitutionalisation can only be measured by how national courts have 
actually received this jurisprudence. However, the confrontation of the ECJ by national courts is 
outside the main scope of the present thesis, which seeks to present the bottom line, that is, 
constitutionalisation has taken place mainly due to the ECJ's interpretation of the treaties. 
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self-professed constitutional nature of the EU gave rise to intense debate32 on the 
nature and the democratic legitimacy of the polity. 
Regardless of the academic controversy on whether the Union has transformed 
from an international into a constitutional legal order situated outside the system 
of international law altogether, the EU has evolved into something different to a 
mere subsystem of international law. It is often accepted as being sui generis and 
the transformation of the European legal system created a structural change in the 
way the legal (and political) process works in Europe. 33 In assessing its 
uniqueness, certain attributes seem to stand out: its institutional set-up ensures 
that action by the EU is reflected in or influenced by Union interests, as laid 
down in its treaty objectives; all Member States are bound to accept the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to resolve disputes relating to Community 
law; Community legislation is directly enforceable in national courts. The twin 
pillar of the Union's sovereignty as established by the Court - direct effect and 
supremacy- has rendered Community law part of the national legal structure to 
be applicable and enforceable as the internal law of the Member States. As Judge 
Federico Mancini34 wrote: `But if the European Community still exists in 50 or 
100 years from now, historians will look back on Van Gerd as the unique 
judicial contribution to the making of Europe'. 
s= A comprehensive analysis of whether the Community legal order constitutes a subsystem of 
international law or whether it is entirely separate from public international law is again outside 
the main scope of the current work. See among many contributions on this subject, D. Wyatt, 
'New Legal Order, or Old? ', (1982) 7 EU 147-166. B. dcWittc, 'Rules of Change in International 
Law: How Special is the European Community? ', (1994) 25 NYIL 299-334. T. Hartlcy, 
Constitutional Problems of the EU, }fart Publishing, 2000, chapter 7. J. N. N. Weiler, 'European 
Constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional Order', in 
Constitutionalism in Transformation, R. Bellamy and D. Castiglionc (cds), Blackwell Publishers, 
1996, p. 105. T. Hartley, 'National Law, International Law and EU Law - How do they relate? ', 
in Asserting Jurisdiction. International and European Legal Perspectives, P. Capps, M. Evans and 
St. Konstadinidis (cds), Hart Publishing, 2003. J. H. H. Weiler and U. R. Naltcrn, 'Constitutional or 
International? The Foundations of the Community Legal Order and the Question of Judicial 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz', in The European Courts and National Courts - Doctrine and Jurisprudence. op. cit. n. 21. A. Weale, `Democratic Legitimacy and the Constitution of Europe', 
in Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the EU, RBcllamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione, 
Lothian Foundation Press, 1995. 
u K. Altcr, op. cit. n. 30, pp. 208 and 210. 34 F. Mancini and D. Kccling, `Democracy and the European Court of Justice', (1994) 57 MLR 
175-190, p. 183. O. Spicrmann, op. cit. n. 22, p. 766. 
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A real concern in the whole transformation debate seems to be the lack of a 
constitutional theory to sustain the Union's alleged constitutional existence, an 
element which is also reflected in the lack of academic consensus as to the EU's 
nature as a juridico-political system or organisational structure . 
3-5 This is 
exacerbated by the lack of legal personality. Treaty renegotiations have failed to 
explicitly endow the Union with fully-fledged legal personality. The reluctance 
to resolve the issue of the EU's legal personality indicates that the Member 
States are unwilling to furnish the former with independent legal capacities. 
Since the Member States' intention as to what to make of the EU polity is 
inconclusive, it is difficult to locate EU law and its legal set up in the 
international legal order as well as define the boundaries between itself and other 
legal orders. In this context, the debate of the democratic legitimacy of the EU 
legislative process becomes relevant. If the EC has long been recognised as a 
subject of international law, an ambiguity remains as to the EU's legal capacity. 36 
The Convention Working Group on Legal Personality considered that `all too 
often' the current ambivalent situation leads to confusion regarding the European 
system, `both in relations with states which are not members of the Union and 
among Europeans themselves'. 7 This resulted to the eventual endowment of the 
Union with legal personality in the new Constitutional Treaty (Article 1-7). 
Ultimately, what seems to lurk behind the `constitutional transformation' debate 
is not so much about whether the EU legal order is independent from the 
international or national legal orders, but rather the other way round; the extent to 
which the national legal orders can be independent from the Union. And the 
reluctance to settle the debate is the reluctance to surrender to the transfer of 
" A. Vcrhocvcn, op. cit. n. 31, p. 71. 
36 While the European Community (EC) constitutes a legal order that is self-sufficient in relation 
to the legal orders of the Member States, the EU falls short of the EC in the aspects of autonomy, 
direct applicability and primacy of EC law. However, there is no express statement in the Treaties 
to the effect that the EU is an independent legal order. However, the perception of the Union as a 
distinct entity could be supported by Article 6(3) TEU: 'it shall respect the national identities of 
its Member States'. KLcnaerts and D. Gcrard, op. cit n. 7, p. 308. 
" CONV 305/02, Final report of Working Group III on Legal Personality, 01.10.2002. The WG 
argued that a legal personality for the Union is justified for reasons of legal certainty, 
transparency and the building of a higher profile for the Union `not only in relation to third states, 
but also vis-ä-vis European citizens'. While increasing the input and output legitimacy, it brings 
the EU in conformity with a constitutional regime able to exercise rights and undertake 
obligations with regard to its own constituents `in conformity with its own constitutional 
arrangements'. 
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sovereign powers at supranational level, beyond the Member States and their 
citizens" permissive consensus'. The fact that the EU may have become a 
constitutional order does not necessarily settle the supremacy debate in its 
favour. The `constitutional' features of this `new' legal order described above 
provide no conclusive answer as to the distribution of powers between 
component parts of the constitutional order. 
2.3 The Union's leg legitimacy based on the `nile of law' principle 
A consequence of the processes of European integration and constitutionalisation 
is a polity with a legal order that consists of institutions with rule-making 
discretion in certain, nonetheless, ever-expanding policy areas, as well as 
procedures for determining and penalising infringements. Seemingly, there is no 
higher law-making power which the EU is subject to, and whose authority can 
validate and guarantee its own rules of power. In the event, the very essence of 
the Union's sovereignty is the fact that it is self-validating, in a legal sense, 
representing at once `a condition of power and of vulnerability'. Of power, 
because the EU is, arguably, independent of any higher authority in the legal 
control over its own policy domains. Of vulnerability, because there is no 
superior legal authority to which it can appeal to confirm its own legitimacy and 
to enforce its own rules in face of internal resistance either from national 
judiciaries or the citizens of the Member States. 8 What then determines the 
political and legal boundaries of the order? 
Undoubtedly, the statement that there is no higher authority should be qualified 
since the EU was founded under international law regarding the establishment 
and observance of the treaties; it is an international organisation set up pursuant 
38 D. Bectham, The Legitimation of Power, Macmillan, 1991, pp. 121-122. 
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to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties. 39 Therefore, the 
Union is an entity of international law and its institutions, as international 
institutions, have secured indirect legitimacy through the approval of the 
legitimate government of the Member States. Then, again, the upshot of the 
Union's transformation argument, established by the Court as examined in the 
previous section, is that the European treaties no longer depend for their 
validation on international law. 
Going back to the original argument, if there is no higher rule-making authority, 
what makes the Union's legislative authority rightful or legitimate? The Union, 
its objectives and policies are said to be founded on the `rule of law'. 40 But what 
is the `rule of law' and how is it relevant to the legitimacy debate? This is an 
essentially contested concept, 41 very much embedded in perceptions of different 
legal systems and different moments in history. It relates to the mechanics of the 
system rather than the content of the rules it produces and forms part of the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States. Since the Union is said to be an 
independent legal order, national interpretations of the principle may not be 
automatically transplanted into EU law. 42 It could be possible to offer a 
minimum definition of the concept as the belief that those who exercise influence 
over the creation of law are themselves subject to it and have to conform to 
s' Articles 26 and 27 of the VCLT 1969. However the Court of Justice has said that the Vienna 
Convention has no binding force in the Community and that the use of the international legal 
framework to challenge the validity of a Community act was unwarranted: Case C-162/96 Racke 
v ! lauptzollamt Alainz [ 1998] ECR 1 -3655, paras. 59-60,67,71,73-4,89-90,39 and 41 of the 
judgment. 
40 Article 177(2) TEC, Preamble, Articles 11 (1) and 6 (1) TEU. In the TcCE, the Preamble, 
Articles 1-2 and I11-292(1). 
41 J. Goldswort y, 'Legislative Sovereignty and the Rule of Law', in Sceptical Essays on Human 
Rights, T. Campbcll, K. D. Ewing and A. Tomkins (cds), OUP, 2001. N. W. ©arbcr, 'Must Legalistic 
Conceptions of the Rule of Law Have a Social Dimension? ', (2004) 17 Ratio Juris 474-488, 
p. 474. For an analysis on legalistic and non-legalistic, formal and substantive conceptions of the 
'rule of law', see: T. R. S. Alkzn Constitutional Justice, OUP, 2001; A. Marmor, `The Rule of Law 
and its Limits', (2004) 23 Law and Philosophy 1.43; P. Craig, 'Constitutional foundations, the 
rule of law and supremacy', (2003) PL 92-111; P. Craig, `Formal and substantive conceptions of 
the rule of law: an analytical framework', (1997) PL 467-487; M. Ncumann, The Rule of Law. 
Ashgatc, 2002. To Yasuo Hascbc, the `rule of law', a controversial concept, is the ideal state of a 
legal system under which people arc able to lead their lives with sufficient knowledge of when 
and how their government can exercise its coercive powers: Y. Ilascbc, 'The Rule of Law and Its 
Predicament', (2004) 17 Ratio Juris 489-500, p. 489. 
42 The English Rule of Law, the French Regne de la Loi and the German Rechtsstaat arc said to 
represent the three main European traditions regarding the 'rule of law' principle. Generally 
speaking, these concepts refer to a set of conditions underpinning democracy, including 
separation of powers, principles of legality and adjudication, formal equality and constitutional 
rights: M. L. Fcrnandcz-Estcban, op. cit. n. 20, Part II, Chapter 3. 
20 
procedures, if they wish to change it. The powers of the institutions to legislate 
need to have a normative force in defining duties, obligations and in conferring 
rights and entitlements. Legislative power can be legitimate to the extent that its 
acquisition and exercise conform to established law and is limited by it. 43 So, a 
substantive condition of legitimacy is legality. 44 
As Michael Newman rightly observes, a broad and politically charged concept 
like the `rule of law' is not defined for the sake of lexicographic or semantic 
purposes, but according to an agenda, to the morality it wants to purport . 
45 The 
`agenda' of the present work is to explore the limits of the EU legal order, as law 
is unequivocally central to the development of the EU. The traditional legal 
reading of EU legitimacy identifies legitimacy in terms of `legal validity'; the 
EU is based on a set of fixed and identifiable rules and principles and judicial 
remedies are available to ensure respect for such rules and principles. 46 
According to Robert Summers' article, `A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law', 47 
`77he ideal of the rule of law consists of the authorised governance of at least 
basic social relations between citizens and between citizens and their 
government as far as feasible through published formal rules congruently 
interpreted and applied with the officialdom itself subject to rules defining the 
manner and limits of their activity, and with sanctions or other redress against 
citizens and officials for departures from rules being imposed only by impartial 
and independent courts'. The institutional system of law-makers, legal process 
and adjudication is the institutional embodiment of the ideal of the rule of law. 
" D. Bcetlkvn, op. cit. n. 38, pp. 56,64 and 68. 
" Legitimacy has a formal, normative dimension that refers to legality, that is, the requirement 
that all authority springs through a chain of formal validity rules intended to promote legal 
legitimacy. A. Vcrhocvcn, op. cit. n. 31, p. 11. R. H. Fallon, 'Tile Rule of Law as a Concept in 
Constitutional Discourse, (1997) 97 Columbia Law Review 1-56, p. 14. L. Scndcn, Soft Law in 
European Community Law, hart Publishing, 2004, p. M. 
45 M. Ncumann, op. cit. n. 41, p. 23. " J. P. McCormick, 'Supranational Challenges to the Rule: The Case of EU', in Recrafling the 
Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order, D. Dyzcnhaus (cd), Hart Publishing, 1999, p. 271. 
S. Smismans, Law, Legitimacy and European Governance-Functional Participation in Social 
Regulation, OUP, 2004, pp. 56-7. S. Smismans, `The Constitutional Labelling of "The democratic 
life of the EU"', in Political Theory and the European Constitution, L. Dobson and A. Follcsdal 
(eds), Routlcdgc, 2004, p. 123. 
47 R. Summcrs, `A Formal Thcory of the Rule of Law', (1993) 6 Ratio Juris 127-142, pp. 129-130. 
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The oldest and the most prominent attempt to justify the European enterprise in 
pursuance of the legitimacy theory is the concept of `a Community governed by 
law' developed by Walter Hallstein. The omission of any reference to the `rule of 
law', which was not mentioned in the original European Community Treaties, 
was not rectified until Maastricht when the term appeared in the Preamble to the 
new TEU and, since then, has come to occupy an important place in the values 
underlying the Union . 
4" The TEU was amended to restrict the right to apply for 
membership of the Union to European states which respect these values (Article 
49 TEU). Moreover, a serious and persistent breach of a `rule of law' by a 
Member State might henceforward lead to suspension of rights. 49 Although 
references to the principle only started to appear recently, it has always been 
implicit in the legal system of the Union. The EU is not merely a creation of law, 
validly constituted by sovereign states according to international treaties, it is an 
entity founded on law that pursues its objectives purely by means of the law. It 
has no other means of enforcing its authority; its weapon is the law it creates. It 
was, therefore, envisaged from the outset that the institutional structure of the 
Community would include a Court of Justice with the express duty to ensure 
observance of the law. Each of the three original treaties equipped the Court with 
far-reaching powers to enable it to discharge that duty. SO Decision-making in the 
Union is governed by rules laid down in advance and, in the case of the EC, 
enforced by an independent judiciary. The treaties are the basis of the 
institutional system; they lay down the procedures for decision-making and 
regulate the relationship between the institutions. Each institution is to act within 
the limits of the powers conferred on it. Like any legal order, that of the Union 
affords a self-contained system of legal protection for the purpose of recourse to 
and enforcement of Community law. 
48 D. Obradovic, op. cit. n. 10, p. 196. A. ArnuU, `The Rule of Law in the EU', in Accountability and 
Legitimacy in the EU, A. Arnull and D. Wincott (cds), OUP, 2002, p. 238. Scc, for instance, the 
duty to promote democracy and the rule of law in CFSP (Article 11(1) TEU) and development 
cooperation (Article 177(2) TEC). 
49 Article 7 TEU. 
80 M. L. Fcrnandcz-Esteban, op. cit. n. 20, p. 175. D. Obradovic, op. cit. n. 10, p. 197. A. Arnull, op. cit. 
n. 48, p. 241. 
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2.3.1 Democracy. La pillar of legitimacy? 
In the previous section, an attempt was made to define the `rule of law' principle, 
concluding that it is not clear what sort of construct it really is. However, one can 
determine what it is not. It is not a form of government. On the other hand, 
democracy is. Before exploring how democratic the Union is as a regime, the 
democratic yardstick needs to be explained. s' Democracy is a system of 
government in which power is based on the will of the people, on the people's 
ability to rule in the sense that they are able to control those who make decisions 
on their behalf. The law, being a human creation, must necessarily be subject to 
human will. Democracy requires that people who live under laws have a 
substantial voice in the generation of rules under which they live. S2 The 
fundamental idea of democratic legitimacy is that political power should be 
based on law and ultimately be the power of the public, i. e. the power of free and 
equal citizens. This is a very abstract statement, but it points to the normative 
core of the democratic ideal: when we speak of democratic legitimacy, the idea is 
that citizens must be able to regard themselves not only as the addresses, but also 
the ultimate authors of the law. Then, people consent to be governed and obey 
rules to the extent that they can consider themselves in one way or another as 
makers of those rules. "3 Consent may be achieved by popular control of the 
political process pursuant to institutionalised rules which ensure that the 
governing and decision-making authority is authorised by the people, in a 
manner that is represenlative of and accountable to the latter. s' The democratic 
legitimacy of the decision-making process presupposes that legislation is adopted 
51 I. Sanchcz-Cucnca, 'Power, Rules and Compliance', in Democracy and the Rule of Law, 
J. M. Maravall and A. Przcwrski (cds), Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 67. A. Pctcrs, 
'European Democracy after the 2003 Convention', (2004) 41 CMLR 37-85, p. 38. 
12 N. Ncuwvahl and S. Whcatly, 'The EU and Democracy - Lawful and Legitimate Intervention in 
the Domestic Affairs of the State', in Accountability and Legitimacy in the EU, op. cit. n. 48, 
pp. 222-3. I. Sanchcz-Cucnca, op. cit. n. 51, p. 62. CKLord, 'Democracy and democratization in the 
EU', in Governing Europe, S. Bromlcy (ed), Sage Publications, 2001, pp. 166-7. II. S. Richardson, 
'Administrative Policy-making: Rule of Law or Bureaucracy? ', in Recrafling the Rule of Law: 
The Limits of Legal Order, op. cit. n. 46, p. 318. G. Rcss, `Democratic Decision-Making in the 
European Union and the Role of the European Parliament', in Institutional Dynamics of 
European Integration, D. Curtin and T. Iicukcls (eds), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, p. 159. m O. Gcrstcnbcrg, 'Denationalization and the Very Idea of Democratic Constitutionalism: The 
Case of the European Community', (2001) 14 Ratio Juris 298-325, pp. 301-2. J. Tully, 'The 
Unfrccdom of the Moderns in Comparison to their Ideals of Constitutional Democracy', (2002) 
65 MLR 204-228, p. 205. 
" Ch. Lord, Democracy in the EU, Sheffield Academic Press, 1998, pp. 15-16. 
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through institutionalised procedures that facilitate citizen participation in 
decision-making. As such, legitimacy is a concept founded on the premise of the 
doctrine of popular sovereignty, that the people may be the only legitimate 
source of power since they represent the `ultimate authority'. " 
Why should democracy be regarded as a source of legitimacy for the EU? Quite 
rightly, Joseph Weiler observes that the extensive literature on Europe's 
democratic shortcomings just takes for granted that Europe should be a 
democracy. m `In principle', writes Juergen Habermas, `the rule of law can exist 
without the concomitant existence of democracy, that is, without the political 
rights empowering the citizens to bring influence to bear on changes of their own 
status'. 57 Indeed, there is no universal legal obligation to introduce democracy. 
There have been periods in history and society, where regimes enjoyed 
legitimacy in the absence of democracy, and it has also been possible for 
democratic structures to be illegitimate either in toto or in certain aspects of their 
operation. m A crucial aspect of the discussion on the legitimacy of the Union's 
legislative process is the recognition that there is more to legal norms than 
procedures. Legality alone is not adequate, because rules cannot justify 
themselves simply by being rules; they require justification by reference to 
considerations beyond themselves. Legitimacy cannot be guaranteed merely by 
rule conformity as no account is taken of the content of such rules and of the 
principles that underpin them. There has to be a deeper normative validating rule 
such as `democracy', an ethic, as norms are not value free. S9 The `rule of law' 
u L. Scndcn, op. cit. n. 44, p. 66. M. Jachtcnfuchs, 'Democracy and Governance in the EU', EIOP 
WP97/02. The universality of the idea today is recognised in the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights that 'the will of people shall be the basis of the authority of the government' (Article 21). 
D. Obradovic, op. cit. n. 10, p. 195. O. Gcrstcnbcrg, op. cit. n. 53, p. 299. 
'J. H. H. Wcilcr, 'Prologue: Amsterdam and the Quest for Constitutional Democracy', in Legal 
Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty, O'Kccffc and Twomey (cds), Hart Publishing, 1999, p. 4-5. 
57 F. Mancini and J. H. H. Wcilcr, 'Europe- The Case for Statehood... and the Case Against. An 
Exchange', (1998) JMWP 6/98. 
5' Regimes enjoyed both formal and substantive legitimacy in the absence of democracy, where, 
for instance, the divine, and not the people, was the source of legitimacy (i. e. monarchy): 
Ch. Lord, op. cit. n. 2, pp. 7-8 and N. Ncuwahl and S. Whcatly, op. cit. n. 52, pp. 222-3. Germany 
during the Weimar period was democratic but the government enjoyed little legitimacy. During 
National Socialism, Germany ceased to be democratic when Hitler rose to power, but the 
government enjoyed widespread legitimacy. J. 11.11. Wcilcr, The Constitution of Europe, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 79-80 and D. Dyzcnhaus, Legality and Legitimacy, OUP, 
1999, pp. 1-32. 
59 F. M. Barnard, Democratic Legitimacy-Plural Values and Political Power, McGill-Qucens's 
University Press, 2001, pp. 9,27-8 and 40. J. Goldsworthy, op. cit. n. 41, pp. 64-5. D. Obradovic, 
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and democracy are inherently connected, perhaps because legality is thought of 
as intimately linked to legitimacy and legitimacy in turn depends on 
democracy. 60 To Habermas, 61 it is only democratic institutions that can sustain a 
culture of justification. To be in favour of democracy is to think that the way to 
decide on the terms of collective life is through citizens engaging in a process of 
justifying to each other what they hold to be right. And to institutionalise a 
process of mutual justification is to adopt democratic institutions. 
Writing in the field of law, scholars like Thomas Franck have argued that there is 
an (emerging) right to democratic governance. Francis Fukuyama has proclaimed 
western liberal democracy as the final form of human government; although he 
did not mean that no other regimes will emerge, to him history had come to an 
end, meaning that mankind had achieved in liberal democracy, on the closing 
decades of the twentieth century, a form of society that satisfies its deepest and 
most fundamental longings. 62 These developments recognise an increasing trend 
to see democracy as a truly universal value and as a condition for the acceptance 
of a regime by the world community. This is also the case in Europe, where both 
states and international organisations have made it clear that democracy is the 
only legitimate form of government '3 Legal instruments, national and 
international, enshrine rights that are designed to ensure political participation. 
Article 21 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights is an example. 
It seems that, at least in the western world, democracy is considered the sole 
legitimate form of government to the extent that any other system would be 
op. cit. n 10, pp. 197-8. J. 11.11. Wcilcr, `Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance', in The 
Politics of European Treaty Reform-The 1996 IGC and Beyond, G. Edwards and AI. Pijpers (cds), 
Pinter, 1997, pp. 249-250. 
60 Richardson refers to legitimate legality as he agrees that that the legitimacy of laws does 
depend on democracy. However, the relation between 'rule of law' and democracy is quite open. 
A narrower traditional interpretation of the `rule of law', he says, may be summed up under three 
headings: rules must be general, they must provide a predictable basis for citizen action and they 
must be generated via a regular and fair process. l1. S. Richardson, op. cit. n. 52, pp. 309 and 315. 61 D. Dyzcnhaus, op. cit. n. 58, p. 244. 
62 Fr. Fukuyama, The End of history and the Last Man, Penguin, 1992. A. Verhocvcn, op. cit n. 3 1, 
pp. 7-8. Ch. Lord and D. Bcctliarn, 'Legitimizing the EU: Is there a "Post-Parliamentary Basis" for 
its Legitimation? ', (2001) 39 JCMS 443-462, p. 447. D. llcld, 'Democracy: From City-states to a 
Cosmopolitan Order? ', in Contemporary Political Philosophy. An Anthology, R. E. Goodin and 
PtLPcttit (eds), Blackwell Publishers, 1997, p. 83. 
' S. Whcatlcy, 'Democracy in international law: a European Perspective', (2002) 51 ICLQ 225- 
248, pp. 234-5. 
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unacceptable and politically illegitimate. A democratic regime has both a social 
aspect in terms of being rooted in popular consent and a normative aspect in 
terms of advocating values like liberty and equality on which consent is based. 
Hence, to some commentators the notions of legitimacy and democratic 
legitimacy are interchangeable, while `formal' legitimacy is not defined solely as 
legality, but as democratic legitimacy. This notion of formal legitimacy is 
distinct from that of simple `legality' and is founded on democratic institutions 
and processes created by law. " Therefore, in today's Europe, as in the West 
generally, any notion of legitimacy must rest on some democratic foundation, 
loosely stated as the people's consent to power structures and processes. In the 
individual Member States, the substance and procedures of legislative processes 
have been democratically structured and legitimated. The Union is no longer an 
organisation that pursues purely economic objectives with institutional 
mechanisms that can disregard the requirement of democracy. Thus, its structure, 
powers and activities require both legality and democracy as constitutive parts of 
its legitimacy. '5 In the EU, any perception of `democracy' will have to take into 
account its relationship with the Member States, although one could not overlook 
the peculiarities of the polity. 
With the `Europeanisation' of decision-making, the Union's decisional 
boundaries have been fundamentally redefined by successive intergovernmental 
reforms and informal adjustments, normally judicial, whilst the formal political 
boundaries of the Member States remain intact. The EU has emerged as a polity, 
as a system of governance in its own right, a regime of multilevel governance in 
which authority and policy-making are shared across multiple levels of 
government (subnational, national, supranational). As decision-making is shared 
across these levels and as the political culture at the national and subnational 
levels is that of (liberal) democracy, then what alternative political options are 
left to the EU? The constitutions of the Member States are all based on 
democratic principles, notwithstanding the fact that there are various conceptions 
" J. 11.11. Wcilcr, 'Why Should Europo be a Democracy? The Corruption of Political Culture and 
the Principle of Constitutional Tolerance', in The Europeanisation of Law: The Legal Ejects of 
European Integration, F. Snydcr (cd), Hart Publishing, 2000, p. 213. G. dcBurca, op. cit. n. 3. 
K. Lcnacrts and M. Dcsomcr, op. cit. n. 9, p. 1220. J. 1I. 11. Wcilcr, 'Thc Transformation of Europe', 
(1991) 100 YLJ 2405-2478, pp. 2468-9. A. Vcrhocvcn, op. cit. n. 31, p. 8. ' J. H. H, Weiler, op. cit. n. 56. 
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of democracy due to the different traditions and history of those states. If the 
Union in its development has moved away from a strictly international 
organisation towards a polity of democratic states, then, democracy -a 
constitutional principle in every Member State - has to be regarded as a general 
principle of EU governance. Democracy might have been irrelevant, if EU 
policy-making had not interfered with the political culture, political and legal 
organisation within the Member States, but this polity-creating process has long 
passed some threshold in the accumulation of power and the direct influence over 
ordinary lives. 
Does the non-stateness of the EU's political system mean that the Union does not 
need to meet the same broad criteria of legitimacy as liberal democratic states or 
that it can be legitimated by a lesser standard or even by different standards than 
a state? One rarely hears the argument that the EU does not need democratic 
legitimacy, although opinions as to how such legitimacy is to be understood and 
attained differ widely. Within the Member States there is a general expectation 
that the EU should meet similar standards to the state as to the kind of choices it 
makes on behalf of citizens and the extent to which it has final rule-making 
authority. " According to the German Federal Constitutional Court in the 
Maaslricht67 judgment, in examining questions relating to the democratic 
decision-making in the EU, the relationship between democracy in the Member 
States and democracy within the EU is crucial for the further development of 
European integration. An indication of the significance of democratic rule in 
Union governance is provided by survey evidence, which suggests that there is 
popular expectation that the EU should be subject to key attributes of democratic 
rule found in national orders, namely, public scrutiny of institutions and 
definition of their powers, public control and participation in decision-making. " 
According to a recent EU poll, 69 while the majority of citizens are satisfied with 
the way democracy works in their country, it is widely felt that the voice of 
citizens is not heard in the EU and there is less satisfaction with how the system 
CiLLord and D. Bcctham, op. cit. n. 62, pp. 443-7. 67 Brunner v European Union Treaty 1199411 CMLR 57. 
Five Democratic Tests for Europe, Chartcr88,2003. 
69 Eurobaromctcr 63, Public Opinion in the European Union, European Commission, Spring 
2005. 
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works in democratic terms. Although the results may differ from Member State 
to Member State, they still are testimony of the fact that citizens expect the EU 
somehow to emulate national political systems. 
From its inception, the Union was not envisaged by its founders to be a 
democratic organisation. This is not surprising, since it began its life as an 
international organisation founded on a treaty between sovereign states and, as 
such, it derived indirect legitimacy from the democratically elected governments 
of the Member States. Hence, there was no need for direct democracy in its 
system of decision-making. The Court's jurisprudence on the special nature of 
the Community legal order came years later and did not represent either the 
intention of the founding fathers or the position of the Member States and their 
citizens. Since Maastricht, democracy is one of the principles upon which the 
Union is founded and its membership is reserved only for democratic states70 
and, although until the TeCE" democracy was not part of the overarching 
guiding principles that affect policy-making, it has always been a fundamental 
factor in policy formulation. 72 Decision-making within the Union is often judged 
in terms of the extent to which it is based on democratic principles and there is 
consensus among the EU institutions that democracies need the participation of 
all their citizens in the institution of representative democracy, if democracy is to 
function properly. 73 The intention to accommodate and consolidate democratic 
structures, as they exist in the Member States, is further manifested in the 
proposals for institutional reform. 74 The importance of democracy in the EU is 
best reflected in the requirement of internal democratic rule as a condition for 
Union membership. So, democracy does matter in Europe to a degree that the 
70 For instance, Articles 6,7 and 49 TEU. In contrast, under Article 237 EC, Community 
membership was reserved to any state, democratic or not. 71 Article 1-2, Title VI on `the democratic life of the Union' TcCE. An analysis will be provided 
in chapter 7. 
n The EU treaties go a step further expressly stipulating that the CFSP and external cooperation 
should aim at developing and consolidating democracy, the `rule of law' and respect for human 
rights (Article 177(2) TEC and Article 11(1) TEU), principles that define the economic and 
political relationship of the EU and its Member States with third countries. Under Article 7 TEU 
Member State rights may be suspended in the event of serious and persistent breaching of the 
principle of democracy. "' Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
of 24 May 2005 meeting within the Council on implementing the common objective: to increase 
participation by young people in the system of representative democracy, [2005J OJC 141/02, 
10.06.2005. 
" A. Vcrhocvcn, op. cit. n. 31, p. 6. 
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Union exposes itself to the democratic yardstick by equating legitimacy with 
democratic governance. 
2.3.2 Democratic deficit as a crisis of le itimacy 
When assessing democracy in the EU, emphasis should be placed both on 
individual institutions and the overall decision-making process. One needs to 
establish how the Union performs against the defining features of democratic 
rule, that is, public control and political equality, but also the key principles by 
which the democratic rule is realised like accountability, openness, 
representation and responsiveness, (electoral) authorisation, rights protection, 
which seek to provide a scale, an `index' of democracy by which to audit the 
quality of democracy. 75 For instance, authorisation especially through 
appointment of decision-makers into public office provides a publicly expressed 
consent for their subsequent policies. Representation and responsiveness entails 
the aligning of public policy with preferences of the public itself; decision- 
makers should be representative of the governed at least in the sense of being 
institutionally constrained to consider the needs and values of the public. 76 
Accountability in the form of political responsibility ensures that the terms on 
which political power is authorised are duly observed. 77 It is also important to the 
democratic content of decision-making that information is available about policy 
and that policy should be open and transparent, since this is likely to increase 
public support in the exercise of power. Democracy issues raise intricate 
questions not only about the exercise of legislative power, but also about the 
's Morison, 'Models of Democracy: From Rcprcscntation to Participation? ', in The Changing 
Constitution, J. Jowell and D. Olivcr (eds), OUP, 2004, pp. 144 and 150. Ch. Lord, A Democratic 
Audit of the European Union, op. cit. n. 2, pp. 7-8. J. H. H. Wcilcr, `Tic Transformation of Europe', 
op. cit. n. 64, p. 2470. K. Lcnacrts, P. van Nuffcl and PLBray (cd), Constitutional Law of the EU, 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2005, pp. 652-653. D. Bcctham and Ch. Lord, Legitimacy and the EU, 
Longman, 1998, p. 6. Cii. Lord, `Democracy and democratization in the EU', op. cit. n. 52, p. 167. 
76 Ch. Lord, `Democracy and democratization in the EU', ibid. Ch. Lord, Democracy in the EU, 
op. cit. n. 54, pp. 17,44 and 80. 
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protection afforded as to the effects of legislative outcomes, pursuant to the `rule 
of law' principle. 
The `new', historically unprecedented, sui generis political entity, the EU, which 
transgresses the classic dualism of states and international organisations has 
brought with it disquiet over the `democratic deficit' of the emerging system of 
shared political (and legal) authority. On the one hand, this system remains based 
on international treaties with its roots still traced in the national orders of the 
Member States. On the other hand, the Treaty on European Union created a new 
entity with a much broader substantive ambit. The substantial accretion of 
authority to supranational institutions beyond the control of the Member States 
represented a quantum leap with which many ordinary people were 
uncomfortable'78 as the increased independence of EU decision-making from 
national parliamentary control has entailed the transfer of normative authority to 
actors that are not directly accountable to an electorate. 79 The problem is not 
merely the establishment of an additional layer of policy making, which is distant 
from the people, but the very transformation of the Member States, which may 
no longer claim to be the sole source of their own legitimacy. The borders of the 
democratic (Member) State no longer embrace the whole spectrum of individual 
activity and it is becoming increasingly difficult to relate the polities in which 
one participates and the polities that affect us 80 In essence, the shift of power 
from national to EU level was not followed by an EU-bound popular consent 
which in turn created a `disconnection', a `disconnection between institutions 
and voters', in other words, a `democratic deficit'. 8' Accordingly, since the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, citizen commitment to the European 
project has been far from unequivocal. 
73 O. Gcrstcnbcrg, op. cit. n53, pp. 300-1. A. Arnull, op. cit. n. 48, p. 7. 
P. Lindscth, op. cit. n. 21, p. 633. 
so E. Erikscn and J. Fossum, 'Democracy through strong republics in the EU? ', ARENA WP 
01/16. M. P. Maduro, 'Europe and the Constitution: What if this is As Good As it Gets? ', 
CONWEB 5/2000. 
St N. CIcgg MEP, 'Restoring Legitimacy: Parliaments and the EU', in European Governance. 
t iews from the UK on Democracy, Participation and Policy-making in the EU, U. Rucb (ed), TIM 
Federal Trust, 2002, p. 31. A. Muntcan, 'The European Parliament's Political Legitimacy and the 
Commission's "Misleading Management": Towards a "Parliamentarian" European Union? ', EIoP 
4/2000. 
30 
The degree of public unease became clear during the exceptionally difficult 
ratification process which the Treaty underwent, 82 and it was the subject of legal 
challenge in the national courts of the United Kingdom, " Germany84 and 
Denmark, ss that arose out of constitutional complaints against ratifying 
Maastricht, by individuals reacting to the transfer of sovereignty and its impact 
on issues like representation and authorisation (voting) at national level. Both 
instances manifest widespread public misgivings about the nature of the Union 
and an unwillingness to entrust the continued governance of Europe to distant, 
bureaucratic elites. This brought democratic deficit into the public domain and 
generated widespread academic and political debate, especially with regard to the 
classical thesis of the limited influence of the European Parliament in the EU 
decision-making. " The thrust of the debate is not that the EU is undemocratic, 
but that it is not sufficiently democratic as, due to its complex working structure 
and the manner in which power is distributed horizontally and vertically across 
the levels of governance and across particular institutions, the EU is far-removed 
from its citizens. 
Although it has no fixed meaning, the idea behind the notion of `democratic 
deficit' is that decisions in the EU are in some ways insufficiently representative 
of and accountable to the people. 87Once the debate had moved away from the 
main preoccupation with the role of the EP, a number of other issues became 
relevant. So, what are the perceived shortcomings of the Union's institutional 
structure? First and foremost, the distance between the place where decisions are 
taken and the place where decisions affect us. In a multilevel decision-making 
structure, it becomes increasingly difficult to track, contest or influence particular 
decisions. The transnationalisation of political (and legal) authority brings into 
decision-making actors external to national political contexts who are said to 
affect (and are affected by) national decisions and overall diminish the 
82 It was rejected by the Danish in a referendum less than six months aflcr it was signed and later 
secured only a narrow majority in a rcfcrcndwn held in France. The Danish people were 
Vrsuadcd to vote in favour of the Treaty in a second referendum in May 1993. 
Rv Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex pane Lord Rees -A1099 
I199313 CMLR 101. 
4 Brunner, op. cit. n. 67. 
as Carlsen and Others v Prime Minister Rasmussen [ 1999] 3 CMLR 854. 86 A. Vcrhocvcn, op. cit. n. 3 1, p. 69. 87 Ch. Lord, `Democracy and democratization in the EU', op. cit. n. 52, p. 165. 
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meaningful and equal opportunity of individuals to influence policy outcomes 
within their national orders. 88 Another complaint is the bypassing of democratic 
channels as decisions take place outside the formal institutional framework or 
through the operation of complex procedures established pursuant to the 
delegation of power to the Commission. In this context, technocrats and national 
interest groups dominate the sphere of decision-making to the exclusion of more 
regular channels of democratic decision-making such as the EP, the Council and 
national parliaments. Then, there are issues of transparency as much of decision- 
making takes place behind closed doors, while the plethora of procedures and 
their inherent complexity are further exacerbated by the different voting rules in 
the Councils' Last but not least, the absence of a European `demos' means that 
democratic deficit is structurally determined. 90 
While it is largely the view that the EU suffers from `democratic deficit', others 
argue that such deficit is conjured. Philippe Schmitter challenges the veracity of 
the claim due to the general tendency among academics and actors to presume an 
isomorphism between the EU and national polities. This attitude implies that the 
only way to fill that deficit is to insert `conventional democratic institutions' into 
88 N. Walkcr, `Europe's Constitutional engagement', (2005) 18 Ratio Juris 387-399, pp. 391-2. 
89 P . Craig, op. cit. n. 9, p. 23. 90 According to a school of thought, constitutional consensus can never be achieved because 
Europe lacks a demos, a European `constituent subject', a people that is the basis of the polity. 
Traditional state-oriented constitutional theory considers, in a nutshell, that the legitimacy of a 
constitutional text requires a prc-cxisting sovereign (state) entity based on a pre-cxisting social 
substrate and, thus, it is improper to give the TcCE 'the appellation of a constitution'. The 
objection to the claim that the treaties have matured into a European Constitution is summarised 
by J. Habcrmas; so long as there is not a European people sufficiently 'homogeneous' to form a 
democratic will, there should not be a constitution. This view does not deny that treaties, coupled 
with the Court's jurisprudence, meet many of the criteria of modern constitutionalism. What is 
inherent in a constitution is the people's capacity to attribute power to themselves, and a 
constitution is an act taken by or at least attributed to people. The absence of a collective 
European identity means that there is no justification for grounding any European Constitution in 
the people. Without the will of a European demos there can be no democracy and without 
democracy a legal and political order lacks the necessary underpinnings that justify its 
constitutional nature; only a demos can `constitute' or `create' a constitutional order. J. ilabermas, 
'Remarks on Dieter Grimm's "Does Europe Need a Constitution? "', (1995) 1ELJ 303, p. 304. 
D. Grimm, `Does Europe Need a Constitution? ', (1995) 1 ELJ 282, pp. 290-1 and 298-9. For a 
detailed analysis on the 'no-demos' thesis, see : J. N. H. Wcilcr, `Legitimacy and Democracy of 
Union Governance', in The Politics of European Treaty Reform, G. Edwards and A. Pijpcrs (cds), 
Pinter, 1997. P. Craig, op. cit. n. 9, p. 28. D. Bcctham and Ch. Lord, op. cit. n. 75, pp. 6 and 8. P. Craig, 
'Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the EU', (2001) 7 ELJ 125-150, p. 137. J. N. H. Wcilcr, `The 
State "Ucbcr alles" Demos, Tclos and the German Maastricht Decision', JMWP 6/96. The no- 
demos thesis is beyond the remit of the current work, as it is pertinent to the issue of 'polity' 
legitimacy. 
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the way the EU makes binding decisions. 91 His central contention along with 
Andrew Moravcsik and Yves Meny is that, if one adopts reasonable criteria for 
judging democratic governance, the widespread criticism is unsupported by the 
existing empirical evidence. In reality, they say, the EU is a sophisticated 
institutional system of checks and balances based on the carefully balanced 
triangle of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament underpinned by the 
ECJ and there are other procedural constraints, like the indirect democratic 
control via national governments to ensure that the EU is politically responsive to 
the demands of EU citizens. '2 What the commentators argue is that the 
constitutional or procedural features of democracy are met, but what about the 
popular or participatory aspects of democracy? 
Surely, it is difficult to apply state-centred notions of democracy to the EU due to 
its special nature. Besides, the democratic performance of the EU varies across 
institutions and levels of Union governance but the opportunities for democratic 
control depend crucially on how the Member States interact within the European 
arena. For instance, it is up to the Member States to decide the procedure for 
treaty ratification, how scrutiny and powers are exercised by national parliaments 
as well as the conduct of national representatives in the Council. Still, the 
question is not whether Member States can control EU institutions but whether 
citizens can control the EU institutions as well as their national governments who 
combine to exercise EU powers. As Christopher Lord rightly observes, 93 it is 
harder to give an answer to this question because of the poor citizen 
understanding of the EU system due to `transparency blindspots' in the workings 
of Union institutions and legislative process, the uneven development of the 
power of the national parliaments on EU issues and voter alignment in EP 
elections. If the popular and participatory ingredients of democracy are 
underdeveloped, he continues, should we be reassured by the claim that the EU is 
constitutionally a sophisticated system of checks and balances? Popular and 
constitutional elements of democracy are interdependent to the point at which it 
91 Ph. C. Sclunittcr, 'What is thcrc to Legitimize in the EU... and how might this be 
Accomplished? ', JM WP14/01. 
' A. Moravcsik, `In Dcfcncc of the "Democratic Deficit": Reassessing Legitimacy in the EU', 
(2002) 40 JCMS 603.624, p. 604. Y. Mcny, `De !a democratie en Europe: Old Concepts and New 
Challenges', (2002) 41 JCMS 1-13, p. 6. 
93 Ch. Lord, op. cit. n. 2, pp. 223-5. 
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is questionable whether it is meaningful to speak of one being present without 
the other. Checks and balances on their own only deliver controlled government 
not publicly controlled government. 
2.3.3 Institutional balance and democratic legitimacy timacy in the cliangin 
constitutional arrangements 
The pre-Maastricht comment of Bogdanor and Woodstock that the shortcomings 
of the Community lie in the feelings of remoteness and lack of influence and 
involvement on the part of many of its citizens still seems to hold true. '' The 
debate on the lack of democratic input narrows down to the institutional setting 
of the Union, so the linchpin of this approach is to define democracy as an 
`institutional arrangement', where the focus is on government structures and their 
interrelationship. This is an idea of democracy based on the way powers are 
allocated to allow for the participation of democratic institutions that `strive to 
motivate law-making in the public interest and render it accountable to citizens' 95 
and on a decision-making process that subscribes to popular involvement and 
scrutiny. 
In this context, the notion of `institutional balance' is firmly linked to the 
constitutional language of the Union. It is both a legal (as developed by the 
Community courts) and a political principle and, although its content and 
function arc far from clear, its historical and intellectual roots are to be found in 
the doctrine of `separation of powers', commonly attributed to Montesquieu. 
96 
9' V. Bogdanor and G. Woodstock, `mc European Community and Sovereignty', (1991) 44 
Parliamentary Affairs, cited in K. Fcathcrstonc, `Jean Monnct and the "Democratic Dcficit" in 
the EU', (1994) 32 JCMS 149-170, p. 149. 
9s P. Craig, op. cit. n. 9, pp. 37-8. 
96 K. Lcnacrts and A. Vcrhocvcn, `Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for Democracy in EU 
Governance' and S. Smismans, 'Institutional Balance as interest Representation. Some 
Reflections on Lcnacrts and Vcrhoeven', in Good Governance in Europe's Integrated Market, 
C. Jocrgcs and RDchoussc (cds), OUP, 2002, pp. 35-6 and pp. 91-2 respectively. II. Wallacc, 
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`Separation of powers' relates to the apportionment of competences between the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches of authority. Properly (and thus not 
strictly) understood, it purports to install a system of `checks and balances' 
according to which no power should be able to fulfil its tasks without being 
controlled by another power. 97 Hence, as a principle of democracy, it seeks to 
protect people against abuses in the exercise of power and in this way it 
preserves the democratic character of a legal order. 
The sui generis nature of the EU makes difficult the automatic translation of the 
principle of separation of powers into a central organiser of the role of the 
institutions. The institutional architecture of the EU is such that it has not an 
identifiable legislature but a legislative process in which different political 
institutions have different parts to play. In the absence of a clear separation of 
powers the concept of institutional balance has acted as a substitute with the aim 
to highlight the interrelations between the institutions and to establish a basic 
protective and guarantee mechanism over the exercise of functions between 
them. " Yet, this is not to say that the principle of separation of powers is 
irrelevant in the case of the Union. The EC Treaty recognises a division of 
fiunctions, rather than powers strictly speaking, among the institutions in Title X 
(ex VIIa) EC. In this functional sense, it is a structural feature underlying the EU 
legal order? For instance, the Court of Justice, in the IBM case, 1°° referred to a 
`system' rather than a `principle' of division of powers between itself and the 
`Designing Institutions for an Enlarged EU', in Ten Reflections on the Constitutional Treatyfor 
Europe, B. deWitte (cd), CONV703/03, p. 90. 97 W. Van Gcrvcn, `Towards a Coherent Constitutional System within the EU', (1996) 2 EPL 81- 
101, p. 90. The proper understanding of the notion of separation of powers as a system of checks 
and balances is supported also by Laurence Claus. He explains that although Montcsquicu rightly 
saw that liberty from the arbitrary exercise of power would be served by apportioning power 
among multiple actors, he erred in thinking that apportionment could be sustainable only if along 
essential lines. Montcsquicu failed to sec that involving multiple actors in every exercise of 
power is the true protection against arbitrariness. Checks and balances, not essentialist separation 
of activities, prevent actors from conclusively determining the reach of their own powers: 
L. Claus, `Montcsquicu's Mistakes and the True Meaning of Separation', (2005) 25 OJLS 419- 
451, p. 420. 
9s C. Closa, 'Constitution and Democracy in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe', 
(2005) 11 EPL 145-164, p. 150. "M. L. Fcmandcz-Estcban, op. cit. n. 20, p. 157. 100 Case 60/81 International Business Machines Corporation v. Commission of the European 
Communities [19811 ECR 2639, para. 20. 
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Commission, after considering the entirety of the rules that define their 
respective competences. 
The phrase `institutional balance' does not appear in the treaties but has become 
an accepted term for describing the complex allocation of functions amongst the 
various organs. '°' It was rather developed by the ECJ to inhibit the EU 
institutions from encroaching on each other's prerogatives. 102 Together with the 
principles of the autonomy of the institutions and loyal cooperation between 
them, it defines the institutional setting of the Union by delimiting the 
constitutional position of the different institutions to ensure the respect of the 
prerogatives of each institution. 103 In the Court's case law, institutional balance 
is an expression of the `rule of law' principle, 'a which requires the exercise of 
power to reach a stage of equilibrium among the institutions, so as to avoid 
concentration of unlimited power in a single authority. Broadly the phrase is 
intended to convey the impression that there is a reassuring symmetry among the 
respective powers and roles of the main institutions (the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission). The principle of institutional balance does not 
imply that the authors of the treaties set up a balanced distribution of functions, 
whereby the weight of each institution is the same as that of others. 1°5 It rather 
refers to the treaty-based distribution of powers between the various institutions - 
which varies according to policy domains and specified procedural rules - that 
101 The Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, added by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam now mentions institutional balance without defining it: 'The application 
of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality shall respect the general provisions and the 
objectives of the Treaty, particularly as regards the meaning in full of the acquis communautaire 
and the institutional balance... ' (paragraph 2 of the Protocol). 
102 Institutional balance is `a system for distributing powers among the different community 
institutions, assigning to each institution its own role in the institutional structure of the 
Community and the accomplishments of the tasks entrusted to the community'. Leading case: 
Case C-70/88 EP v Council [19901 ECRI-2041. C. Narlow, Accountability in the EU, OUP, 2002, 
26. ý° 
M. L. Fcrnandcz-Estcban, op. cit. n. 20, p. 157. K. Lcnacrts, `Some Reflections on the Separation 
of Powers in the European Community', (1991) 28 CMLR 11-35, p. 15. Case C-138/79 Roquette 
v Council [19801 ECR 3333. Case C-70/88, ibid. Case C-300/89 Commission v Council [19911 
ECR 1-2867. Case C-271/94 European Parliament v Council [1996] ECR 3-1689. Case C-408/95 
Eurotunnel & Ors v Sea France [ 19971 ECR 6315. 
104 Formulated already in 1958 in the Meroni case the concept was clearly defined in Chernobyl: 
'The treaties set up a system for the distribution of powers among the different EC institutions, 
assigning to each its own role. Observance of the institutional balance means that each of the 
institutions must exercise its powers with due regard for the powers of other institutions': 
S. Smismans, op. cit. n. 46, pp. 1234. 
105 J. P. Jacquc, 'The Principle of Institutional Balance', (2004) 41 CMLR 383-39 1, pp. 383-4. 
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underlies the Union's institutional structure and which the institution shall have 
to respect (Article 7(1) TEC). 
In the Union context, institutional balance is not a static concept, but it evolves 
over time as the Union's founding treaties are adapted. In the early academic 
literature, it was associated with the lack of adequate EP participation in the 
legislative process. A `balance' in practice rested on a kind of trialogue with the 
Council and the Commission, in which the EP originally enjoyed a weak 
institutional role but gradually gained considerable ground. 1°' This constituted 
the classic democratic deficit thesis. Such traditional reading of the principle 
does not correspond to the complex reality of EU governance, its three-pillar 
structure and the gradual proliferation of formal and informal actors, all forms of 
functional participation and representation that are part of the institutional 
reality. 107 Although the treaties have been amended, as well as construed by the 
ECJ, to incorporate most of the changes in substantive policy areas, they do not 
reflect the degree of institutional change that has actually taken place, other than 
in relation to the five `cardinal' institutions. 108 Since each institution in theory at 
least represents a different constituency, the notion of institutional balance can be 
presented as a way of ensuring adequate participation and representation of 
difference constituencies within the EC process, 109 thus reflecting the 
institutional evolution of the EU not always evident in formal constitutional 
change. 
106 The Toussaint report argued in a 1988 resolution that the democratic deficit stems essentially 
from a combination of two phenomena: the transfer of powers from Member States to 
Community level and the exercise of these powers by Community institutions other than the EP, 
even though before the transfer national parliaments held powers to pass laws: Resolution of the 
EP on the Democratic Deficit of the EC of 17.06.1988, [1988] OJ C1871229. H. Wallace, op. cit. 
n. 96. 
107 S. Smismans, op. cit. n. 96. 
108 G. dcBurca, `The Institutional Development of the EU: A Constitutional Analysis', in 
Evolution ofEULaw, op. cit. n. 9, p. 56. 
109 A new reading of the institutional principle in terms of `fair interest representation' has 
equally been developed by Craig and dc Burca and has been suggested by Jocrgcs and Nycr. 
Thus, institutional balance is regarded above all as a political principle, used as a normative tool 
to shape the institutional framework of the Treaty. It is not limited either to the three EU 
institutions (EP, Council and Commission), or to territorial representation, but extends to interest 
representation. P. Craig, op. cit. n. 9, pp. 3(5.41 and G. dcl3urca, ibid. pp. 56 and 60. S. Smismans, 
op. cit. n. 96, pp. 92-3. 
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The current European treaties mirror only part of the `institutional balance' as it 
exists in practice, that is, as to the way in which the legislative process really 
operates. Substantial elements of decision-making operate in the margins of or 
wholly outside the formal constitutional framework. For instance, executive rule- 
making in the EU is characterised by intricate institutional elements such as 
comitology committees and agencies that operate in a `constitutional twilight 
zone', regulated only by a few treaty provisions, some case-law and secondary 
legislation as well as a number of declarations and interinstitutional 
agreements. 110 Institutional balance has been also described as euphemism which 
`masks an inherent institutional tension between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism'. "' This tension is reflected in features such as the complicated 
voting rules and the maze of intricate legislative procedures, which partly 
determine the relative influence of the different institutional actors. Further, 
informal institutional changes have occurred through the ways in which powers 
have been exercised by the various institutions and the developing relations 
between them, which now play an important role in the institutional structure of 
the Union. "2 
Consequently, the formal institutional framework and decision making of the 
Union are based on the principles of `rule of law' and democracy, but what about 
those not reflected in formal constitutional arrangements? As Grainne deBurca 
observes, the development of EU institutional practice and the institutional 
framework in general pose a challenge to the normative constitution of the EU, 
which has not sufficiently adapted to accommodate those changes. This is not 
merely a cosmetic problem of lack of fit between the `formal' and the `real' 
constitution, since the normative constitutional sources (treaties, case law and 
other parts of the acquis) reflect important values and contain important 
safeguards. 113 The issue is not simply one of institutional imbalance which could 
- after the intervention of the ECJ - be adjusted by bringing the institutional 
practice into conformity with the treaty-based norm of institutional balance. The 
gap between institutional reality and formal constitutional rules is wide enough 
10 K. Lcnacrts and A. Vcrhocvcn, op. cit. n. 96, pp. 47-8. 
"' G. dcBurca, op. cit. it 108, p. 56. 
112 Ibid, p. 65. 
13 Ibid, p. 71. 
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to contest the democratic and legitimate underpinnings of European governance. 
A reinterpreted institutional balance to reflect the complex reality of EU 
institutional framework may serve as a tool to shape that framework. ' 14 As a 
result, the proper application and understanding of institutional balance will 
address effectively the issue of democratic deficit. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The debate on the democratic legitimacy crisis of the Union is relevant to its 
changing constitutional framework. What this chapter has done is to link the 
issue with the processes of European integration and constitutionalisation. The 
former saw the transformation of the EU order from a mere policy to a 
comprehensive polity process with a wide competence remit that has a direct 
impact on the organisation and function of the national legal and political orders 
as well as the everyday lives of the European citizens. The latter, while it was 
neither proclaimed in the treaties nor constituted an unforeseen consequence due 
to functional spillover, was primarily the product of the judicial will, of the 
consistent interpretation in the ECJ's jurisprudence of the nature of the EU legal 
norms and of the place of those norms within the legal system based on the 
Court's `cerlaiine idee de l'Eürope'. 'ls 
As seen, the institutional system of the Union, its objectives and policies are 
based on the two overarching principles of the rule of law and democracy, found 
also in the national political orders. Yet, the democratic underpinnings of the EU 
have been challenged, especially since the ratification crisis of the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, a challenge pertaining to both the role and function of individual 
institutions and the decision-making system as a whole. The new and historically 
unprecedented sui generic political entity, the EU, has brought with it disquiet 
114 S. Smismans, op. cit.. n. 96. 
115 O. Spicnnann, op. cit. n. 22, pp. 7634. A. Stonc-Swcct, op. cit. n. 21. E. Fossum and 
A. Mcncndcz, `Thc Constitution's Gift? A Dclibcrativc Democratic Analysis of Constitution 
Making in the EU', (2005) 11 ELI 380413, p. 391. 
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over the democratic deficit of its emergent system of governance, a perceived 
disconnection between institutions and voters as well as feelings of remoteness 
and lack of influence and involvement on the part of its citizens. Somehow, EU 
decision-makers are not sufficiently representative of and accountable to the 
people, while the decision-making process is organised in a manner that bypasses 
democratic channels. In this environment, institutional balance becomes relevant 
to the democratic legitimacy of the EU, because the way legislative powers are 
allocated among the EU institutions matters to the democratic quality of the EU 
legal order in terms of what institutions represent, which constituencies and how 
effectively. After an initial identification of the complex reality of the Union's 
institutional system, this theme will occupy the following chapters in the context 
of both the formal and informal institutional evolution of the EU with the 




AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF DECISION-MAKING IN TILE UNION 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, a democratic regime was described as one in which popular rule is 
carried by democratic institutions. Based on the principle of popular control over 
decision-making, this chapter will offer an early assessment of EU decision- 
making against different attributes of democratic rule such as accountability, 
representation, transparency. An initial observation of the overall institutional 
system of the Union brings a number of issues into light. The Union may be 
served by a `single institutional framework' normally in the form of an 
institutional triangle that consists of the European Parliament, the Commission 
and the Council but, in reality, decision-making takes place mainly within the 
latter. Therefore, it is important to firstly focus on how the Council's 
organisational infrastructure and internal workings affect issues of representation 
and accountability. Further, the evolving nature of the Union's institutional 
structure is not always reflected in formal constitutional amendments. If the 
institutional development of the Union materially outgrows the basic 
constitutional structure established by the treaties, can the EU claim that it is 
firmly based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law? It is also 
essential to democratic decision-making that information is available about 
policy processes and preferences, since this is likely to increase public support in 
the exercise of power. This formal, legalistic examination of the Union's 
institutional structure will be attempted with the aim to identify salient features 
of the legislative process that affect democratic legitimacy. The ultimate purpose 
of this initial assessment is to establish whether EU decision-making is 
inherently amenable to public scrutiny and influence. 
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3.2 Reflections on the Council 
Legislative power is not described in the treaties. To attain the objectives and 
exercise EU competences, the treaties allocate powers to the institutions, an 
allocation that rests neither on a system of separation of powers nor on any 
general statement defining the usual functions of the institutions under the rule of 
law. Under Article 202 (ex 145) TEC, legislative power is assumed to belong 
primarily to the Council which acts jointly or with the participation of the EP. ' 
The TEC expressly submits to the function of the Council as a legislator only in 
relation to access to documents (Article 207(3)). Apart from the general 
procedure of treaty reform found in Article 48 TEU, 2 it is conceivable for the 
Council to amend primary law under the treaties. These formal procedures take 
the form of smaller revisions whereby the Council acting unanimously, and 
occasionally by qualified majority, 3 is empowered to adopt decisions either 
`autonomously' from national approval procedures or `semi-autonomously', in 
the sense that a recommendation is made to the Member States to adopt such 
decisions according to their constitutional requirements. Again, the involvement 
of the other EU institutions varies according to particular cases and is normally 
reduced to a mere initiating or consultative role. 4 For instance, the Council on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the EP may add to citizen 
rights already found in the treatiess or shall lay down the provisions regarding the 
direct elections to the EP by universal suffrage on a proposal from the Parliament 
and with its assent 6 It may also decide to convert cooperation under the 
1 The Commission also plays an important role in the Community pillar through its prerogatives 
to initiate legislation. The treaties delimit the respective roles of the institutions on a casc-by-case 
basis according to a large number of procedures. However, according to the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe (TcCE), Article 1-23, the Council will share legislative, budgetary, 
policy-making and coordinating functions with the Parliament. CONV 50/02, `The legal 
instruments: present system', 15.05.2002. CONV 162/02, `The legal instruments: present 
system', 13.06.2002. 
2 This general amendment procedure seems to legitimise any formal constitutional and 
institutional reform, as this is attained by the common accord of national governments and 
receives the final seal of approval subject to national constitutional guarantax. The procedure is 
not subject to review by the European Courts. 
3 Article 107(5) TEC, Articles I. 30 and I11.187 TcCE. 
4 `Reforming the Treaties, Amendment Procedures', Second report on the organisation of the EU 
Treaties submitted to the European Commission on 31 July 2000. 
s Article 22 EC. The corresponding Article 111-129 TcCE requires parliamentary assent instead of 
consultation. 
6 Article 190 (4) EC. In the corresponding Article 111-330 TcCE, the Council can do that only 
after obtaining the EP's consent. 
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intergovernmental pillars into the Community pillar and determine the voting 
procedures. ' 
The Union's formal institutional structure has changed little since the Treaty of 
Rome (1957), especially with regard to the balance of power. To be more 
precise, the Council has always been at the centre of decision-making both as a 
strong executive and legislator, but never been subjected to parliamentary control 
at EU level. Therefore, in terms of institutional accountability, provisions on the 
composition and internal structuring of the Council are essential components of 
the institutional balance debate, since each of the institutions in theory at least 
represents a different constituency. The EP has highlighted that along with the 
process of decision-making, the composition and function of the institutions are 
important issues in democratic legitimacy as both can address questions of 
representation and accountability. " By virtue of Article 203 TEC, the Council 
shall consist of one representative from each Member State at ministerial level 
committing its government. ' The Council's dominant role in the Union's 
institutional system and its lack of accountability at EU level may be offset by 
the indirect mandate it receives through the democratic and legitimate 
governments of the Member States. On closer inspection, the indirect link 
between the Council and individual citizens may in fact generate democratic 
deficit in the EU legislative process. This additional level of decision-making (at 
EU level) which is supranational and executive-oriented has affected the exercise 
of competences by national actors, specifically national parliaments and their 
control over national executives often guaranteed under national constitutions, 
Article 42 TEU provides that action in areas referred to in Article 29, Title VI, TEU will fall 
under Title IV TEC. This provision has been omitted from the TcCE. 
8 The notion of institutional balance can be presented as a way of ensuring the adequate 
participation and representation of the different constituencies within the EC process. As seen in 
Chapter 2, this newer definition of institutional balance as 'interest representation' has been 
developed by Lcnacrts and Vcrhocvcn as well as by Craig and dc Burca: S. Smismans, 
'Institutional Balance as Interest Representation. Some Reflections on Lcnacrts and Vcrhocvcn', 
in Good Governance in Europe's Integrated Market, C. Jocrgcs and R. Dchoussc (eds), OUP, 
2002, p. 92. G. de Burca, `Institutional Developments of the EU', in The Evolution of EU Law, 
P. Craig and G. dc Burca (eds), OUP, 1999, p. 60. J. Shaw, `The Legal and Constitutional 
Implications of the Treaty of Nice', in The Treaty of Nice Explained, M. Boyd and K. Fcus (eds), 
The Federal Trust, 2001, p. 98. EP Report A5-0086/2000 on the EP's proposals for the IGC. 
Rapportcurs: Dimitrakopoulos and Leinen, PE232.758,27.3.2000. 9 Article 1-23 TcCE. The TcCE adopts the existing provisions on Council composition and 
membership. Both the EC Treaty and the TcCE do not dictate the way Member States are to be 
represented in Council. 
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with an entailing overall decrease in democratic accountability and 
transparency. 1° This may be exacerbated by the new Article 111-343 TeCE, which 
provides for the possibility of one Council member to delegate their voting to 
another Member State representative. A practical implication might be that 
members of the Council are hardly individually accountable to their national 
parliaments, let alone collectively to the EP. 
Moreover, scrutiny of decision-making within the Council reveals that the 
institution is not really a `unitary' body, but rather an abstract term covering 
several distinct fora. It is often described as a `legal fiction' as its members will 
vary in accordance with the subject matter of the meeting in question, despite its 
treaty status as a single institution. " Decision-making in the Council takes place 
at the micro level of Working Groups (WGs), that is, at the level of 
communication networks of expert policy-makers operating within complex lines 
of authority, whose actions often duplicate and overlap, creating a system of 
regulatory government. In the decision-making process of the Council, the WGs 
have a more important function than the one that exists in the treaties whose 
communication behaviour is determined by formal and informal rules, 
supranational and intergovernmental cooperation, preferences and alliances., 2 the 
Ministers being the only visible level of the Council. At the apex of such 
subsystems stands the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) 
which consists of the permanent representatives13 of the Member States to the 
Council and provides the groundwork for the Council's decision-making. In this 
sense, COREPER would be expected to present national preferences but, as 
delegations vary from state to state, they are not necessarily likened to national 
administrations. In most cases, decisions are adopted without debate, since they 
For a detailed analysis, sec Chapter 6. 
S. McGiffcn, The EU. A Critical Guide, Pluto Press, 2001, p. 16. Ch. Lord, Democracy in the 
European Union, Sheffield Academic Press, 1998, pp. 24-5. S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law 
of the EU, Longman, 2002, p. 75. CKLord, A DemocraticAudit of the European Union, Palgravc, 
2004, p. 162. 
'= S. Douglas-Scott, ibid, p. 78. J. Bcycrs and G. Dicrickx, `The Working Groups of the Council of 
the European Union: Supranational or Intergovernmental negotiations? ' (1998) 36 JCMS 289- 
317, pp. 291,293 and 295. It is estimated that 80-90% of the Council's work is done in the 
working groups. 
" Article 207(1) TEC, Articles 1-24 and 111-344 TcCE. Article 19 of Council Decision 
2004/338/EC of 22 March 2004 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure, OJL106/22, 
15.04.2004. 
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have been prepared by the subsidiary organs and a consensus has already been 
established between the representatives of the Ministries. " The existence of 
specialised Council compositions and the various delegations of power within 
and away from the Council mean that it is an institution of uncertain external 
boundaries as well as internal complexity. 15 This makes it difficult to determine 
with certainty whose interests it represents and how it allocates political 
accountability. 
Even the Council itself appears contradictory about its status as it has, on the one 
hand, claimed that it is a single body consisting of all its compositions, working 
groups and committees and, on the other, it has insisted that the Council 
Presidency is a separate institution. " According to Article 203 EC, political 
leadership of the Council falls to the rotating Presidency. The Member State 
holding the Presidency is responsible for its day-to-day management for a period 
of six months and, therefore, EU policy-making is dependent on an individual 
Member State rather than collective policy priorities, with the aim to further its 
own policy objectives. " The Presidency was a much debated issue at the 
European Convention, following the submission of the Franco-German plan on 
institutional reform which proposed the elimination of the present system of 
rotating presidency and was badly received by the smaller countries. 18 The 
rotation system was maintained in the Constitutional Treaty (TeCE) which 
stipulates in Article 1-24 that the Presidency of all Council configurations, other 
than Foreign Affairs, is to be held by Member State representatives on the basis 
of equal rotation for a period of eighteen months. The new arrangements will 
achieve some continuity lacking from the current six-monthly rotating system, 
'4 Despite the provision for majority voting, votes arc rarely taken in the Council and some 85% 
of decisions are agreed at COREPER or working group level: S. Andcrscn and K. Elliassen, 
`Formal Processes: EU institutions and Actors', in Making Policy in Europe, S. Andcrscn and 
K. Elliasscn (cds), Sage Publications, 2001, p. 26. 's Ch. Lord, A Democratic Audit of the European Union, op. cit. n. 11, p. 163. 16 S. Douglas-Scott, op. cit. all, p. 82. Case T-14/98 Ilautala v. Council [1999] ECR 11-2489. 
Report of the Ombudsman for 1997 pp. 176 et seq: application by Tony Runyan for access to 
documents - complaint 1054/25.11.96, Statewatch v Commission. " The Presidency may also restrict the numbers per delegation present in meetings and 
discussions, set the order in which the items arc to be taken, as well as determine the duration of 
discussion on them. Article 20 of Council Decision 2004/338/EC, op. cit. n. 13. 18 CONV 489/03, Contribution submitted by Mr Dominique de Villepin and Mr Joschka Fischer, 
members of the Convention, 16.01.2003. CONV 646/03, Contribution submitted by Mr. Michael 
Attalides, et al, members of the Convention: 'Reforming the institutions: Principles and 
Premises', 28.03.2003. 
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although there is no reference to how these will take effect, 19 and are in essence a 
flexible `team system' that may be altered without formal constitutional 
amendment, yet not less confusing if viewed especially in conjunction with the 
new provisions for a permanent President of the European Council (Article 1-22). 
The Council's formal structure was not dealt with constitutionally at Nice, as 
reforms were mainly limited to the issue of `voting'. It was the European Council 
that embarked on a process of reform of the Council which started at Helsinki 
and concluded at Seville; with the aim to prepare the Union for enlargement, the 
process saw a reduction in the Council formations and provided for a more 
effective coordination among them. Consequently, in 2002, the Council annexed 
a list of nine configurations to its Rules of Procedure. 2° The Council's different 
formations that correspond to existing practice have been written down in the 
treaties in Article 1-24 TeCE, following the European Convention and the 2003-4 
IGC. 21 The Convention proposal to set up a separate Legislative Council was 
abandoned by the 2003-4 IGC due to strong misgivings by many Member 
"These were specified by the European Council in a declaration appended to the Final Act of the 
2004 IGC: 'The Presidency of the Council shall be held by pre-established groups of three 
Member States for a period of 18 months. The groups shall be made up on a basis of equal 
rotation among the Member States, taking into account their diversity and geographical balance 
within the Union. Each member of the group shall in turn chair for a six-month period all 
configurations of the Council. The other members of the group shall assist the Chair in all its 
responsibilities on the basis of their common programme. Members of the team may decide 
alternative arrangements among themselves. ': Cig 87/04 ADD2 REV2, Declaration to be 
annexed to the Final Act of the IGC and the Final Act, 25.10.2004; Declaration on Article 1-24(7) 
concerning the European Council decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council, OJC 
310/420,16.12.2004. CONY 508/03, Summary report on the plenary session - 20-21 January 
2003,27.01.2003. This Draft Decision will be adopted, if, or when, the TcCE enters into force. 20 Helsinki European Council Conclusions, Nr. 00300/99,11.12.1999. Guidelines for Reform and 
Operational Recommendations, approved by the Helsinki European Council, 10-11.12.1999, 
available from http: //uc. cu. int/cn/info/curocounciV index. htm, accessed 20.06.2001. Follow-up to 
the Helsinki European Council Conclusions on 10 and 11.12.1999 - Council Formations, OJ L 149,23.6.2000. Goctcnborg European Council Conclusions, SN200/1/01,15-15.06.2001. Interim 
Report 15100/01, Preparing the Council for Enlargement, 07.12.2001. Seville European Council 
Conclusions, SN200/1/02,21-22.06.2002. In the interests of representation and accountability the 
EP proposed a substantial reform of the Council and an actual separation of the institution 
between a legislative and executive institution: EP Report A5-008612000, op. cit. n. 8. Annex I of 
the Council Decision 2002/682/EC, of 22 July 2002 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure, 
OIL 230/7,28.08.2002, now contained in Annex I of the Council Decision 2004/338/EC, op. cit. 
n. 13. 
21 Two configurations arc specifically mentioned, the General Affairs Council (GAC) and the 
Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). The former is responsible for ensuring consistency in the work of 
the various configurations, while the latter elaborates the Union's external action. The Article 
also provides for a European decision adopted by the European Council to establish a list of other 
configurations in which the Council may meet. 
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States. 22 It was felt that the legislative work of the Council currently spread 
across a number of different formations was risking an overly specialised 
approach with legislation taking insufficient account of wider interests, while the 
increasing range and complexity of the issues it had to address had led to less 
coherence and more conflict between the different formations. 23 This striking 
innovation would have introduced an overarching `legislative' body, a unitary 
institution replacing the existing sectoral configurations. Instead, the Council was 
left `untouched by Montesquieu's idea of separation of power 24 between the 
legislative and the executive. The new provision, if it ever comes into effect, will 
nevertheless require each Council meeting to be divided in two parts, dealing 
respectively with deliberations on legislative acts and non-legislative activities. 
This will entail a degree of separation between the Council's legislative and 
executive functions and will render its workings more transparent, which is not 
currently the case. 
22 CIG 1/03, The Council Presidency, 03.10.2003. CIG 35/03, Reply from the Commission to the 
questionnaire on the Legislative Function, the Formations of the Council and the Presidency of 
the Council of Ministers (doc. CIG 9/03), 15.10.2003. CIG 36/03 and 39/03, Council Presidency 
and Council formations, 16 and 24.10.2003. P. Craig, `Institutional Structure: A Delicate 
Balance', (2005) 1 EuConst 52-56, p. 53. 23 The GAC and the External Relations Council particularly had proved unable to coordinate the 
work of other Council formations effectively. The European Council in Seville decided to limit 
the number of formations to nine and to hold separate meetings of the two main areas of 
activities, that is, the GAC and the External Relations Council. The Convention Working Group 
VII (External Action) formally separated the two formations: CONV 459/02, Final Report of the 
Working Group VII on External Action, 16.12.2002 and CONV 477/03, `The Functioning of the 
Institution', 10.01.2003. 
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3.2.1 The parameters of decision-making in the Council 
Despite the regular but very moderate institutional reform over the past two 
decades, the issue of voting procedures in the Council has always been on the 
agenda as the Member States normally favour at least in principle the extension 
of qualified majority voting (QMV). At the 2000 IGC, unanimity was generally 
regarded fundamentally inappropriate to effective decision-making in an 
enlarged Union of diverse members as the risk of deadlock would entail 
significant loss to the Union's operating ability. Some Member States even 
argued that the possibility of majority decisions would result in greater 
receptivity to compromise, opening the road for a more democratic decision- 
making process; progress towards greater democratisation entailed the 
implementation of principles which could be recognised by European citizens, 
such as the principle of majority voting. 25 Unsurprisingly, QMV was also at the 
centre of the debates in the Convention. 26 From the beginning it raised two 
delicate issues, namely, whether it should be extended and whether its definition 
should change. The extension of QMV to new substantive areas in every treaty 
revision is a move away from a consensual conception of decision-making 
towards a more majoritarian one that reinforces the supranational character of the 
Union. 
At the 2000 IGC, the Commission advocated that the debate on extending QMV 
should focus on large categories of decisions rather than individual cases, 
whereas some Member States were willing to examine the issue on a case-by- 
case basis. What prevailed was the Portuguese Presidency's approach which 
distinguished between articles to be examined for straightforward transition to 
QMV and provisions for which a move to QMV could be considered only for 
23 Sec for instance, CONFER 4719100, Memorandum from the Greek Government to the IGC on 
institutional reform of the EU, 03.03.2000. CONFER 4722/00, Contribution from the Danish 
Government, 07.03.2000. CONFER 4720/00, Contribution from the Dutch Govcmment, 
06.03.2000. CONFER 4751/1/00, Rcwcighting Mcmbcr States' votes in the Council of the EU, 
16.6.2000. IGC: Reform for Enlargement. Cm 4595, The British Approach to the EU IGC, 
Fcbniary 2000. CONFER 4723/00, Contribution from the Finnish Government-Background and 
objectives of the IGC 2000,7.3.2000. CONFER 4712/00, Basic principles of Austria's position, 
15.2.2000. COM(2000)34, Adapting institutions to make success of enlargement, 26.01.2000. 26 CONV 548/03, Summary Report on the plenary session, 6-7 February 2003,13.02.2003. Sec 
also, CONV 60/02, Note on the plenary session, 23-4 May 2002,29.05.2002. 
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certain, specific and clearly defined aspects. 27 The Treaty of Nice to some extent 
widened the scope of decision-making by qualified majority, as twenty seven 
provisions changed over completely or partly from unanimity to QMV. For 
instance, provisions in Title IV TEC, regarding visas, asylum, immigration and 
other policies linked to the free movement of persons, apparently fundamental 
issues for EU citizens, were agreed on a partial and deferred switch to QMV by 
means of different instruments (amendments of Article 67 EC, protocol or 
political declaration) and subject to different conditions (either from 1.5.04, or 
after the adoption of Community legislation setting out the common rules and 
essential principles). 28 
It is obvious from the stance of the EU institutions and the Member States during 
treaty negotiations that, to remain efficient and effective, the Union had to make 
use of majority voting in its decision-making. However, the range of applications 
of the rule remained qualitatively limited, less than what both the Commission 
and the Member States had proposed. There was a broad consensus in favour of 
retaining unanimity for the provisions relating to the constitutional and 
institutional structure of the EU, those with intergovern mental character (eg. 
foreign policy and immigration) as well as sensitive domestic policies like 
taxation and social security. 29 On top of that, moving to QMV has been deferred 
or has been made conditional in several areas. The outcome at Nice is a 
quantitative advance in terms of the number of instances when QMV may be 
used, but still leaves issues requiring unanimity. 0 And although such policy 
areas may be instrumental to preserving national sovereignty, viewed in the 
context of a Union of twenty five or more members, one needs to assess the 
extent to which Nice has materially and pragmatically prepared the EU for 
enlargement. 
Such pragmatic assessment was undertaken by the Convention in 2003; QMV 
played a central part in the institutional reform of the EU and was directly 
27 CONFER 4755/00, Follow-up to the Fcira European Council, 05.07.2000. 
2$ SEC(2001)99, Memorandum to the Members of the Commission, European Commission, 
18.01.2001. 
_' Ibid. 
30 M. Barnicr, 'Reforming the Institutions for Enlargement: A Commission Perspective', in The 
Treaty ofMce Explained, op. cit. n8, pp. 118-9 and 130-1. 
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associated with enlargement. The Convention advocated the widening of the 
field of application of QMV both in quantitative and qualitative terms. The 2003- 
4 IGC agreed with the broad thrust of these proposals" and established QMV as 
the general rule of decision-making in the Council. Currently, under Article 205 
EC, unless the treaties provide otherwise, the Council shall decide by simple 
majority which is rarely the case as in the vast majority of cases the treaties refer 
to QMV or unanimity. Article 1-23 TeCE reverses this approach by eliminating 
the need for reference to QMV, a move that will simplify the legislative process. 
By further restricting the use of unanimity in Council, decision-making will 
become more effective both materially and pragmatically in an enlarged Europe. 
The Convention, and particularly the Praesidium, found a more incisive way to 
retain the veto power, it shifted the institutional balance to favour the European 
Council by enhancing its role in the legislative process. 32 
Over successive enlargements, the relative weight of the Member States with 
smaller populations had increased to the detriment of those with larger 
populations. As a result, the system of weighting of votes under Amsterdam was 
not demographically comparable. During the 2000 IGC, Member States were 
concerned about the impact of Amsterdam weighting rules on the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU. With the accession of the new states in 2004 consisting of 
small to medium-sized populations, if the system under Amsterdam had been 
maintained, their power would have increased even more disproportionately. The 
larger Member States would find themselves compelled to accept decisions taken 
31 In certain sensitive areas the IGC thought that the extension of QMV had gone too far and 
unanimity was reintroduced in several key areas, notably tax and own resources (the Union's 
s'stcm for raising finance). 
' QMV is to apply to eighteen new arras, including the citizens' initiative provision on Article I- 
47 and permanent structured cooperation in defence Article 111-312. It is extended to around 
twenty old articles, including the sensitive areas of justice and home affairs, asylum and 
immigration. Unanimity is preserved in sensitive areas like CFSP, save initiatives of the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs where the Council will act by QMV when adopting decisions on the actions 
and positions of the Union and actions implementing those (Article 111-300). In three areas, 
specific clauses have been introduced to allow a Member State to refer a matter to the European 
Council (known as 'emergency brake' clauses). This mechanism has allowed the application of 
QMV to these articles. These are Article 111-136 on free movements of workers/social security, 
Article 111-270 on judicial cooperation in criminal matters and Article 111-271 on the 
approximation of definitions of criminal offences. A new 'bridging clause' will allow a matter to 
be passed aller a final vote by unanimity in the European Council to a QMV under Title III 
(internal policies and actions) of Part III of the TcCE. 
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by a group of states representing a minority of the European population, 33 while a 
process should be treated as democratic, if it reflects the basic principle of 
equality of the Member States within the Union. 3' Likewise, what makes the 
decision-making process democratically legitimate within states is equal (voting) 
power per citizen. In the EU, a polity of both states and peoples, it is difficult to 
apply such a simplistic equality principle. Yet, as identified in Chapter 2, 
democratic systems need to provide all citizens with the opportunity to 
participate equally in the political life of the state and, in the case of the Union, 
the EU polity. 
The 2000 IGC negotiations looked at the issue of vote weighting in the Council 
along the parameters of a system that needed to be legitimate for both Member 
States and their citizens. The objectives of reforming the Amsterdam system 
should ensure a more representative balance between Member States and reflect 
their demographic differences. When the Conference came to address the issue, it 
did not start from scratch; all Member States were willing to abide in principle by 
the agreement reached at Amsterdam which vaguely provided for two main 
options: dual majority and reweighting of votes. 5 Consultations with the 
Member States examined both options; the latter gained more support. Moreover, 
the smaller Member States, and especially Austria, advocated a link between 
changes in the size of the Commission and the weighting of votes in the Council, 
in order to offset the loss of influence due to vote adjustment 36 The outcome of 
Nice represented a satisfactory outcome for all negotiating parties in terms of 
33 COM(2000) 34, CONFER 4751/1/00,4722/00 and 4720/00, op. cit. n. 25. CONFER 4733/00, 
Policy document of the Fcdcral Republic of Germany on the Intergovernmental Conference on 
institutional reform, 30.03.2000. 
3+ CONFER 4719/00, op. cit. n. 25. R. Baldwin, Nice Try: Should the Treaty of Nice Be Ratified?, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research 2001, p. 35. 
ss CONFER 4755/00 op. cit. n. 27. Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of 
the EU, annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam but repealed and replaced by a new Protocol on 
Enlargement by the Treaty of Nice. EP Report A4-0049/99 on the decision-making process in the 
Council in an enlarged Europe. Rapportcur. Bourlangcs, PE229.066,28.01.1999. EP Report A5- 
0086/2000, op. cit. n8. EP Report A5-0168/2001 on the Treaty of Nice and the future of the 
European Union. Rapportcurs: hiigo and Josd, PE294.755,04.05.2001. CONFER 4733/00, op. 
cit. n. 33. CONFER 4751/1/00 and 4722/00, op. cit. n. 25. CONFER 4717/00, Italy's position to 
the 2000 IGC, 03.03.2000. 
36 CONFER 4723/00 and 4712/00, op. cit. n. 25. 
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achieving their own political objectives. " An adjustment in vote weighting in 
Council was compensated by the loss of the second scat in the Commission. 
The generally accepted aim of reweighting was to ensure that any winning 
coalition under QMV would represent a reasonable majority of the population 
and that decisions could not be blocked by too small a minority. 38 The 
compromise found may be dubbed a kind of a `triple majority' system in which 
three separate conditions need to be met in order to achieve a qualified majority, 
namely, a majority of weighted votes and of members in the Council as well as a 
majority representing at least 62% of the Union's population. 39 All Member 
States receive an increased number of votes, but in different proportions. The 
threshold is to be adjusted proportionally with every accession. The reweighting 
will take place in stages, the number of which will depend on the number and 
timing of the future waves of enlargement. 40 Equally important is the fact that the 
relative demographic weight is now explicitly stated for the first time as a 
condition for decision-making. But it is just a condition rather than an essential 
requirement and it exists as a `safety net' in the sense that it provides the 
opportunity, especially to the larger Member States, to form a `blocking 
minority', if they are not happy with a decision. 
Although in a way it reflects the dual nature of the Union, as one of citizens and 
Members States, the requirement of a triple threshold renders the system 
contentious. Given the need to fulfil three separate conditions as well as meet a 
higher QMV threshold as the Union expands, the final outcome is complex, 
difficult to explain and undoubtedly runs counter to the general desire at the start 
of the negotiations not to make Council decisions more difficult. Moreover, there 
is the further technical complication of how to verify the population criterion, 
37 D. Gallo%%ay, The Treaty of Nice and Beyond, Shcýcld Academic Press, 2001, p. 89. 
"Dr. E. Best, 'The Treaty of Nice: Not Beautiful but It'll Do', EIPASCOPE No. 2001/1. The ncWv 
regime was only going to come into force after the accession of new states in 2004, by which 
time, paradoxically, a new Treaty was expected to have been negotiated. And, actually, in July 
2004 a draft Constitutional Treaty was formally agreed to by all Member States and signed by 
October 2004. 
s' Article 205 TEC. Article 3 of the Protocol on the Enlargement of the EU, Declaration 20 on the 
Enlargement of the EU and Declaration 20 on the Qualified Majority Threshold and the Number 
of Votes for a Blocking Minority in an Enlarged Union, all annexed to the Treaty of Nice. 
Brussels European Council Conclusions, Nr. 14702/02,24-25.10.2002. 
40Article 3 of the Protocol on the Enlargement of the EU, annexed to the Treaty of Nice. 
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which is clearly stipulated in the Treaty as a verifiable condition for adopting 
legally binding acts. 41 These new rules are likely to slow down the decision- 
making process and seem to favour the preservation of the legislative status quo 
- resulting from unanimity - which, to some commentators, 
42 enhances the 
margin of discretion of the executive (the implementing rules become more 
important) and the judiciary which will tend to a more sustained form of activism 
because there is less likelihood of being overruled. 
The current system tries to remedy the domination of the small Member States, 
which were previously overrepresented, as against the larger ones, but it is 
unable to prevent the domination of groupings, consisting of small and larger 
countries, that may lead to the alienation of other Member States. How may one 
reconcile this prospect with the aim of equal representation arguably inherent in 
the Nice rules? Also, the minimum number of countries that can block decision- 
making on the basis of a given percentage under the new system is almost the 
same as the one under Amsterdam; only the combination of states differs. So the 
parameters of the new weighting rules are the same, save the demographic 
verification clause that benefits one particular Member State, that is, Germany. 43 
In terms of democratic legitimacy, the Nice system seems to contribute nothing 
material. 
Testament to the perceived inadequacy of the Nice system of weighing votes in 
the Council was the fact that it was once again subject to review just as the 
Treaty entered into force in February 2003. The Convention proposed a 
completely new system of QMV known as `double majority': the majority of 
Member States and the majority of the population. The issue was at the heart of 
the 2003-4 IGC which approved the principle proposed by the Convention 
adding certain amendments to facilitate the transition to the new system 
introduced by the TeCE, which can be considered a real revolution in Council 
decision-making. Firstly, it has been made much simpler. Instead of the current 
41 D. Galloway, op. cit n37, p. 90. 
42 X. Yatayanas, `The Treaty of Nice. The Sharing of Power and the Institutional Balance in the 
EU-A Continental Perspective', JMWP 1/01. 
" Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, three large states may block, but under the Treaty of Nice, 
two large and a medium-sized can. Report A5-0168! 2001, op. cit. n. 35. 
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system (threshold of weighted votes, majority of Member States and 62% of the 
population of the Union), once subject to long and difficult negotiations at Nice, 
just two criteria will apply. Under Article 1-25 TeCE, a QMV can be achieved 
only if a decision is supported by 55% of Member States, including at least 
fifteen of them, representing at the same time at least 65% of the population. 44 
Is there a difference between the simple vote reweighting, coupled with the 
Member State and population `safety nets', agreed at Nice and a `weighted' dual 
majority system proposed by the Commission, the EP and a few Members States 
during the 2000 IGC? As David Galloway remarks, 45 if there is any difference, it 
exists in the `eyes of the beholder'. In a way, the two approaches (dual majority 
and reweighting), often proposed as different concepts in the 2000 IGC 
negotiations, are in fact variants of one and the same system attempting to 
reconcile both the state and population elements. However, the outcome at Nice 
owed more to negotiating styles than logic, 46 as the loss of influence by the 
smaller Member States represented a considerable variation of their per capita 
representation in Council. On the other hand, the `double majority' rule is likely 
to achieve a simpler and more flexible system of decision-making as it can 
facilitate a greater number of combinations of Member States that can constitute 
a QMV which will make a difference in an enlarged EU. It also takes into 
account the twofold nature of the Union -a polity of states and peoples - in a 
more equitable manner in terms of representation of individual voters in that it 
reinforces proportional representation by emphasising the will of a majority of 
the population over that of the states in the adoption of binding acts. 47 
" In Declaration No. 5 on Article 1-25 and the draft decision contained therein, annexed to the 
Constitutional Treaty, it is envisaged for the new system to take effect on 1 November 2009. 
Modification of criteria for counting the majorities may occur in three situations: regarding acts 
not proposed by the Commission, specific transitional clause in the event of a narrow majority 
and the blocking minority. The latter has to consist of four Member States at least and will have 
to represent at least 35% of population. The effect of the rule is mitigated by a mechanism 
reminiscent of the 1994 `Ioannina' compromise; Member States with less than a blocking 
minority, but representing three-quarters of such a minority in terms of population or numbers of 
Member States will be able to call on the Council 'to do all in its powers' to reach a solution. On 
the 1994 'Ioannina' compromise, sec S. Wcathcrill and P. Bcaumont, EU Law, Penguin Books, 
1999, pp. 87-8. 
45 D. Galloway, op. cit n. 37. 
46 P. Norman, op. cit n. 24, p. 117. 47 W. Van Gcrven, The European Union. A Polity of States and Peoples, Hart Publishing, 2005, 
pp. 283 and 286. 
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3.3 The empirical reality of the evolving EU architecture 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, due to its evolutionary nature, the EU defies precise 
definition as a polity. The Union's incremental, ongoing integration process and 
the ensuing difficulty to constitutionally describe its multilevel decision-making, 
which occurs through a complex and interwoven pattern of intergovernmental 
and supranational structures, reveal a hybrid organisation of intrinsic 
complexity. " Whether constitutionalised or not, the Treaties afford a set of legal 
rules that regulate the legislative process and the tasks of the institutions therein. 
Although under Article 3 TEU a single institutional framework is to ensure the 
consistency and the continuity of the Union activities, the rules that regulate the 
exercise of public power are not themselves based on consistent and often visible 
criteria across the Union pillars; the fragmentation of decision-making means 
that the institutions are subjected to diverse roles, principles and voting rules. 
The duty to attain the Union's objectives through legislative activity must be 
taken to refer overwhelmingly to the Council which is both the forum of 
interstate bargaining and supranational decision-making; under the second and 
third EU pillars there is little supranationalism and it is the Council49 which takes 
the main decisions, whereas the EP and the Commission play a negligible role 
and the ECJ50 may be denied jurisdiction to adjudicate on legal acts adopted. 
In this context, the aim of implementing a single institutional framework appears 
redundant due to the significant variation endorsed by the pillar structure. This 
may lead to compartmentalisation and duplication of action, as decisions adopted 
43 R. Bicbcr and C. Amarcllc, `Simplification of European Law', in The Europeanisation of Law - 
The Legal Effects of European Integration, F. Snydcr (ed), Hart Publishing, 2000, p. 223. 
W. Mcrkcl, 'Legitimacy and Democracy: Endogenous Limits of European Integration', in 
Regional Integration and Democracy, J. Anderson (ed), Rowman & Littlcfcld Publishers, 1999, 
p. 47. 
`9 Articles 14 and 1S TEU (CFSP Title V TEU) provide that the Council shall take joint actions 
and adopt common positions with the aim of implementing CFSP. For third pillar matters, under 
Article 34 TEU (PJC Title VI TEU), the Council may adopt common positions, framework 
decisions, or establish Conventions. 
S0 For instance, under article 46 (cx article L) TEU, the ECJ still has no powers to adjudicate on 
matters of CFSP. Article 46 TEU does not exclude the ECJ's jurisdiction to assess, under article 
47 TEU, whether an act adopted by the Council, pursuant to Title V or VI TEU, is in fact within 
the scope of the EC Treaty and thus reviewable under Article 230 EC. 11cnce, the Court is 
prepared to annul a legal measure adopted in the context of the CFSP (or CJ11A), if the measure 
is found to encroach upon the powers conferred on the Community by the TEC: Case C-170/96 
Commission v Council [19981 ECR 1-2763, paras. 13-17. 
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under the intergovernmental pillars often overlap with Community policies, 
creating institutional and constitutional blurring. s' In the case of external action, 
for instance, the Treaty of Maastricht introduced Article 301 TEC economic 
sanctions to implement political decisions adopted under the second pillar. 
Regardless of the political dimension of decisions dealing with a policy vis-a-vis 
a third state, the actual actions are often of economic nature. Yet, the Council 
shall take Community measures, only when this is required in a CFSP act. In 
essence, the obligation becomes redundant, since many decisions omit to refer to 
the necessity of implementing Community measures. 52 In very few cases there is 
explicit reference to an essential Community decision, like the Common Position 
1999/273/CFSP, where `action by the Community was needed in order to 
implement the measures cited' in the decision. -" In almost all cases, CFSP 
decisions simply echo UN Resolutions by which the economic sanctions were 
established in the first place. Prima facie it would make more sense, if EC 
decisions would directly follow these Resolutions. However, the very existence 
of Article 301 makes independent EC decision-making very difficult. 54 
The `governmental' element of the Community method did not only prevent the 
Member States from extending it to the fields of CFSP and JHA, but also the 
balance between the supranational and intergovern mental approaches within the 
single institutional framework have formally remained undetermined. Yet, the 
Union's institutional architecture is more than the sum of its parts. As the 
analogy between the EU's external action and CFSP has manifested above, the 
Union pillars are linked by institutional dynamics. The evolutionary nature of the 
31 G. dcl3urca, op. cit. n. 8, p. 66. J-L. Qucrmonnc, '71he Question of a European Government', 
Research and European Issues No. 20/02. 
s= For instance, Common Position 95/254/CFSP of 7 July 1995 defined by the Council on the 
basis of Article J. 2 of the Treaty on European Union with regard to the extension of the 
suspension of certain restrictions on trade with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro), OJL 160/2,11.07.1995, and Council Decision 95/11/CFSP of 23 January 1995 
concerning the common position, defined on the basis of Article J. 2 of the Treaty on European 
Union, and regarding the extension of the suspension of certain restrictions on trade with the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), OJL 20/2,27.01.1995. u Paragraph 4, Preamble. OJ L108/1,27.4.1999. In Decision 98/426ICFSP on a ban of flights by 
Yugoslav carriers between the FRY and the EC, it was merely said that 'a further reduction of 
economic relations with the FRY should be foreseen'. No explicit reference to EC measures. s' R. A. Wesscl, The European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, Kluwer Law International, 
1999, p. 309. For a detailed analysis of the specifics of decision-making in the three pillars, sec 
A. Arnull and D. Wincott (eds), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union, OUP, 
2002, Chapters 24. 
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EU institutional system is also apparent from the frequent changes in primary 
law, such as the communautarisation of the third pillar by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. The matters that remained in the area of intergovernmental 
cooperation underwent substantive refinement, especially in the areas of police 
and criminal justice cooperation. ' Under the Constitutional Treaty, the merging 
of the pillars and the endowment of the Union with legal personality' is set to 
clarify the Union's institutional architecture and legal status. Although due to the 
present lack of formal legal personality, the EU is often conceived as not having 
legal existence of its own, as Bruno de Witte rightly remarks, 57 the merging of 
the treaties is probably not something new; the TeCE is only to codify existing 
practice. As the objectives, powers and practice of the Union are currently spread 
across pillars, there is a growing acknowledgement that the EC is more like a 
suborganisation of the EU. 
The incorporation of the second pillar into the general legal framework of the 
TeCE is of formal significance only since most formal intergovernmental 
features of cooperation under CFSP remain intact. Namely, the Member States 
share legislative initiative with the Commission, QMV remains the exception and 
there are specific provisions governing the respective roles of the ECJ and the 
EP. According to the final report of the Working Group on legal personality at 
the Convention, 58 neither the merging of legal personalities nor the merging of 
the treaties automatically entails the merging of the pillars, but it was thought 
that to preserve the current design of the pillar structure in a single treaty would 
be anachronistic. It would, moreover, be a needless complication since all the 
institutional and procedural features specific to the two intergovernmental pillars 
(CFSP and cooperation in criminal matters), which the Convention considered 
appropriate to maintain, could be preserved in the new constitutional treaty. 
ss RBicbcr and C. Amarcllc, op. cit. n. 48, p. 224. 5' Establishment of the Union in Article I-1 TcCE and legal personality in Article 1-7 TcCE. EP 
Report A5-0409/2001 of 21 November 2001 on the legal personality of the European Union. 
Rapportcur: Camcro-Gonzdlcz, PE304.279,21.11.2001. 
s' B. Dc Witte, 'Simplification and Reorganization of the European Treaties', (2002) 39 CMLR 
1255-1287, p. 1267. 
sa CONV 305/02, Final report of Working Group Ili on Legal Personality, 01.10.2002. 
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But even the communautarisation of intergovernmental pillars during successive 
treaty reforms would be hardly realised without derogations contemplating 
`enhanced cooperation' among subgroups of Member States which shape 
decision-making according to variable geometry and somewhat reflect a reversal, 
from the `community-method' to intergovernmental. The insistence to subject 
sensitive issues to intergovernmental cooperation may be an implicit recognition 
that only the Member States can legitimately legislate in sensitive to national 
sovereignty policy areas. As Eileen Denza remarks, -59 `if the only option 
available were the Community method or no legal framework at all, the Member 
States would in some contexts choose to have no legal framework'. Maybe this 
approach is realistic as it acknowledges that different policies call for different 
approaches. 60 Therefore, it would be appropriate to say that, even under the 
Constitutional Treaty, the Community method is a synthesis of the supranational 
and intergovernmental elements of decision-making, while the Council is 
increasingly under the tight rein of an intergovernmental body par excellence: 61 
the European Council. 
3.3.1 The European Council's strategic leadership in decision-making 
The European Council is said to be a `source of gravitas' of the integration 
process by setting and steering major integration goals such as enlargement, 
which also shape the scope of institutional reform. 62 It increasingly seeks to 
assert its leadership role in both the political and institutional development of 
subject sensitive issues like Economic Growth'3 as well as Freedom, Security 
s' E. Dcnza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the EU. OUP, 2002, p. 5. 
60 G. Milton and J. Kcllcr-Nocllct, The European Constitution - its origins, negotiation and 
meaning, John Harper Publishing, 2005, p. 54. 
61 J-L. Qucrmonnc, op. cit. n. 51. 
62 Copenhagen European Council Conclusions, Nr. 15917/02,12-13.12.2002. S. Douglas-Scott, 
op. cit. it 11. p. 96-7. 
Brussels European Council Conclusions of 20-21.03.2003, Nr. 8410/0320. Brussels European 
Council Conclusions of 16-17.10.2003, Nr. 15188/03. Brussels European Council Conclusions of 
25-26.03.2004, Nr. 9048/04. 
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and Justice. " Especially in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (RIA) tile 
European Council's initiatives are quite ambitious. " Having laid the foundations 
for action and established the cross-border prosecution agency `Eurojust' at 
Tampere, it further developed and adopted a new multi annual programme, 
known as the Hague Programme, which deals with all aspects of policies relating 
to the area of freedom, security and justice, including their external dimension, 
notably fundamental rights and citizenship, asylum and migration, border 
management, integration, the fight against terrorism and organised crime, justice 
and police cooperation, and civil law. 
The European Council is not an institution responsible for attaining the 
objectives of the EU, pursuant to Article 7 EC. Therefore, the European Council 
does not appear to be bound by the constitutional principle of attribution of 
powers and the obligation to act within the limits of its powers found therein. 
Still, it seems to fulfil a `perceived need for a focus of authority at the highest 
political level' and has developed into a system of `institutional summitry' which 
has detracted from the power of the three institutions. '6 As Peter Ludlow rightly 
observes, 67 the European Council's responsibilities are comprehensive rather 
than limited to the extent that the reference, made in Valerie Giscard d'Estaing's 
first Convention Draft, to the institution as `the highest authority of the Union' is 
simply a statement of fact. By simply reading the presidency conclusions, one 
may find ample evidence that it is the European Council that determines what the 
other institutions can or cannot do. It plays a very important role in the political 
process of the EU by setting strategic guidelines and generating political impetus, 
taking general policy decisions, but most importantly, directing the evolution of 
the Union. Therefore, it was an inevitable outcome that the Convention reviewed 
the basic institutional set up of the Union to constitutionalise the European 
6' Brussels European Council Conclusions of 17-18.06.2004, Nr. 10679/2/04 REV2. 
as See Tampere European Council Conclusions of 15-16.10.1999, Nr. 200/1/99. Brussels 
European Council Conclusions of 4-5.11.2004, Nr. 14292/M4 REV 1. Brussels European 
Council Conclusions of 16-17.06.2005, Nr. 10255/05. 
"DcBurca, op. cit. n. 8, p. 64. Andersen and Eliasscn, op. cit. n. 14, p. 27. 
67 P. Ludlow, A New from Brussels. Leadership in an Enlarged EU, Briefing Note Vol. 3, N. 8, 
EuroComment, 2005, p. 31. 
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Council's institutional role. " The political leadership structure of the Union is 
further reinforced by the permanent leadership in the European Council. With a 
permanent President, `the European Council is not just an event, it is a process. '69 
The European Council's constitutional role, as envisaged in the treaties, is 
political rather than legal. Its function of setting strategic guidelines and 
generating political impetus is delineated in Articles 4 and 13 TEU as an initial 
procedural step. Yet, it often emerges as the de facto higher level decision-maker 
in the EU without constitutional foundations for this role. At Lisbon, the 
European Council endorsed the `knowledge-based Europe' project and, there 
onwards, it invented and codified a new method of open coordination in the field 
of employment involving, among other things, benchmarking and measuring best 
practice through commonly agreed indications and scoreboards. 70 Article 128 
TEC generally allows for the European Council to play a minimal role in policy- 
making in terms of assessing the employment situation in the Union, adopting 
conclusions and providing guidelines for the Member States. Employment is also 
one of the objectives of the EU, found in Articles 2 and 3 TEC, to be attained by 
the Community institutions and no such role is ascribed to the European Council. 
Even though the method involves all three components of the `institutional 
triangle' - EP, Council, Commission - the European Council is in the driving 
seat. 71 This may not be strictly speaking a new legal basis for action in the field 
of employment, but it may be interpreted as an implementation of Article 128. 
It seems that, again, reservations about the `governmental' element of the 
Community method with the ever-expanding use of QMV give decision-making 
by consensus a new lease of life by the increasingly powerful European Council. 
This is evident in Article 11(2) TEC72 and Article 23(2) TEU73 where 
`problematic' areas of decision-making appear to be transferred to a higher 
" In Article I. 19 TcCE, the European Council is formally rccogniscd as an institution of the 
Union in its own right cvcn though its function will continue to be confined to issuing general 
policy guidelines, without any participation in the legislative process. 
9 P. Ludlow, op. cit. n. 67, p. 33. 
70 Lisbon European Council Conclusions, Nr. 100/1/00,23-24.03.2000. Part II, Barcelona 
European Council Conclusions, Nr: 100/1/02,15-16.03.2002. 
" Jean-Lois Qucrmonnc, op. cit. n. 51. 
n Right of veto at European summits disappears with Nice. 
73 Member States who want to block decisions can still do it at the European Council Ievcl. 
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institutional level - from the Council to the European Council - and even more so 
in the new Constitutional Treaty where, in provisions like `passarelle', '4 
`emergency brake' procedure7s and the general `bridging' clause, 76 the European 
Council appears to exercise a legislative function contrary to Article 1-20 TeCE 
which expressly precludes such role for the institution. The Constitutional Treaty 
further stipulates that certain decisions of more institutional nature will be taken 
by the European Council, such as the composition of the EP (Article 1-20), the 
arrangements for the rotating presidency of the Council (Article 1-24) and the 
system of equal rotation for the composition of the Commission (Article 1 -26). 
The notion of `institutional balance' which rests on a trialogue between the 
Parliament, Council and Commission detracts from the fact that some important 
changes that have taken place outside the formal institutional framework, have 
still become a central element of the institutional system. 77 At face value, the 
provision of a policy impetus appears to subsist in order to facilitate the decision- 
making in the Council, rather than upset the institutional status quo. Yet, the 
impact of the European Council's leadership role on gearing the Council's 
institutional reform and on the Commission's traditional right of initiative 
74 Article IV-443 TeCE. This procedure will allow the European Council in future to decide by 
unanimity, without treaty revision, upon the transfer of new policy areas from unanimity to 
QMV. This rule marks a major relaxation of existing rules which require both an IGC and a 
ratification process in each Member State to facilitate a shift from unanimity to QMV. However, 
obtaining unanimous agreement to unlock the passarelle may be difficult particularly due to the 
power of a single national parliament to block a unanimous decision of the European Council to 
remove the national veto from areas of legislation in Part III TcCE. 
's In the three sensitive areas where QMV applies, namely, free movement of workcrs/social 
security (Article 111-136), judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Article 111-270) and 
approximation of definitions of criminal offences (Article 111-271), a Member State may appeal 
to the European Council, in which case the legislative procedure is suspended. The European 
Council must discuss the proposal in question and within three months either send the draft back 
to the Council, which will continue with the procedure taking into account the discussions within 
the European Council, or ask the Commission to present a new draft, which means the initiative 
considered not to have been adopted. 
"Out of the four old legislative procedures only codccision is retained as an ordinary legislative 
procedure. New special legislative procedures arc envisaged. Article 1-34 states that in certain 
cases specified by the Constitution laws and framework laws may be adopted by the Council 
alone or more rarely by the EP alone rather by the two jointly. A general `bridging clause' offers 
the option of switching to the ordinary legislative procedure; this can be authorised by the 
European Council acting unanimously (Article 111-444). 
" IH. Wallace, `Designing Institutions for an Enlarging European Union', in Ten Reflections on 
the EU Constitutional Treatyfor Europe, D. dcWittc (cd), 2003, p. 97, CONV 703/03, Study by 
the EUI presented by Vice-President Amato, 2 April 2003, p. 90. 
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requires attention. As Joerg Monar observes, 7 much of the Tampere agenda 
could have been formally proposed by the Commission. The same stands for 
employment policy. The European Council is not strictly an institution (listed in 
Article 7 EC), but it would be unrealistic to deny it any longer a place in the 
broader institutional framework of the Union. 79 Under the new TeCE provisions, 
its formal institutional role, combined with the Presidency, inserts the European 
Council into the institutional system as an autonomous institution and not as a 
special formation of the Council. From the perspective of democratic legitimacy, 
the European Council's role is not unproblematic as its decisions are not subject 
to parliamentary control at either EU or national level. 80 Conventionally, the 
acceptability of this situation rested on the fact that its decisions were not legally 
binding. Currently, its lack of institutional status means that it is not subject to 
the jurisdiction of the ECJ, and consequently to the rule of law, unless it 
encroaches on actions taken by the EC institutions under the Treaty. 81 Far from 
being a victory for democracy, any reluctance to constitutionally realise the true 
extent of the European Council's position in the Union's institutional architecture 
deflects from the necessity to make it more accountable. 
3.3.2 Interinstitutional dynamics and the use of `soft' law" 
Interinstitutional relations are a key aspect of the EU legislative process. The 
treaties govern only the basic principles of the operation of the specific 
legislative procedures and set out the general competences of the institutions, 
" J. Monar, 'Decision-making in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice', in A. Arnull and 
D. Wincott (eds), op. cit. n. 54, pp. 67 and 70. 
79 Maybe that is the intention of Article 3 TEU which does not list specific institutions as does 
Article 7 TEU. 
B0 Unless the passarelle clause comes into effect, which gives national parliaments considerable 
rower in relation to the European Council. 
Case C-170-96, op. cit n. 50. S. Douglas-Scott, op. cit n. 11, p. 96. Under Article 47 TEU, the 
incorporation of the European Council into the EU Treaty did not change the powers conferred 
on the institutions by the Community Treaties. 
"' A comprehensive analysis of the nature and role of `sott' law instruments in the EU legislative 
process is outside the main scope of the present thesis, as it concerns the attribution of 
compctcnccs and balance of power between Member States and the EU, that is, the frequent 
unwillingness of the former to transfer more decision-making compctcnccs to the supranational 
level or engage in new forms of'hard' law coordination. 
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whereas the particulars are left to be determined by interinstitutional dynamics. 
For the most part, institutional change yielded by successive treaty amendments 
has not been so much the result of formal negotiations, but rather represents the 
sanctioning of established informal practices, like the use of interinstitutional 
agreements (IIAs). 83Hence, quasi-formal and informal procedures may emerge 
around decision-making and even if influenced by the formal treaty environment, 
they are not fully determined by it, as they originate from and are enforced by the 
institutions themselves. In his study of EU decision-making, referring to 
committees, M. Van Schendelen maintains that `the Treaties ... are not a reliable 
and valid indicator of the empirical reality of European decision-making'. 84 And 
the empirical reality of the evolving EU institutional practice is that, due to the 
openendedness of the treaties, the actual machinery of law-making may be ad 
hoc and unconstrained by formal rules. 
The institutions frequently use all the political and legal means available to 
increase their impact on the decision-making process and to defend their 
prerogatives. This interinstitutional dynamic is enhanced by the lacunae character 
of the treaties which leaves much room for different interpretations of the 
institutional roles and the application of legislative procedures. Such was the case 
with codecision. While the procedure constitutionally enhanced the EP's 
legislative role vis-a-vis the Council and the Commission, its practical 
arrangements were the product of years of informal interactions between the 
institutions, formalised by the adoption of joint declarations on the practical 
arrangements regarding the operation of codecision. The 1999 Joint Declaration, 
unlike the 1993 Agreement it replaces, covers the whole procedure and, while it 
reflects the formal changes in interinstitutional relations stemming from the 
Amsterdam Treaty, it seeks to encourage rather than rigidly mandate the 
development of contacts at all stages between the institutions. ss In the interest of 
83 EP Report A4-0117/98 on improvements in the functioning of the institutions without 
modification of the Trcatics-making EU policies more open and democratic. Rapportcur. 
Herman, PE225.909,23.05.1998. 
8` M. Van Schcndclcn, `The Council Decides: Does the Council Decide? ', (1996) 34 JCMS 531- 
548. 
ss H Farrell and A. Hcriticr, `Formal and Informal Institutions under Codccision: Continuous 
Constitutional Building in Europe', EIoP 6/02. Joint Declaration on Practical arrangements for 
the New Codccision Procedure, 1999 OJC 148. EP Report A4-0206/99 on the Joint Declaration 
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better law-making, 8' the three institutions have further agreed on the general 
coordination of their preparatory and legislative work based on dialogue and 
appropriate procedures, including the provision by the Commission with clear 
and comprehensive justification for the legal basis used for each proposal. In the 
event of a change being made to the legal basis after any Commission proposal 
has been presented, the European Parliament is to be duly reconsulted by the 
institution concerned, in full compliance with the case-law of the Court of 
Justice. 
As Amaryllis Verhoeven argues, the principle of institutional balance flows also 
from the duty of sincere cooperation to which EU institutions are bound and the 
rather widespread phenomenon of interinstitutional agreements underscores the 
importance of such balance as they are essentially about facilitating relations 
among the institutions and perfecting the equilibrium among the competing and 
evolving interests they represents' The EP itself sees the conclusion of 
interinstitutional agreements, and not necessarily formal treaty amendments, the 
way to enhance its legislative role and reduce the democratic deficit caused by 
the absence of democratic (parliamentary) scrutiny of EU policy areas. 88 For 
instance, the 2002 Draft Intrinstitutional Agreement on access to Council 
sensitive documents is connected in its substance with Article 21 TEU, pursuant 
to which the Council Presidency consults Parliament on issues of foreign, 
security and defence policy and ensures that the latter's views are carefully taken 
into consideration. " The Parliament may substantially influence foreign policy 
through its exercise of budgetary control under the Interinstitutional Agreement 
on Practical arrangements for the New Codccision Procedure. Rapportcur: Manzclla, PE230.581, 
21.04.1999. 
N EP, the Council and the Commission Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making OJC 
321/1,31.12.2003. 
' A. Vcrhocvcn, The EU In Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory, Kluwer Law 
International, 2002, p. 207. 
8S EP Report A4-0117/98 on improvements in the functioning of the institutions without 
modification of the Treaties-making EU policies more open and democratic. Rapportcur: 
Herman, PE225.909,23.03.1998. EP Report A4-0158/99 on improvements in the functioning of 
the institutions without modification of the Treaties. Rapportcur. Herman, PE229.072, 
26.03.1999. 
s9 EP Report A5-0329/2002 on an Interinstitutional Agreement concerning access by the EP to 
sensitive information of the Council in the field of security and defence policy and on 
amendments to the Rules of Procedure. Rapporteur. Brok, PE313.404,07.10.2002. 
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on provisions regarding the financing of the CFSP, as amended in 1999. ' In this 
way, the Parliament's involvement in the conduct of foreign policy is more 
considerable than under its formal, treaty powers. 
Moreover, actors like the Parliament with relatively little direct influence over 
formal treaty negotiations, may have an important indirect influence insofar as 
treaty changes reflect informal rules which they have bargained over. 91 When 
codecision was introduced (at Maastricht) and the Council opted to view the 
reforms as a `cosmetic enhancement' to the EP's consultative role in law- 
making, the latter tried to attain institutional leverage by threatening to hamper 
the legislative process as much as possible. The institutional rankling culminated 
in the Directive on Voice Telephony in 1994, where the credible threat by the EP 
to vote against the Council's common position, if reintroduced, established the 
informal expectation that the Council would not seek to use its formal third 
reading ability to reintroduce a common position after conciliation had failed. 
This institutionalisation of informal relations led to the formal revision of 
codecision at Amsterdam. 92 Firstly, the Council's ability to reintroduce its 
common position was removed. Secondly, the possibility of early agreement 
between the Council and the EP was introduced. 
In practice the institutions make use of a far broader range of soft law 
instruments. These may include resolutions and declarations, action programmes 
indicating a future course of conduct, decisions of the representatives of the 
Member States meeting in Council, guidelines issued by institutions as to how 
they will exercise their powers. Therefore, the use of soft law instruments directs 
the conduct of the EU institutions by providing a framework for the organisation 
of relations among themselves, which creates commitment on their part to 
90 OJC 286/80,22.9.97. It was subsequently replaced by the Intcrinstitutional Agreement of 6 
May 1999 between the EP, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and 
improvement of the budgetary procedure, OJ C 172/1,18.6.1999. On the basis of the preliminary 
draft budget established by the Commission, the Parliament and the Council shall annually secure 
an agreement on the amount of the operational CFSP expenditure, where the former will have the 
final word. 
91 J. Monar, `Interinstitutional Agreements: The Phenomenon and its New Dynamic af1cr 
Maastricht', (1994) 31 CMLR 693-719, p. 695. 
92 ibid. 
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respect certain values93 and expectations as to their position under Community 
law. 
Despite the fact that they regulate institutional conduct during decision-making, 
the legal status of `soft' law instruments is ambivalent, as they do not fall in one 
of the categories of Community legal acts mentioned in Article 249 EC. They are 
obviously `acts' of the institutions and the treaties provide in a number of cases, 
like Article 218(1) EC, for special accords between the institutions. The legal 
situation has not changed much under the TeCE. The reclassification has been 
limited more or less to the same instruments that are already regulated in the EC 
Treaty, while there is only indirect reference to `sot' law instruments. More 
precisely, Article 1-33(2) provides that, when considering draft legislative acts, 
the EP and the Council shall refrain from adopting acts not provided for by the 
relevant legislative procedure. On the other hand, in assessing appeals under 
Article 230 EC, 94 the Court has said that the system of Community acts is not 
closed and as to whether a particular act intends to produce legal effects, that is 
to be decided on the specific merits of that act. In the absence of `inherent' 
legally binding force, an act can still be found to have `incidental' legally binding 
force (if it affects the legal position of those concerned). It appears that under EC 
law a Community act may have legal effect, if it is capable of altering a person's 
legal rights and obligations. 95 
With particular reference to IIAs, the ECJ 96 has always acknowledged their legal 
authority as binding commitments between the institutions in the light of the 
principle of interinstitutional cooperation laid down in Article 10 EC, yet IIAs 
were dealt with officially only at Nice, where a Declaration was attached to the 
Treaty. It reiterates the Court's position that relations between the Community 
93 On the First Action Programme, sec 1973 OJC 112.77hc adoption of Action Programmes is 
now explicitly recognised in Article 130s(3) EC. Joint Declaration by the EP, the Council and the 
Commisssion on Human Rights, [19771 OJ C103/1 Which commits the institutions to respect 
these rights _D. Chalmers, EU Law: Law and EU Government. Mol. 1, Ashgate Publishing Group, 1998, p. 161-2. L. Scndcn, Soft Law in European Community Law, Hart Publishing, 2004, p. 498. 
9' Article 230 EC provides for the possibility of bringing an action for annulment of Community 
acts other than recommendations and opinions. 
95 Sec, for example, Case C-400/99 Italy v Commission [20011 ECRI-7303. L. Scndcn, op. cit. 
n. 93, p. 238. 
% C-106/96 UK v Commission [ 19981 ECR 1-2729. 
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institutions arc to be governed by the duty to cooperate sincerely, but such 
agreements can neither change nor supplement the provisions of the Treaty and 
can only be concluded with the agreement of the three institutions (Council, 
Parliament and Commission). The Declaration itself has political rather than 
legal effect, but is intended as an institutional rebalancing measure attempting to 
put the three institutions on equal footing.? There is an attempt to settle the 
constitutional status of IIAs by the TeCE, Article 111-397, where their binding 
nature is envisaged as part of interinstitutional cooperation. 
The effect of `soft' law instruments on the institutional balance is evident 
particularly in cases where the EC Treaty provides for the adoption of a 
Commission or Council recommendation, or leaves open the choice of 
instrument, whilst it prescribes a specific decision-making procedure (e. g. Article 
175(3) EC prescribes the adoption of general action programmes according to the 
codecision procedure). In this context, illustrative of the tendency of the 
institutions to transgress their powers is the following quotation from the EP 
resolution relating to the Commission Communication on certain legal aspects 
concerning intra-EU investment (Golden Share): `the content of the above- 
mentioned communication cannot be seen as binding, since the Commission 
clearly overstretched its powers by not discussing this important item of `soft 
law' with the Council and the EP'. 9 
Another issue is the impact of `soft' law on the Union's democratic legitimacy in 
terms of how their use affects the influence of citizens - and not just their 
representatives - on the decision-making process. `Soft' law has been described 
as `rules of conduct which find themselves on the legally non-binding level but 
which according to their drafters have to be accorded a legal scope'. " As already 
mentioned, any act, including `sofft' law instruments, may be found by the ECJ to 
have `incidental' legally binding force, thus affecting the legal position of 
persons. Their obscure status raises doubts about their legal authority and 
97 D. Galloway, op. cit n. 37, p. 159. SEC(2001)99, op. cit. n. 28. Declaration on Article 10 TEC, 
annexed to the Treaty of Nice. 98 L. Scndcn, op. cit. n. 93, p. 68. EP resolution 135-0249,0250,0255 and 0250/2001on the updating 
of certain legal aspects conccming intra EU investment, OJC 21 E/338,24.1.2002. 
" S. Douglas-Scott. op. cit. n. 11, p. 115. KC Wcllcns and GM Borchardt, 'Soft Law in EC Law', 
(1989) ELR 267-321, p. 285. 
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punitive quality, their conformity to principles found in the treaties, let alone the 
substantive normative constraints which `hard' law must comply with. As acts, 
they may produce legal effects but still bypass normal systems of 
accountability. 100 A stark example is the case of economic coordination among 
the euro-zone Member States (Eurogroup). While monetary policy is centralised 
and conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) based on `hard' rules that 
sanction non-compliance, Member States remain responsible for the conduct of 
their economic policies according to broad economic policy guidelines which 
have the legal status of recommendations. Such coordination uses informal 
working methods among ministers, where confidentiality is an integral part of 
their work. These informal circles of ministers which can have a considerable 
impact on decision-making and directly affect the life of citizens are difficult to 
control. '°' On the other hand a question arises, which will be explored in Chapter 
6, as to what extent democratic legitimation of the decision-making process can 
come about through increased participation of the citizen in the process of policy 
preparation in an informal way through the use of `soft' law. 
While one would not necessarily question the necessity of `sot' law instruments 
in terms of efficiency, their use may appear problematic in the light of the 
Union's commitment to the rule of law and democracy. Their proliferation is a 
point of concern as it is less clear what requirements actually apply to their 
adoption, how their use fits in with the formal, legally binding instruments and, 
last but not least, what rights and duties they create. '°2 If their growing use is a 
sign of the essential place of `sofft' law in the decision-making system of the EU, 
the systematic failure to make their regime more visible is a disappointing feature 
of successive institutional reforms, especially in the context of hierarchy of 
instruments. 
10° D. Trubck, P. Cottrcll, and M. Nancc, ""Sott Law", "Hard Law", and European lntcgration: 
Toward a Theory of Hybridity', JM WP02/05. 101 U. Pucttcr, `Informal Circles of Ministers: A Way out of the EU's Institutional Dilemmas? ', 
(2003) 9 ELJ 109-124, pp. 109-124 and 122. 
102 L. Scndcn, op. cit. n. 93, pp. 477-478 and 497. 
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3.4 The debate on transparency: simplified and oven decision-makina, 
The peculiarities of EU decision-making described so far, such as the complexity 
of the pillar structure, the proliferation of acts and instruments that can emanate 
from informal practices of the institutions (and other actors), the obscurity 
regarding the European Council's role and the Council's internal workings, raise 
real concerns about the existence of adequate and visible normative controls as to 
the rules regarding the particulars of decision-making and the limits of 
institutional activity. Opening up the legislative process is essential for 
democratic policy-making as citizens should have sufficient information about 
the objectives of legislation, as well as its process and the balance of the exercise 
of vested powers among the EU institutions. Therefore, it is regarded as essential 
to the democratic process that individuals are able to understand decision-making 
and the means by which decision-makers have reached their conclusions, in order 
to effectively evaluate policies and attribute responsibility. 103 According to the 
Court of First Instance (CFI), `transparency... is essential to enable citizens to 
carry out genuine and efficient monitoring of the exercise of power vested in 
Community institutions. "04 In short, lack of transparency impedes democratic 
control and oversight. As Juliet Lodge points out, 10'5 transparency and openness 
`are frequently coupled together in EU parlance and are portrayed as 
synonymous'. 
Transparency can be defined, on the one hand, as simple and clear procedures 
regarding the organisation and function of the institutions and the decision- 
making process and, on the other, as an open process of decision-making with 
effective public access to documents relating to such process. Seen in terms of 
103 D. Curtin, 'Democracy, Transparency and Political Participation: Some Progress Post- 
Amsterdam', in Openness and Transparency in the EU, V. Dcckmyn and I. Tomson (eds), 
European Institute of Public Administration, 1998, p. 107. B. Bjurulf and O. Elgstrom, 
'Negotiating Transparency: the Role of Institution', (2004) 42 JCMS 249-269, p. 252. 104 Case T-92/98 Interporc v. Commission (Interporc! ) (1999] ECR 11-3521, para. 39. S. Douglas- 
Scott, op. cit. n. 11, p. 143. 
'os JLodge, 'Transparency and EU Governance: Balancing Opcncss and Security', (2003) 11 
Journal of Contemporary European Studies 95-117, pp. 95-6. Sec also, C. Moscr, 'slow open is 
"open as possible"? Three different approaches to transparency and openness in regulating access 
to EU documents', Rcihc Politikwisscnschaf 80/01. Study on Secrecy and Openness in the EU 
by Tony Bunyan, Statcwatch, 1.10.02. Available at http: //www. frccdominfo. org; accessed on 
4.10.02. A. Pctcrs, 'European Democracy after the 2003 Convention', (2004) 41 CMLR 37-85, 
p. 63. 
69 
democratic accountability, simplification indicates the intent to shape legislation 
in a more `citizen-centred' manner to increase legitimacy through 
accessibility. 106 What actually simplification signifies is to be found in the 
Convention debates and recommendations. To simplify means `to make 
comprehensible', but also to provide a guarantee that acts with the same legal or 
political force have the same foundation in terms of democratic legitimacy. 
Legislative procedures must therefore be reviewed to ensure that they respect this 
simple principle: acts which have the same nature and the same legal effect must 
be produced by the same democratic procedure. This will lead to a clearer 
hierarchy of legislation, which is the consequence of a better separation of 
powers, `not with the aim of paying tribute to Montesquicu, but out of concern 
for democracy'. 107 A certain degree of complexity is inevitable purely from the 
fact that the EU is a multilayered and multisectoral political system, however, 
simplification of the Union's institutional framework was not genuinely 
considered as part of constitutional reforms. While the Treaty establishing the 
European Union, in 1993, acknowledged a need for `consistency' of the Union 
activities- (TEU, Article C, now 3), it retained the multitude of different 
instruments and different entities forming the Union. Ultimately, the need for 
simplification was expressed at the 1996 Turin European Council which called 
for the IGC `to simplify the Treaties and to make the aims and the functioning of 
the Union more comprehensible to the citizen'. 108 Later, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam enshrined the term `simplification' as the heading of its Part 11 
(Articles 6-11 TEC). 
Simplification was a constitutional reform topic at the Convention. The Working 
Group's report addressed separately the simplification of instruments, including 
the hierarchy of legislation and the simplification of legislative procedures. 
Consequently, one may find in the Constitutional Treaty a more simplified 
structure in terms of decision-making rules, a separation between legislative and 
implementing acts, not to mention the structural simplification of the treaties 
106 RBicbcr and C. Amarcllc, op. cit. n. 48, p. 220. 107 CONV 424/02, Final report of Working Group IX on Simplification, 29.11.2002. tos Turin European Council Conclusions, Nr. SN100/1/96,29.03.1996. 
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which will improve the comprehensibility of the system. '" More precisely, the 
typology of acts is limited to six instruments: law, framework law, regulation, 
decision, recommendation and opinion. Article 1-33 TeCE puts an end to the 
proliferation of acts which had progressively led to the use of more than fifteen, 
namely, the five basic acts in Article 249 TEC and numerous atypical acts such 
as resolutions, guidelines, etc. For the very first time, a distinction is made 
between legislative (Article 1-34) and non-legislative (Article 1-35) acts and, 
unlike the current treaties, each legal basis in the TeCE specifics the type of 
instrument which shall be used to implement it. 
The commitment found in the Treaty for an `ever closer Union', where decisions 
are to be taken as closely as possible to its citizens, placed the issue of 'public 
access' at the core of legislative activity. Transparency rules on access came first 
on the agenda in the early 1990s. A declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty 
linked transparency firmly to democratic government as it stated that the 
Conference considered that the transparency of the decision-making process 
would strengthen the democratic nature of the institutions and the public's 
confidence in the administration. 10 Following a series of `sot' law measures 
reaffirming the commitment to open and democratic government as well as the 
adapting of the institutions' working practices to this effect, "' in December 
1993 the Council and the Commission adopted a common Code of Conduct on 
public access to documents which was implemented by way of decisions. 112 The 
aim pursued by the 1993 Council and the 1994 Commission Decisions was to 
give effect to the principle of the largest possible access for citizens to 
information with a view to strengthening the democratic character of the 
109 B. dcWittc, op. cit. n. 57, p. 1255. CONY 424/02, op. cit. n. 107. A. Pctcrs, op. cil n. 105, p-65- 
110 Declaration No. 17 on the right of access to information annexed tot ch Final Act of the Treaty 
on European Union, 7.2.92. C. Harlow, Accountabilily in the EU, OUP, 2002, p. 37. 
"' Birmingham Declaration-A community close to citizens, 16.10.1992, Bulletin of the European 
Communities, No. 10-1992, p. 9. Edinburgh European Council Conclusions on transparency and 
implementation of the Birmingham Declaration, 12.12.1992, Bulletin of the European 
Communities, No. 12-1992, pp. 18-20. Copenhagen European Council Conclusions on access to 
information, 21-22.6.1993, Doc. 180/1/93. Intcristitutional Agreement between the EP, the 
Council and the Commission on democracy, transparency and subsidiarity, 25.10.1993, Bulletin 
of the European Communities, No. 10-1993, p. 118-9. 
112 Code of Conduct concerning public access to documents, approved by the Council and the 
Commission, [1993] OJ L340/41. Decision 93/731 on public access to Council documents, 
[1993] OJ L340/43 and Decision 94/90 on public access to Commission documents, [1994] OJ 
L46/58. 
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institutions. 13 Any exception to that right of access must be interpreted and 
applied strictly. "4 The right of access does not apply to documents which do not 
exist. 115 A broad appreciation of the right of access to documents as a general 
principle seems to have emerged in the Guardian16 case, where the newspaper 
requested access to COREPER preparatory documents, minutes, attendance and 
voting records as well as decisions taken by each Council (different formations). 
Such demand was rejected by the Council pursuant to Article 4(l) of the 
Decision on the basis of protecting the confidentiality of its proceedings. The 
CFI rejected the Council's position, ordered the release of documents, but 
stressed the necessity of counter-balancing the public interest to access to 
documents and the need to protect internal proceedings. 
A new Regulation was adopted in May 2001, amid controversy, to implement the 
new Article 255 TEC with the aim, contrary to pre-existing rules, to establish a 
`right' of public access to documents. "' It begins by referring to the principle of 
taking decisions `as openly as possible' and acknowledges openness as a means 
of enabling citizens to participate in decision-making and as a guarantor of 
democracy and legitimacy of the system (Recitals I and 2). The most important 
aspect of the Regulation is its broad purpose, scope and beneficiaries (Article 
113 Case T-174/95 Svenska Journalistförbundet v Council [19981 ECR 11-2289, para. 66. 
114 Case C-41/00 Interporc v Commission [2003] ECR 1-2125, para48. 
"s T-311/00 British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd, v Commission [2002] ECR 11-2781, 
para. 35. 
16 Case T-194/94 John Carvel and Guardian Newspapers v Council [1995] ECR 11-2765. The 
same strict application of the `right of access' is found in the Case T-105/95 W41r, v. Commission 
119971 ECR 11-313, which is a challenge to the 1994 Commission Decision. 
17 During the preparation of a new regulation and contrary to the spirit of transparency and 
openness, the Council, in an apparent act of bad faith and in an unannounced move to meet 
NATO demands, made far-reaching changes to its 1993 Decision without consulting national 
parliaments and the EP. Such amendments were agreed at the meeting of COREPER, in July 
2000, and later adopted by "written procedure". It did not only change the 1993 Decision but also 
overturned the Council Decision of December 1999 to the extent that it excluded from public 
access documents relating to the security and defence policy of the Union, military and civilian 
crisis management as well as any category of linked documents which `enables conclusions to be 
drawn' regarding the existence of another classified document without the express permission in 
writing of the author. On the application by Statewatch for access to the amendments, the Council 
refused access on the ground of the undemocratic argument that the release 'could fuel public 
discussion on the subject'. Recital 4 of Regulation No. 1049/2001 of the EP and of the Council of 
30 May 2001 regarding public access to EP, Council and Commission documents, [2001] OJ 
L145/43,31.05.2001. Council Decision 2000/23 on the improvement of information on the 
Council's legislative activities and the public register of Council documents, 6.12.99, [2000) OJ 
L9. 'Solana Decision': Council Decision 2000/527 of 14.6.00, [2000] OJ L212. Essays for an 
Open Europe, T. ßunyan, D. Curtin and A. Whitc, European Federation of Journalists, November 
2000. Available at littp: //www. statcwatch. org/secrct/cssays. pdf-, accessed 4.10.2002. 
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2(1)), while it applies to all documents that are in the institution's possession, no 
matter who the author, in all areas of activity of the EU (Article 3). As with the 
old legal regime, there are far-reaching exceptions"8 which are also 
consolidated, extended and divided into categories and sub-categories. To the 
CFI, 19 the Regulation establishes the principles, conditions and limitations 
governing the exercise of the right of public access to the documents of the 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission, in order to ensure that the 
administration acts with greater propriety, efficiency and responsibility vis-a-vis 
the citizens in a democratic system and to help strengthen the principles of 
democracy and respect for fundamental rights. Accordingly, the CFI has 
interpreted the right of access broadly, 120 but for the treatment of pleas based on 
an infringement of Article 4(5) which the Court has applied vigorously and has 
systematically evaded an assessment of the merits of a refusal to disclosure. For 
instance, in Messina, 121 it construed the Article in a manner consistent with 
Declaration No 35, annexed to the final act of Amsterdam, to enable a Member 
State to give its consent to disclosure where an application for access is made in 
relation to a document originating from that State. This interpretation is 
consistent with the wording of Article 4(5) of the Regulation, however the 
analogy with the Declaration is not. Neither is its interpretation in II-TVA and 
Scippacercola'22 to the effect that any request for non-disclosure made by a 
Member State constitutes an instruction by which the institution is bound to 
comply. 
Attitudes as to the extent to which citizens should be granted access to public 
documents vary widely from one jurisdiction to another. The case of Svei"ska 
Journalislforbundet illustrates the disparity in access afforded to the public 
between a Member State like Sweden and the EU, as well as the treatment of the 
" Recital 3, Articles 4,9 and 18. Article 4 exception arc designed to protect the follo%%ing 
public interests: 1) public security, 2) defence and military matters; 3) international relations; 4) 
the financial, monetary and economic policy of the Community or a Member State; 5) the privacy 
and the integrity of the individual; 6) commercial interests, including intellectual property; 7) 
court proceedings and legal advice, and 8) inspections, investigations and audits. 
119 Case T-84/03, Afaurizio Turco v Council, judgment of 23.11.2004, not yet reported, para. 53. 
120 Case T-76/02, Mara Alessina v Commission 120031 ECR 11-3202. Case T-168/02, IFA It' v 
Commission, judgment of 30.11.2004, not yet reported. 
121 Case T-76/02, ibid, para. 41. 
122 Case T-187/03, Isabella Scippacercola v Commission, judgment of 17.03.2005, not yet 
reported, paras. 58-60 and Case T-168/02, op. cit. n. 120, para. 57. 
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access right in different Member States. W Having said that, the issue is not 
whether the EU matches the transparency provisions found in the Member States. 
The many levels of government, the multiplicity of actors and procedures, the 
geographical autonomy or even insulation of the institutions and decision- 
making, the hardly existent European public space - at least one that resonates 
the protest and criticism often found in national systems124 - mean that the onus 
on the EU is higher to provide for democratic control and oversight of its 
institutional system. 
Transparency rules were formalised by their de jure incorporation in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, allowing the ECJ to monitor their implementation. A `norm' of 
legislative openness had, therefore, been formally acknowledged as an 
operational principle. 12*5 The new Article I TEU required that EU decisions be 
taken as openly as possible, whereas a new Article 255 TEC created a relatively 
limited right of access to the EP, Council and Commission documents, where 
general principles, limits and procedure were to be defined by legislation to be 
adopted under codecision. Greater transparency is recognised formally by the 
Constitutional Treaty as part of the democratic life of the Union (Title VI), but 
what appears more notable, as regards the functioning of the democratic process, 
is the novel principle of `publicity' enshrined in Article 1-50 TeCE, 121 that is, the 
general `active' duty to legislate in public and to publish legislative material. 
lu The Swedish authorities applied their citizens' right of access to information in respect of 
documents relating to EU activities more openly than the Council, as they granted access to 18 
out of 20 documents requested. The Council did exactly the opposite. It further claimed that the 
release of the documents in Sweden constituted a breach of Community law. The Swedish and 
Dutch Governments supported the applicant's arguments as to admissibility. On the other hand, 
the UK Government shared the Council's view that the applicant's interest was general and 
political in nature, the intention being to ensure that the Council gave proper effect to its own 
Code of Conduct and Decision 93/731. The applicant could not derive any benefit from obtaining 
access to documents which were already in its possession. The applicant's insufficient interest in 
the outcome of the proceedings constituted an abuse of procedure. Case T-174/95, op. cit. n. 113. 
W. Van Gcrvcn, op. cit n. 47, p. 225. 
124 C. Harlow, op. cit. n. 110, p. 33. 
12S D. Cluyssochoou, 'Models of Democracy and the European Polity', CIVIC 1/2001. 
1: 6 Under Articles 1-50(3) and 111-399 TcCE, the institutions will lay down in their rules of 
procedure the specific provisions for public access to documents. The right of access is also 
contained in the Charter, Article 11-102 TcCE, Article and 1-47(2) and Preamble in Part I, which 
do not expand the one already found in Article 255 EC apart from the fact that access to 
documents of agencies and bodies created by the legislator is now guaranteed at constitutional 
level., not only by secondary law. 
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As the Union's approach to transparency is not that of a standard international 
organisation, it needs to operate as a balancing act among different interests and 
attitudes. The debate between institutions and Member States on the text of 
Regulation 1049/2001 illustrates the vast differences in opinion on openness 
between and among the Member States and EU institutions. 127 As transparency is 
characteristic of a democratic system, democracy impersonates the need to strike 
a balance among the different objectives and rights. A certain degree of 
confidentiality is required, for instance, in the handling of sensitive documents 
relating to the security and defence policies of the Union. The 01/i Mailila12" 
case is very telling in this respect; the ECJ may have ruled in favour of Mr. 
Mattila who had been refused access to EU documents by the Council and the 
Commission, but in a separate case, Mr. Mattila was found guilty of espionage 
by the Finnish Supreme Court for passing confidential EU documents to Russian 
diplomats. And there are other considerations equally important for citizens like 
public interest, '29 or the protection of privacy and personal data that any EU- 
wide access right will have to take into account. 
What can really affect the efficacy of transparency provisions is their application 
and interpretation by the EU institutions. For instance, there is lack of uniformity 
in the application of the exceptions found in Regulation 1049/2001 and the 
frequency with which the three institutions (EP, Council and Commission) 
invoke each exception as ground for refusal. The Council states protection of the 
public interest as regards international relations and public security as the main 
reasons for refusal, the EP is likely to refuse access to documents on grounds of 
protecting personal data, court proceedings and legal advice, while the 
Commission mainly invokes the protection of inspections, investigations and 
audits. Of the three, the Parliament is the most open. Moreover, the apparent 
discrepancy in applying exceptions is more a reflection of the divergent missions 
'17 Among the advocates of openness were the EP, the CFI, the European Ombudsman and some 
Member States, mainly the Nordic and the Netherlands. They demanded and finally obtained 
greater transparency, despite the efforts of those opposing transparency, such as the Commission, 
the Council, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. W. Van Gcrvcn, op. cit. n. 47, pp. 227-8. 1211 C-353/0IP, Olli Rfattila v Council and Commission [20041 ECRI-1073. ': ' Joint Cases T-110/03, T-150-03 and T-405/03, Jose Maria Sison v Council, judgment of 
26.04.2005, not yet reported. 
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and activities of the institutions, rather than a different interpretation of the 
provisions in the Regulation. 130 
Whether transparency will become an overarching EU principle depends also on 
the interpretation given to the exceptions to the `access' right by the European 
Courts. In its judgment in the Turco case13', the CFI reiterated that, according to 
settled case-law, such exceptions shall be interpreted and applied restrictively so 
as not to frustrate the application of the general principle of giving the public the 
widest possible access to documents held by the institutions. Yet, it rejected the 
applicant's claim that the exception in Article 4(2) covered only legal advice 
drawn up in the context of legal proceedings and not legal advice drafted in the 
course of the institutions' legislative activities. Following a complaint by the 
same applicant, the Ombudsman reached the opposite conclusion in one of his 
reports to Parliament, as he considered that the legal opinions in the case 
concerned raised questions in the framework of the legislative process and they 
should have become available to the public when the legislative process had 
reached a conclusion. 132 
Most notable is the interpretation of the Article 4(5) exception which, according 
to the CFI, lays down a lex specialis to govern the Member States' position. The 
power conferred on the Member States by Article 4(5) of the Regulation is 
explained by the fact that it is neither the object nor the effect of that regulation 
to amend national legislation on access to documents. Otherwise, the obligation 
130 COM(2005) 348, Report from the Commission on the application in 2004 of Regulation (EC) 
No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to 
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents Brussels, 29.07.2005. COM(2003) 
216, Report from the Commission on the application in 2002 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 
of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission documents Brussels, 29.4.2003. Annual report of the Council on access 
to documents - 2003, April 2004 available from httpl/uc. cu. int/cros3 applications/showPagc. 
ASP? id=305&lang=cn&modc=g. See COM(2004) 45, Report of the Commission on the 
application of the principles of the Regulation (EC) if 1049/2001 relative to the access of the 
public to documents of the European Parli ment, the Council and die Commission, 30.01.2004, 
16. p 
The applicant contested the Council's refusal to grant him access to an opinion of its Legal 
Service on a proposal for a Council Directive laying down minimum standards for the reception 
of applicants for asylum in Member States: Case T-84/03, op. cit. n. 119, paras. 59 ct seq. This 
judgment was subsequently appealed, and is currently the subject of cases C-39/05 P (Kingdom of 
Sweden v. Council) and C-52/05 P (Afaurizio Turco vs. Council). 
132 Special Report from the European Ombudsman to the European Parliament following the draft 
recommendation to the Council of the European Union in complaint 1542/2000/(PB)SM. 
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imposed on the institution to obtain a Member State's prior agreement would risk 
becoming a dead letter, if the institution were able to decide to disclose that 
document despite an explicit request not to do so from the Member State 
concerned. '" At the same time, the Court adopted a very lax approach when it 
considered the authority of the source of the document requesting non-disclosure, 
as the competence of the author was to be decided by national law. To the CFI, 
the EU institution does not have to determine whether a document requesting 
non-disclosure is simply forwarded and not drafted by the Member State; it is 
still covered by the Article 4(5) exception. ' Potentially, any third party may 
circumvent its obligations under Regulation No 1049/2001 simply by asking a 
Member State to forward a document requesting non-disclosure. The practical 
effects of the CFI's claim in Scippacercola135 that it is for the national 
administrative and judicial authorities to assess, on the basis of their national 
legislation, whether access to the documents originating from a Member State 
must be granted and to determine whether, and to what extent, there is a right of 
appeal for the parties concerned would be to introduce a `veto right' for the 
Member States, despite the Court rejecting such argument in the case. The wider 
implications of the CFI's interpretation of the Article 4(5) exception would be 
that citizens' access rights under EU legislation may be compromised by 
stringent national rules. Citizens may also be forced to direct applications for 
access to EU documents to Member States. Most importantly, the fact that, 
according to the CFI, '3' a Member State is under no obligation to state the 
reasons for any request for non-disclosure means that it has to satisfy a lesser 
standard than the EU institutions under EU law. That is, the obligation on the 
part of the institution to handle a request promptly and with diligence and 
133 Case T-168/02, op. cit. n. 120, paras. 57-8. Case T-7W02, op. cit. n. 120, paras. 40-41. 
"+ For instance, in Case T-187/03, op. cit. n. 122, paras. 37-8 and 40, a cost bcncfit analysis was 
carried out by a bank on behalf of the Greek national authorities. The CFI said that the EU 
institution did not have to determine whether documents were simply forwarded (and not drafted) 
by the Member State; they were still covered by the Article 4(5) exception. In Case T-76/02, 
op. cit. n. 120, paras. 46 and 48, the CFI said it was not for the Commission to determine the 
competence of the author of the letter of 16 May 2002 to raise an objection under Article 4(5) to 
the disclosure of the documents requested by the applicant; it was required only to verify whether 
the letter in question was, prima facie, that of a Member State. 
135 Case T-1 87/03, ibid, para. 59. 
136 Case T-187/03, ibid, para. 58. Case T-168/02, op. cit. n. 120, para. 59. 
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provide the reasons for refusal. '37 That will cause a chaotic application of the rule 
throughout the EU and casts doubt on the protection of transparency as an 
overarching EU principle. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to provide an initial assessment of the EU decision- 
making process. What has become apparent is that, under the current 
constitutional framework (Treaty of Nice), the rules governing decision-making 
and the relations between the institutions therein are not always constant and 
clearly defined, rendering the legislative process quite complex and non- 
transparent at times. The application of different principles across the Union 
pillars, the varying and ambiguous voting rules, institutional roles and multiple 
avenues of influence, create uncertainty and unpredictability as to the actual 
boundaries of exercise of power by the EU institutions. The evolving nature of 
the Union's institutional structure is not always reflected in formal constitutional 
amendments nor is subject to normative controls. Satisfactory constitutional 
control is not necessarily synonymous with inclusion within the treaty 
framework, but the absence of observable norms or standards governing 
institutional practice138 and the increasing difficulty in identifying which 
institutions are politically responsible for decisions hinder, rather than facilitate, 
citizen understanding of the EU system. Even if there are still safeguards in 
informal institutional practice and channels of cooperation, such checks and 
balances on their own only deliver controlled government not publicly controlled 
government. 
"' For instance, Article 7 of the Regulation 1049/2001 as well as established case law. For 
instance, Case T-188/98 Kuyer v Council 120001 ECR 11-1959, para. 38, Case T-14/9811autala v 
Council [19991 ECR 11-2489, para. 67 and Case T-2/03, VKI v Commission, judgment of 
13.04.2005, para. 69. 
13$ G. dcBurca, op. cit. n. 8, pp. 56-7. 
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The evidence of institutional asymmetry in treaty provisions, which promote a 
legislative and executive role primarily for the Council, raise questions about the 
presence, or absence, of essential structural guarantees of democracy in the EU 
legislative process. This is because the Council has been criticised in particular 
over the extent to which its organisation and operation comply with notions of 
democratic legitimacy. How, unlike the other two institutions (EP and 
Commission), voting in the Council is much complicated, exacerbated by the 
pillar structure of the Union, the plethora of instruments to be adopted, the role of 
the European Council. "' On this note, there is an increasing hijacking of policy 
generating by the European Council, a non-representative and thus 
unaccountable institution, whose increasing dominance may be seen to take over 
roles traditional held by other EU institutions, in this case, agenda-setting by the 
Commission. 
As analysed in the different sections of this chapter, the Constitutional Treaty has 
made a conscious and at times considerable effort to address the perceived 
shortcomings of the Union's decision-making as a whole regarding its 
simplification and streamlining, but left intact fundamental aspects of the 
institutional system. For example, it avoided any demonstrable and compelling 
innovation regarding the day to day workings of the Council by refusing to create 
a separate legislative Council that would have rendered it more visible and 
comprehensible as an institution and its workings more transparent. Most 
notably, the TeCE formalised, and thus enhanced, the institutional role of the 
European Council in decision making, although not in strictly legislative terms, 
without any accompanied attempts to make it accountable. Shouldn't a 
constitutional document, that was negotiated on the strength of the perceived 
need that any reforms should enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Union, 
institutionally design a system that would be directly answerable to the people? 
The following chapter will examine the parliamentary aspect of the institutional 
system of the Union that is intended to do just that, namely, to be directly 
answerable to European citizens, by focusing on the role of the European 
139 F iiaycs-Rcnshaw, `Thc Role of the Council', in The European Union: how democratic Is It? 
S. Andcrscn and K. A. Eliasscn (cds), Sagc Publications Ltd, 1995, p. 147. W. V. Gcrvcn, op. cit. 
n. 47, p. 282. 
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Parliament and its actual ability to better address issues of democracy in the 
complex legislative environment, that of the EU. 
80 
CHAPTER 4 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AS `REPOSITORY' OI 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
4.1 Introduction 
All Member States have in common a system of representative democracy where 
parliaments are regarded as pillars of democracy, be it parliamentary democracy, 
as in most of them, or a form of presidential democracy with restricted, though 
essential, parliamentary functions, as in France. In effect, by embodying popular 
sovereignty, parliaments act as gatekeepers of the political process. ' The 
parliamentary system is not only the dominant form of governance in Western 
Europe, it also happens to be the standard reference in reflections on the 
institutional architecture of the European Union, 2 especially since it has evolved 
into a polity process. Although the Community was conceived within 
parliamentary traditions, the treaties have been criticised for failing to follow that 
tradition. The democratic deficit in the EU decision-making process has been 
attributed over the years partly to the minimal legislative role of a directly 
elected, supranational institution, the European Parliament. 
The widespread perception of the EP as an `anchor of democracy' is deeply 
rooted in the constitutional traditions of the Member States and to the belief that 
voting is the central mechanism for political decision-making. The premise of 
this approach rests on the assumption that the Parliament is able to claim 
legitimacy through the democratic participation of the electorate? That the 
' J. Gcrkrath, 'Representation of Citizens by the EP', (2005) 1 EuConst 73-78, p. 73. G. Rcss, 
`Democratic Decision-Making in the EU and the Role of the EP', in Institutional D, vamics of 
European Integration, D. Curtin and T. Hcukels (cds), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, pp. 154 
and 158. B. Crum, `Tailoring Representative Democracy to the EU: Does the European 
Constitution Reduce the Democratic Deficit? ', (2005) 11 ELI 452-467, pp. 455-6. 
2 R.. Dchoussc, `European Institutional Architecture After Amsterdam: Parliamentary System or 
Regulatory Structure? ', (1998) 35 CMLR, 595-627, p. 598. 
3 D. Obradovic, 'Policy Legitimacy and the EU', (1996) 34 JCMS 191-222, p. 202. 
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enhancement of its institutional role would compensate for the transfer of 
sovereignty from national parliaments to supranational institutions. However, the 
claim that the accountability issue in the Union decision-making should be 
pursued through increased parliamentary participation presupposes an undisputed 
legitimising capacity for the Parliament and acknowledges the institution as the 
main bearer of democratic legitimacy. The EP is misconceived as the EU 
equivalent to a national legislature. 
The chapter will explore the EP's role in the EU legislative process in two 
separate contexts. Firstly, its position in the institutional balance which is 
traditionally perceived as a system of checks and balances that seeks to achieve 
equilibrium in the exercise of legislative functions. The emphasis will be placed 
on codecision and executive supervision and their constitutional significance in 
attaining a strong institutional role for the EP in the institutional triangle (its 
relationship with the Council and the Commission). Secondly, its place in the 
institutional reality of the EU where each institution is to represent a constituency 
and institutional balance - in the contemporary, political sense - could be 
achieved by ensuring adequate representation. Whether, in this context, the EP 
can fare as a truly representative actor will depend on its ability to appropriately 
address two main issues of democracy: representation and equality. The ultimate 
aim is to establish whether the democratic content of decision-making at EU 
level can be reduced to the degree to which the Parliament has a say. 
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4.2 Parliamentary participation in the legislative process: the 
constitutional sienificance of codecision 
The conviction, shared in western democracies, that a democratic process entails, 
inter alia, the right to vote for representative institutions and that these 
institutions shape decision-making through powers of (co)decision, 4 has 
influenced institutional practice in the EU to partly evolve towards the 
`parliamentary' model of representative democracy. Participation in the 
Community's legislative process is one of the duties of the EP envisaged in the 
Treaty, ' a body of full-time elected representatives at the heart of decision- 
making in Brussels. The extent of such participation has been the subject of 
successive intergovernmental reforms. Under Maastricht, the EP `was perhaps 
the largest net beneficiary of the institutional changes in the Treaty'. ' Its 
evolving institutional role in law-making is epitomised in its power of 
codecision. As Renaud Dehousse remarks, 7 the introduction of the codecision 
procedure marked Parliament's accession to the role of colegislator. The 
Amsterdam reforms went a step further along the same path both in qualitative 
and quantitative terms; 8 they put the Parliament and the Council on equal footing 
in decision-making and extended the procedure to a significant number of new 
areas. 
At Nice, the extension of codecision was tied with provisions that changed over 
from unanimity to QMV, but not with legislative measures that already came 
4 L. Sendcn, Soft Law in European Community Law, Hart Publishing, 2004, p. 66. 
s Article 192 TEC, Article 1-20 TcCE. 
6 A. Maurcr, `The Legislative Powers and Impact of the EP', (2003) 41 JCMS 227-247, p-227- 
7P Dchoussc, op. cit. n. 2, p. 605. This is largely true for the policy areas that traditionally fall 
under the first pillar. 
'A new development introduced by Amsterdam was that agreement could be reached at first 
reading either by the Council accepting the EP's amendments or by the Parliament accepting the 
Council's common position. Yet, the essence of the codccision procedure is summed up in a 
single sentence; if after two readings each, the Council and the Parliament have not reached an 
agreement on the text, the matter is referred to a Conciliation Committee - composed of equal 
members from each side and attended by the Commission - which has the task of negotiating a 
compromise text to be submitted to the Council and the Parliament for final approval. If the 
Conciliation Committee fails to reach an agreement within the prescribed period, the text 
automatically fails and innot bccomc Jaw. This is a significant improvement to the Parliament's 
legislative position as compared to the Maastricht provisions where, if under conciliation no 
agreement could be reached, the Council could adopt a text unilaterally, unless unanimously 
rejected by the EP. This has redressed Parliament's position from a subordinate role of 'blocking' 
to one of `making' legislation and with it the negative quality of such intervention (blocking). 
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under QMV. 9 The Progress Report on the 2000 IGC1° proposed an amendment to 
Article 251 EC that would acknowledge codecision as the standard procedure for 
the adoption of general legislation, but the Nice European Council failed to reach 
agreement so as to include it in the approved text of the Treaty. The EP emerged 
as a `winner' from the Constitutional Convention. " It is said to jointly enact 
legislation with the Council (Articles 1-19(1) and 23(1)). The codecision 
procedure is deemed to be the ordinary legislative procedure for the making of 
European laws and framework laws (Article 1-34(1)), whose reach has been 
extended to cover more policy areas, including agriculture and fisheries, asylum 
and immigration law. 
The EP has succeeded in transforming its constitutional position as a significant 
player in shaping legislation, as part of a two-chamber legislature in which the 
Council represents the states and the EP the citizens. Therefore, codecision is 
significant in constitutional terms to the institutional balance, as it offers the EP a 
real partnership with the Council in shaping the measure finally adopted, a real 
power to say `yes' and `no' to legislation with decisive effect over the bulk of 
EU legislation. 12 How did the EP manage to secure these changes? Unlike most 
national parliaments, the EP has not regarded itself as part of a finished 
9 These include: Article 13 EC, incentives to combat discrimination; Article 65 EC, judicial 
cooperation in civil matters; Article 157 EC, specific industrial support measures; Article 159 
EC, economic and social cohesion actions outside the Structural Funds; Article 191 EC, the 
statute for European political parties. In the case of visas, asylum and immigration policy, under 
Articles 62 and 63 EC, the move to QMV and to codccision is partial and deferred for a later 
date. EP Report A4-0102/95 on the functioning of the TEU with a view to the 1996 IGC- 
Assessment of the Reflection Group's work. Rapporicur. Bourlangcs and Martin, PE 190.440, 
4.5.1995. 
'o The introductory sentence appeared as follows: `Acts adopted pursuant to the procedure 
prescribed below shall define the objectives to be attained and the essential elements of tile 
measures to be taken, save where special provisions of this Treaty or the nature of those measures 
so justify': CONFER 4790100, Progress Report on IGC on Institutional Reform, 3.11.00. 
A. Dashwood, `The Constitution of the EU after Nice', (2001) 26 ELRcv 215-238, pp. 220-1. "P Craig, `Institutional Structure: A Delicate Balance', (2005)1 EuConst 52-56, p. S3. 12 However, codccision preserves intact the exclusive institutional right of the Commission to 
initiate legislation and, to that extent, it maintains unchanged the institutional balance. This 
means that it falls on the Commission to decide whether the Community should act and. if so, on 
what legal basis which in turn determines the type of decision-making procedure to be followed. 
It also decides what content and what provisions the proposal should contain as regards further 
implementation. Article 192 EC and Article I-26(2) TcCE. 
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institutional system, but rather as part of one requiring evolution or even 
transformation and to which goal it has always sought to act as a catalyst. " 
Yet, the real impact of codecision can only be assessed by the Parliament's actual 
capacity to influence the legislative outcome. It is generally accepted that the co- 
decision procedure has worked well. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Maastricht, in 1993, the number of legislative dossiers processed under 
codecision increased significantly and were mostly concluded at second 
reading. 14 Also, since its introduction, only very few procedures failed with 
particular reference to the proposals for Directives on the patenting of 
biotechnological inventions, 15 on voice telephony, " on establishing a securities 
committee, 17 on takeover bids'' and on the patentability of computer 
implemented inventions. " The EP's veto threat may either force the Commission 
to modify its original proposal subsequently adopted by the Council ('voice 
telephony') or may entice the Council to overcome its inflexibility over 
13 A. Dashwood, `Issues of Decision-making in the EU after Nice', in Accountability and 
Legitimacy in the EU, A. Arnull and D. Wincott (eds), OUP, 2002, pp. 36-7. European Parliament, 
Activity Report of the delegations to the Conciliation Committee, 1 November 1993 to 30 April 
1999. Rapporteurs: Fontaine, Imbcni and Aldca, PE230.998; Activity Report of the delegations to 
the Conciliation Committee, 1 August 2001 to 31 July 2002. Rapportcurs: Dimitrakopoulos, 
Cedcrschiocld and Imbcni, PE287.614. R. Corbctt, F. Jacobs and M. Shacklcton, 'The EP at Fifty: 
A View from the Inside', (2003) 41 JCMS 353-373, pp. 354-5 and 359. 
1+ During the last five years since Amsterdam came into force, there were 403 codccision 
procedures successfully concluded and 86 sets of conciliation negotiations in this parliamentary 
term. European Parliament, Activity Report of the delegations to the Conciliation Committee, 1 
May 1999 to April 2004. Rapportcurs: Dimitrakopoulos, Ccdcrschiocld and Imbcni, PE287.644. 
's The parliamentary delegation reached agreement with the Council during conciliation, but was 
subsequently rejected by the MEPs (March 1995). however, on the same subject in May 1998, 
the parliament approved the Council's common position, which had taken on board 65 out of its 
66 amendments. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions, OIL 213/13,30.7.98. 
6 The proposal to apply open network provision to voice telephony services, after failure to agree 
on a joint text, the Council confirmed its common position. Subsequently, this was rejected by 
the European Parliament in July, 1994. It is worth noting that the Commission has since 
reintroduced a proposal, and a compromise agreement was reached on the seventeen amendments 
adopted by the Parliament at second reading. Directive 98/10/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the application of open network provisions (ONP) to voice telephony and on 
universal service for telecommunications in a competitive environment, OIL 101,1.4.98. 
17 On a proposal for a directive, the Council did not propose to affirm its common position, 
anticipating the changes put forward by the Treaty of Amsterdam (in May 1998). The proposed 
act was deemed not to have been adopted: COD 95/ 0188. 
" hic joint text agreed in conciliation was rejected after a tied plenary vote in July 2001, 
pursuant to Rule 128 EP's Rules of Procedure. European Parliament, Activity Report of the 
delegations to the Conciliation Committee, 1 August 2000 to 31 July 2001. Rapportcurs: lmbcni, 
Provam and Friedrich, PE287.593. 
19 COD/2002/0047, Proposal for a Directive of the EP and of the Council on the patentability of 
computer based inventions. For the first time, the Parliament has rejected a piece of legislation by 
absolute majority in the second reading. 
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parliamentary amendments ('takeover bids'). There is also an ever-increasing 
trend for legislative texts to be adopted on the basis of a compromise between the 
Parliament and the Council in Conciliation. 20 It is difficult to say whether the 
quality of legislative output has improved under codecision. Such amendments 
may not always be sufficient or necessary as their weight may be debatable. 
Parliament's wishes are often accommodated by making changes to the recital of 
a proposed act, as in the case of the Directive on biotechnological interventions. 
Although these are useful for interpretative purposes, their legal effect is 
indirect 2' The joint text on the pursuit of television broadcasting activities22 
shows that difficult conciliation cases have resulted in the adoption of `package' 
compromises, accompanied by declarations and statements whose legal status is 
questionable. 23 
Parliament's legislative influence is contingent on a number of institutional 
factors: different voting rules, the peculiar, `sectorised' structure of the Council 
as well as interinstitutional relations. The opportunity available to the Parliament 
to press amendments through conciliation often depends on the favourable, or 
unfavourable, stance of the Council Presidency. In the `auto-oil' package, 
Parliament clashed with Council over the two auto-oil proposals, by insisting on 
setting mandatory fuel quality and vehicle emission limits for 2005. Both the 
Council and the Commission had agreed for indicative targets to be set initially, 
with legal standards to be set at a later stage, while Parliament remained adamant 
20 Of the 1344 amendments adopted by Parliament at second reading: 307 were agreed in 
conciliation as they stood, i. e. 23%; 809 were agreed on the basis of a compromise, i. e. 60%; 228 
amendments were withdrawn during the conciliation procedure, i. c. 17%. Activity Report 
PE287.644, op. cit. n. 14. 
21 Legal protection of biotechnological interventions (COD0159/94) dclcgation chairman: 
Fontain. Rappoctcuc Rotlcy. Legal Affairs Committee, 1995. S. Boyron, 'The codecision 
procedure: Rethinking the constitutional fundamentals', in Law-Making in the EU, C. Ilarlow and 
P. Craig (cds), Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 148. 
22 The joint text adopted in conciliation did not contain two major EP amendments. Report on the 
joint text on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities (C4-0203/97- 
95/00074(COD)). Rapportcurs: Qucccdo and Iloppcnstcdt, A4-0201/97,3.6.97. 
23 The ECJ has decided that such declarations have no legal effect unless reference is made to its 
content in the text of the act: Case C-292/89 ex parse Antonlssen it 99 11 ECR I. 745. S. Boyron, 
ibid, p. 153. As Earnshaw and Judge explain, it is not possible to distinguish between 
'substantive' amendments designed to be accepted and 'propagandistic' amendments designed to 
advance an issue up the policy agenda of the Council and the Commission without any realistic 
expectation of inclusion in the final directive. D. Earnshaw and D. Judgc, `From co-operation to 
co-decision: The EP's path to legislative power', in EU. - Power and Policy-Making, J. Richardson 
(cd), Routlcdge, 1998, p. 102. 
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to its position and the convening of the Conciliation Committee became 
inevitable. 24 The EP found itself facing a British Presidency with plans to make 
the environment its priority. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook reaffirmed in a wide- 
ranging address to MEPs the determination of the New Labour government's 
commitment to strengthen relations with the European Parliament. 25 In that 
climate, a deal on a package of binding measures to reduce pollution from car 
emissions from 2000 and improve fuel quality was agreed by the conciliation 
procedure just before the end of the British Presidency. 
The different voting rules in Council and their linkage to codecision may place 
Parliament in a disadvantageous position, having to make more compromises in 
the effort to agree on a joint text. The requirement of unanimity diminishes the 
merit of the codecision procedure, because Council's attitude towards Parliament 
becomes inflexible and is likely to increase the risk of stalemate, particularly 
during the conciliation process. 26 But, ultimately, the EP does not simply propose 
amendments; it screens draft legislation at every stage of the procedure and, 
jointly with the Council, determines the final content of a legislative proposal. 
When it comes to the essence of legislative (and budgetary) work, MEPs shape 
legislation in a way that members of many national parliaments do not. It is 
usually headline news, if a national parliament amends a bill against the will of 
the government; when a government publishes a bill, it is usually clear what will 
come out of the procedure. This is not the case in the European Parliament. A 
draft legislative act is really a draft, subject to examination and amendments. 
24 "Tlhe EP's Determined Stance on Auto-Oil" - EC Inform Transport No 13/5, February 1998. 2S Directive 98/691EC of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to measures to be 
taken against air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles and amending Council Directive 
70/220/EEC; Directive 98/70/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to the 
quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Council Directive 93/12/EEC, OJ L 350/1, 
350/58,28.12.1998. EP News 1, January 1998 and EP News 4, February 1998. 
26 For instance, in the decision establishing a support programme in the field of books and 
reading, including translation (Arian), the conciliation phase had been deadlocked for a number 
of months. Actually, the first meeting of the Conciliation Committee was cancelled at the List 
minute, because of lack of agreement in the Council, due to the unanimity requirement. 
Eventually, the procedure was concluded and all substantive parliamentary amendments were 
accepted by the Council. The negotiations on the financial framework proved to be particularly 
difficult, as the programme was based on Article 151 of the Treaty, which required the Council to 
act unanimously. Due to this requirement, a small number of Member States was in a position to 
block a possible compromise in Council. It became obvious that the need for unanimity in the 
Council conflicted with the spirit of conciliation. EP Report A4-0237/97 on a European 
Parliament and Council Decision establishing a support programme, including translation, in the 
field of books and reading (Arian). Rapporteur. Mouskouri, PE222/102,03.07.97. 
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And if the act goes into conciliation, ultimately the positions of the two 
institutions, the Council and the EP, must be reconciled. 27 
4.3 The EP: a vehicle for citizen representation at EU level? 
Although the principle of political equality is one of the founding norms of 
modern democracies, it is difficult to apply such a simplistic equality principle to 
the EU, a polity of both states and peoples. 28 Yet, as identified in Chapter 2, if 
the EU is to be regarded a democratic system, it needs to provide all citizens with 
the opportunity to participate equally in the political life of the polity. The 
European Parliament is the only supranational institution directly elected by 
universal suffrage, consisting of `representatives of the peoples of the States 
brought together in the Community'. 29 The Constitutional Treaty introduces new 
significance to the Parliament's representative quality: it `shall be composed of 
representatives of the Union's citizens'. Replacing the plurality of distinct 
peoples by a more generic reference to the Union's citizens considered as one, 
more or less, homogenous group, clearly intends to strengthen the linkage 
between the EP and its electorate. 30 It also seems to be a logical consequence of 
the establishment of the Union's citizenship with the right to vote and to stand as 
RCorbctt, F. Jacobs and M. Shacklcton, op. cit. n. 13, p. 358. 
2$ As Stephan Collignon observes, the main distinction between the modern-individualist norm of 
equality is `one (wo)man, one man vote' and the holistic-communitarian norm is that 'all 
communities are equal'. In the EU voting does not follow these pure principles. In the Council 
the votes are weighted to reflect the size of countries, in the EP not all members represent the 
same number of citizens. Political equality implies that cvcry country's voting rights would 
represent its population share. This in not the case in the EU. The EU has a bias in favour of 
smaller Member States. S. Collignon, The European Republic - Reflections on the Political 
Economy of a Future Constitution, The Federal Trust, 2003, pp. 151-2. 
29 Article 189 TEC. Article 1-20 TcCE provides that the EP represents the `citizens' of the Union. 
so See Articles 1-1,1-46, and 1-20(2). J. Gcrkratl, op. cit. n. 1, pp. 7.1-5. The French Conseil 
Constitutionnel recently took a position that sustains the angle adopted by Article 1-19. In a 
decision from 3 April 2003, it held that the building of constituencies for the elections of the 
members of the European Parliament in France uns not contrary to the principles of indivisibility 
of the Republic and unity of the French people. Remarkably enough, it considers the French 
MEPs as elected `representatives of the citizens of the European Union residing in France'. The 
German Bundesverfassungsgericht also recognises the potential function of Union citizenship, 
defining it as 'the legal expression of the essential connection among nationals of all Member 
States granting a legally binding expression to the existing amount of community'. 
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a candidate to EP elections, the establishment of political parties and a process of 
direct universal suffrage. And although universal suffrage was not foreseen in the 
original treaties, in the mid to late 70s direct elections were acknowledged as a 
means of bestowing the EP with `a new political authority' that would `reinforce 
the democratic legitimacy of the whole European institutional apparatus'. 31 
Therefore, the obvious starting point is the recognition that the Parliament 
constitutes the representative - democratic element par excellence in the Union's 
institutional structure. A principal dilemma is to what extent and on what basis 
citizens can influence the formation of EU policies that directly affect their lives. 
The representation system, as envisaged in the Treaty, aims to `ensure 
appropriate representation of the peoples of the States brought together in the 
Community'. 32 Despite the explicit reference to `appropriate representation' of 
the peoples, the current system of seat distribution gives disproportionate 
representation in favour of the smaller Member States. It had been decided at 
Nice to increase on a pro rata basis the number of MEPs to be elected to reach a 
total of 732 for the 2004 European elections, but also substantially reallocate 
seats in the Parliament following enlargement in the form of a decrease. 33 Article 
1-20 TeCE maintains the standard of representation, which is said to be 
`degressively proportional'. 34 This formula is not novel, but simply describes the 
existing system as the number of citizens represented by each elected 
representative depends on the overall size of a Member State's population and 
still provides disproportionate representation in favour of the smaller Member 
States. The system leads inevitably to distortion in representation as citizens are 
set to be represented differently, according to their country of residence. 35 
Articles 1-20 appears at odds with Article 1-44 which proclaims that `in all its 
31 The 1975 Tindcmans Report in J. Blondcl, R. Sinnott and P. Svcnsson, People and Parliament in 
the European Union, Clarendon Press, 1998, pp. 4 and 10. 
32 Article 190 (1) EC. 
33 The Parliament did not object to the cciling. SEC(2001)99, Memorandum to the Members of 
the Commission, Brüssels, 18.01.01. Article 190(2) EC, Article 2 of the Protocol on the 
Enlargement of the EU, Annexed to the Treaty of Nice. EP Report A-5-0086/2000 on the EP's 
proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference. Rapportcurs: Dimitrakopoulos and Leinen, 
27.03.00. 
34 Maximum of 750 MEPs, scats divided by degressive proportionality: minimum threshold of six 
and maximum threshold of ninety six members by Member State. 
31 J Gcrkrath, op. cit. n. 1, p. 76. 
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activities the Union shall observe the principle of democratic equality of its 
citizens'. 
Although the EP, as the only directly elected institution of the EU, has often been 
accorded prominence in discussions of democracy and representation within the 
EU, relatively little attention has been paid to the attitudes of its members and the 
practice of representation in the EU. There has been growing criticism that the 
Parliament fails to provide an effective representative link between European 
citizens and the Union. 36 The question arises whether it is the individual MEPs or 
the European parties that act as `representative agents' in the EU. Both Article 4 
of the 1976 Act on EP elections and Rule 2 of the Parliament's Rules of 
Procedure declare the MEPs' ideological independence when voting in plenary. 
Studies have shown that MEPs are strongly more pro-integrationist than most of 
their constituents, whereas when it comes to specific policy areas, like common 
border controls and the single currency, the congruence between the electorate 
and their elected representatives is remarkably poor. As for European parties, 
their organisation into political groupings is either based on permanent, but rather 
loose party coalitions, 37 or often task-specific and technical with no specific 
ideology to such an extent that even the Parliament has challenged their 
legitimacy. As a result, the EP has adopted an interpretation of Rule 29(1) of its 
Procedures - an act which was accepted by the Court of Justice - as regards the 
exercise of electoral mandate to the effect that political affiliations are a 
mandatory requirement under the Rule. The dual requirement for MEPs of 
sharing political affinities and coming from more than one Member States when 
organised into political groups was seen as the expression of the objective found 
in Article 191 EC. Namely, contributing to forming a European awareness and to 
36 R. Scully and D. M. Farrcll, 'MEPs as Representatives: Individual and Institutional Roics', 
(2003) 41 JCMS 269-288, p. 269. 
" 1976 Act concerning the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by Direct 
Universal Suffrage, (1976) OJL 278. Sec, for instance, the results of the European 
Representation Study 1994-1997 as discussed in ILSchmitt and J. 11homasscn, 'Dynamic 
Representation: The Case of European Integration', Mannheimer Zentrum fucr Europacischc 
Sozialforschung, Arbeitspapier 21/00 and 1I. Schmitt and J. Thomasscn (cds), Political 
Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union, OUP, 1999, chapters 9 and 12. P. Dann, 
'Looking through the Federal Lens. The Semi-parliamentary Democracy of the EU', JMWP 5/02. 
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expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union. 38 Nonetheless, the 
parliamentary rejection in plenary of the joint text on `takeover bids' agreed in 
conciliation, in July 2001, portrays the salience of national factors in decision- 
making within the Parliament. MEP voting intentions were subject to scrutiny 
and lobbying not only by those whose interests were affected but also by national 
governments, especially after Germany withdrew its support to the Council 
common position. So, a primary determinant that led to the rejection of the 
Directive was nationality and not party grouping 39 
Since Maastricht, the Treaty - Article 191 (ex138a) EC - has formally 
acknowledged the role of European political parties (Euro-parties) in the 
formation of a European awareness and in the expression of the political will of 
the citizens of the Union. Indeed, political parties may be regarded as a 
functional prerequisite for a democratic process. The reason being, they are 
central to political life as they politically mobilise voters by providing ideologies, 
platforms and programmes. 40 Euro-politicians4' also seem to think that the 
democratic deficit should be remedied through 'partyfication' and a 'politically 
vibrant' EU, where political parties will `have to organise themselves so that they 
can articulate across Europe the will of the section of the population they 
represent'. Although there is express reference to the `political will' of the 
citizens, curiously enough, one does not find any direct reference to democracy 
or other political values at least not until the text of the Constitutional Treaty, 
where political parties have become part of `the democratic life of the 
Union'(Article I-46(4)). Even then, provisions on Euro-parties have no more than 
declaratory status with no operational implications. 42 To assess the quality of 
38 Joint Cases T-222/99, T-327/99 and T-329/99 Martinez v. European Parliament, 120011 
ECRII-2823. 
39 D. Judgc and D. Earnshaw, The European Parliament, Palgravc, 2003, pp. 264-5. 
40 M. Pcdcrscn, 'Euro-parties and European Parties: New Aromas, New Challenges and New 
Strategies', in The EU. " how democratic is it?, S. Andcrscn and K. Eliasscn (cds), London, 1996, 
15. ýý 
Opinion expressed by Thomas Jansen, general secretary of the European People's' Party: 
Thomas Jansen, The European People's Party, Macmillan, 1998, p. 177. K. lleidar, 'Parties and 
Cleavages in the European Political Space', Arena WP 03/7. 
42 The obscure Article 191 EC provides only a hypothesis about the possible long-term effects of 
the creation of parties at supranational level as it is suggested that transnational parties may 
enhance the process of integration. It does not provide a constitutional definition of what amounts 
to a European political party and what its status entails in terms of echoing the political will of 
the Union citizens. At Nice, the Article was extended allowing for the Community legislator to 
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representative democracy in the EU, political representation and control need to 
happen at the place where decisions are taken. The EP itself has declared that 
Euro-parties need to organise and act on a transnational basis so as to monitor, 
discuss and influence the expression of political will at European level. A party 
system is emerging in the Union, but is embryonic and hardly reflects a 
supranational structure. 'ü Although the EU political groups are, generally 
speaking, organised along a left-right continuum that corresponds to the main 
national ideological party families found in most Member States, the distribution 
of nationally elected members in the Parliament does not preclude the absence of 
some Member States in a given political group. 4 Hence, the linkage between the 
two levels becomes problematic. 
Procedural elements like the absence of an authentic `uniform electoral 
procedure' may also hinder the process of direct representation, as elections to 
the European Parliament take place in the Member States within constituencies 
designed by each State. The reality about EP elections is that they are often 
perceived as `second-order' fought primarily on national issues, "' institutionally 
dependent on national party systems. Even with the creation of transnational 
parties their activities and organisational structure are dependent upon national 
party agreement; they are national instruments. Absence of uniform electoral 
system means that each Member States determines its own rules of EP elections. 
They nominate candidates, organise and finance the electoral campaigns. But 
once elected, MEPs have to establish a dual function of maintaining a political 
profile in domestic politics and creating for themselves a status and a platform 
lay down a statute for political parties at European level, but provision was made only for 
secondary issues, like funding. 
43 Euro-parties arc composed of parties from each of the EU Mcmbcr States (sometimes more 
than one per state) and in some cases from countries outside of the EU (especially in the case of 
the European Green Party which is more pan-European in nature with 32 full member parties). 
EP Report A4-0342f96 on the constitutional status of the European political parties. Rapportcur: 
Tsatsos, 30.10.96. H. Sclunitt and J. Tlhomassen (eds), Political Representation and Legitimacy in 
the European Union, op. cit. n. 37, chapter 12. M. Pcdcrscn, op. cit. n. 40, pp. 16-7. " M. Pcdcrscn, op. cit. n. 40, pp. 20-1. On the history and development of the European party 
groups, see A. Krcppcl, The European Parliament and Supranational Party System -A Study in 
Institutional Development, Cambridge University Press, 2002. On a more detailed analysis on the 
EU political parties system, see F. Attiva, `Party Fragmentation and discontinuity in the EU', in 
Transnational Parties in the European Union, D. S. Bcll and Ch. Lord (eds), Ashgatc, 1998 and 
S. Hir, A. Krcppcl and A. Nouzy, 'The Party System in the EP: Collusive or Competitive? ', (2003) 
41 JCMS 309-33 1. 
43 K. Hcidar, op. cit. n. 41. 
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within the EP, a fact that may be said to diminish the ability for Euro-parties to 
aggregate interests and programmes at European level. The proposal made 
during the 2000 IGC by the Parliament and the Commissiond6 for a number of 
members to be elected on European-wide lists that would be presented to all 
voters throughout the Union was discounted at an early stage, because it would 
represent an ambitious change in EP elections, given the Union's current level of 
integration. Article I-46 TeCE does not alter the legal context as it stands under 
the Treaty of Nice, while Article 111-331 allows for regulations governing such 
parties to be established by European laws, including rules governing their 
funding, replicating Article 191 EC. 47 
Democracy in the EU would be fostered by strong and independent European 
parties fighting on truly European rather than national issues. The post-electoral 
survey to the 2004 EP elections" shows that there is a positive relation between 
commitment to a political party and going to the polls. Correspondingly, the less 
people feel close to a political party, the more they tend to abstain. Here, we have 
another indicator confirming the hypothesis that abstention, whether observed in 
the European or in national elections, is above all related to a low degree of 
`politisation', or even distrust for politics. The connection between the voting 
public and parties at European level will remain weak as long as campaigns are 
almost exclusively fought over national issues. 
" D. Galloway, The Treaty office and Beyond, Sheffield Academic Press, 2001, p. 116. 
" The first recognises that 'political parties at European level contribute to forming political 
awareness and to expressing the will of Union citizens', whereas t1hc second provides for the 
adoption of regulations governing them and in particular their funding. The recent regulation on 
the status and funding of European political parties from November 2003 might encourage their 
development and institutionalisation. Regulation (EC) No. 2004/2003 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European 
level and the rules regarding their funding, OJ L 297,15.11.2003. 
`e Flash Eurobarometer 162, Post European elections 2004 survey, European Commission, July 
2004. 
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4.3.1 The European Parliament's ability to act as `opposition' 
Although the EP's powers have notably increased since Maastricht, the debate on 
the democratic deficit is as vivid as ever because of the impact elections make 
and the very nature of the Parliament as a representative institution. Rather than 
increasing its democratic legitimacy, the Union is facing a crisis of representation 
mainly because European elections do not serve the function of linking the 
opinions of the electorate to the decision-making arena. '" One would ask what 
purpose European elections serve. As Karlheinz Neunreither rightly points out, 
the main shortcoming of the Union governance is that there is no formal function 
of an `opposition', which is very much a vivid reality in the practical and 
political life of all the Member States S0 Unlike national parliaments, the 
European Parliament does not have the traditional dichotomy between majority 
and opposition. Because the EU does not possess clear institutional or procedural 
means of sanctions, the inability of elections to remove officials for policy failure 
calls into question both the democratic legitimacy of the EU and the role of the 
EP in providing one. European elections change little at least in terms of political 
agenda. As the EP does not have a right to initiate legislation, it is not possible to 
offer substantive proposals for a legislative programme as part of election 
manifestos. 5' 
In section 4.2, it was observed that the constitutional significance of codecision 
pertained to the Parliament's ability to effectively influence the content of a 
legislative act. However, is there any other significance to this fact apart from the 
realisation that the Parliament may effectively utilise codecision to politically 
enhance its position in the institutional balance? In other words, what is the 
impact of the amendments proposed and/or passed by the EP on the EU citizen? 
Do amendments reflect the needs and interests of the electorate? Simply put, the 
more democratic the process, the more important should be the resulting 
" J. Thomasscn, 'Partics and Voters. The Feasibility of a European Systcm of Political 
Representation', in The EP-Moving toward Democracy in the EU, B. Stcuncnbcrg and 
J. Thomasscn (cds), Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002, p. 15. 
S0 K. Ncunrcithcr, `Governance without Opposition: The Casc of the European Union', (1998) 33 
Government and Opposition 419-441, pp. 420-423 and 434. 
51 J Smith, Europe's Elected Parliament, Shcfficld Academic Press, 1999, pp. 95.6 and 124. 
94 
legislation for the citizens. In its general amending strategy, the EP tends to be 
`politically substantive', to focus on the political implications of a measure and 
to take up issues that reflect the needs and concerns of the electorate. Codecision 
activity is highly concentrated on issues like the environment, public health and 
consumer policy, regional policy, transport and tourism. 52 It also tries to reverse 
the tendency by which the Council adopts legislation which is normally 
technocratic in approach and represents the lowest common denominator. For 
instance, regarding the Directive on speedometers for two-or-three-wheel motor 
vehicles, -" the parliamentary committee on transport and tourism considered that 
a proposal should go beyond technical specifications necessary for the smooth 
operation of the internal market to accommodate sustainable mobility, road 
safety and environmental protection. 
At this stage, it is only appropriate to ask whether the EP is at all visible to its 
constituents. Opinion polls have shown that, although the Parliament is the most 
identifiable EU institution, people have ambivalent perceptions about its tasks as 
well as how MEPs affect their lives. Even among the most favourable of 
European attitudes to the Parliament (e. g. the Belgians and Danish), there is the 
belief that the EP enjoys greater influence than it should to the detriment of the 
citizens, a clear indication that they do not perceive the Parliament as defending 
their interests. M Opinion polls also confirm the assertion that European elections 
are `second order' as citizen willingness to vote is limited, unless they take place 
at the same time as national ones. " Some commentators argue that the low 
turnout both reflects and accentuates the democratic legitimacy deficit of the 
Union. Voter apathy and electoral absenteeism is not a problem peculiar to EP 
52 Activity Report PE287.644, op. cit. n. 14. D. Judge and D. Earnshaw, The European Parliament, 
op. cit. n. 39, p. 252. S. Boyron, op. cit. n. 21, pp. 153-155. 
EP Report A4-0491/98 on the proposal for a Directive on speedometers for two-or-three-wheel 
motor vehicles (COM(98)0285-C4-0317/98-98/0163(COD)). Rapporteur. Barton, 9.12.98. 
54 W. Wcsscls and U. Dicdrichs, 'A New Kind of Legitimacy for a New Kind of Parliament - The 
Evolution of the European Parliament', EloP 06/97. How Europeans sec themselves - Looking 
through the mirror with public opinion surveys. European Documentation Series, Of icc for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2001. Eurobarometer 59, 
Public opinion in the European Union, Spring 2003. Charter 88, Five Democratic Tests for 
Europe, 2003. 
ss On the other hand, voters' attitudes do manifest transnational trends. Electoral behaviour is 
normally affected by national institutional factors, such as compulsory voting, or voters' apathy 
in general. There are variations in the public support, like the perceptions of representative 
democracy at national level, but also attitudcs/support to EU integration and membership Flash 
Eurobarometer 162, op. cit. n. 48. 
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elections. First and foremost, it is an expression of disappointment in the political 
system, national or otherwise. However, public attitudes towards the EP arc 
important to its legitimacy; an institution designed to directly represent citizens 
ought to enjoy public respect and support. Very low support is likely to motivate 
institutional change towards the curtailment, rather than enhancement, of the 
EP's authority. m Hence, the real appraisal of the Parliament's representativeness 
consists in the presence of a European `political class', a body of citizens, who 
are aware of Europe-wide political agendas and who conceive themselves as 
participating in debates over common European issues" as members of a 
European society, as part of a European public space where such issues can be 
debated. Unless and until this is done, the Parliament's contribution to the 
democratic legitimacy of the Union is overstated. 
4.4 The EP as a multifunctional legislature 
In the `parliamentary model', the key feature of democracy to subject the 
government to parliamentary scrutiny implies that parliaments function not only 
as legislatures in the strict sense, but their role encompasses wider issues relating 
to government control and authorisation. Equally, the substance of parliamentary 
representation in the Union requires a Parliament with significant law-making 
and control powers .m In 
Matthews v. UK, the UK Government contended that 
the Parliament lacked the most fundamental attributes of a legislature on the 
basis of a conception of legislatures as essentially law-making bodies. That is, 
' A. Lijphart, `The Problem of Low and Unequal Voter Turnout - and what %c can do about it', 
Reihe Politikwissenschaft 54/98. M. Gabcl, `Public Support for the European Parliament', (2003) 
41 JCM 289-308, p. 290. The 2004 European elections were marked by a particularly low rate of 
participation which showed record abstcntionism and by strong mobilisation of Eurosccpticism in 
certain Member States: Flash Eurobarometer 162, op. cit. n. 48. 
57 N. MacCormick, Who's14 raid of a European Constitution?, Imprint Academic, 2005, pp. 53-3. 
" S. Smismans, Law, Legitimacy and European Governance - Functional Participation in Social 
Regulation, OUP, 2004, p. 3, D. Judgc and D. Earnshaw, The European Parliament, op. cit. n. 39, 
pp. 9-10. J. Gcrkrath, op. cit. n. 1, p. 78. C. ilarlow, `Citizen Access to Political Power in the EU', 
EUI WP 99/2, p. 10. 
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the power to initiate legislation and the power to adopt it. s' However, in its 
judgment, the European Court of Human Rights (ECIIR) held that the EP was 
sufficiently involved both in the legislative process that led to the passage of 
legislation, especially under Articles 251 and 252 EC, and the democratic 
supervision of Community activities. It seems that the ECHR espoused the same 
multifunctional nature of legislatures, namely, the idea that government control, 
rather than law-making, has become their prime function. It further stated that 
monofunctional legislative role had little place in the reality of EU decision- 
making, which tends to be a limited elaboration of broad aims and increasingly 
delegated rule-making powers to the Commission 60 It remains to be seen, 
whether the treaties have envisaged a multifunctional legislative role for the 
Parliament. 
The `parliamentary model', which nestles at the heart of European civic cultures, 
has deeply influenced constitutional reforms in the EU, but has not been 
transplanted to the Union's institutional system whose peculiar nature gives rise 
to hybrid practices. " Although the treaties provide for several mechanisms to 
ensure executive accountability, the collective accountability of the EU executive 
to the EP is limited. For instance, the Parliament's power of democratic 
supervision can be found in Articles 193 and 195 EC, under which by means of a 
parliamentary Ombudsman or committees of inquiry the institution can 
investigate instances of alleged contraventions and maladministration committed 
by other EU institutions. Also, pursuant to Article 4 TEU, the European Council 
is required to report to the EP on the progress of the EU. The EP can claim wider 
and arguably substantive control only in the case of the Commission. 
The EP is to formally approve the appointment of Commissioners and their 
President, pursuant to Article 214 EC. Accordingly, the EP is in a position to 
determine the thrust and maximise the content of the mandate given to the 
59 Matthews v. UK Judgment of February 18,1999 11999128 E. ILR. R 361. K. Muyllc, 'Is the 
Parliament a "Legislator"? ', (2000) 6 EPL 243-252, pp. 249-251. 
60 Ibid. 
"P Magnettc, 'Appointing and Censuring the European Commission: The Adaptation of 
Parliamentary Institutions to the Community Context', (2001) 7 EU 292-310, p. 292. 
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Commission in terms of policies and programmes. 62 The Parliament's 
involvement in the investiture procedure was increased marginally at Nice and 
proposals to link parliamentary election to the appointment of the President and 
the Commission were quickly discarded. In this specific regard, the advance 
towards a more `parliamentary system' through effective involvement in the 
appointment process of the executive was stalled at Nice. '3 The Constitutional 
Treaty - Article 1-27 - does not propose any substantial changes to the way the 
President is appointed but it clearly states that when the European Council 
proposes a candidate for the Presidency for election by the EP, the latter must 
take account of the results of the European elections. This change indirectly 
increases the influence of the Parliament and gives greater political significance 
to the European elections. 
The EP is often depicted as an institution with strong committees. As its powers 
have increased over time, so has the role of EP committees in shaping EU 
legislation and in holding the Commission accountable. " The fate of the Santer 
Commission and, more recently, the rejected nomination of Mr. Buttiglione as 
Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs indicate the degree to which 
Parliament can exert and sustain pressure on the Commission. The EP may force 
the Commission to resign en masse, but the real power to sanction individual 
Commissioners has been reserved for the Commission President (Articles 217 
EC and 1-28 TeCE). Therefore, the motion of censure may prove ineffective as a 
mechanism of ensuring executive political responsibility'5 and it usually 
62 EP Report A4-0488/98 on the institutional implications of the approval by the EP of the 
President of the Commission and the independence of the members of the Commission. 
Rapportcur: Brok, PE226.877,8.12.98. 
D. Judge and D. Earnshaw, The European Parliament, op. cit. n. 39, p. 62. 
V. Mamadouh and T. Raunio, `The Committee System: Powers, Appointments and Report 
Allocation', (2003) 41 JCMS 333-351, pp. 333-334,337 and 348: When explaining the EP's 
legislative success, scholars have emphasised the interaction between party groups and 
committees. More specifically, the rapportcurship system with individual mcmbcrs/rapportcurs 
accumulate policy expertise, build consensus among party groups and negotiate with the 
Commission and the Council, time factors essential for legislative influence. A very recent 
example of the success of parliamentary committees is the adoption by the transport and tourism 
committee of several major amendments to the rail passengers' rights bill in the so-called Third 
Railway Package: EP Report A6-0123/2005 Proposal for a Regulation of the EP and of the 
Council on International Rail Passengers' Rights and Obligations. Rapportcur. Sterckx Dirk, 
PE 347.287,28.4.2005. 
61' Article 201 EC. The first time the EP tried to use its power to censure the Commission over its 
management of the EU budget, in 1998, did not materialise, because some parliamentary groups 
could not agree on how to handle the crisis. However, the Parliament did manage to set up a 
98 
V. 
denounces the Commission's lack of competence and not the content of the 
policies it promotes, treating the latter more as an administration than a 
government. Should a motion arise, the submission to a `committee' of experts in 
the midst of a highly political procedure is in itself evidence that MEPs are more 
willing to present themselves as neutral experts who follow the scientific 
objectivity of facts than to act as politicians. " The argument also goes, whether 
the Commission is politicised enough to perceive itself as `government' and not 
merely as a body of civil servants. Certainly, the institutional relationship 
between the EP and the Commission cannot be likened to the traditional 
government-parliament model, where the vote of approval by parliament is an 
opportunity to record a parliamentary majority with the commitment to support 
executive actions throughout its term of office. 
EP is also depicted as an institution with weak political parties. 67 Their task of 
facilitating European awareness and expressing the political will of the citizens 
of the Union is not adequate, unless they partake in the political process that 
determines the structure of the EU government and the political goals to be 
pursued. Currently, the Euro-parties' functions are restricted to the preparation of 
EU legislation and to the screening of the Commission candidates proposed by 
the Member States. Likewise, the President and the Commissioners may not 
proclaim affiliation with any political party, nor may they consider themselves to 
be bound by their specific political program. By implication, they do not share 
political philosophies and agendas with any of the political groups in the EP - or 
Member States' parliaments - and therefore they have no political ties with the 
EU citizens. " Therefore, there should be a direct linkage between the election of 
the President of the Commission and the outcome of parliamentary elections. 
This does not require any treaty reform; all that is needed is for political parties 
committee of independent experts to investigate allegations of fraud, mismanagement and 
irregularities in the Commission. The damning 'Wise Men' Report led to the en masse 
resignation of the Commission in 1999 and fuelled a debate and a series of measures regarding its 
administrative reform. Committee of Independent Experts, First Report on Allegations regarding 
Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission, 15 March 1999. White 
Paper, Reforming the Commission, COM(2000)200,1.3.00. 
"P. Magncttc, op. cit. n. 61. 
67 V. Mamadouh and T. Raunio, op. cit. n. 64, p. 333. 
" W. Van Gerven, The European Union. A Polity of States and Peoples, haart publishing. 2005, 
pp. 352-353. 
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contesting the European elections to nominate their candidates, allowing the 
voters to consider the choices by somehow linking EP candidates to the 
candidates for the Commission Presidency, while the elected MEPs will have to 
approve the nomination put forward by the European Council. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Due to the fact that parliaments are considered strongholds of democracy and 
legitimacy in the Member States, the EP does enjoy a symbolic importance in the 
Union's institutional system. It is the only supranational institution that receives 
a direct mandate and it has also been set up to constitute the democratic 
component, at least since direct elections were introduced. To this extent, the EP 
can be regarded as the democratic pillar of the Union69 and its role in the Union's 
decision-making process has been enhanced with each treaty reform so that it is 
sufficiently involved in law-making and in the general democratic supervision of 
the activities of the EU. 
In terms of form and function, the EP differs considerably from its national 
counterparts and as such it provides a poor model of representative democracy; it 
is not yet fully developed either as a representative body or as an institution of 
political authority. 70 The lack of linkage between public preferences and 
constitutional decisions by the EP as well as the `second order' character of 
European elections significantly diminish the EP's capacity to command public 
assent. At EU level, there is no government, and if one regards the Commission 
as such, it is not a party government. The EP fails to provide a mechanism for 
popular opinion to influence EU policy. An elected majority in Parliament does 
not express the policy preferences of the majority of citizens. Thus, one might 
69 J. Blondcl ct. al., op. cit. n. 30, p. 11. 
70 Mather, `The EP-A Model of Representative Democracy? ', (2001) 24 West European 
Politics 181-201. 
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conclude that the Union's system of parliamentary representation scores high for 
the development of a parliament with considerable attributions but still scores 
low in terms of representational and electoral connection. " Since Maastricht, the 
role of the EP has been strengthened significantly, which is said to have 
enhanced the Union's democratic legitimacy, but this fact has not appeased 
public discourse on the Union's democratic deficit. This paradox implies the loss 
of validity in the claim that democratisation means parliamentarisation of the 
Union. 72 The democratic content of decision-making at EU level cannot be 
reduced to the degree to which the EP has a say. 
The sui generic nature of the EU makes the `parliamentary model' difficult to 
apply as a solution to its democratic deficit. That is partly due to the fact that the 
`parliamentary model' is allied to the statal concept of `territorial' representation 
which is not simply the case for the EU system that is gradually evolving towards 
functional forms of representation (as will be examined in chapter 6). Full 
parliamentarisation of the EU on the model of the national constitutional state 
may aggravate rather than solve the democratic deficit problem. } The absence of 
a truly supranational party and election system suggests that the EU governance 
is not a fully-fledged federal system of political representation. Nonetheless, the 
citizens' representation in a double capacity, at national parliaments and at the 
EP, is not empty of federal-like characteristics. The balance between these two 
types of representation reflects the level of integration of the EU polity, rather 
than a change in its democratic legitimacy. A transfer of power from the national 
to supranational level is therefore neutral in principle in terms of overall 
democracy, if not detrimental to the democracy provided at national level. 
Therefore, propositions made to strengthen the position of the EP in the decision- 
making process are not to be seen as an increase of the democratic standard of 
the Union, but as a strengthening of its federal content. 4A dramatic shift of 
71 A. Muntcan, `The EP's Political Legitimacy and the Commission's "Mislcading Managcmcnt": 
Towards a "Parliamcntarian" EU? ', EIoP 4/2000. T. liarilcy, Constitutional Problems of the EU, 
Hart Publishing, 2000, p. 19. J. Gcrkrath, op. cit. n. 1, p. 78. 
n K. Lcnacrts, and R. Bray, Constitutional Law of the EU. Swcct and Maxwell, 2004, p. 654. 
A.. Moravcsik, `In Defence of the "Democratic Deficit": Reassessing Legitimacy in the European 
Union', (2002) 40 JCMS 603-624. 
" S. Smismans, op. cit. n. 58, p. 16. 
" K. Lcnacrts and E. dc Smijtcr, `The Question of Democratic Representation', in Reforming the 
TEU - The Legal Debate, Winter ct. al. (cds), Kluwer Law Intcmational, 1996, pp. 176-7. The 
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institutional balance towards the EP would mean just that: shift of power away 
from national parliaments. A strong legislative role for the EP would exacerbate 
public anxieties about the weakening of national and regional parliamentary 
control. Hence, the idea of a `Peoples' Congress' was abandoned early is the 
Convention. 
same might be said to hold true for cvcry shift of power from the Council to the Parliament, 
especially since the problem of lack of appropriate EP representation could be arguably 
compensated by the double majority in the Council. 
102 
CHAPTER 5 
THE JUDICIALISATION OF LAW-MAKING 
5.1 Introduction 
As examined in Chapter 2, the debate on the democratic legitimacy crisis of the 
Union is relevant to its changing constitutional framework which has been 
brought about by the processes of European integration and constitutionalisation, 
as facilitated primarily by the Court's jurisprudence on the nature of the EU legal 
norms and their place within the Union's legal system, as envisaged by the Court 
itself. What this chapter will examine is how the Court has attempted, not 
without criticism, to constitutionalise EU law by creating a system of legal 
protection under EC law based on a discourse of legal principles and individual 
rights. Relevant to this analysis is the manner by which the Court used the 
judicial review mechanism to institutionally position itself in the decision- 
making process, as it sought procedurally and substantively to control law- 
making pursuant to its duty to ensure that the `rule of law' is observed. The Court 
employed institutional principles and fundamental rights to blur the institutional 
separation between itself and the other EU institutions. 
The ultimate aim of the analysis is to offer some clues regarding the relationship 
between `democracy' and the `rule of law' in order to evaluate the Court's 
contribution to European democracy. The present contribution does not intend to 
either give an account of the emergence of the human rights discourse within the 
EU, or to appraise the effectiveness of the system of remedies created by the 
Court and its relationship with national courts. Both have been copiously 
revisited in academic scholarship. 
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5.2 Judicial review of EU acts: setting constitutional constraints on 
leeislative freedom 
Under the constitutional model, courts in judicial review proceedings act 
essentially as overseers of the legislative process in the name of a 'higher law' 
which plays an essential role in defining the constitutional limits of legislative 
activity. In the case of the EU, Article 220 EC constitutes a general clause of 
jurisdiction for the Community Courts' and the very foundation of judicial 
review conferred expressly on the European Court of Justice (ECJ)2 by means of 
which the 'rule of law' should be ensured under all circumstances. The 'rule of 
law' doctrine determines that the exercise of legislative competence by the EU 
institutions is subject to normative controls and general normative values or 
principles which act as constitutional constraints. It provides a degree of legal 
accountability, a framework for the exercise of legislative power in 
constitutionally acceptable terms both as an objective guarantee of legality and a 
subjective safeguard for the individuals affected. 
Procedural scrutiny of the legislative process is a ground for judicial review 
under Article 230(2) EC and a fundamental premise of legal accountability 
(accountability through law). The ECJ has to ensure that institutions act within 
the remit of conferred powers3 but also with the procedural guarantees found in 
the treaties. Such duty is imposed, inter alia, by Article 253 EC which obliges 
the institutions to state the reasons on which their decisions are based. Martin 
Shapiro4 underlines the Court's readiness to recognise the potential of this 
laconic requirement, as he calls it. The standard formula justifying reasoned 
decisions stresses the control function of judicial review, but also promotes the 
principle of transparency. The ECJ insists that the obligation to state reasons 
found in Article 253 is not a mere formality, but it must disclose in a clear and 
unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the 
measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain 
' Article 1-29 TeCE. Since Nice, the obligation to ensure that in the interpretation and the 
application of the Treaty the law is observed rests both on the ECJ and CFI. 
2 Under Article 230 TEC (Article 111-365 TcCE). 
3 Choice of the correct legal basis as specified in treaty articles. 
4 M. Shapiro, `The Giving Reasons Requirement', (1992) University of Chicago Legal Forum, 
pp. 179 and 180, found in C. Iiarlow, Accountability in the EU, OUP, 2002, p. 160. 
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the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community Court to 
exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of 
reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the 
measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the 
addressees of the measure may have in obtaining explanations. 5 It is not 
necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, 
since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of 
Article 253 must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its 
context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. ' 
The ground of challenge on the basis of infringement of the Treaty, or `any rule 
of law', relating to its application? is not restricted to the definition of the 
procedural requirements that are relevant to the EU legislative process. General 
principles play a central role in the EU legal order, alongside primary and 
secondary legislation, comprising a distinct and well defined body of common 
law. One category is fundamental rights and there is also reference by the Court 
to principles of institutional law which are intended to regulate institutional 
relations, yet hardly ever developed into a coherent grouping. The reason may be 
that, although it did refer to `the general principles on which the institutional 
system of the Community is based and which govern the relations between the 
institutions and the Member States', 8 it has never developed this statement into a 
consistent doctrine of institutional principles. Institutional principles are more of 
a device of balancing legislative power between the EU institutions, as in the 
classical `separation of powers' theory. The influence of such doctrine lies 
behind the idea of `institutional balance' used by the ECJ as an interpretative 
principle of EU law. 
a See, inter alia, Case C-445/00 Austria v Council 120031 ECR 1-8549, para. 49. Case C-41/00 P 
Interporc v Commission [20031 ECR 1-2125, paua. 55. Case C-304/01 Spain v Commission 120041 
ECR 1-7655, para. 50. Joined Cases C-138/03, C-324/03 and C-431/03 Italy v Commission, 
judgment of 24.11.2005, not yet reported, para. 54. 
6 Sec, for instance, Case C-122/94 Commission v Council 119961 ECR 1-881, para. 29. Case C- 
367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink's France 119981 ECR I-1719, para. 63. Case C-17/99 
France v Commission [20011 ECR 1-2481, para. 36. Case C-310/99 Italy v Commission [20021 
ECR 1-2289, para. 48. 
7 Article 230(2) TEC. 
e For instance, Joint Cases 205-215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor v Germany [19831 ECR 2633, 
para. 17. B. Dc Witte, `The Role of Institutional Principles in the Judicial Development of the of 
the EU Legal Order', in The Europeanisation of Law: The Legal Effects of European Integration, 
F. Snydcr (cd), Hart Publishing, 2000, p. 834. Sec analysis in section 5.2.1. 
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The issue of judicial review of EU legislation actually raises issues regarding the 
margin of discretion allowed to the EU institutions to engage freely in decision- 
making. Such limitations may be imposed by the Community courts even beyond 
the scope envisaged in the treaties. It also highlights the fact that while the ECJ 
tries to promote the ideal of `limited government' by regulating institutional 
relations, the legislative process and indirectly the content of legislation, it 
actually blurs the borderline between judicial and political activities. In a 
nutshell, it raises concerns about the institutional equilibrium in the legislative 
process and, by association, about the democratic legitimacy of EU decision- 
making. 
5.2.1 Adjudicating `institutional balance' 
The European courts subject EU decision-making to a test of `democracy', as an 
unwritten principle of higher law, 9 which regulates the relationship between the 
EC institutions and against which the legitimacy of EC acts may be reviewed. 
The use of the democratic principle in jurisprudence seems akin to liberal 
democratic values found in the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States. To the ECJ, institutional balance is a fundamental part of European 
democracy, where the starting point of democratisation of decision-making is the 
empowerment of the Parliament. 10 
' 'Democracy' is not part of the objectives and activities that affect policy-making in the EU 
(Articles 2 and 3 TEC and Articles 2 TEU). It is, however, an overarching principle along with 
the rule of law, liberty and respect for fundamental rights (Preamble and Article 6(l) TEU). This 
is rectified by the Constitutional Treaty in Articles 1-2 and 145-52. 
10 In Case T-135/96 UE. 4PME v Council [19981 ECR 11-2335, para. 89, the CFI «, cnt a step 
further to emphasise that 'the principle of democracy on which the Union is founded requires - in 
the absence of the participation of the EP in the legislative process- that the participation of the 
people be otherwise assured, in this instance through the parties representative of management 
and labour who concluded the agreement which is endowed by the Council ... with a 
legislative 
foundation at Community level. In order to make sure that the requirement is complied with, the 
Commission and the Council arc under a duty to verify that the signatories to the agreement arc 
truly representative'. B. Dc Witte, op. cit. n. 8, p. 95. S. Ninatti, 'flow Do Our Judges Conceive of 
Democracy? The Democratic Nature of the Community Decision-Making Process under Scrutiny 
of the ECJ', JMWP 10/03. 
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First reference to the term `institutional balance' is to be found in Meronri" 
where the Court established the Meroni doctrine, which precludes the delegation 
of discretionary powers to bodies other than those established by the treaties on 
the ground that this would upset a fundamental guarantee contained in the 
balance of powers between the European institutions. It was not until Chernobyl 
that the ECJ indicated what `institutional balance' meant, when it referred to it as 
`a system for distributing powers among the different Community institutions, 
assigning to each institution its own role in the institutional structure of the 
Community and the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community'. A 
breach of such rule might be judicially sanctioned. 12 The Court sought to define 
the abstract division of tasks found in Article 7 (ex 4) TEC as `the powers of the 
institutions are not always based on consistent criteria'. 13 From its case law, one 
can distil further values that underlie institutional balance, namely, that each 
institution should enjoy a sufficient independence in exercising its powers 14 
without assigning them unconditionally, or encroaching on the powers and 
prerogatives of other institutions. 's 
The Court has generally refrained, in its jurisprudence, from formally accepting 
institutional balance as a `principle' with an independent legal content separate 
from the attribution of powers already found in the treaties. This holds true with 
one major exception, its case law dealing with the procedural rights of the 
European Parliament, where the Court blatantly dispensed with the text of Article 
230 EC in the name of institutional balance; particularly in Cliennobyl, it held 
that the absence in the Treaties of any provision giving the Parliament the right to 
" The Court held that `... there can be seen in the balance of powers which is characteristic of the 
institutional structure of the Community a fundamental guarantee granted by the Treaty to the 
undertakings and associations of undertakings to which it applies. To delegate a discretionary 
power, by entrusting it to bodies other than those which the Treaty has established to effect and 
supervise the exercise of such power each within the limits of its own authority, would render the 
uarantcc ineffective. ' Case 9/56 Meroni v lligh Authority [1957 and 1958] ECR 133, p. 152. 
j Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council [1990] ECR 1-2041, paras. 21-22. 
is Case 242/87 Commission v Council [1989] ECR 1425, para. 13. 
14 Accordingly, each institution is entitled to regulate its own organisation and manner of 
operation (including internal decision-making procedures) within the limits of the rules set forth 
in the Treaties. Case 5/85 AKZO Chemie v Commission [1986] ECR 2585, paras. 37-10. 
'S Mferoni, op. cit. n. 11. Case 149185 IVybol v Faure [1986] ECR 2391, para. 23. Case 25/70 
Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle Getreide v Koester [19701 ECR 1161, paras. 8-9. K. Lcnacrts and 
A. Verhocven, `Institutional balance as a Guarantee for Democracy in EU Governance', in Good 
Governance in Europe's Integrated Market, C. Jocrgcs and R. Dchoussc (cds), OUP, 2002, pp. 36- 
38 and 44-46. 
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bring an action for annulment might constitute a procedural gap, but could not 
prevail over the fundamental interest in the maintenance and observance of the 
institutional balance laid down in the treaties. 1' 
The concept of institutional balance was used by the Court to delimit the 
competences between the Council and the Commission and to define or rather 
enhance the institutional position of the EP in the legislative process vis-a-vis the 
other institutions. As noted by AG Darmon, '7 the opening of institutional conflict 
before the Court arose almost entirely with the introduction of parliamentary 
elections by universal suffrage. The Parliament's desire to be more closely 
involved in the Community decision-making process acquired a new dimension 
with the impetus provided by its new legitimacy. This is an interesting point 
because it seems to inspire the Court's reasoning, specifically, due consultation 
of the Parliament in the cases provided for by the Treaty - emphasis added - 
constitutes an essential procedural requirement disregard of which renders the 
measure concerned void. The effective participation of the EP in the legislative 
process represents an essential factor in the institutional balance intended in the 
Treaty. 18 
The Roquette judgment was the first step towards a jurisdictional guarantee of 
parliamentary consultation, as the Court established a direct link between the 
Parliament's procedural prerogatives and the democratic principles underlying 
16 B. Dc Witte, op. cit. n. 8, pp. 91-2. Case C-70/88, op. cit. n. 12, paras. 26-7: The absence of any 
reference to the European Parliament in that provision did not, however, prevent the Court from 
holding in Chernobyl that 'an action for annulment brought by the Parliament against an act of the 
Council or the Commission is admissible provided that the action socks only to safeguard its 
prerogatives'. Nice reforms rendered EP a privileged applicant under Article 230 (cx 173) TEC. 
17 Opinion of AG Darmon in Case 302/87 EP v Council [1988] ECR 5615, para. 28. S. Ninatti, 
onit. IL 10. 
Case 138/79 Roqueue Freres [1980] ECR 3333, para. 33. Case 139179 Ale eina v Council 
[1980] ECR 3393, para. 34. Case C-65/93 Parliament v Council [1995) ECR 1-643, para. 21. Case 
C-392/95 Parliament v Council [1997] ECR 1-3213, para. 14. Case C-408/95 Eurotunnel and Ors 
[1997] ECR I-6315, para. 46. Any action for annulment brought by the Parliament against an act 
of the Council and the Commission is admissible provided that the action socks only to safeguard 
its prerogatives and that is founded only on submissions alleging their infringements and the 
Parliament's prerogatives include in particular participation in the drafting of legislative 
measures. The CFI very rarely intervenes on the question of the obligation to consult the 
Parliament, but it seems unlikely to find that there has been a breach, especially if an act that had 
been adopted without parliamentary reconsultation was not called into question by the Parliament 
itself. See for instance Joint cases T-125/96 and T-1521'96 ßoehringer v Council and Commission 
[1999] ECRII-3427. 
108 
77IEJUDICLIL, ISATIONOP AIN4 ' WO 
the EC legislative process. Two core arguments outlined its reasoning; the 
presence of the EP in the legislative process as an clement of institutional 
balance provided for in the Treaty along with the need for peoples to participate 
in supranational decision-making. 19 The Court further qualified the duty to 
consult the Parliament as implying that it should be reconsulted whenever the 
text finally adopted, viewed as a whole, departed substantially from the text on 
which the Parliament had been consulted, unless amendments essentially 
corresponded to the wish of the Parliament itself. 20 The legislating institution 
could not dispense with that requirement on the basis of prior knowledge of the 
Parliament's wishes, because that would seriously undermine the effective 
participation of the Parliament in law-making? ' Observance of the consultation 
requirement implies that the Parliament has actually and meaningfully expressed 
its opinion and the requirement cannot be fulfilled by the Council simply asking 
for the opinion. In situations where the Council is faced with the urgency to 
adopt legislation, it shall use all the possibilities available under the Treaty and 
the Parliament's rules of procedure to obtain the preliminary opinion of the 
latter. 22 
The Court's tenor shifted following the introduction of the new cooperation and 
codecision procedures by Maastricht, which, on the one hand, reinforced the 
position of the Parliament in the legislative process while, on the other, required 
the Community judge to delineate more clearly the newly created labyrinth of 
19 Case 138/79, ibid: "the consultation ... is the means which allows the Parliament to play an 
actual part in the legislative process of the Community. Such power represents an essential factor 
in the institutional balance intended by the Treaty. Although limited, it reflects at Community 
level the fundamental democratic principle that the peoples should take part in the exercise of 
power through the intermediary of a representative assembly. " Therefore, a simple request for an 
opinion without having exhausted all the means necessary to obtain it was not sufficient to avoid 
the breach of an essential procedural requirement of the act. AG Gclhocd affirms the nexus 
between the two democratic principles in Imperial Tobacco, para. 179: `institutional balance plays 
an important role in the decisions of the Court. In this, however, the Court establishes a direct 
link with the prerogatives of the EP and the democratic principles underlying them'. S. Ninatti, 
op. cit. M10. 
2 Case 41/69 Chemiefarma v Commission [1970] ECR 661. Case 817/79 Buy! v Commission 
[1982] ECR 245. Case C-65/90 Parliament v Council 119921 ECR 1-4593, paras. 16 and 20-1. 
Case C-21/94 Parliament v Council [1995] ECR I-1827, para. 18. Case C-388/92 Parliament v 
Council [1994] ECR 1-2067, p©ra. 10. Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR 1-4973, 
para. 38. 
1 Case C-21/94, ibid, para. 25. Case C-392/95, op. cit. n. 18, para. 15. Case C-408/95, op. cit. n. 18, 
p46. Case C-316/91 Parliament v Council [ 19941 ECR 1-625, para. 17. C-65/93, 
op. cit n. 18, para. 22. Case 138/79, op. cit. n. 18, paras. 36-7. 
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procedures. In EP v Council 23despite the fact that the Court reiterated the need 
to adopt acts subject to prior parliamentary consultation as part of the correct 
legislative procedure, it also affirmed that `interinstitutional dialogue' on which 
parliamentary consultation is based is subject to a mutual duty of sincere 
cooperation. The closing remarks of the case are noteworthy: Parliament's plea 
was dismissed as retaliatory by the Court. Hence, the lack of observance of the 
essential requirement of parliamentary consultation was justified by the lack of 
observance on the part of the EP of its obligation to cooperate sincerely with the 
Council. 
Along with the institutional duty of parliamentary consultation, the legal basis 
issue constitutes another means of judicial scrutiny over the legislative activity of 
the EU institutions. In view of the open-ended character of treaty provisions and 
the absence of a formal hierarchy among the different legislative procedures, the 
choice of the appropriate legal basis becomes essential for the maintenance of the 
rule of law, as this will determine the degree of legislative competence of the EU 
institutions in the specific policy areas entrusted to the Community and, by 
reference, the legal validity of any adopted measure. Besides, the legal basis 
determines the procedural requirements applicable to the legislative process, as 
well as the relevant voting rules. The legal basis issue, therefore, is never neutral 
in terms of institutional politics: it is an instrument for each institution to 
maximise its influence in decision-making, 24 a fact that has caused institutional 
conflict before the Court and an increasing tendency by the latter to dominate the 
choice of the appropriate legal basis through judicial review. 
2' Case C-65/93, op. cit n. 18, paras. 23-24 and 27-8. The contested regulation provided for 
preferential tariffs applying to certain products coming from certain third Countries. There was 
urgency in adopting the regulation because it had, inter alia, to make the system of preferential 
tariffs conform to the imminent initiation of the Single European Market on 1 January 1993. On 
October 22, the Council asked the EP to express its opinion according to urgent procedure, so 
that the act could be adopted before January 1993, the scheduled date for entering into force of 
the regulation. On December 21, by which point it was clear that the Parliament would not have 
given its opinion before the New Year, the Council decided to adopt the act, despite the lack of 
parliamcntary consultation. S. Ninatti, op. cit. n. 10. 
` S. Ninatti, op. cit n. 10. D. Chalmcrs, EU Law: Law and EU Government. Vol.!, Ashgatc 
Publishing Group, 1998, p. 214. Cases 188-190/80 French Republic, Italian Republic and United 
Kingdom v. Commission [19821 ECR 2545. M. L. Fcmandcz-Estcban, The Rule of Law in the 
European Constitution, Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 165-6. 
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The Court did identify the choice of legal basis as `an essential institutional 
problem', yet, its awkward stance has rendered the issue even more problematic, 
The reasoning in some of its earlier case law was adversative to the adoption of 
legislation (by the EU institutions) under treaty provisions that did not envisage 
substantive parliamentary involvement, even if the requirement to consult the 
Parliament was optional. 25 The prevailing position now seems to be that the 
choice of legal basis must be based on objective factors, like the aim and content 
of the measure, which are amenable to judicial review, irrespective of the 
institutions' convictions or the political necessity for an institution (e. g. the EP to 
protect public health as part of a campaign) to participate more fully in law- 
making. 26 One needs to establish the number of objectives and their significance 
so as to ascertain the number of required bases. 27 The Court went a step further to 
25 Case 68/86 United Kingdom v Council (Re Agricultural hormones) 119881 ECR 855. Case C- 
316/91, op. cit. n. 21, para. 16. Case C-70/88, op. cit. n. 12. C-300/89 Commission v Council [ 19911 
ECRI-2867. The Court also held that where the powers of an institution derive from two treat) 
articles, that institution is obliged to adopt the relevant measure on the basis of both Articles: 
Case 165/87 Commission v Council (Re Harmonised Commodity Description) [ 19881 ECR 5545. 
26 Case C-22/96 Parliament v Council [19981 ECRI-3231. Case C-269/97 Commission v Council 
[2000] ECR 1-2257, para. 10. Amazingly, the Court rejected the Commission's plea that the 
contested regulation (beef and veal labelling) should have been adopted under Article 100a (now 
95) TEC and not Article 43 (now 37) TEC to enable the EP to participate in the legislative 
process, as the general objective of the regulation was to protect public health, as part of the BSE 
campaign. See also, cases C-300/89 ibid, para. 10, C-426/93 Germany v Council [19951 ECRI- 
3723, para. 29, C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council [19961 ECRI-5755, para. 25, C-164/97 & 
C-165/97 Parliament v Council 119991 ECRI-1 139, para. 12, C-269/97 Commission v Council 
[20001 ECRI-2257, para. 43, C-336/00 Huber [2002[ ECRI-7699, para. 30, C-491/01 British 
American Tobacco [20021 ECRI-11453, para. 93, C-338/01 Commission v Council [20041 
ECRI-4829, para. 54 and C-110/03 Belgium v Commission, judgment of 14.4.2005, para. 78, not 
yet reported. 
Case C-281/01 Commission v Council [20021 ECRI-12049, para. 39. If it is established that a 
measure simultaneously pursues several objectives, the Court said that a measure can be founded 
on multiple legal bases, unless some of them arc secondary or indirectly linked. Then the 
predominant objective should prevail and the act adopted on a single legal basis. Sec for instance, 
case C-42/97 Parliament v Council [1999] ECR 1-869, pams. 38-40 and 43. However, no dual 
legal basis is possible where the procedures laid down for each legal basis arc incompatible with 
each other: Cases C-300/89, op. cit. n. 25, paras. 17-21 and C-164/97 & C-165/97, ibid, para. 14. In 
this context, the opinion of AG Kokott, is quite interesting; a combination of legal bases should 
not disturb the institutional balance. After confirming established case law, she said that if the 
contested measure were to be adopted under both legal bases - in this case Article 133 EC which 
provides no formal right to the EP to participate in common commercial policy and Article 175 
EC which provides for codccision - the procedure under Article 133(4) EC could be abruptly 
supplemented by a codccision right of the Parliament not present in the Article. The Council 
would, as a result of the extension of the codccision procedure into the sphere of Article 133 EC, 
be deprived of its exclusive legislative competence and would have to share it with the 
Parliament. Such a result would contradict the deliberate decision of the Member States, 
confirmed at several intergovernmental conferences, on the legislative procedure in the common 
commercial policy. Hence, the decision-making process laid down in the relevant legal basis and 
the institutional balance laid down in the Treaty could be distorted: Case C-178/03 Commission v 
European Parliament and Council, [20061 ECRI-107, paras. 60-61. 
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declare that in order to determine the appropriate legal basis, it would not only 
focus on objective factors amenable to judicial review, but also on a certain 
hierarchy of norms `settled in its case law' like, for instance, that preference 
would be given to Article 37 (ex 43) TEC for measure regarding production and 
marketing of agricultural products 28 In EP v Council & Commission29 the Court 
introduced further institutional limitations by construing the scope of conferred 
legislative powers under Article 7(1) TEC as not including competencies 
conferred by secondary law, in this case Article 19 of Regulation 820/97. Such 
`residual' powers were beyond the limits of powers conferred upon the 
institutions by the Treaty and the Court refused to carry out an assessment of 
objectives that would not conform to that. Implicit in the argument is the Court's 
rebuff to the idea that secondary law conferring residual powers on one 
institution (the Council) would be permitted to upset the institutional equilibrium 
inherent in primary law (treaties). But the line of reasoning is not that of 
safeguarding Parliament's effective participation in decision-making, but rather 
on the strength of a de facto hierarchy of primary law over secondary; Regulation 
820/97 could only be amended on a legal basis equivalent to the one adopted, 
namely, the Treaty itself. 
The conclusion drawn from the Court's jurisprudence, as analysed in this section, 
is that the ECJ comes to assume a complex role when regulating institutional 
relations. Although the Court never announced institutional balance as a 
principle per se, it was a `value' created in its jurisprudence as a means of 
regulating institutional conduct during decision-making. Institutional balance as 
a notion is not entirely absent from the treaties which assume a certain division 
of function between the institutions. However, the Court created the concept of 
institutional balance - one that is neither static nor visibly defined - and further 
developed the `values' that underlie it. During this process of constitutional 
_' Referring to Case C-180/96 UK v Commission [ 19981 ECR 1-2265, para. 133 and the case law 
sited therein: Case C-269/97, op. cit. a24, para. 47. 
_9 Case C-22/96, op. cit. n. 26. Case C-93/00 EP v Council & Commission (20011 ECRI-10119, 
paras. 19 and 39-35. The Council ignored the Commission proposal to adopt two regulations (for 
a system of identification and registration of bovine animals and of labelling beef and beef 
products) to implement Regulation 820/97 under Article 152 EC which provided for the 
codecision procedure. It instead adopted the implementing Regulation on the basis of Article 19 
of Regulation 820/97, because the EP ignored the Council's threat and introduced amendments 
on its first reading in the context of Article 251 EC. 
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interpretation of institutional balance, it is evident, especially in its earlier case 
law, that the Court adapted the constitutional text of the treaties. A stark example 
is Cliernobyl, where it blatantly dispensed with the text of Article 230 EC when 
it held that the absence in the treaties of any provision giving the Parliament the 
right to bring an action for annulment might constitute a procedural gap, but 
could not prevail over the fundamental interest in the maintenance and 
observance of the institutional balance laid down in the treaties. The same 
conclusion applies to the jurisprudence on the duty of parliamentary 
reconsultation. 
It seems that the Court was drawn into the overall political climate and discourse 
of the time that would link the Union's democratisation with the EP's enhanced 
participation in decision-making, as the latter enjoyed its newly found legitimacy 
following the introduction of direct elections. Hence, the Court established a 
direct link between the Parliament's procedural prerogatives and the democratic 
principles underlying the EU legislative process. In the post-Maastricht era, the 
Court appeared to have revised its standard understanding of EU democracy 
linking a `rule of law' interpretation of the institutional balance to the mere or at 
least mainly democratic input of the EP. Again, during this period, academic and 
political discourse started to increasingly disassociate the Union's 
democratisation from EP participation. Besides, the Parliament had already 
acquired new cooperation and codecision powers under the Maastricht Treaty. 
Hence, in its later case law - including the jurisprudence on the use of the 
appropriate legal basis - it adopted a more balanced and moderate approach that 
would subject institutional balance to sincere cooperation between the EU 
institutions, a principle expressly stated in the Treaty (Article 10 TEC). This was 
more akin to an approach that perceived the democratic nature of the EU as 
based on both the role of the EP and the Council. 30 Beyond that, as Stijn 
Smismans31 rightly observes, the Court's democratic reading of the institutional 
so While this is in line with the 'traditional' rcading of the institutional system of the EU this las 
never been stated in the Treaty. Article I-46 TcCE provides for the first time a clear constitutional 
statement that the democratic representative nature of the EU is based on both the role of the EP 
and the Council 
31 S. Smismans `The Constitutional labelling of "The democratic life of the EU"', in Political 
Theory and the European Constitution, L. Dobson and AFollcsdal (cds), Routledge, 2004, p. 135. 
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balance should extend further to take account of all institutions that represent a 
different constituency as part of the formal constitutional and informal 
institutional reality of the EU system of governance. That would constitute a 
more accurate description of democracy and institutional balance in the EU, a 
multilevel polity. 
5.2.2 Adjudicating `fundamental human ribits' 
Respect for fundamental human rights is a condition of legality of Community 
law and thus a ground of review under Article 230 EC. It is settled case law that 
these form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance is 
ensured by the Community judicature in fulfilling their institutional role pursuant 
to Article 220 EC 32 Originally, the Court's approach was that such role did not 
normally require to rule on the compatibility of Community measures with 
fundamental rights guaranteed by national constitutions, thus treating them 
essentially as a matter of national law. 33 However, it was not slow to redefine its 
institutional role by holding that fundamental rights whilst inspired by the 
constitutional traditions common to Member States, should be ensured within the 
framework of the structure and objectives of the Community. 3' The Court 
protects fundamental rights as `an integral part of the general principles of 
[Community] law' and their autonomy from their national source has been 
The Court's approach on the role of other actors - particularly national and subnational - in the 
institutional balance will be examined in Chaptcr 6. 
32 Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Communities to the Com'ention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 119961 ECR 1-1759. Case C-404/92PXv Commission 119941 
ECR 1-4737, paras. 17-25. The Court said that those requirements are binding also on the Mcmbcr 
States as they implement Community law: Case 5/88 Jrachauf v Bundesamt Euer Ernaerung und 
Forstwirtschaft [ 19891 ECR 2609, para. 19. 
33 Case 1/58 Stork v high Authority [ 1959] ECR 17, p. 26. 
34 Case 11/70 Internationale Ilandelsgesselischafl v Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle Getreide [19701 
ECR 1125, para. 4. Thc ECJ implied in a ruling in 1969 that human rights considerations were 
inherent in EC law when it said that an Article in Decision 69/71 `contained nothing capable of 
prejudicing the fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law 
and protected by the Court: Case 29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [ 19691 ECR 419, p. 425. 
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regularly emphasised: 35 `the question of a possible infringement of fundamental 
rights by a measure of the Community institutions can only be judged in the light 
of Community law itself. ' 
No Treaty provision confers on the Community institutions any general 
competence to enact rules on human rights, except in the area of external 
development policy. 36 In Opinions 2/94 the Court, assuming its constitutional role 
in interpreting the extent of Community powers under the Treaty, denied the use 
of Article 308 EC as a likely general enabling provision. In this context, the 
Court took on itself what it saw as an institutional duty to ensure the respect of 
fundamental rights as a means of preserving the rule of law and created an 
unwritten catalogue of rights in a substantial body of case law, which has been 
held to be a kind of negative constraint on EU law and policy-making, loosely 
constitutionalised by Article 6(2) TEU. Respect for fundamental rights remains 
open-ended, inspired by national constitutional traditions, the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and other international treaties which the 
Member States have cooperated on, as restated in Article 6(2). 37 
The Court has recognised a variety of rights in its jurisprudence in an 
incremental expansion of fundamental rights protection, for instance, the right for 
respect to one's private life, 38 right to property and to engage in economic 
3s Case 44/79 Mauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [ 19791 ECR 3727, paras. 14-5. Case C-274/99P 
Connolly v Commission [20011 ECRI-1611, para. 37. J. H. H. Weiler and S. Frics 'A Human Rights 
Policy for the EC and the EU: the Question of Compctcnccs', JMWP 4/99. According to the 
Constitutional Treaty, Article 1-9(3), fundamental rights constitute general principles of law. 36 Article 177 EC. However, there arc a small number of treaty articles dealing with specific 
fundamental rights, like Article 12 EC on prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality. 
37 Joint cases 60 and 61/84 Cinetheque £4 v Federation Nationale des Cinemas Francals [19851 
ECR 2605, para. 26. In ERT it imposed a similar duty on Member State courts as regards a certain 
class of Member State acts. Opinion 2/94, op. cit. n. 32. Dc Burca 'Convergence and Divergence 
in European Public Law: The Case of Human Rights', in Convergence and Divergence In 
European Public Law, P. 13eaumont, C. Lyons and N. Walker (eds), Hart Publishing, 2002, p. 135- 
8. Article 6(2) TEU provides that the Union shall respect fundamental rights as they result from 
the ECHR and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles 
of Community law. Case C-274/99P, op. cit. a35, pa a. 38. Case T-1 12/98 ftfannesmannroehren- 
Werke v Commission [20011 ECRII-729, para. 60. Joint Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 
Oesterreichischer Rundfunk and Others [2003) ECRI-4989, ptaras. 68-9. Case 4/73 Nold v 
Commission [19741 ECR 491, para. 13. The ECIIR was first specifically referred to in Case 36/75 
Rutili [19751 ECR 1219 and has been quoted in subsequent case law. However, no attempt ill 
be made to examine the relationship between the EU and the ECI IR, as this is not the focus of the 
current thesis. 
ss Case_ C-404/92, op. cit. n. 32. 
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activity39, rights of defence4° and some social rights. '' It stated that the 
prohibition on discrimination on the grounds of sex is a fundamental human right 
and recognised the principle of equality - with specific reference to equal pay for 
equal work - as one of the general principles of Community law, enshrined in the 
`social objective' of Article 141 TEC. 42 The Court further considered the scope 
of the Treaty as it applies to free movement of persons and drew an association 
between EU citizenship, access to education and non-discrimination by reason of 
nationality. This development flows in part from the extensive interpretation of 
the original EEC Treaty by the Court, which brought within the Treaty's scope 
interests that are not primarily economic. 43 lt has repeatedly emphasised that 
fundamental rights protection is a balancing test between differing interests, as in 
the case of the Directive 95/46 (processing of personal data) which must be 
interpreted in light of the right to privacy and the freedom of movement of 
personal data 4' Such conditionality of protection offers the Community 
judicature ample discretion to determine the degree of judicial review. 
39 Case C-280/93 Germany v. Council [19941 ECR 1-4973. 
' The Community judicature has emphasised how important it is that the rights of defcncc arc 
respected as fundamental rights, particularly by the Commission during administrative 
procedures and investigative decisions which may lead to the imposition of penalties. Joined 
Cases 18/65 and 35/65 Gutmann v Commission [19661 ECR 149, p. 172. Joined Cases T-305/94 
to T-307/94, T-313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94 
Limburgse Vinyl blaatschappij and Others v Commission [19991 ECR 11-931, para. 96, confirmed 
on this point by the ECJ in Joined Cases C-238/99P, C-244/99P, C-245/99P, C-247/99P, C- 
250/99P to C-252/99P and C-254/99P Limburgse Vinyl Afaatschappif and Others v Commission 
[20021 ECR 1-8375, para. 59. T-223/00 Kyowa Ifakko Kogjv Co. Ltd, v Commission [20031 
ECRII-2553, paras. 96-7. Case T-59/99 Ventouris v Commission 120031, ECRII-5257, paras. 117- 
8. Order C-232/02 P(R)1 Commission v Technische Glaswerke 11menau 120021 ECRI-8977, 
ýara. 80. 
4 In Case C-173/9913ECTU [20011 ECR 4881, the ECJ classified the right to paid annual leave 
set out in Directive 93/104 as a 'social right'. It did not expressly refer to the Charter, unlike the 
AG Tizzano (in paras. 26-28 of his opinion) but it used the phrase 'social right' rather than 
'entitlement'. 
42 Case C-50/96 Deutsche Telekom AG v Schroeder [2000) ECR I-743 and Joint Cases C-270 & 
271/97 Deutsche Post AG v Elisabeth Sievers and Brunhilde 120001 ECR 1-929. See Case C- 
185/97 Coote [19981 ECR 1-5199, para. 23. According to the principle of equality, similar 
situations should not be treated differently and different situations should not be treated equally, 
except if such treatment is objectively justified. See Case C-15/95 E1RL de Kerlast [19971 ECR 
1-1961, para. 35. 
" Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [20011 ECR 1-6193. Case C-224/98 D'Hoop v Office National 
d'emploi, [20021 ECRI-6191, Opinion of AG Gcclhocd paras. 27-32. The Court asserted an EU- 
wide right for students to loans and grants in cases C-209A)3 The Queen (on the applicaton of 
Dany 13idar) v London Borough of Ealing, Secretary of Education and Spills 120051 ECRI-2119 
and in C-147103 Commission v. Austria, judgment of 7.7.2005, not yet reported. 
44 Case C-101/01 BodilLindqvist [2003] ECRI-12971. 
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The jurisprudence on fundamental rights as part of Community law principles is 
important in examining how the Court created an institutional duty of obedience 
and observance of the rule of law. Drawing on the case of T. Port, Weiler and 
Fries maintain that the Court has moved beyond the prohibition of measures 
which in themselves violate human rights and has set a positive duty on EC 
institutions to take positive action to comply with fundamental rights. 43 The most 
recent case law on the right of access to documents - enshrined also in Article 
255 EC - may provide a clearer indication as to the true extent of the institutional 
duty. In Hautala, the CFI held that Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731, which 
provided exceptions to access relating to the protection of public interest, was to 
be interpreted as meaning that the Council was obliged to examine whether 
partial access should have been granted to documents covered by one of the 
exceptions mentioned in that provision. 46 The CFI concluded that as the Council 
had not examined whether the right of access applied not only to documents as 
such but also to the information contained in them, the decision to refuse access 
to the documents in question was vitiated by an error of law and had to be 
annulled. This interpretation was expressly confirmed by the ECJ on appeal. `' 
Subsequently, 48 the Court of Justice annulled a Council and Commission 
decision - overturning a CFI ruling - refusing access to documents as the 
institutions had not considered the possibility of granting partial access, because 
they took the view that the Code and the Decisions on the right of access did not 
impose such an obligation on them. 
`s Case 68/95 T. Port [19961 ECRI-6065, para. 40: `The Community institutions arc required to act 
in particular when the transition to the common organisation of the market infringes certain rights 
protected by Community law, such as the right to property and the right to pursue a profession or 
trade activity' in J. 11. H. Wcilcr and S. Frics, op. cit. n. 33. P. ßcaumont argues that this single 
example provided by J. H. H. Weiler and S. Frics is not enough evidence that the Court has created 
a duty on the institutions to take certain positive action to comply with fundamental rights: 
`Human Rights: recent developments and Impact on Law in Europe', in Convergence and 
Divergence in European Public Law, op. cit. n. 35. 
" Case T-14/98 Ifautala v Council 119991 ECR 11-2489, para 87. The CFI further said that an 
institution is obliged to assess in a concrete and individual manner whether exceptions to the right 
of access apply to each of the documents referred to in a request. Only such an examination can 
enable the institution to assess the possibility of granting the applicant partial access. It then 
concluded that where an institution receives a request for access under Regulation No 1049/2001 
it is required, in principle, to carry out a concrete, individual assessment of the content of the 
documents referred to in the request: Case T-2/03 Verein filr Konsumenteninformation v 
Commission, judgment of 13.4.2005, paras. 72-4, not yet reported. 
" Case C-353/99P Council v Hautala [20011 ECRI-9565, paras. 27 and 31. 
`e In Case C-353/01P Olli Mallila v Council [20041 ECRI-1073, appeal from Case T-204/99 
htattila v Council and Commission [20011 ECR 11-2265. 
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As explained by AG Leger in 011i Mattila149 and approved by the ICJ, by virtue 
of the principle of legality and as part of settled case-law, the internal legality of 
a measure refusing access must be assessed on the basis of facts and law as they 
stood at the time of the adoption of the measure and not subsequently. SO The rule 
is intended to ensure that the European Community functions as a Community of 
law and that the institutions exercise their powers in compliance with that law. 
The Community judicature is not entitled, when exercising judicial review of 
legality under Article 230 EC, to take the place of the institutions by specifying 
the measures needed to comply with its judgments or to issue directions to those 
institutions. s' It is up to the institutions, under Article 233 EC, to provide the 
remedy, but the Court suggested that the right path was the reopening of 
communication between the institutions and the applicant, in order to provide the 
reason for refusal. 
Consistent with its case law, the Court seems to draw an analogy between the 
right of access with the duty to give reasons. 52 When a reply confirms the 
rejection of an application on the same grounds, the Courts would review the 
sufficiency of the reasons given in the light of all the exchanges between the 
institution and the applicant. In this context, the onus on the institution to show 
that it satisfied the requirement to give reasons may be more stringent where the 
applicant puts forward factors capable of casting doubt on whether the first 
refusal was well founded. The institution would then be obliged, when replying 
to a confirmatory application, to state why those factors were not such as might 
warrant a change in its position. Otherwise, the applicant would not be able to 
"Opinion of AG Leger in Case C-353/i0IP, ibid, paras. 52-5. 
S0 Joint cases 15/76 and 16176 France v Commission [1976] ECR 321, para. 7. Case C-449/98P 
IECC v Commission [2001 ] ECRI-3875, para. 87. 
s' Opinion of AG Leger in Case C-353/O 1P, op. cit. n. 48, para. 30. Sec Case 53/85 A&7ZO Chemie 
v Commission [1986] ECR 1965, para. 23. Case C-199/91 Foyer Cculturel du Sart"771man Y 
Commission [1993] ECRI-2667, para. 17. Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T- 
388/94 European Night Services and Others v Commission [19981 ECRII-3141, para. 53. Case T- 
126/99 Graphischer Maschinenbau v Commission [2002) ECRII-2427, para. 17. The limitation 
also applies in the context of an appeal: Case C-5/93P USf v Commission [1999] ECRI-4695, 
para. 3 G and Case T-106/99 Mejvr v Commission [1999] ECRI I-3273, para. 21. 
52 Case C-353/01P, op. cit. n. 48, paras. 31-2. Case T-105/95 IPVI% UK v Council [1997] ECRII- 
313, paras. 65-6 and the case law contained therein. 
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understand the reasons for which the author of the reply to the confirmatory 
application had decided to confirm the refusal on the same ground. 53 
5.2.2.1 The institutional implications of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 
Has the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter)54 affected the 
institutional position of the Community Courts vis-a-vis the other EU 
institutions? The EU Charter does not explicitly say that it is concerned with 
violations of fundamental rights arising out of measures adopted by the EU 
institutions. It simply states that its provisions are addressed to the EU 
institutions (and the Member States). The institutions shall therefore respect the 
rights, observe the principles and promote their application in accordance with 
their respective powers. The EU Charter does not create any new EU competence 
or institutional powers, including any new jurisdiction for the Community 
courts. 55 The position has not changed under the Constitutional Treaty, as the 
Convention was not mandated to propose changes to the very character of the 
Union. Therefore, the EU Charter was not designed to convert the Union into a 
general human rights organisation. That would have entailed a huge expansion in 
the competences of the Union. m Neither shall the Union's potential accession to 
the ECHR affect its competences as defined in the Constitutions' 
5' Case T-188/98 Kuijer v Council [20001 ECRII-1959, paras. 44-6. 
OJ2000, C364/1,18.12.00. 
55Article 51 of the EU Charter. 
According to Article 11-191(2) TcCE, the EU Charter does not create any new EU competence, 
powers and tasks. According to Article II-191(1) TcCE, the scope and application of the EU 
Charter is to be limited to actions of the EU institutions only when implementing law and is not 
intended to replace other forms of fundamental rights protection. According to the Working 
Group's common understanding, the legal scope of the Union's accession to the ECIIR would be 
limited to issues in respect of which the Union has competence. It would not lead to any 
extension of the Union's competence, let alone the establishment of a general competence on 
fundamental rights. Accordingly, `positive' obligations of the EU to take action to comply with 
the ECHR could arise only to the extent such action is permitted under the Treaty: CONV 
354/02, Final report of the Working Group If `Incorporation of the Charter/accession to the 
ECHR', 22.10.2002. 
57 Article 1-9 TcCE. 
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At present, the EU Charter is just a political declaration that reaffirms the 
protection of rights resulting from the treaties, the ECIIR and the ECJ's 
jurisprudence. As the proclaimed aim of the European Council was not to alter 
the substance of fundamental rights protection in the EU but to make the already 
existing protection clearer to the citizens, there seems to be a wide consensus 
among commentators that it consolidates existing law in the form of a 
`confirmation' rather than create a legal basis as such. 5' Seen in this light, the 
Charter would mainly serve as an additional instrument of constitutional control 
over the EU institutions. The Constitutional Treaty, if and when ratified, will 
formally incorporate the EU Charter to the primary law of the EU, but will not 
modify the substance of protection. This is consistent with the aim of the 
Convention to make only technical drafting adjustments to the text agreed by the 
Convention on the EU Charter. 5' Therefore, the legal force of the Charter would 
not affect the standard of protection. 
Would a legally binding Charter lead to a change in the direction of protection, 
that is, to a reorientation of human rights protection from economic to social? It 
can be argued that the main legal consequence would be a possible shift in 
balance between fundamental rights and economic freedoms in EU law, as the 
EU Charter grants fundamental status to civic, political and social rights but not 
to the four economic freedoms. This may shift the scope of what could be 
constitutionally mandated by EU law as exceptions to economic freedoms and 
hence provide critical guidance to the Courts 60 It is unlikely to lead to the 
establishment of different economic and social policies as both the current 
treaties and the Constitutional Treaty are largely market oriented. 
'" A. J. Mcncndcz `Legal Status and Policy Implications of the Charter'. ARENA WP02/7. 
E. Vrancs `The Final Clauses of the Charter of Fundamental Rights' EIoP 7/03. FG Jacobs, 'Tlhe 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights', in Accountability and Legitimacy In the EU. A. Arnull and 
D. Wincott, OUP, 2002. N. Bcnnard, `"New Governance" Approach to Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights' and M. P. Maduro, `The Doubic Constitutional Lifc of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union', in Economic and Social Rights under the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights -A Legal Perspective T. Ilcrvcy and J. Kcnncr (cds), Hart 
Publishing, 2003, pp. 271-2. 
59 The idea behind this choice was not to impair the legitimacy of the Convention that negotiated 
the EU Chartcr: CONY 354/02, op. cit. n. 56. Preamble to Part 11 TcCE. 
60 A. J. Mcncndcz, 'Between Lackcn and the Dccp Bluc Sea. An Assessment of the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty from a Deliberative-Democratic Standpoint', (2005) 11 EPL 105-143, 
pp. 138-139. 
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Most notably, it is arguable that the EU Charter will need to be incorporated into 
the Treaty to have legal effect or policy impact, as it has already provided 
normative guidance and a shift in the burden of argumentation to the opinions of 
Advocate Generals (AGs)61 to the ECJ and to the CFI. This argument is 
supported by the practice of AGs who have invoked the text of the EU Charter as 
authoritative evidence of EU law. 62 In addition, the CFI was prepared to vest the 
EU Charter with a degree of constitutional stature, when it held in max. mobil" 
that complaints regarding infringement of competition rules should be treated 
61 AG Geclhoed in Case C-491/01 The Queen v Secretary of Stale for Health ex Parte: British 
American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd supported by Japan Tobacco Inc. 
and JT International SA [20021 ECRI-11453, para. 106 seems to be pointing to this direction: 
'Proceeding on the assumption that a national measure such as that outlined in the preceding 
paragraph is justified by Article 30 EC, this will already mean that the barrier to trade exists. In 
order to set aside this barrier to trade, the Community legislature is entitled to adopt measures by 
which it takes over from the national legislature the protection of the matter of public interest (in 
casu, public health). In other words, the realisation of the internal market may mean that a 
particular public interest - such as here public health - is dealt with at the level of the European 
Union. In this the interest of the internal market is not yet the principal objective of a Community 
measure. The realisation of the internal market simply determines the level at which another 
public interest is safeguarded' 
= Particular reference should be made of I3ECTU, a UK case concerning the right to paid annual 
leave, where AG Tizzano noted: 'Admittedly ... the Charter has not been recognised as 
having 
genuine legislative scope in the strict sense ... the fact remains that it includes statements which 
appear to reaffirm rights which arc enshrined in other instruments ... I think therefore that 
in 
proceedings concerned with the nature and scope of a fundamental right the relevant statements 
of the Charter cannot be ignored; in particular we cannot ignore its clear purpose of serving 
where its provisions so allow as a substantive point of reference for all those involved - Member 
States, institutions, natural and legal persons - in the Community context. Accordingly, I 
consider that the Charter provides us with the most reliable and definite confirmation of the fact 
that the right to paid annual leave constitutes a fundamental right'. Although he acknowledges 
that the text is formally not binding, AG Tizzano appears to give considerable weight to the 
Charter when indicating the way in which one should solve the case at hand. Having referred to 
Article 31(2) of the Charter as 'even more significant' legal evidence to other legal resources, he 
concludes that the Working Time Directive should be interpreted as not requiring such a 
minimum period of employment to acquire the right to paid annual leave: Case C-173/99, op. cit. 
n. 41, paras. 26-8. E. Vrancs and FG Jacobs, op. cit. n. 58. Most references arc rather modest, where 
the Charter is cited as `additional' legal authority to support le al argument. Reference to 
principle of fair hearing/presumption of innocence as fundamental right enshrined in ECI IR and 
Article 48(1) of the Charier. Opinion of AG R-J. Colomcr in Case C-338/00P Volkswagen .1Gv 
Commission [2003] ECRI-9189, para. 94. Or the necessity to make a double reference to treaty 
provisions and charter provisions, for instance, in the need to reaffirm and highlight the 
fundamental right of equal treatment as a fundamental legal principle in employment 
relationships: Opinion of AG Goclhoed in Case C-256/01 Debra Allonby [2004) ECRI-873. 
Principle of legality has the status of a fundamental right as laid down in national legal order, the 
ECHR and Article 49 of the EU Charter Opinion of AG Gcclhocd in Case C-58/02 Commission 
v Spain [20041 ECRI-621, paras. 39-40. On a more interesting note, AG Leger founded the claim 
that 'the European Union and its Member States arc based on the principle of the rule of law' on 
the Preamble of the Charter. Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002) ECRI-1577. 
63 Case T-54/99 max. mobil Telekommunikation Service Gmbh! v Commission 120021 ECRI1-313, 
paras. 48 and 57, set aside by the ECJ in Case C-141/02 Commission v T-Moblle Austria Gmbll 
(previously known as max. mobil Telekommunikation Service Gmbll) 120051 ECRI-1283. T- 
198/01 R1 op. cit. n. 58, para. 85. 
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impartially by the Commission during formal investigation as a matter of sound 
administration, which is one of the general EC principles confirmed in Article 
41(1) of the Charter; the fulfilment of that obligation must be amenable to 
judicial review. It stated: `Such judicial review is also one of the general 
principles that are observed in a State governed by the rule of law and are 
common to the constitutional traditions of the Member States as is confirmed by 
Article 47 of the Charter under which any person whose rights guaranteed by the 
law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a 
tribunal. ' 
Further, in Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co. Lid and Arclier Daniels Midland 
Company" the CFI defined the scope of application of the principle nonn bis in 
idem by reference to Article 50 EU Charter, which provides that no one may be 
tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence he has been 
acquitted or already convicted within the Union, in accordance with the law. 
Independently of whether the provision has binding legal force, the CFI held that 
the EU Charter is clearly intended to apply only within the territory of the Union 
and the scope of the right laid down in that provision is expressly limited to 
cases, where the first acquittal or conviction is handed down within the Union. 65 
As long as the EU Charter remains, irrespective of its force, a consolidation of 
existing law and, thus, authoritative evidence of the law in force, the rights 
declared therein only have legal meaning if they already existed in the system of 
protection, for instance, in the Court's jurisprudence. " Apart from that, the 
Charter provides a catalogue of rights and principles in a more consistent and 
transparent manner, arguably constructing a European `awareness' of such rights 
and principles. As it is not intended to affect the competenees of the EU 
institutions and their allocation, it is equally unlikely to affect the ECJ's position. 
A legally binding Charter, however, would mean constitutionalisation of 
fundamental rights protection brought about by a political and institutional 
process beyond the institutional control of the Court. According to Article II- 
" Case T-223/00, op. cit. n. 40, para. 104 and Case T-224/00 Archer Daniels Midland Company v 
Commission [2003] ECRII-2597, para. 93. 
Case T-67/01 JCB Services Ferries v Commission, [2004] ECRII-49, para. 36. 
F. RLlorcntc, `A Chartcr of dubious utility', (2003) 1 Int J Constitutional law 405-126, p. 423. 
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112(5), in its interpretative task, the Court will have to give due regard to the 
explanations provided by the two Conventions (the Convention on the EU 
Charter and the Constitutional Convention). Still, it is unlikely that it will deter 
the Court from its typical systematic interpretation of the Treaties, even to 
occasionally give prominence to political rights, 67 and there are doubts that the 
Court will ever develop the political and moral clout to creatively interpret the 
already ambitious social and political rights enshrined in the EU Charter, for 
instance, to construe the `right to life' (Article 11-62) to maintain a prohibition of 
abortions in Ireland. 
As for the potential impact of the accession to the ECHHR on the autonomy of EU 
law, including the position and autonomy of the ECJ, it shall not affect the 
Union's competences as defined in the EU Constitution including the primacy of 
EU law. ' There is the theoretical possibility that any interpretation of the EU 
Charter on the basis of the ECHR - many Charter rights are based on the ECLIR - 
may determine a standard of protection that would diverge from the case law of 
the Court and would create two competing regimes for the protection of 
fundamental rights in the EU, thus establishing an `external control' of EU 
institutional and legislative activity. 69 On closer inspection, there are sufficient 
guarantees in the TeCE that any rights protection would remain within the limits 
of the Treaty without preventing EU law from providing more extensive 
protection (Article II-112). Also, that the ECJ would remain the sole supreme 
arbiter of questions on EU law and the validity of Union acts. 7° The Court would 
have, of course, to rethink its relationship to the Strasbourg Court (ECHR). 
"For instance, the Court viewed the free movement of goods and the freedom of assembly and 
association as being of equal constitutional ranking: Case C-112/00 Schmidberger, Internationale 
Transporte und Planzage vAustria [20031 ECRI-5659. A. J. Menender, op. cit. n. 60, p. 139. 
`8 Articles 1-9 and 1-6 TcCE. That was the conclusion reached and the recommendations made by 
the Group, Accession to the ECHR would give citizens analogous protection vis-3-vis acts of the 
Union as they presently enjoy vis-ä-vis all the Member States. This is seen as an issue of 
credibility as the adherence to the ECHR has been made a condition for membership for new 
states in the Union. CONV 354&)2, op. cit. n. 56. 
69 A. Arnull, 'From Charter to Constitution and Beyond: Fundamental Rights in the EU', (2003) 
P. L. 774-793, p. 781. 
70 According to Article 111-375 TcCE, Member States undertake not to submit a dispute 
concerning the interpretation of application of the Constitution to any method of settlement other 
those provided for therein. 
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Despite the limited projected impact of the EU Charter on the Court's 
institutional position and contrary to AG and CFI practice, as well as predictions 
by the EU institutions that the Charter would become mandatory through judicial 
interpretation as part of the general law principles, 71 the ECJ has not sought 
inspiration in it, as it already does with other fundamental rights instruments. 
Presumably, the ECJ is quite cautious to apply the Charter in its judgments due 
to its political nature. No longer wishing to assume the constitutional leadership 
of the EU, it may believe that the steps to the Charter's constitutionalisation must 
be taken by the political institutions. 72 Besides, AGs have invoked the Charter in 
several cases, but they have done so in various ways which do not necessarily 
imply express recognition of any legal force. But a different reading is also 
possible; by non-reliance on Charter in its human rights jurisprudence, the ECJ 
asserts its authority in a new pluralist institutional environment of fundamental 
rights protection which is emerging and which uses the Charter as a reference 
standard. The Commission has insisted that the binding character of the Charter 
as a codification of the EU acquis in the field of human rights should not depend 
on its formal incorporation into the treaties. 73 Since 2000, the EP's annual report 
on the situation of fundamental rights in the Union uses the Charter as its main 
source of reference and as the authoritative template on which to base its 
examination of the evolution of fundamental rights in the Member States. The 
adoption of the Charter - in any form - has encouraged the development of 
political forms of human rights monitoring, like the Network of Independent 
Experts on Fundamental Rights, established by the Commission in 2002, or, most 
notably, the EU Human Rights Agency, an institution with legal personality that 
is to operate across pillars in promoting civil and political rights 74 The main 
argument for the creation of such a body was to encourage the Union and its 
71 COM(2000) 644 Communication from the Commission on the legal nature of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU, 11.10.00, paras. 9-10: `it is reasonable to assume that the Charter 
will produce all its effects, legal and others, whatever its nature. [... J it is clear that it would be 
difficult for the Council and the Commission, who arc to proclaim it solemnly, to ignore it in the 
future in their legislative function... ' 
n R. Lawson, `Human Rights: The Best is Yet to Come', (2005) 1 ECLR 27-37, p. 28. 
M. P. Maduro, op. cit. n. 58, pp. 283-4. Jo Shaw, `Tlic Treaty of Nice: Legal and Constitutional 
Implications', (2001) 7 EPL 195-2 15, p. 199. 
" COM(2000)644, op. cit. n. 71. 
" To replace the existing European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia EUMC and 
will become operational by 2007: COM(2005)280 Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing 
a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Brussels, 30.06.2005. 
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institutions to adopt a more preventive approach to human rights instead of 
human rights being monitored post hoc by the possibility of judicial review in the 
event of violation. 75 And in this environment, it is not possible to predict with 
certainty the breadth of the Court's future role in fundamental rights 
adjudication. 
5.2.3 Access to judicial review 
It has been repeatedly stated in this chapter that the Community courts are 
prepared to review measures taken by the institutions to uphold the fundamental 
rights of individuals, as part of their institutional duty to ensure that the rule of 
law is observed. One fundamental human right, settled in the case law, is the 
right to effective legal protection , 
76 a particular aspect being the right of access to 
judicial review by individuals. The Court of Justice is prepared to review any act, 
whatever its nature and form, on condition that it is intended to produce legal 
effects. 77 One would assume that it will not review recommendations, opinions, 
interinstitutional agreements and any other instruments of soft law, as for 
instance, the attempt to annul the declaration that the Maastricht Treaty had come 
into force. In Roujansky the action was simply rejected on the basis that there 
was no jurisdiction to annul acts of the European Council under the EU Treaty. 78 
7s P. Alston and O. dc Schuttcr (cds), Monitoring Fundamental rights In the EU-The Contribution 
of the Fundamental RightsAgency, Hart Publishing, 2005, pp. 2,5 and 18. 
76 The European Community is based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Mcmbcr Statcs 
nor its institutions can avoid review of the question whether their acts arc in conformity with the 
basic constitutional charter, the Treaty, which established a complete system of legal remedies 
and procedures designed to enable the Court of Justice to review the legality of acts of the 
institutions: Case C-314/91 Weber v Parliament [1993] ECRI-1093, para. 8; Joint Cases T- 
377/00, T-379A)0, T-380/00, T-260/01, T-272/01 Philip Morris International [2003] ECRIi-1, 
para. 122; Joint Cases T-116/01 & T-118/01 P&O European Ferries v Commission 120031 
ECRII-2957, para. 209; Case T-306/01 Yusuf and Al IJarakaat International Foundation v 
Council and Commission, judgment of 21.09.2005, para. 26, not yet reported. n For instance, Case 60/81 IRR v Commission 11981] ECR 2639 and Case 22/70 Commission V 
Council [1971] ECR 263, para. 3. N. Bcnnard, op. cit. n. 58, p. 256. 
78 Case T-584/93 RoujansLy v Council [1994] ECRII-585. J. Ushcr, 'Assertion of Jurisdiction by 
the ECJ', in Asserting Jurisdiction, P. Capps, Ivl. Evans and St. Konstadinidis (cds), Hart 
Publishing, 2003, pp. 287 and 292. Article 46 TEU excludes the Court's jurisdiction on matters 
falling under the intergovernmental pillars. 
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Yet, the Court did not hesitate occasionally, " while reviewing the application of 
Community acts, to extend its jurisdiction to measures adopted under the Union 
pillars which would interfere with fundamental Community principles on the 
ground of preserving the acquis communautaire, probably prompted by Article 
47 TEU which appears to grant the ECJ the role of the guardian with regard to 
the respect and observance of the EC Treaty. 
For Christopher Lord legal accountability possesses two main elements: `the 
rules must be enforceable by an independent judicial authority' and the legal 
system must allow `any citizen on the basis of equality' to access a court `with a 
complaint that power-holders are seeking to evade or distort the rules by which 
they are themselves brought to account' 80 While the independence of the court 
structure is beyond doubt, a somber mood prevails over the issue of standing for 
individuals to challenge general Community measures. Whilst the Court made a 
bold move in granting the EP standing when that was not envisaged by Article 
230 EC for the sake of institutional balance - as seen in s. 5.2.1 - it has construed 
very restrictively the locus slandi requirement for private litigants, rendering it 
very difficult for them to obtain a remedy when adversely affected by a 
Community measure, that is, the outcome of the legislative process. To be more 
precise, Article 230(4) states that a natural or legal person only has standing to 
challenge decisions that are of direct and individual concern to them. According 
to the formula first laid down by the Court in Plaumann, s* persons may be found 
7" In Case C-124/95 The Queen, ex pane Centro-Com v ILt! Treasury and Bank of England 
[19971 ECRI-81, the Court stated that powers retained by Member States in the field of foreign 
and security policy had to be exercised in a manner consistent with Community law and, in 
particular, with the provisions adopted by the Community in the sphere of common commercial 
policy under Article 133 TEC. The Court rejected the UK's argument that competence in the 
field of CFSP suggested also that Member States had more leeway in interpreting, applying, or 
supplementing Community acts with a foreign and security policy dimension. The undisputed 
powers under the second pillar had still to be employed in accordance with Community law. 
Even if Member States were competent to implement UN sanctions beyond the limits of the EC 
Regulation (Sanctions Regulation), that competence should be always exercised in such a way as 
not to contradict the basic aims and purposes of the Regulation. See also Case C-177/95 Ebony 
Maritime and Loten Navigation v Prefetto della Provincla di Prlndisi and Others [19971 ECRI- 
645 and Case C-84/95 Bosphorus ifava Yollari Turizm ve 7icaret AS v Minister for Transport, 
Energy and Communications, Ireland and the Attorney General [19961 ECRI-3953. 
"0 C. Lord, Democracy in the EU, Sheffield Academic Press, 1998, p. 96. C Marlow, op. cit. n. 4, 
148-9. ýi 
Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission 119631 ECR 95 and more recently Case C-IS1/98 
Antillean Rice Mills 120011 ECRI-8949, para. 49. Normally, a person has to demonstrate 
membership of a closed class of affected persons: Case 106-107/63 Toepfer v Commission [ 19651 
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individually concerned, if a measure affects them by reason of certain attributes 
peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances which differentiate them from all 
other persons. 
Where individuals have the right to participate in the legislative process, they 
may be granted standing on the ground of democracy. In UEAPME, a challenge 
to the Parental Leave Directive, the CFI asserted that agreements reached 
through the social dialogue, which are incorporated into directives, may be 
challenged on grounds of their democratic legitimacy. 82 It then held that a breach 
of the principle of democracy should be considered as a possible ground for the 
annulment of a directive in an action brought by a private party. In this case, the 
applicant was not found entitled to participate in negotiations for the adoption of 
the framework agreement on parental leave, later implemented by the contested 
Council decision, because Articles 3 and 4 of the Agreement on Social Policy did 
not confer on any representative of management and labour, whatever the 
interests purportedly represented, a general right to take part in any negotiations 
entered into, although it was open to any representative to initiate such 
negotiations. a' Yet, the absence of a right to participate in the negotiation and 
conclusion of the Framework Agreement was not sufficient in itself to deprive 
the applicant of standing. The deciding factor was whether the Council and 
Commission fulfilled their institutional obligation to verify the `representativity' 
of the signatories' actions in the proposal and adoption of the agreement. In the 
absence of such `representativity', the two institutions had to refuse to implement 
the agreement at Community level; otherwise, they would have infringed the 
applicant's rights. "' 
ECR 405. F. Jacob, `Effective Judicial Protection of Individuals in the EU, Now and the Future' 
in The Treaty of Nice and Beyond, M. Andcnas and J. Usher (cds), IZart Publishing, 2003, p. 335. 
B. Bcrcusson, 'Democratic Legitimacy and European labour Law' (2002) 28 IU 153-170, 
153. 
Despite initial consultations with the Commission, only those social partners that actually 
express the willingness to start negotiations have the right to participate. Under the Agreement, 
cross-industry organisations can negotiate and conclude an agreement and lhcn request the 
Commission that it be implemented by a Council decision on a proposal from the Commission: 
Case T-135/96, op. cit. n. 10, paras. 78 and 89. Agreement on Social Policy (ASP) concluded 
between the Member States (apart from Britain and Ireland), annexed to Protocol (No. 14) 
annexed to the Treaty in 1996. The ASP is now part of Articles 138 and 139 EC, 
" Case T-135/96, ibid, paras. 78,83,88 and 90. 
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The CFI's statement that the Commission and Council's participation at the 
implementation stage had the effect of `endowing an agreement concluded 
between management and labour with a Community foundation of a legislative 
character'85 coupled with its reluctance to review the legality and representativity 
of the agreement itself, seems to accept a lesser institutional status and a 
constitutional role for other institutional actors in the legislative process. The 
CFI's over-emphasis on the `sufficient representativity' during the 
implementation stage in establishing standing has been criticised as evading the 
real issue: in theory, an applicant would have had the right to prevent an 
agreement being implemented, but not the more fundamental right to contest the 
legality of the agreement itself. " 
The CFI rejected later in Emesa Sugar the applicant's plea, referring to 
UEAPME, that the contested decision escaped all democratic scrutiny, as there 
had been no consultation with either the EP or the overseas countries and 
territories (OTCs). The CFI concluded that no provision of Community law 
required the Council, in reviewing the OTC Decision, to follow a procedure 
during which the applicant would have had the right to be heard, thus conferring 
on them standing. The fact that the contested decision escaped all democratic 
scrutiny could not give rise to non-application of the rules of admissibility laid 
down in Article 230(4) EC'' 
That later case seems to be more in line with the Courts' rejection of the reliance 
by individuals on institutional balance -a `principle' judicially proclaimed as 
intrinsic to the principle of democracy - as a ground of review. In FNA13, the 
appellants submitted that they were entitled to seek the annulment of a measure 
as mid, para. 88. 
86 P. Syrpis, `Social Democracy and Judicial Review in the Community Order', in The Future of 
Remedies In Europe, C. Kilpatrick, T. Novitz and P. Skidmorc (eds), Hart Publishing, 2000, 
pp. 258-63. 
Case T-43/98 Emesa Sugar v Council [20011 ECRII-3519, paras. 45 and 55-6. The CFI 
emphasised in UEAPME, Case T-135/96, op. cit. n. 10 at para. 89, that `the principle of democracy 
on which the Union is founded rcquircs - in the absence of the jxuticipation of the EP in the 
legislative process- that the participation of the people be otherwise assured, in this instance 
through the parties representative of management and labour who concluded the agreement 
which is endowed by the Council ... with a legislative foundation at Community Icvcl. In order to 
make sure that the requirement is complied with, the Commission and the Council arc under a 
duty to verify that the signatories to the agreement arc truly representative'. 
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which undermined a fundamental right inherent in the principle of democracy, 
that is, the European Parliament's right as elected body to participate in decision- 
making. The CFI at first instance had failed in its duty to raise the issue of 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, as the Council adopted the 
contested measure without consulting the EP afresh. Also, invoking a breach of 
procedural guarantees found in the Treaties was enough to grant them standing, 
irrespective of whether they were `directly and individually concerned' by the 
act. The rationale being, the alleged breach of the rule of law had severe 
consequences for respect for the fundamental rights of individuals. The ECJ 
rejected those pleas and concluded that the alleged infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement was not sufficient in itself to allow the applicants access 
to judicial review. 88 It stated emphatically that its conclusion in Meroni, that the 
balance of powers constituted a fundamental guarantee for the institutional 
structure granted by the Treaty, could not be interpreted as providing a remedy 
for any natural or legal person who considered that an act of a Community 
institution had been adopted in breach of the principle of institutional balance, 
regardless of whether the act in question was of direct and individual concern to 
that person. The Meron i judgment was rather based on the need to ensure 
continuing institutional equilibrium and judicial supervision of the Parliament's 
prerogatives; therefore, it was not relevant to questions on standing. ' 
In Philip Morris, 90 the applicants claimed that a Commission decision granting 
itself power to bring legal proceedings before a Court in a non-Member State 
breached institutional balance and thereby produced legal effects on the division 
of powers for which the Treaty provided. Therefore, no such act could escape 
judicial review. The CFI declared that the Commission's alleged lack of powers 
as Order C-345/OOP FNAB v Council 120011 ECRI-381 1, appeal against T-268199 PWAI v 
Council 120001 ECRII-2893 under Article 230(4), which dismissed for partial annulment of a 
Council regulation, paras. 35 and 37. 
" Ibid, paras. 41-2. Case 9/56, op. cit. n. 11, p. 152. See also Case C-282/90 Industrie en 
Ilandelsondernerning Vreugdenhil v Commission 119921 ECRI-1937, pan. s. 20.21. The Court 
was confronted with arguments that the Commission had acted in breach of the division of 
powers between the institutions. It held that `the aim of the system of the division of powers 
between the various Community institutions is to ensure that the balance between the institutions 
provided for in the Treaty is maintained and not to protect individuals' and that consequently, 'a 
failure to observe a balance cannot be sufficient on its own to engage the Community's liability 
towards the traders concerned'. 
90 Philip Morris, op. cit. n. 76, paras. 52-4 and 85-7. 
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and any undermining of institutional balance resulting therefrom were not 
sufficient to render the contested act reviewable. It reiterated that, following 
precedent, the seriousness of the alleged infringement by the institution 
concerned or the extent of its adverse effect on the observance of fundamental 
rights could not justify an exception to admissibility rules. Thus, an alleged 
infringement of the institutional balance could not give rise to actions for 
annulment laid down in the Treaty. The CFI adopted a line of arguing consistent 
with the Court of Justice, yet one cannot ignore the fact that it blatantly declined 
to review the act despite allegations that the adopting institution, the 
Commission, the guardian of the treaties, had acted ultra vires by circumventing 
EC law procedures, in order to obtain a favourable result, unavailable under 
Community law. Effectively, a mere plea of illegality is not available to a natural 
or legal person to challenge a legislative measure. 
While the Court attempted to make the judicial protection of individuals as wide 
as possible - also with the development of principles such as proportionality, 
equality, legitimate expectations, legal certainty -under Article 230 (4) EC the 
standing of individuals has been very restrictively, and arguably unfairly, 
interpreted by the Court to the effect that it limited individuals to challenge 
Community legislation. This paradoxical situation has been recently 
acknowledged by AG Jacobs in UPA, who expressed concerns about the damage 
that could be caused to the Union's (democratic) legitimacy and pointed out that 
this aspect of case law was often regarded as creating a serious gap in the system 
of judicial remedies established by the EC Treaty. " He emphasised that no 
alternative procedure, referring to the procedures laid down in Articles 288(2) 
and 234 EC, could adequately protect the individual's right to an effective 
judicial remedy to contest the legality of a Community measure. 92 In particular, 
when a measure of general application is challenged in the context of non- 
contractual liability of the EC institution, the review carried out by the 
Community judicature does not cover all the factors which may affect the 
legality of that measure, being limited instead to the censuring of sufficiently 
91 Casc C-50/OOP UPA v. Council 120021 ECRI-6677, paras. 37,60,86 of the opinion. 
Ibid, para. 24, expressed also by the CFI Case in T-177/01 Jego-Quere V Commission 120021 
ECRII-2356, paras. 45-7 and by AG Jacobs in his opinion in Casc C-263/02 P Commission v. 
Jego-Quere) [20041 ECRI-3425, paras. 23-4. 
130 
rý»JunIciAI_ýSATIONOf' 1W- ýýaNQ 
serious infringements of rules of law intended to confer rights on individuals. 9s 
As for indirect challenges under Article 234, national courts are not competent to 
declare EC measures invalid, rendering them inappropriate fora for such cases. ' 
Consequently, AG Jacobs proposed a new test on standing: `a person is to be 
regarded as individually concerned by a Community measure where, by reason 
of his particular circumstances, the measure has or is liable to have, a substantial 
adverse effect on his interests'. The new requirement is said to improve judicial 
protection as individuals directly and adversely affected by a measure will never 
be left without judicial remedy. " 
The CFI accepted the new approach; in view of the need to ensure effective 
protection of legal rights for European citizens and businesses, a `natural or legal 
person is to be regarded as individually concerned by a Community measure of 
general application that concerns him directly, if the measure in question affects 
his legal position in a manner which is both definite and immediate by restricting 
his rights or by imposing obligations on him'. '' The CFI referred to Article 47(1) 
of the EU Charter to support a new interpretation of Article 230(4) EC. Access to 
the courts was to be treated as one of the essential elements of the Community 
based on the rule of law and was guaranteed by the complete system of legal 
remedies and procedures designed to permit the review of the legality of acts 
adopted by the institutions. The ECJ, although it noted that individuals were 
entitled to effective judicial protection of their Community rights as a general 
principle of law, rejected the new test as its effect would be to remove all 
meaning from the requirement of individual concern set out in Article 230(4). 
The Treaty had established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures 
designed to ensure review of the legality of acts of the institutions and it would 
9311c chances of success in an action for damages under Article 288 EC arc quite slim. Most of 
the acts at stake are likely to be concerned with the exercise of significant discretion by the EC 
institutions and it is likely that the restrictive Schoeppenstedt test, requiring a `sufficiently 
flagrant violation of a superior rule of law for the protection of the individual', will apply: Case 
S/71 Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Schoeppenstedt Y Council [19711 ECR 975, para. 11, Case C-352/98P 
Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [20001 ECRI-5291, paras. 41-3; Case T-155/99 Dleckman 
& Hansen v Commission [20011 ECRII-3143, paras. 42-3; Joint Cases C-104/89 & C-37/90 
Mulder and Others v Council and Commission [1992) ECRI-3061, paras. 18-9; Case T-196/99 
Area Cova and Others v Council and Commission 120011 ECRI1-3597. 
94 Case C-50/OOP, op. cit. n. 9 1, paras. 41-2. Case 314/85 Foto-frost 119871 ECR 4199. 
Case C-50100P, ibid, para&63 and 102. 
% Case T-177/01, op. cit. n. 92, especially paras. 41-4 and 51. The CFI based his reasoning also to 
Case 294/83 Les Verts v EP [19861 ECR 1339, para. 23. 
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not be acceptable to adopt an interpretation of the system of remedies as to bring 
amendments to current law. It rejected AG Jacobs's interpretation of the 
effectiveness of the system of remedies (the fact that particular Member States 
have failed to provide for sufficient legal remedies) and declared that it is for the 
Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures that will 
ensure respect for the right to effective judicial protection. 97 
The Opinion in the Discussion Circle in the Constitutional Convention was 
divided along the same lines as between the ECJ and the AG. 's The Constitution 
is a compromise of the divergent opinions. On the one hand, it explicitly protects 
the right to an effective remedy and imposes an obligation on the Member States 
to safeguard this right, thus reflecting the UI'A judgment"' On the other hand, it 
clarifies the type of instruments which non-privileged applicants are able to 
challenge, while it expands the range of acts to be subject to judicial review to 
include `European laws' and `framework laws'. Article III-365(4) TeCE removes 
the requirement that private parties must prove `individual concern' if they wish 
to challenge a `regulatory act', rendering the standing test less stringent for this 
category. 1°° Fundamentally, however, the Constitutional Treaty does not change 
" In this context, in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 10 
EC, national courts arc required, so far as possible, to intcrprct and apply national procedural 
rules governing the exercise of rights of action in a way that enables natural and legal persons to 
challenge before the courts die legality of any decision or other national measure relative to the 
application to them of a Community act of general application, by pleading the invalidity of such 
an act. Case C-50100P, op. cit. n. 91, paras. 38-9 and 43-5. Case C-263/02 P, op. cit. n. 92, paras. 29- 
30 and 38. 
" The Convention on the Future of Europe established a Discussion Circle on the Court of 
Justice, which was given the mandate to explore various issues in relation to the operation of the 
Community Courts. One group thought that the current wording of the article provided effective 
judicial protection of litigants' rights, taking into account that these rights were primarily 
protected by references for preliminary rulings. Rather than changing Art. 230(4) EC, these 
members recommended that the new Treaty include an explicit articulation of the obligation on 
Member States and their courts to ensure respect for the right of individuals to effective judicial 
protection. The other group in the Discussion Circle regarded the conditions for admissibility in 
Art. 230(4) EC as too restrictive. The majority of this group was in favour of amending the 
provision in a way that granted standing more readily to those private parties %hich were 
affected by a Community act not requiring national implementing measures. For these applicants 
the requirement of individual concern was to be removed, while direct concern should be 
retained: CONV 636/03, Final Report of the Discussion Circle on the Court of Justice, 
25.03.2003. 
9' Article I-29(1) TcCE: 'Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective 
l5al protection in the fields covered by Union law. ' 
1 The undefined term 'regulatory act' would seem to refer to 'non-legislative acts' as defined in 
Article 1-33. so no longer need to show that they arc differentiated from all others the Plaumann 
formula A. Ward, 'The Draft EU Constitution and Private Party Access to Judicial Review of EU 
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the system of remedies established by the EC Treaty. While it makes some 
improvements to the prospect of initiating proceedings directly in the EU Courts, 
by creating an exception to the requirement of individual concern in the case of 
`regulatory acts', many of the problems that currently arise for private parties 
attempting to gain direct access to the Community Courts have been 
preserved. 101 As Rene Barents102 rightly observes, this distinction creates an odd 
result. A prohibition contained in a non-legislative act which is of `direct 
concern' will be admissible. The same prohibition but contained in a legislative 
act may only be admissible if of `direct and individual concern'. So, admissibility 
depends on the form of the act, a claim contrary to the Court's established case 
law according to which only the contents of an act are decisive for the 
interpretation of the requirements of `direct and individual concern'. 
In legal literature, it is generally accepted that the condition of `direct and 
individual concern' as interpreted in the case law is too restrictive to provide 
effective legal protection of individuals against acts of a general nature and 
consequently, the rules governing actions for annulment of EU measures brought 
by private parties in the Community Courts have been one of the most 
controversial areas of EU law. Furthermore, the ECJ's narrow approach to the 
interpretation of Article 230(4) EC has been widely criticised as too restrictive 
and less attentive to the merits of the case. Therefore, it has been argued that an 
individual's right to an effective remedy against Community measures is not 
comprehensively guaranteed under the EC Treaty. 103 As Angela Ward104 points 
out, declining to hear cases on the grounds of locus stanndi alone does little 
toward the propagation of an impression that the Community judicature presides 
measures', in EU law for the twenty-first century: rethinking the new legal order, Vol. 1, 
T. Tridimas and P. Ncbia (cds), Hart Publishing, 2004, p. 212. 
'o` C. Koch, `Locus stand! of private applicants under the EU Constitution: preserving gaps in the 
protection of individuals' right to an effective remedy', (2005) 30 ELRcv 511.527, pp-511 and 
519. 
102 RBarcnts, `The Court of Justice in the Draft Constitution', (2004) 11 MJ 121-141, p. 134. 
lo' A. Arnull, `Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment under Article 173 of the EC 
Treaty', (1995) 32 CMLR 7-49, p. 7. RBarcnts, ibid, p. 130. C. Koch, op. cit. n001, pp. 511-2. 
A. Arnull, `Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment since Codomiu', (2001) 38 CMLR 
7-52. A. Arnull, `Editorial: April Shower for Jdgo-Qudrr', (2004) 29 E. L. Rcv 287-288. F. Jacobs, 
op. cit. n. 81, pp. 337-340. 
I A. Ward, `Amsterdam and Amendment to Article 230: an opportunity lost or simply 
deferred? ', in The Future of the Judicial System of the EU, A. Dashwood and A. Johnston (cds), 
Hart Publishing, 2001, pp. 37-9. A. Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of I'r! vate Parties in EC 
Law, OUP, 2000. 
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over a mature system of constitutional review. This debate is unlikely to abate, 
even if the moderate constitutional reforms under TeCC come into etfcet. 
Besides, how individually concerned should an individual be when a violation 
directly affects their fundamental rights, as for instance in the case of UI'A the 
basic right of judicial protection? The CFI seems ready to draw legal effects from 
the Charter even in the absence of formal binding legal value, possibly trying to 
reinforce its own constitutional position by distancing itself from the policy 
choices of the Court of Justice. In contrast, the ECJ's scepticism towards the 
Charter became particularly clear when in UPA, a decision where the Court had 
to decide a question substantially similar to Jego-Quere, not only did not support 
the decision of the CFI, but also did so without any reference to the Charter 
provision on access to justice that had been referred to by the CFI. 105 The right to 
an effective remedy is expressly recognised in the EU Charter, Article I1-107,106 
as incorporated by the TeCE into primary law. This express recognition could 
lead the ECJ to assign more importance to the right, should the EU Charter 
become legally binding. Having said that, and as the Convention Working Group 
on the Charter has argued, 107 although locus standi has a nexus with fundamental 
rights, it transcends the protection of those rights. Judicial protection must exist 
for all subjective rights beyond the question of the incorporation of the EU 
Charter into the treaties. It is also a matter with institutional and policy 
implications and should be weighed against sensitive issue like, for instance, the 
Court's jurisdiction in Justice and Home Affairs (JIIA) presently contained in 
Articles 68 TEC and 35 TEU, or the limits of judicial control over subsidiarity 
and institutions like Europol. 
The ECJ has committed entirely to the text of the Treaty as far as Article 230(4) 
is concerned and has clearly set the limits of its jurisdiction. What it has not done 
is provide an alternative in cases where an applicant is denied judicial protection, 
as AG Jacobs has done in UPA, which would offer a way to rebuild the open- 
ended language of Article 230 with Union values, i. e. effective legal 
pos M. P. Maduro, op. cit n. 58, pp. 282-3. 106 `Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union arc violated has the 
right to an cfcctivc rcmcdy bcforc a tribunal. ' 
107 CONV 354/02, op. cit. n. 56. 
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protection. 1°8 But most notably, what the Court has not done is offer an objective 
examination of the facts, as it is accustomed to do when a `misuse of power' 
claim arises under the second paragraph of Article 230.109 Besides, relaxing 
standing conditions does not necessarily imply a modification of the wording of 
the Treaty, but simply a liberal interpretation of paragraph 4, which is not 
unusual in the Court's jurisprudence. Carol Harlow1° argues that the Courts 
could alternatively encourage `public interest actions' which have to rely on 
individual standing rules, but are brought by interest or pressure groups, such as 
consumer and environmental groups, claiming to represent the general public or 
individuals entitled to participate (in these groups) and demand that public bodies 
come before the courts to account for their use of public power. In the Stichling 
Greenpeace"' case, for instance, Greenpeace joined with residents and local 
fishermen to challenge the Commission's funding decision for the construction 
of power stations in the Canary Islands on ecological grounds. On a strict 
interpretation of treaty provisions, the CFI ruled the application inadmissible, on 
the ground that the applicants were not individually affected, but `in the same 
manner as any other local resident, fisherman, farmer or tourist who is or might 
be in the future in the same situation'. Greenpeace appealed, 12 with the public 
interest argument that environmental interests were by nature common and 
shared and the rights relating to those interests were liable to be held by a 
potentially large number of people so that there would never be a closed class of 
applicants satisfying the criteria adopted by the CFI. An unresponsive ECJ 
upheld the CFI ruling on the ground that the rights in question were fully 
protected by the national courts. 
108 A. Arnull, 'April Shower for Jcgo-Qucrc', op. cit. n. 103, p. 288. 
109 Article 230(2) TEC: `It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member 
State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lick of 
competence, infringement of an essential procedural rcquircmcnt, infringement of this Treaty or 
of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers'. According to settled case-law, 
a measure is vitiated by misuse of powers only if it appears on the basis of objective, relevant and 
consistent evidence to have been taken with the exclusive, or at least the main, purpose of 
achieving an end other than that stated or evading a procedure specifically prescribed by the 
Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case: Case C-285/94 Italy v Commission 119971 
ECRI-3519, para. 52; Case T-143/89 Ferriere Nord v Commission It 9951 ECRI 1.917, para. 68. 
10 C. Harlow, op. cit. n. 4, pp. 150-3. C. ilarlow, 'Towards a Theory of Standing for the ECJ', 
(1992) 12 YEL 213. 
"' Case T-585/93 Stichling Greenpeace Council v Commission 119951 ECRII-2205. 
112 Case C-321/95 Stichling Greenpeace Council v Commission [19981 ECRI-1651. 
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The Court's approach may appear reasonable in the context of separation of 
powers. It means that politically the Court is not willing ißt this case (locus 
standi) to take initiatives of a legislative nature in view of the frequent treaty 
revisions. However, the Court's `limits of competence' argument in U11A is not 
consistent with the liberalisation of the standing requirement in Codori, iu'", for 
example, or its dynamic interpretation in Chernobyl. "4 Should one read UPA as 
a new element in the Court's move from a `law-making' status towards a judicial 
restraint approach? Dominik Hanf"" offers an interesting insight and an 
important objection to such an understanding. It appears that the Court's aim was 
to constitutionalise its own traditional and arguably unnecessarily restrictive 
interpretation of Article 230(4) in order to insulate this approach from any reform 
attempt by means of judicial interpretation. In other words, to stall any debate on 
constitutional reform on the standing requirement triggered or fuelled by its 
judicial interpretation. It was more of a self-protection in an environment of 
constant constitutional reform through intergovernmental treaty revision but most 
importantly through the advent of a new institutional process of treaty revision, 
the Constitutional Convention. This development signals the entry into the next 
phase of the European integration process which adopts a new method of 
constitutional reform: `the Convention method'. The radical change in the 
political context since the early 1990s has profoundly affected the ECPs 
institutional position in the `constitutional dialogue'. 
113 The Court held that `although it is true that a provision ... is by nature and by virtue of its 
sphere of application of a legislative nature ... that does not prevent it from being of individual 
concern to some of them. Natural or legal persons may claim that a contested provision is of 
individual concern to them only if it affects them by reason of certain attributes which arc 
peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they arc differentiated from all other 
persons. ' Case C-309/89, Codorniu SA v. Council, [19941 ECRI-1853. 
Case C-70/88, op. cit. n. 12. 
"s D. Hanf, 'Taking with "pouvoir constituent" in Times of Constitutional Rcform: The ECJ on 
Private Applicants' access to Justice', (2003) 10 MJ 265-290, pp. 284 and 290. 
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5.3 Judicial review vs judicial activism: when the `judicial' becomes 
`Political' 
The recognition of institutional principles and fundamental rights as part of the 
Community legal heritage has been a central contribution of the ECJ to the 
constitutionalisation of the EC legal order, as its use of a `principles' discourse 
imposed a constitutional `ethos' on the EU constitutional system with 
characteristics quite akin to the liberal democratic traditions shared among the 
Member States: open government, democracy, rule of law, human rights 
protection and division of powers, even if in minimalist terms. Each of these 
implies some sort of basic assumptions which are to regulate institutional 
conduct during decision-making, as well as its legislative outcome. 
Article 220 EC places an absolute duty on the Community courts to `ensure that 
in the interpretation and application of the Treaty, the law is observed. ' It 
assumes the existence of a legal order, but tells us nothing about its substantive 
principles, but for the miniscule reference in the Treaty to the principles found in 
the constitutional traditions of the Member States and the ECIIR, serving as a 
source of inspiration. 116 The Article grants the Courts the power to say what the 
`law' is and effectively the jurisdiction to create `constitutional doctrine by the 
common law method', while it includes no reference to any limits on their power 
or jurisdiction. Read along with Article 230 EC, observance of the law will entail 
compliance with the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application; the 
precise importance of both Articles is that they mandate the Courts to work out a 
system of legal principles in the light of which the legality of Community (and 
Member State) action must be reviewed. 117 
The open-ended and deliberately ambiguous text of the Treaty provides no more 
than a framework within which the legal system is fashioned. In defending those 
constitutional values which define the EU polity as a distinct legal order, the 
Court had to give them content and interpretatively shape their substance and 
16 Articles 6(2) TEU and 288(2) TEC introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht only in 1993. 1" T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law, OUP. 1999, pp. 11. K. Lcnacrts and P. Van 
Nuffcl, Constitutional Law of the EU, Sweet & Maxwell, 1999, p. 530. 
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model the normative structure of the system. The Court had to fashion a 
`constitution' of sorts from a Treaty which inevitably contained a number of 
compromises. 18 The first step taken by the Court in the interpretation of the 
treaties was to accord EU law a status distinct from that of international law. The 
move of constructing the Union with its own legal system implied the creation of 
an entire legal framework that eventually led to the constitutionalisation of the 
treaties with well-known principles such as supremacy and direct effect, implied 
powers and human rights. What makes the EU legal order unique is the 
development by the Court of a constitutional infrastructure with individual rights, 
enforcement mechanisms, and an institutional rule of law (e. g. separation of 
powers). ' 19 
Article 1 TEU signifies the creation of the EU polity in its own right and stresses 
the importance of cooperation with its citizens. Through the doctrine of direct 
effect and the recognition of subjective rights, the Court integrated societal actors 
(legal and natural persons) into the Community legal system. It became legally 
and politically imperative that a way be found to vindicate fundamental rights at 
EU level, once legislative competence moved away from national political 
institutions and national judicial control. It was not until Amsterdam, in 1997, 
that the Treaty first affirmed respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
as part of the Union's objectives and policies (Article 6(2), (4) TEU), but this has 
not created any legislative momentum. The Court's jurisprudence was partly a 
response to the Union's growing capacity to affect fundamental rights to an 
extent unforeseen in the original treaties that had to be (judicially) controlled, if 
the rule of law was to be observed. Besides, it did not have to recreate a system 
as the treaties already provided for the review of the legality of Community acts 
and the exercise of legislative power. 
In this context, the Court has understood its interpretative jurisdiction broadly. 
As seen in s. 5.2, it recognised a variety of rights in its jurisprudence in an 
incremental expansion of fundamental rights protection. For instance, by 
118 T. Tridimas, ibid., p. 9. H. Schcpcl, `Reconstructing Constitutionalisation: Law and Politics in 
the ECJ', (2000) 20 OJLS 457-468, p. 460. J. W. R Rcid, 'Political Rcvicw of the ECJ and its 
Jurisprudence', JM WP 13/95. 
119 M. P. Maduro, We The Court, OUP, 1998, pp. 7-8. 
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creatively using the concept of `indirect discrimination', it succeeded in giving a 
treaty basis to the prohibition of discrimination on other grounds related to 
nationality or sex. The treaty-based prohibition of discrimination on the grounds 
of sex was extended by the Court to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
of the fact that someone wishes to change, or has changed their sex. 12" The EU 
system has been developed under a model of teleological legal construction, 
especially in the case of institutional principles. Prompted by the eagerness to 
afford judicial protection to the individual against the exercise of power by the 
EU institutions and the nature of the legislative process which reflects forms of 
representative democracy in the shape of the Council and the Parliament, the 
Court became rhetorically bolder, in some instances without explicit textual 
support in the Treaty. In Les Vera, "' it extended judicial review to institutions 
not expressly referred to in the treaties; the rationale being, in a Community 
based on the `rule of law', neither the Member States nor the EU institutions 
could escape judicial scrutiny. 
The Court's approach to legal reasoning is not atypical; interpreting treaties on 
the basis of their spirit and purpose, rather than simply their words, is in fact 
required in public international law under the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, Article 31(1). In the case of the EU legal order, the need to fill gaps in 
the system of legal protection is exacerbated by its inimitable and dynamic 
quality. The founding and amending treaties are moulded by teleology; their aims 
and objectives, which are in themselves in constant evolution and couched in 
general terms, provide only the framework, while someone has to develop the 
core of the legal system. Recourse to principles enables the Court to be 
responsive to change. Besides, it is inherent in the art of interpretation to 
`pronounce' the rule, to some degree make the law. The power of judicial review 
involves this kind of discretion. The audacious character of the Court's 
120 Case C-29/95 Pastoors and Trans Cap [19971 ECRI-285, paras. 17-8. Casc C-13/94 PvS 
[19961 ECRI-2143, paras. 13-24. The Court however was not prcparcd to bring discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation: Case C-249/96 Grant [1998) ECRI-621, paras. 24-17. K. Lcnacrts 
and E. DcSmijtcr, 'A "Bill of Rights" for the EU', (2001) 38 CMLR 273-300, p. 275. T. Tridimas, 
op. cit. n. 98, p. 117. T. Koopmans, Courts and Political Institutions, Cambridge University Press, 
2003, p. 221. 
ul A. Arnull, The European Union and Its Court of Justice, OUP, 1999, Cli 14. S. Wcathcrill, 
`Activism and Restraint in the ECJ', in Asserting Jurisdiction, op. cit. n. 78, p. 260. Case 294/83, 
op. cit. n. 96, para. 23. 
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judgments, at least in the early years, was intended to create a uniformity of 
application of Community law in different jurisdictions in conformity with the 
underlying premises of the legal system. "2 To the ECJ, it was necessary to create 
a common constitutional basis for the achievement of the objectives of the 
treaties. 
It is largely a fiction that the judicial function is to state the law and not to create 
it, that is, to play a supporting role by applying already established rules. Judicial 
organs by their nature necessarily carry out a creative task particularly when they 
have to apply a text of a general nature, which is arguably the case for most 
constitutions, written or otherwise. In a democratic society, it is not easy to find 
justification for judicial creativity; the legislator is democratically elected, the 
judge is not. To Mark Van Hoecke, 123 this is a very formal approach to the notion 
of democracy. Indeed, a functioning democracy needs much more than majority 
voting; it needs a democratic infrastructure. Fundamental rights have acquired 
greater prominence in all western societies, where the eagerness to hold public 
authorities accountable and the empowerment of the individual have rendered 
respect for human rights not only as a sine qua non of legality, but as the most 
important yardstick in assessing a polity's democratic credentials. In the EU, 
democracy is not exhausted in the majoritarian rule but encompasses `values' 
like justice, solidarity and non-discri mination'. 124 Democracy is a delicate 
balance between majority rule and fundamental rights to which all organs of state 
are committed. Hence, the accusation that judicial review is incompatible with 
democracy is not founded. Judicial review provides a system of `checks and 
122 T. Tridimas, op. cit. n. 117, p. 9. S. Wcathcrill, ibid, pp. 256 and 258. T. Koopmans, op. cit. n. 120, 
p. 23. M. Shapiro, `Tic ECJ', in The Evolution of EU Law, P. Craig and G. dc 13urca (cds), OUP, 
1999, p. 323. 
'u M. Van lioc ckc, `Judicial Review and Deliberatively Democracy: A Circular Model of Law 
Creation and Legitimation', (2001) 14 Ratio Juris 415-423, p. 416. 114 These are found throughout the text of the treaties. Also, Article 1-2 TcCE provides that these 
values are common to the Member States in `a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity 
and non-discrimination'. A. Peters, 'European Democracy after the 2003 Convention', (2004) 41 
CMLRcv 37-85, p. 7. T. Tridimas, `The ECJ and the Draft Constitution: A Supreme Court for the 
Union? ', in EU law for the twenty-first century, op. cit. n. 100, p. 135. Amaryllis Verhoc%-cn, The 
EU in Search of Democratic and Constitutional Theory, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p. 14. 
M. L. Fcrnandcz-Estcban, op. cit. n. 24, p. 98-99. As Lisa }lilbink informs us, prominent democratic 
theorists now agree that democracy is 'as much about opposition to the arbitrary for unjust) 
exercise of power as it is about collective self-government'. L. ltilbink, 'Law and Politics in the 
Madisonian Republic', in After National Democracy - Rights, Law and Power in America and 
the New Europe, L. Tragardh (cd), Hart Publishing, 2004, p. 131. 
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balances' by implementing the rule of law, protecting both 'minorities' and the 
'majority'. Setting aside any theoretical discussion on the relationship between 
rights and democracy, rights protection does appeal to the political systems of the 
Member States, where constitutional courts have been introduced - in most of 
them - in order to scrutinise legislation on the basis of constitutionally protected 
rights. 125 At least in this respect, courts fulfill an important social function. 
The process of judicial review is by no means peculiar to the EU legal order. 
Judicial review of constitutional issues has been implemented continuously in the 
US since the Supreme Court (SpCt) decision in Marbury. The US Constitution 
did not mention judicial interpretation or confer expressly on judges the power of 
judicial review, that is, the authority to remedy breaches of the Constitution by 
the other branches of government. Judicial review emerged in the reasoning of 
SpCt Judge Marshall in cases such as Marbury, where the SpCt held that the 
power was a necessary implication of the establishment of the Constitution as 
law by the sovereign people. The legal basis for the power of judicial review was 
constituted by general acquiescence in judicial law-making. 126 Across Europe, 
courts have played an active role in deciding important and controversial social 
questions, traditionally decided by governments and parliaments. Almost all 
Member States have some sort of system of judicial review or judicial scrutiny in 
place, where either general courts or constitutional courts safeguard the 
constitutionality of legislation based on the adjudication of fundamental rights. 
With this judicialisation of policy-making, Europe seems to be moving closer to 
the US model of democracy, in which courts have long played an important, 
although often controversial, role. 127 
123 J. Limbach, 'The Concept of the Supremacy of the Constitution', (2001) 64 MLR 1-12, p. 3. 
R. Dchoussc, The European Court ofJustice, MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. 117. J. I1.11. %Vcilcr, U. 
haltern and F. Maycr, 'European Democracy and its Critique. Five Uneasy Pieces', JMWP 1/93. 
126 dlarbury v Madison (1803) 5 U. S. (1 Cranch. ) 137. J. Goldsworthy, 'Raz on Constitutional 
Interpretation', (2003) 22 Law and Philosophy 167-193, p. 169. M. Roscnfcld, 'Constitutional 
Adjudication in Europe and the United States: paradoxes and contrasts', (2004) 2 Int J 
Constitutional Law 633-668, p. 633. 
127 J. Fcrcjohn and P. Pasquino, 'Rule of Democracy and Rule of Law', in Democracy and the 
Rule of Law, J. M. Maravall and A. Przcworski (ads), Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 249. 
D. Chalmcrs, `Judicial authority and the constitutional treaty', (2003) 1 Int J Constitutional Law 
448-472, p. 449. L. Hilbink, op. cit. n. 124, p. 122. 
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The German Constitutional Court (BverfG), for instance, will not determine the 
meaning of individual rights by looking solely to constitutional provisions. The 
Basic Law (BL) does not only lay down rights, but also enshrines values (e. g. 
democracy, the social state). Due to the fact that the BL embraces general 
undefined concepts, the Bverm has an abstract and highly deductive style of 
reasoning showing little regard to the facts of the case in hand. The `law' is not 
purely the outcome of the legislative process; legal principles, particularly those 
embodying human rights and fundamental guarantees of the rule of law, have a 
legal value of their own and are regarded uebergesetzlich, that is, `supralegal'. 
When it comes to the respective judicial and legislative roles, the BverlU has to 
carry a balancing act between freedom of choice inherent in the act of legislating 
and the enforcement of values it has to protect. Concepts such as the `social 
state' (sozialstaat), inherent in the constitution, set certain limits to political 
institutions, yet do not prescribe how these should be achieved; the legislator will 
fill in the details. 128 The legislator cannot make new laws that arc contrary to 
those natural law concepts perceptible in the BL and the BvcrfG assumes the 
traditional role as the guardian of the rule of law. So, when the Bverf 3 carries 
out judicial review, judges may not be founding their decision on a specific 
constitutional provision, but remain faithful to the constitutional system as a 
whole, which consists of `norms' and `principles'. 
As the Basic Law, one could argue that EU law is not just a collection of 
`statutory' texts but also an accumulation of legal principles which have a value 
of their own and underpin the constitutional system of the EU. Constitutional 
adjudication, as in Germany for instance, seems inherently political in the sense 
that the courts must deliberate not only on a specific constitutional provision, but 
also on principles that underpin the system. In the Union's constitutional 
adjudication, the ECJ has been criticised for its active approach to 
"" Certain constitutional rules cannot be changed at all (Article 79 S (3) 13L). T. Koopmans, 
op. cit. n. 120, pp. 107-9. Guiding principles are more important than the particular issues of the 
case. The constitutional Court is more concerned with the incompatibility of legislation with 
constitutional law, than with the unconstitutionality of the application of legislation to a particular 
case. It often determines aspect of laws as unconstitutional, but exercises restraint in negating 
them. It admonishes the legislature but does not declare the measure void. Under some 
circumstances, if the legislature does not then act the Court sustains the law but warns the 
legislature that unless certain requirements arc met the act may be declared unconstitutional: 
K. Holland, Judicial Activism in Comparative Perspective, MacMillan, 1991, pp. 157-8. 
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constitutionalisation and its lack of judicial objectivity and impartiality with 
designs to further European integration, a claim that is largely drawn from 
academic scholarship. '29 In Article 220 EC, an apparent differentiation exists 
between the 'interpretation and application of the treaty' and the 'law' to be 
observed. The provision is open-ended and does not prevent rules and principles 
from being incorporated into the 'law'. To a certain degree, activism is due to the 
nature of 'rights' that are supposed to be part of EU law which even after the 
adoption of the EU Charter are part of an imprecise, in terms of boundaries, 
collection of norms rooted in the common constitutional traditions of the 
Member States or the ECHR130 Besides, because judges value legality both 
intrinsically and as the principal source of their own authority, they are 
particularly disposed to take an expansive view of legal requirements and thus an 
expansive view of their authority. "' So, activist judicial behaviour may not 
always be inevitable or deliberate. 
Regarding the furthering of the European integration argument, if the Court had 
been activist in the opposite direction, namely slashing EU powers, would it not 
have faced the same criticism? Whether the ECJ has been unduly active, depends 
on the standard of judicial interpretation one takes to be the correct one. For 
instance, the Court's frequent recourse to contextual and teleological arguments 
might be offensive to those who favour a `rulebook' interpretation of law and do 
not perceive a political role for the judges. 132 The real issue, however, is not 
about the Court's institutional empowerment as such, but about the content 
129 The issue has been abundantly revisited elsewhere and in varying degrccs based on a wider 
context of the Court's constitutional activities (not just institutional balance and fundamental 
rights). One of the most fervent critics of the Court is iljaltc Rasmussen; sec II. Rasmusscn, On 
Law and Policy in the ECJ, Martinus Nijhoff, 1986 and `Between self-restraint and Activism: A 
Judicial Policy for the European Court', (1988) 13 ELRcv 28-38. Another critic is Trc%-or I lartlcy 
who suggests, inter alia, that a court may be justified in giving judgment contrary to the written 
law when it applies the doctrines of necessity and natural law. To illustrate his argument he cites 
the cases of Les Verts and Grogan, but concludes the ECJ's judgments cannot be justified by the 
kind of arguments that might apply to courts generally, unless made on the basis of 
considerations specific to the European Court: T. llartlcy, 'The European Court, Judicial 
Objectivity and the Constitution of the EU', (1996) 112 LQR 95-109, pp. 102-3 and T. llartlcy, 
Constitutional Problems in the EU, Hart Publishing, 1999, p. 41. 
130 RBarcnts, op. cit. n. 102, pp. 125 and 127. F. RLlorcntc, op. cit. n. 66, p. 412. 
131 J. Fcrcjohn and P. Pasquino, op. cit. n. 127, p. 258. 
132 J. H. H. Wcilcr, 'Human Rights, constitutionalism and integration', in Developing a 
Constitution for Europe, O. E. Erikscn, J. Fossum and A. J. Mcncndez, Taylor and Francis Lid, 
2004, p. 60. A. Vcrhocvcn, op. cit. n. 124, p. 83. 
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judicial interpretation embraces, whether it has remained within the ambit of the 
possible interpretations permitted by an open-ended, teleological treaty. 
The method of interpretation of fundamental human rights by the Court is at the 
centre of the debate on judicial activism. What appears to be lacking in its case 
law is a coherent theoretical and dogmatic explanation of the variation in the 
standards it uses. Fundamental to the rule of law is the adoption and consistent 
application of a general methodology of interpretation that is faithful to the 
content of the antecedent rules. It is difficult to extract some sort of judicial 
philosophy in the human rights cases of the ECJ, as one can in the US SpCt civil 
rights jurisprudence, albeit one that has changed over time (e. g. the 50s and 60s 
Warren era). 133 Still, if one can identify any general theme, this does seem to be 
economic integration and the fundamental freedoms of EC law have been highly 
developed to this end. The cases of Konstantinidis and Groganr13' arc evidence of 
how the Court favours Community interests over fundamental rights. Individuals 
will not be able to assert their Community rights on a claim of a per se violation 
of fundamental rights; they will have to establish some kind of economic nexus 
in order to fall within the protection of EC law. In defence of the Court's 
economic integration oriented attitude, the subordination of political freedoms to 
economic ones is not purely a matter of judicial choice, but rather incumbent in 
the treaties which have been built on economic objectives. With the introduction 
of European citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht and the successive treaty 
revisions to reflect more political rights for Europe's citizens, the Court has 
followed suit with an ever-increasing adjudication on citizenship. 
Another crucial question is how these principles, elaborated by the Court, operate 
within the EU legal order. Are they binding rules or just guidelines and where do 
they derive from? The protection given to human rights depends on the 
interpretation adopted. In Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin contrasts 
legal principles with legal rules stipulating that while legal rules operate in an `all 
t" R. S. Summcrs, 'A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law', (1993) 6 Ratio Juris 127-142, p. 132. 
M. P. Maduro, 'The Doubic Constitutional Lifc of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union', op. cit. n. 58, p. 280. S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the EU, Longman, 
2002, p. 458. 
134 Case C-168-91 Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig 119931 ECRi-1191 and Casc C-159-90 SPUC 
v Grogan 1199113 CMLR 849. 
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or nothing' fashion, principles do not. Although they cannot be identified by way 
of any positivist rule of recognition, principles have a dimension of weight that 
may bind courts. 135 Unfortunately, the ECJ has given no clear indication as to 
their status apart from the occasional declaration that it is influenced by the 
principles found in the common constitutional traditions of the Member States 
and the ECHR, yet bound by neither. lM On the other hand, the duty of sincere 
cooperation, under Article 10 EC, to ensure inter alia an effective judicial 
protection for individuals, may prevent fundamental principles of national legal 
orders from `undermining' emergent fundamental principles at EU level. '" The 
visible distinction between `principles' and `rights' in the EU Charter as well as 
the proclaimed duty for the Court to give due regard to the explanations 
provided, '38 may put constraints on its interpretive role in relation to the 
development of a fundamental rights culture within EU law, should the Charter 
become legally binding. The extent, as to how far, is not clear, as the Charter also 
reasserts the rights protection as it results from the case law of the ECJ. 
With respect to fundamental rights, the Court's jurisprudence may be justified 
due to the lack of fundamental rights protection under EU law. With respect to 
institutional principles, too creative an interpretation of the Union's institutional 
design is less justified, especially as the division of functions between the 
institutions is by and large dealt with in the Treaty. Having said that, the Court 
has a central mandate in the Treaty (e. g. Articles 220 and 230 EC) to ensure that 
the EU institutions do not exceed their authority. What appears problematic is 
that, with respect to institutional relations, the Court is particularly activist and 
often inconsistent. Chernobyl and Les Verts illustrate that, when deciding which 
institutions are entitled to bring proceedings for annulment under the Treaty, the 
135 S. Douglas-Scott, op. cit. m 133, p. 452. RDworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Ducksorth, 2005, 
24-t 1. 
6 1 It reiterated in Emesa Sugar case that the ECIIR is not binding on the ECJ, but that it has a 
`special significance' in the development of the Court's own concept of fundamental rights. Case 
C-17/98 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) v Aruba 120001 ECRI-675, para. 8 citing case C-260/89 EUUT 
119911 ECRI-2925, para. 41. 
" Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parse Factortame 119901 
ECRI-2433, para. 19. D. Curtin and I. Dckkcr, `71he Constitutional Structure of the EU: Some 
Reflections on Vertical Unity-in-Diversity, in Convergence and Divergence in European Public 
Law, op. cit. n. 35, p. 75. 
13e As prepared under the authority of the Pracsidium of the Convention %jhich drafted the 
Charter and updated under the responsibility of the Pracsidium of the European Convention: 
Preamble to the EU Charter and Article 11-112(7) TcCE. 
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Court has adopted a lax reading of the Treaty, or even contra legem, to ensure 
that the evolution in the powers of the EU institutions did not undermine the rule 
of law and the institutional balance. 139 In E1' v Council, 140 the Court appeared to 
question the convenience of its own intervention where it gave no consideration 
to the Council's motives of adopting a regulation without proper parliamentary 
consultation, having asked the Parliament's opinion only in a pro forma manner 
at the EP's dismay, which called the consultation `a mere sham or fiction'. Less 
than a month later, "' it intervened to the opposite direction annulling a directive 
on the matter of transportation due to the lack of reconsultation of the EP. One 
may take the view that judicial activism can more easily be justified in 
procedural matters which fall par excellence in the judicial province, than in 
issues of substance. 14' But this appears to be a false distinction. It is very 
apparent in the Court's jurisprudence how closely the substantive right of access 
to documents and the procedural duty to give reasoning are connected. Besides, it 
was in Roquelte that a direct link between the Parliament's procedural 
prerogatives and the democratic principle underlying the EU legislative process 
was established. 
It is tempting to simply equate legal accountability with judicial review or 
control. Richard Mulgan separates law's standard-setting function, regarded as 
the framework for accountability, from the enforcement procedures. Ile argues 
that `accountability' and `control' are not identical terms and ought not to be 
conflated: `being accountable for alleged breaches of the law does not mean that 
compliance with the law is also an act of accountability or that the law itself is an 
accountability mechanism'. "3 Equally, let us not assume that the use of a 
language of `principles' translates into a system of legal protection. The process 
of `application and interpretation' is also a process of institutional choice; when 
the Court exercises its function of judicial review, it also ascertains the `margin 
of discretion' allowed to the EU institutions during law-making. Interpretation in 
that context becomes particularly instructive as the expression of judicial policy; 
"' B. dc Wittc, op. cit. n. 8, p. 99. AG Opinion in Casc C-50/00 p, op. cit. n. 91, paras. 69 and 71. 
10 Casc C-417/93 EP v Council [ 19951 ECRI-1185, para. 8. 
141 Case C-21/94, op. cit. n. 20. 
"= T. Tridimas, The General Principles ojEC Law, op. cit. n. 117, p. 34. 
14' RMulgan, '"Accountability": an Evcr-Expanding Conccpt7', (2000) 78 Public Administration 
555 in C. tiarlow, op. cit. n. 4, p. 146. 
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it tells us what the Court perceives to be its function, what it considers to be the 
underpinnings of the legal system. The Opinion on the draft EEA Agreement 
illustrates the importance that the Court attaches to Article 220 and the judicial 
structure of the Community. It held that Article 238 EEC did not provide any 
basis for setting up a system of courts which conflicted with Article 220 and 
more generally with the very foundation of the Community, to the extent that 
even an amendment to the Treaty, at least as indicated by the Commission, could 
not cure such incompatibility. The implication of the judgment is that courts arc 
usually given the final interpretative authority of the law. '' By using 
institutional principles in its jurisprudence, the ECJ delineated the institutional 
position of the EU institutions within the EU institutional system. By using 
fundamental rights, it defined its own institutional position vis-n-vis the other EU 
institutions. So, by incorporating general principles of law into the law to be 
observed, the Court created a constitutional regime of division of powers in an 
institutional system where control over legislative activity remains central to its 
mandate. 
Does the use of general principles of law in the constitutional adjudication of the 
EU make a compelling case from a democratic perspective? The Court of Justice 
(and the CFI) by using the judicial review mechanism has become part of the 
decision-making process. The right of access to judicial review provides an 
important avenue of access to this process. The Court's draconian stance on the 
eligibility of natural and legal persons to institute proceedings and its refusal to 
let the latter invoke institutional principles as a ground for judicial review hinders 
public participation in the decision-making process. So, the Court's interpretation 
of the standing requirement may be true to the text of the Treaty and thus 
legitimate, but is it democratic? On the other hand, the integration of general 
principles of law, including the protection of fundamental rights, into the lent, to 
be observed marked a shift to a more democratic and social conception of the 
144 Opinion 1/91, Draft Agreement relating to the creation of EEA 119911 ECRI-6079. Asa result 
of the ruling the draft EEA Agreement was amcndcd and subscqucntly in Opinion 1/92 119921 
ECRI. 2821 the Court held that, subjcct to certain conditions, the amended version %%2s 
compatible with the Treaty. T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law, op. cit. n. 117, pp. 33 
and 37-8. M. P. Maduro, We The Court, op. cit. n. 119, pp. 15-6. 
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rule of law. 143 As a result, EU decision-making, to be democratically legitimate, 
must not only come about in a democratic way in terms of sullicicnt 
representation and participation, but should also comply with general principles 
of law, in particular ensuring respect for and realisation of fundamental rights. At 
least to this extent, the ECJ has contributed to EU democracy. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined how the Court has used the judicial review mechanism to 
institutionally position itself in the decision-making process, as it sought 
procedurally and substantively to control law-making pursuant to its duty to 
ensure that the `rule of law' is observed, through its jurisprudence on institutional 
principles and fundamental rights. The issue of judicial review of EU legislation 
actually raises issues regarding the margin of discretion allowed to the EU 
institutions to engage freely in decision-making. Such limitations may be 
imposed by the Court even beyond the scope envisaged in the treaties. The issue 
of judicial review also highlights the fact that while the ECJ tries to promote the 
ideal of `limited government' by regulating institutional relations, the legislative 
process and indirectly the content of legislation, it actually blurs the borderline 
between judicial and political activities. 
14s This is also reflected in the Treaty, Articles 1 and 6 TEU. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EU DECISION-MAKING: PRESERVING OR PERVERTING 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY WITHIN TILE MEMBER STATES? 
6.1 Introduction 
Much of the current discussion about the Union's decision-making and 
democracy is concerned with the EU institutions, rather than with its impact on 
the democratic systems of the Member States. ' The aim of this chapter is to 
examine how EU decision-making impacts on the institutional balance in the 
internal legal orders of the Member States and how that affects democratic 
legitimacy to the extent that the least democratic institutions are involved in 
decision-making. Namely, how EU constitutional rules and the requirements of 
EU decision-making have influenced the competence exercise of national and 
subnational actors guaranteed under national constitutions and, subsequently, the 
balance of powers underlying the government system established therein. 
The idea of bringing Europe closer to citizens predominated the parallel post- 
Nice constitutional reform and the Commission's EU governance debate. While 
both initiatives aimed, inter alia, at increasing the democratic legitimacy of EU 
decision-making, they provided a different vision of the role of national and 
subnational actors in the future institutional development of the Union, which in 
a way unveils the plurality of the Union's institutional system which is not 
always reflected in formal constitutional arrangements. 
' N. Ncuivahl and S. Whcatlcy, 'Thc EU and Democracy - Lawful and Lcgitimalc Intcnvcntion in 
the Domestic Affairs of States? ', in Accountability and Legitimacy In the EU, A. Arnull and 
D. Wincott (eds), OUP, 2002, p. 223. 
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6.2 The impact of EU decision-making on the institutional balance in the 
internal legal orders of the Member States 
As has already been examined in Chapters 2 and 3, although legislative and 
executive powers are not formally separated in the Union's institutional system, 
the Council is set at the centre of decision-making both as a strong executive and 
legislator, while, over time, it has come to share legislative and delegated 
executive powers with the Commission and the Parliament. Participation in the 
EU decision-making process via the Council has strengthened the Member States 
governments' position in relation to other sovereign bodies, especially national 
(and regional) parliaments in the sense that they have acquired normative powers 
that they would not normally have in their own country without parliamentary 
control or authorisation. 2 Given the central role of national executives in the EU 
decision-making process (versus the central role of parliaments in the national 
legal systems), it could be argued that national parliaments (NPs) see European 
integration as a threat due to the reduction of their legislative and policy control 
and the overall decrease in democratic accountability and transparency. 
Parliaments appear to be central institutions in national systems of governance. 
They elect and oversee their governments, approve legislation, amend national 
constitutions and, as far as citizens are concerned, appear to hold the ultimate 
power in society. That is because a central aspect of representative democracy is 
how well the chain of delegation and accountability from voters to elected 
representatives and to policy implementers actually works. The typical chain of 
delegation starts from the voters who mandate the members of parliament and 
has at the other end civil servants that are charged with implementing the 
2 B. Crum, 'Lcgislativc-Executivc Relations in the EU', (2003) 41 JCMS 375-395, p. 376. 
C. Botclho-Moniz, '11 c Portuguese Constitution and the Participation of the Republic of Portugal 
in the EU', (1998) 4 EPL 465-478, p. 471. D. Dimitrakopoulos, 'Incrcmcntalism and Path 
Dependence: European Integration and Institutional Change in National Parliaments', (2001) 39 
]CMS 405-422, pp. 405-6. In the Netherlands, the Constitution requires a basis in an Act of 
Parliament for all legislative measures affecting citizens, and is considered an important general 
constitutional principle: L. Bcssclink, "Ihc Separation of Powers under Netherlands 
Constitutional Law and European Integration', (1997) 3 EPL 313-321. 
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decisions of their predecessors in the chain. ' Their centrality as institutions and 
emblems of democratic legitimacy is amply evident in the challenging of the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The German Maastriclst judgment, 
reinforced this position, when it held that it is the peoples of the Member States 
who, through their national parliaments, have to provide the democratic 
legitimation for the Union to carry out its sovereign tasks and exercise its 
sovereign powers. 
NPs are involved in the approval of primary EU legislation and play an important 
role in transposing Community legislation into national law. However, they are 
not part of the Union's decision-making process per se. It is notable that they are 
not referred to in the core treaties as political or legislative organs. At present, the 
only constitutional basis for participation in EU decision-making is found in the 
Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the EU, 3 which precludes any 
formal participation, but for a mere exchange of views at the outset of the 
legislative process. Namely, there is an obligation on the part of the Commission 
to forward consultative documents to NPs and make available legislative 
proposals in good time to the Member States governments, so that their 
parliaments receive them as appropriate. So, the role of NPs in the EU affairs is 
mainly interrogative, dependent on national constitutional practice, the 
willingness of national governments to involve them, but also on their readiness 
to hold their governments fully accountable when it comes to the position 
ministers are to take or have taken at EU level. 6 
3 T. Bcrgman and E. Damgaard (cds), Delegation and Accountability in European Integration, 
Frank Cass, 2000, pp. 1,5 and 16. T. Raunio, 'Two stops forward and one stop back? National 
legislatures in the EU Constitution', Constitutional Onlinc Papcr 16/04, The Federal Trust. 
D. Obradovic, `Policy Legitimacy and the EU', (1996) 34 JCMS 191-222, pp. 204-5; CMLR 
11994157, paras. 39-40. 
Protocol No. 23, annexed to the Trcaty of Amsterdam. The COSAC (Conferencc of the 
Community and European Affairs Committees of the Parliaments of the EU) is rccogniscd as a 
body with the right to make any contribution it deems proper for the attention of the EU 
institutions either on its own initiative or when a specific legislative proposal has been for ardcd 
to it. Such contributions shall neither bind the Union institutions, nor prejudge the position of 
national parliaments. 
6 K. Lcnacrts and E. dc Smitjcr, 'The Question of Democratic Representation', in Reforming the 
TEU- The Legal Debate, Winter ct. al. (eds), Kluwcr Law international, 1996, pp. 184-S. P. Dann, 
`Looking through the federal lens: The Semi-prliamentary Democracy of the EU', JMWP 5/02. 
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Following changes made by Member States to allow for the creation of EU- 
specific mechanisms for scrutiny, the extent to which NPs monitor EU decision- 
making and their governments' participation in it varies from Member State to 
Member State, while it usually reflects existing institutional repertoires, where 
the legislative branch may have been traditionally weak in relation to the 
executive independently of European integration. More precisely, the impact of 
parliamentary scrutiny differs between those parliaments which are legally able 
to mandate their governments representatives before a Council decision takes 
place (e. g. Denmark, Germany, Netherlands) and thus emerge as strong `national 
players' in EU affairs and parliaments which have no means for effectively 
influencing their governments' standpoint in the Council (e. g. Greece, Ireland, 
Italy). 7 In the UK, the concern over the erosion of the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty has led to a process that expanded the UK Parliament's involvement 
in European affairs, but did not lead to the creation of a totally new mechanism 
in the sense of a binding parliamentary scrutiny reserves The two Houses of 
Parliament utilise the scrutiny committee method to consider draft EU legislation 
and other documents, arrangements that arguably recognise a non-binding duty 
on British ministers to avoid giving their agreement in Brussels before the end of 
the parliamentary scrutiny of a document. The scrutiny system does not formally 
consider the merits of legislative proposals or other Community documents 
submitted to it. 
The effectiveness of national mechanisms that strengthen parliamentary control 
over governmental action within the EU relates also to a mixture of other factors. 
One such factor is the constitutional and political context of each Mcmbcr State. 
7 D. Dimitrakopoulos, op. cit. n. 2. C. S. Kcrsc, `Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Third Pillar', (2000) 6 
EPL 81-101, p. 82. 
For a more detailed analysis on the UK scrutiny reserve system, sec: A. Maucr, 'National 
Parliaments in the European Architecture', Constitutional Onlinc Paper 06/02, The Fcdcral Trust. 
C. Andcrscn, 'EU Policy-making and National Institutions - the Case of l3clgium', in hie EU.: 
flow Democratic is it?. S. Andcrscn and K. Eliasscn (eds), Sage Publications, 1996, p. 8S. 
D. Dimitrakopoulos, op. cit. n. 2, pp. 411-3,415-416 and 419. P. I3irkinshaw and D. Ashiagbor, 
'National Participation in Community Affairs: Democracy, the UK Parliament and the EU', 
(1996) 33 CMLR 499-529, p. 504. J. Iiood MP, 'European Scrutiny in the I louse of Commons', in 
European Governance, U. Rucb (cd), The Federal Trust, 2002, p. 50. A. Cygan, 'he White Paper 
on European Governance - Have Glasnost and Perestroika Finally Arrived to the EU? ', (2002) 65 
MLR 229-240. C. A. Cartcr, `Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation State: Third-Level 
Assemblies and Scrutiny of European Legislation', (2000) 6 EPL 429-459. 
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In some Member States, the EU is seen as a synthesis of domestic and foreign 
affairs and, hence, the degree of parliamentary scrutiny may vary a lot given the 
different concepts of 'control', 'participation' and 'scrutiny' within the national 
constitutional orders .9 The British constitutional culture which applies 
foreign 
policy methods to EU affairs may often constitute per se an obstacle to effective 
scrutiny by extending executive privilege and a bargaining format that requires 
secrecy rather than transparency. 10 Also, the extent of information forwarded to 
NPs may be restricted according to national hierarchies of norms. In France, for 
instance, the concept of proposals containing provisions of a legislative nature 
implies that Parliament only receives those draft acts which would form part of 
the law within the meaning of Article 34 of the French Constitution. The 
decision, whether draft proposals constitute legislative acts, lies with the 
Government and the Conseil d'Etal. 1' 
Despite national constitutional variations, parliaments have a central role in the 
national system of governance as legislative proposals require their assent and, 
for the overwhelming majority of citizens, a fundamental element of democratic 
legitimacy is that the executive is accountable to parliament. This view does not 
correspond with the supranational character of the EU, where government 
ministers act in their capacity as members of the Council mostly outside the 
procedural safeguards of national parliamentary control, 12 as NPs enjoy no 
formal role under the treaties. At EU level, it is only the EP that is able to 
formally block legislation under the codecision procedure, a function that goes 
beyond the scope of what the NPs can do. NPs may scrutinise the Council's 
agreed common position on a legislative proposal which occurs at an early stage 
of codecision, but as the Protocol - on the role of national parliaments in the EU - 
does not apply to a revised measure, national scrutiny will not automatically take 
into account any amendments introduced by the EP. In other words, such 
scrutiny will not guarantee that the views of NPs are represented in the final 
legislative act. The codecision procedure seeks to remedy the democratic deficit 
' P. Birkinshaw and D. Asluagbor, op. cit. 118- p. 527. A. Maucr, op. cit. M8. 10 CiLLord, Democracy in the European Union, Shcflicld Academic Prcss, 1998, p. 98. 
: 21 A. Maucr, op. cit. n8. 
12 A. Cygan, op. cit. n8, p. 386. 
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at EU level by giving the EP an enhanced role in safeguarding ministerial 
accountability (direct Council accountability to the EP). '3 Ilowever, the 
empowerment of the parliamentary element through the EP cannot be transposed 
at the national level as a solution to democratic deficit. Apart from hardly being a 
satisfactory result from the point of view of NPs, it is very rarely that the 
European citizens see14 any equivalence between the EP and NPs. 
Due to their weak constitutional role in the treaties and input in EU affairs via 
national scrutiny reserves, NPs are far from key players in the EU system of 
governance. The lack of institutional `fit' between the EU and its Member States 
and coordination between the EU institutions and domestic parliaments over 
issues such as legislative timetable or providing sufficient time for effective 
scrutiny go to the heart of the unease that exists in their relationship. 15 Moreover, 
the executive-oriented decision-making system of the Union and the practical 
difficulties in seeking effective accountability of national ministers who take 
decisions in the Council render the issue relatively straightforward. Powers 
which previously were under the jurisdiction of national legislatures have been 
shifted upwards to the European level and towards national executives. This had 
the added effect of eroding the separation of powers in national political systems 
as much as in the European: the power of NPs to `check and balance' their 
governments by denying them law-making authority are compromised by the 
power of executives to constitute themselves as legislatures in the Council. " And 
to the extent that national governments escape domestic mechanisms of 
democratic accountability, EU perverts, rather than preserves, democracy in the 
is A. Cygan, op. cit. n. 8, pp. 386 and 388-9. A. Cygan, `The Role of National P. Irliamcnis in 111c 
EU's New Constitutional Order', in EU law for the twenty-first century: rethinking the new legal 
order, Vol. 1, T. Tridimas and P. Ncbia (cds), Hart Publishing, 2004, pp. 158-9. 14 How Europeans sec thcrosclvcs - Looking through the mirror with public opinion survc}"s. 
European Documentation Series, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
Luxembourg, 2001. Eurobarometer 59, Public opinion in the European Union, Spring 2003. 
Chat ter 88, Five Democratic Tests for Europe, 2003. 
IS V. A. Schmidt, 'The European Union: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State? ', (2004) 42 
JCMS 975-997, p. 978. A. Cygan, op. cit. n. 8, pp. 387. 
16 Ch. Lord, op. cit. n. 10. 
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national orders'7 by shifting the balance of power between the executive and the 
legislative in favour of the former. 
6.2.1 The erosion of the constitutional autonomy of subnational actors 
The impact of EU decision-making on the institutional balance in the internal 
legal orders of the Member States and how that affects democratic legitimacy is 
not restricted to the issue of the shift in balance between the legislature and the 
executive and is not restricted to the relationship between the EU and national 
levels. According to the Lamassoure report1s on competences, 70 to 80 per cent 
of Community programmes were managed by local and regional authorities in 
the Member States, suggesting that their roles as partners of the Union should 
have greater recognition. Additionally, almost half of the Member States have 
regional governments with significant legislative and administrative powers 
domestically, but have not normally been able to set the terms under which those 
competences are transferred to the European level. " It is difficult to speak of 
`regions' generally as the term is not defined in the treaties. More importantly, 
there seems to be a critical difference between symmetrical systems of 
decentralisation typical of federal constitutions, where some of the tasks 
exercised by the central government can be transferred to institutions 
representing the federal entities as a whole and asymmetrical systems of 
devolution which involve vertical and horizontal arrangements between national 
17 D. Wincott, 'Does the EU Pervert Democracy? Questions of Democracy in New 
Constitutionalist Thought on the Future of Europe' in The European Union and its Order: The 
Legal Theory of European Integration, Z. Bankowski and A. Scott (eds), Dlackwcll Publishers, 
2000, pp. 114 and 122. 
" EP Report A5-0133/2002 on the division of compctcnccs between the EU and the Member 
States. Rapportcur. A. Lamassourc, 24.04.2002. 
º' For instance, there is wide overlap between the legislative competence of the Finnish Aland 
islands and the Community legislative powers. From the point of view of the principle of 
subsidiarity, many of the issues are considered as regional matters suitable to be decided by their 
25,000 inhabitants, like environmental protection and agriculture; yet, they arc heavily regulated 
at EU level: N. Jaaskinncn, 'The Case of Aland Islands - Regional Autonomy versus the 
European Union of States', in The Role of Regions and Sub-national Actors in Europe. 
S. Wcathcrill and U. IIcrnitz (eds), Hart Publishing. 2005, pp. 90 and 96. 
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and subnational institutions 20 It may also be the case, as in Sweden, that the 
regional tier of government is weak with strong local tiers (e. g. municipalities). 
The existing treaties allocate competences only between the EU and its Member 
States, denying regional and other subnational actors direct access to EU 
decision-making. The Maastricht Treaty established the possibility of regional 
presence in the Council under Article 203 TEC, providing that regional delegates 
are authorised by national law to commit their governments as a whole. 
However, pursuant to the principle of `neutrality' inherent in the Article, a 
regional minister may be prevented from expressing regional interests divergent 
from those pursued by the central institutions in the Member State. The principle 
may be said to respect the right of each Member State to organise itself 
internally, such organisation being treated as `entirely a matter of national 
sovereignty'. 2' However, the effect of the principle may be less than neutral. 
Even when national law otherwise guarantees a role for regional institutions in 
national policy-making, this role may be prejudiced by the working of Council 
decision-making procedures, in the sense that they serve to strengthen the 
position of central institutions in Member States in relation to regional 
institutions. 22 In some cases, the possibility of recentralisation or withdrawal of 
regional autonomy can be quite detrimental. 23 
20 The compctcncc of the German Bundcsrat to decide on Germany's vote in the Council 
concerning matters falling within the Laender's competence is an example of a symmetrical 
system of decentralisation. On the other hand, in the UK, the asymmetric dcvolution model 
involves vertical and horizontal arrangements between national and subnational institutions 
which take place within two distinct models of devolution: a legislative model (Scotland) and an 
executive model (Wales). The Welsh devolution model is one of executive devolution which 
involves the transfer of functions to enable the Welsh Assembly to issue for instance subordinate 
legislation to implement EC law, while the Scotland Act equates the 'devolved conipetenccs' of 
Ministers to the 'legislative compctcnccs' of the Scottish Parliament: N. Jaaskinncn, ibid, p. 90 
and C. A. Cartcr, op. cit. n. 8, pp. 433 and 443-4. 
21 Case C-302/97 Klaus Konle v Austria 119991 ECRI-3099. According to its expression by the 
ECJ, EU law does not require Member States to make any changes in the distribution of powers 
and responsibilities between the public bodies that exist on their territory. if the institutional 
arrangements in the domestic system enable the rights which individuals derive from the Union 
legal system to be effectively protected and it is not more difficult to assert those rights than the 
rights which they derive from the domestic legal system, the requirements of EU law arc fulfilled. 
A. Evans, 'Regional Dimensions to European Governance', (2003) 52 ICLQ 21-51, pp. 24-28. 
22 COM(2001)428, European Governance, A White Paper, Bnsscls, 25.07.2001, pp. 13 and 17. 
u Spain is a stark example; the distribution of compctcnces foreseen in the Spanish Constitution, 
devolving important areas of sovereignty to Spain's Autonomous Communities (ACs), was 
operative until Spain acceded to the EU. Thereafter, the fact that foreign affairs wwwcrc the 
exclusive competence of the central government (under the Spanish Constitution) pre-empted any 
exercise of competence by the ACs, even though many of the powers vested in the EU fell under 
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In the UK, there is a stark contradiction between the treatment of relations with 
the Union as a non-devolved matter for which the UK Government remains 
responsible and the capacity of Council decisions to affect matters devolved to 
regional institutions. " In the context of the Scottish devolution, this does appear 
to be the case; notwithstanding the authority of the Scottish Parliament under the 
Scotland Act to issue both primary and secondary legislation to develop a 
number of policies, including policies for which the EU also has competence, the 
UK Government has reserved the right of negotiation in all matters at EU level, 
including those policies considered devolved. Furthermore, the UK Government 
also retained its legal power to issue secondary legislation for Scotland, in order 
to implement or transpose EU legislation should this prove necessary. 25 Ifence, 
perhaps the most striking legacy of EU membership to Scottish devolution is a 
broadly defined statutory `legislative override' whereby, even in non-reserved 
areas, the UK government may legislate for Scotland. "' Subnational access to the 
regional compctenccs. J. Bcngoctxca, `The Participation of Infra-Statc Entities in European 
Affairs in Spain: the Basque Case', in S. Wcatherill and U. Bcmitz (cds), op. cit. n. 19, p. 52. 
24 For instance, around 80% of the policy areas devolved to the Scottish Parliament arc said to 
have an EU dimension. Sec Developments in the EU, January-June 2000, Cm 4922,39. Also, 
COM(2001)428, op. cit. n. 22, p. 21. 
25 In relation to the EU, it is provided that any function of a Minister of the Crown (UK 
executive) shall continue to be exercisable by him as regards Scotland for the purposes spcciticd 
in section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 (s. 57 (1) of Scotland Act). Tlüs is subject 
to schedule 2 of the Act which limits materially the areas in which such power to enact delegated 
legislation may be exercised. For a more detailed analysis, sec N. Burrows, `Unfinished Business: 
The Scotland Act 1998', (1999) 62 MLR 241-260. C. Cartcr and A. McLcod, `The Scottish 
Parliament and the EU: Analysing Regional Parliamentary Engagement', in S. Wcathcrill and 
U. Bcmitz (cds), op. cit. n. 19, pp. 67-8. 
26 J. Scott, `Member States and Regions in Community Law: Convergence and Divergence', in 
Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law, P. Bcaumont, C. Lyons and N. Walkcr 
(cds), Hart Publishing, 2002, p. 22. According to the Agreement on the Joint Ministerial 
Committee and the Concordat on Co-ordination of European Union Policy, supplementary 
agreements to the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United Kingdom Government 
Scottish Ministers, the Cabinet of the National Assembly for If ales and the Northern Ireland 
Executive Committee, SE/2002/54, January 2002, the UK Government envisages the involvement 
of the Ministers and officials of the Scottish Executive as directly and fully as possible in 
decision-making on EU matters which touch on devolved areas. Ministerial involvement in EU 
policy entails that issues are dealt with bilaterally between the lead Whitehall Department and the 
devolved administration or by correspondence or, when this is not possible, such issues arc 
considered by the Joint Ministerial Committee which brings together UK Ministers and Ministers 
of the devolved administration. It is also envisaged that Ministers and officials of the Scottish 
Executive should have a role to play in relevant Council meetings. Decisions on Ministerial 
attendance at Council meetings are to be taken on a case-by-GUC basis by the lead UK Minister, 
depending on whether substantive discussions are expected of matters likely to have significant 
impact on devolved responsibilities. The role of the Ministers and officials of the Scottish 
Executive (and of the other devolved administrations) is to support and advance the single UK 
negotiating line which they will have played a part in developing The emphasis in negotiations 
has to be on working as a UK team; and the UK lead Minister retains overall responsibility for 
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Council may have been established to the satisfaction of some subnational units 
like the German Laender, 27 but overall Article 203 has had limited reach, having 
been implemented only by three Member States: Austria, Germany and Belgium. 
Moreover, the provision does not imply direct subnational representation; it 
simply creates an opportunity to delegate the right of access to the Council to 
regional representatives, while regional influence basically remains within the 
logic of the Member States. 28 
Despite the fact that in some Member States regions and other subnational units 
enjoy constitutional status, at EU level they are deprived of any legal personality, 
at least in terms of access to judicial review before the European Courts to 
challenge the validity of EU legislation which they themselves have to 
implement at national level. In Region Wallone29 the ECJ found the action 
the negotiations and determines how each member of the team can best contribute to securing the 
agreed policy position. Both Supplementary Agreements and the Memorandum of Understanding 
arc statements of political intent and not binding agreements. As a matter of law, relations with 
the EU remain the responsibility of the UK Government and the UK Parliament. 
_' On this basis, specific provisions were inserted into the German Federal Constitution linking 
the external action of the Federal Government to the internal division of powers. According to 
Article 23(6) Grundgesetz (GG), members of the government of the Laender may and do act for 
the Federal Republic. Due to the so-called `eternity clause' in Article 79(3) GG, no constitutional 
amendment is permitted that abolishes the federal structure or the basic participation of the 
Laender in federal legislation. Article 79(3) is interpreted by most scholars as barring any 
development that would completely deprive the Laender - or the Federal Republic - of their 
public powers by virtue of European integration. Linked to 79(3), Article 23(1) GG provides that 
the participation of the Federal Republic requires the Union to be bound, inter alia, by the 
principles of democracy and subsidiarity. P. C. Mueller-Graff, `The German Laender. Involvement 
in EC/EU Law and Policy', in S. Wcathcrill and U. Bcrnita (eds), op. cit. n. 19, pp. 109-112. For a 
more detailed analysis, sec H. C. H. Hofman, 'Parliamentary Representation in Europe's system of 
Multi-Layer Constitutions: A Case Study of Germany', (2003) 10 MJ 39-65. 
2e J. Kottmann, `Europe and the Regions: Subnational Entity Representation at Community 
Level', (2001) 26 ELR 159-176, pp. 167-8. 
29 In Case C-95/97 Regione Wallone v Commission [1997) ECRI-1787 which involved Inter alia, 
a challenge to a Commission decision prohibiting the grant of state aid by the Wallone Region. 
The same reasoning was repeated in Case C-180/97 Regione Toscana v Commission 119971 
ECRI-5245, despite the fact that the applicant argued that, in view of the legislative powers 
which the regions possessed under the Italian Constitution, it had in the corresponding fields the 
same capacity as a Member State. In Case T-609/97 Region Puglia v Commission 119971 
ECRII-4051, a claim by a regional institution that the application or implementation of EU law 
was capable of generally affecting the socio-economic conditions within its territorial jurisdiction 
was not sufficient to render an action brought by the authority admissible. According to Case T- 
288/97 Regione Autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia v Commission [ 19991 ECRI1-1871, it is possible 
to challenge a Commission regulation, but only where the Commission is under a specific duty, 
imposed by Union law, to consider the impact of its regulation on a given territory. In Joint Cases 
T-32/98 & T41/98 Government of the NetherlandsAntilles v Commission 120001 ECRI I-201, the 
CFI examined the framework provision which authorised the Commission to adopt the contested 
regulations and found that the Commission was required to `take into account the negative effects 
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inadmissible as it declared that its jurisdiction was limited to actions brought by a 
Member State (or a Union institution), a term which according to the general 
scheme of the treaties and for the purposes of the institutional provisions referred 
only to central government authorities and could not include the governments of 
regions or autonomous communities, irrespective of the powers they might have. 
Otherwise, it would undermine the institutional balance provided for by the 
treaties which ihiter alia governed the conditions under which the Member States 
participated in the functioning of the EU institutions. The rationale behind the 
interpretation amounts to the claim that it is not possible for the Union to 
comprise a greater number of Member States than the number of states between 
which it was established. However, such approach may prove precarious, as it 
could raise the claim that the meaning of'statei30 within a national legal system 
may refer to subnational authorities. The ECJ has repeatedly declared in its case 
law, as analysed in the previous chapter, that the right of legal protection is 
closely linked to the `rule of law', one of the principles on which the EU is 
founded. Regional institutions should enjoy the fundamental right to legal 
protection as they are directly affected by EU legislation. There should be a 
degree of parallelism between the obligations imposed on regional institutions by 
EU law and their right to have access to judicial redress. 
The Union is a multilevel governance system which does not afford subnational 
policy makers the legal and political space to take decisions that they are 
empowered to under their national constitutional arrangements 31 EU decision- 
making is an arena of action to the exclusion of subnational participation and is 
imbalanced in that it imposes substantial obligations on the regions, while 
which its decision might have on the economy of the overseas country or tcmtory conccrncd as 
well as the undertakings concerned'. 
so In Case T-298A)2 Anna Herrero Romeu v Commission, judgment of 25.10.2005, not yct 
reported, paras. 18,29,32 and 35-6, the applicant set out the argument that the meaning of'State' 
within the Spanish legal system did refer to subnational authorities as the Spanish Constitution 
established a highly decentralised legal system, known as'thc State of regional autonomy', «hick 
is characterised by a division of powers between the central administration and the Autonomous 
Communities. The argument was eventually rejected by the CFI vrhich reiterated the ECJ's 
position tliat, according to the general scheme of the treaties, institutional provisions referred only 
to central government authorities and could not include the governments of regions or 
autonomous communities, irrespective of the powers they might have. 31 Ph. Syrpis, 'in Dcfcnsc of Subsidiarity', (2004) 24 OILS 323-334, p. 333. 
159 
PRESERVING OR PEWIRT Q DE MOC12ATlc1LYIm uACY ºimllN T7! L As! 
allowing them little access to policy formulation or judicial control. 3= It induces 
centralisation by blindly assuming a unitary state where in practice there is none, 
thus, altering the distribution of powers between central and regional 
governments to the detriment of the latter. Moreover, EU decision-making 
endorses institutional bias (and not neutrality), because it operates to the benefit 
of certain groups to the exception of others. The norm that central governments 
represent their state in Council - the EU's predominant legislative body - means 
that central governments predominate in the EU. This affects the distribution of 
powers between central and regional governments in a very direct way. In the 
course of integration, competences allocated to both central and regional 
governments are transferred at EU level. Central governments continue to play a 
central role; while they monopolise formal representation, they also acquire 
influence over powers that were previously exercised by regional governments 33 
Therefore, it is one thing to say that the EU does not wish to interfere in the 
internal arrangements of the Member States and another to claim that it actually 
does not. The only regional presence in the EU institutional architecture can be 
effected through the Committee of the Regions (CoR)34 Arguably, the CoR has 
failed to establish itself as an authoritative voice in the Union's institutional 
terrain because due to its limited advisory role, its diverse membership of local 
and regional governments but, most notably, due to the great deal of diversity in 
the territorial organisation of the Member States, it is hard to establish something 
like the `position of the regions' in relation to legislative proposals in the first 
3s place. 
The constitutional status of subnational entities under EU law may prove 
particularly problematic for the Member States that have no constitutional 
competence or means to compel regions with wide legislative discretion to adopt 
the necessary rules to implement their Community obligations within their 
32 S. Wcathcrill, 'Tic Challenge of the Regional Dimension in the EU', in S. Wcathcrill and 
U. Bcmitz (cds), op. cit. n. 19, pp. 1-6. 
s' A. Boume, 'T'he Impact of European Integration on Regional Power', (2003) 41 JCNIS 597- 
620, p. 600. 
34 Article 265 EC. 
3S J. Ncrgclius, `The Committee of the Regions Today and in the Future-A Critical Ovvcnvicw', in 
S. Wcathcrill and U. Bcrnitz (eds), op. cit. n. 19, p. 124. 
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territories. 36 A stark example is the case of Aland, an autonomous region of 
Finland, where the division of legislative competences between the region and 
the state is mutually exclusive. Therefore, state legislation within the 
competences of Aland is inapplicable, even if Aland has failed to legislate in the 
field in question. In 2003, Finland vetoed regional legislation that amended the 
Aland Tobacco Act as it did not incorporate the ban on chewing snuff ('snus') 
included in the EU Tobacco Directive, 37 but it had no constitutional means to 
compel Aland to issue the necessary regional provisions so that Finland could 
comply with its EU obligations. 38 Aland has been reluctant to implement the ban 
because of the derogation Sweden has in this respect - the use of 'snus' is 
claimed to be part of the Swedish heritage - having declared that the cultural and 
historical ties with Sweden (another Member State) should make it eligible to the 
same exception rule. As a consequence, the Commission39 has requested the ECJ 
to declare Finland in breach of EU law for letting Aland uphold sales of `snus' 
on ferries to and from the island. 
The introduction of the principle of subsidiarity00 into Community law was 
intended to address anxieties about the locus of EU law-making and its 
remoteness from European citizens. 4' As a legal principle, abundantly examined 
36 N. Jaaskinncn, op. cit. n. 19. Case C-103/01 Commission v Germany 120031 ECRI-5369 shows 
how the internal distribution of compctcnccs within Germany is doubtless of profound 
importance, but is not relevant to the ascription of legal responsibility; the EU treats states as 
single entities. 
"Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products, (2001) OJL 194/26. 
Article 8 of the Directive provides: 'Member States shall prohibit the placing on the market of 
tobacco for oral use, without prejudice to Article 151 of the Act of Accession ... '. se A regional Act may me vetoed by the President of the Republic following the opinion of the 
Finnish Supreme Court, but the Finnish Government has no constitutional means to compel the 
Aland legislator to issue the necessary regional provisions when, for instance, in conflict with EU 
law or Finland's other international obligations. N. Jaaskinncn, op. cit. n. 19, pp. 89,93 and 101. 
39 Case C-343/05 Commission v Finland, OJC 281/11,12.11.2005. 
40 Article 5 TEC. 
41 D. Lazcr and V. Maycr"Schocnbcrgcr, 'Blueprint for Change: Devolution and Subsidiarity in the 
United States and the EU', in The Federal Vision, K. Nieolaidis and R. Ilowse (cds), OUP, 2003, 
p. 133. P. Syrpis, 'Legitimating European Governance: Taking Subsidiarity Seriously within the 
Open Method of Coordination', EUI W/P 2002/10. G. deBurca, 'Reappraising Subsidiarity's 
Significance after Amsterdam', JM WP 7/99. The Commission, in its report on the subsidiarity 
principle ('Better Lawmaking 1998: A Shared Responsibility' COM(98)715), denies the 
democratic relevance of the subsidiarity principle in the EU context, arguing that the principle 
has nothing to do with the democratic deficit that has to be made good; it should not be confused 
with the democratic control of Community action. 
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in academic scholarship elsewhere, it fails to address the constitutional role of 
the regional and local tiers of government, although its main premise is to raise 
fundamental questions about the appropriate locus of political and legal authority 
within a complex and multi-layered polity. As a political principle it is less 
restrictive and it seems to embrace regionalism. 42 This may denote respect for the 
central-regional government relations determined by the constitutional law of 
each Member State. '3 This touches on what has been referred to in the US44 as 
the distinction between democratic subsidiarity and executive subsidiarity. The 
former concept deals with the appropriate distribution and exercise of power 
between levels of government and is concerned with the protection of citizens' 
rights rather than the prerogatives of national executives. And regardless of the 
fact that in the EU context the rhetoric of citizens' rights and closeness to the 
citizens is regularly invoked, what appears in the primary legal text (of the 
Treaty) is the executive version, with subsidiarity as a principle appearing to 
protect Member State power against encroachment by the EU institutions rather 
than to protect individual rights and interests in the making of policy. 45 
6.3 The advent of the European Convention 
Concerns over the Union's readiness to operate within its constitutional limits 
and the desire to bring the European citizens closer to the Union and its 
institutions led to a two-fold solution proposed by the Convention, and endorsed 
by the Heads of State and Government in 2004. Firstly, the agreed text of the 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TeCE) clarified and reorganised 
the treaty rules governing competence. Secondly, it enhanced the role of NPs in 
42 Articles 1 and 6(3) TEU. 
" A. Vcrgcs-Bausili, 'Rethinking the Mcthods of Dividing and Exercising Powers in the EU: 
Reforming Subsidiarity and National Parliaments', JMWP 9/02. G. dcl3urca. op. cit. n. 41. 
A. Evans, op. cit. n. 21, pp. 28-32. 
" G. Bcrmann in his article 'Taking Subsidiarity Seriously', (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 
332-456, at pp. 340-2, sets out the different values that underlie subsidiarity, including sclf- 
dctermination and accountability, political liberty, preservation of identity and diversity. 
4s G. dcBurca, op. cit. n. 41. 
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the system of monitoring the existence and exercise of EU competence. This 
section will deal solely with the narrower in scope issue of 'monitoring' of 
competence exercise. The reason being, while reorganisation - combined with the 
flexibility clause's - will allow national and subnational actors to function in their 
autonomous legislative space, arguably better than before, due to a clearer 
catalogue of competences, 47 the solution is localised to specific provisions and 
does not address the issue of 'creeping' EU activity in fields of shared 
competence. 
With regard to the monitoring of competence exercise by NPs, the main outcome 
of the Convention was the inclusion of the two protocols in the TeCC dealing 
with the relationship between NPs and the Union's institutions in decision- 
making. "8 Firstly, the Protocol on the role of NPs is novel by establishing at EU 
level a formal requirement that information be transmitted directly to NPs to 
permit timely reflection and submission of reasoned opinions on legislative 
proposals, consultative documents, the annual legislative programme and the 
outcome of legislative Council meetings, thus permitting a more effective 
scrutiny of the activity of national governments 49 Secondly, the Protocol on the 
" Regarding reorganisation, the relevant provisions arc contained in Part 1, Title III TcCE. 
Article I-11 refers to the fundamental principles that govern Union competence, namely, 
subsidiarity, proportionality and conferral ('the Union shall act within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Constitution to attain the objectives 
set out in the Constitution'). Article 1-12 covers categories of competence: exclusive, shared and 
competence to act to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States. These 
arc referred to in detail in Articles 1-13 to 1-17. Article 1-18, labelled 'flexibility clause', which is 
the successor to the current Article 308 (cx 235) EC, provides that if action by the Union should 
prove necessary within the framework of the policies defined in Part III to attain one of the 
objectives set by the Constitution, and the Constitution has not provided the necessary powers, 
the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, shall take the appropriate measures. Further details 
pertaining to the manner of exercise of these compctenccs arc set out in Part III of the 
Constitutional Treaty. The text moves beyond the abstract by matching up particular areas of EU 
activity to each of the categories of competence. 
" S. Wcathcrill, 'Better Competence Monitoring'. (2005) 30 ELRcv 23-41, p. 29. `e Also, the TcCE places new responsibilities on NPs providing them with the opportunity to play 
a role in the life of the Union that goes beyond the policing of subsidiarity. I Icncc, NPs arc to be 
involved in monitoring Europol and Eurojust and evaluating the implementation of Union 
policies in the area of freedom, security and justice. Article IV-344, the generalised bridging or 
passerelle clause, gives NPs still greater power, a single NP can block a unanimous decision of 
the European Council to remove the national veto from areas of legislation in Part III TcC1? " The Protocol on the Role of NPs in the EU, annexed to the TcCE, OJC 310/204, contains the 
practical details. The Commission's legislative proposals, consultation documents, its annual 
legislative programme and other strategy documents submitted to the European Parliament and 
the Council shall also be sent directly to NPs. A six-weck period shall then separate the 
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application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality' gives NPs a 
specific role in respect of the implementation of those principles. It poses an 
obligation on the Commission to review a proposal when a sufficient number of 
NPs consider that the proposal does not comply with subsidiarity. " The 
obligation is non-binding, yet one could argue that it imposes an institutional 
duty on the Commission to review its proposal and may maintain, amend or 
withdraw it, subject to providing the reason for its decision. This system of `early 
warning' (EWS) is a new process that lays down a series of interinstitutional 
obligations which grants NPs the power to raise objections to EU legislation 
before the intervention of the legislators. 
Both the Convention mandate and the final reforms, with regard to NPs, included 
in the TeCE are more restrictive in scope than the recommendations found in the 
Laeken Declaration. 52 The idea of a collective role of NPs emerged briefly in 
Valerie Giscard d'Estaing's idea about a Congress of the Peoples of Europe 
which would meet once a year bringing together MPs and MEPs, 53 although it 
did not seem clear how adding another institution would further a more 
transparent and efficient decision-making. The Convention strongly asserted that 
the EU should not intervene in the internal territorial arrangements of the 
Member States. Hence, treaty reforms focused on an enhanced system of national 
scrutiny that would allow NPs to formulate positions on EU legislative proposals 
and to convey early opinions on their compliance with subsidiarity. m The idea of 
Commission making available a legislative proposal and the date whcn it is placed on a Council 
agenda and (subject exceptionally to stated grounds of urgency) no agreement may be established 
on the text during those six weeks. Then, ten further days must elapse between the placing or a 
proposal on a Council agenda and the adoption of a position in Council. 
Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, annexed to 
the TcCE, OJC 310/207. 
51 The obligation will also apply when the Commission intends to use the so-called flexibility in 
Article 1-18 TcCE, arguably to prevent the Union from making excessive use of this general 
supplementing power. 
52 Lacken Declaration-Annex 1, Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting in Lackcn, 
14 and 15 December 2001, SN 300/1/01 REV 1. It included the questions: should NPs be 
represented in a new institution alongside the Council and the El'? Should they have a role in 
areas of European actions in which the EP has no competence? Should they focus on the division 
of competence between the Union and the Mcmbcr States, for example, through preliminary 
checking of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity? 
3' CONV 369/02, Preliminary Draft Constitutional Treaty, 28.10.2002. 
s' CONV 548/03, summary report on the plena y session, 6-7 February 2003,12.02.2003. CONV 
74/02, Mandate of the Working Group on National Parliaments, 30.05.2002. CONV 333/02, 
Final report of Working Group IV on the role of NPs, 22.10.2002. 
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a `red card' systemss was advanced at the Convention, but proved disagreeable to 
the majority for fear that it would affect the efficiency of decision-making in the 
EU. 
Although the TeCE provisions do not bestow NPs with a legislator's function, 
NPs appear as a sort of `constitutional watchdog' with the specific task of 
monitoring compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. The process established 
in the protocols is entirely a voluntary one and it is very likely that NPs will use 
it with varying degrees of interest. Also, it is not clear what the Commission will 
do, if one third of NPs have objected to a proposal and it has to reconsider it. The 
Commission cannot be forced to change its position by NPs as their role remains 
essentially advisory. 5' As the pilot project on the 3rd Railway Package to assess 
the EWS has shown, " the Commission may be reluctant to use subsidiarity 
arguments to justify a proposal, in the first place. The non-inclusion of the `red 
card' mechanism in the TeCE leaves a presumption of power in the hands of the 
Commission; it will remain the final political arbiter of which legislation is 
compatible with subsidiarity and whether to withdraw a proposal. -" 
Consequently, the NPs' success in scrutinising EU legislative activity will still 
depend on national constitutional practice, but also on the political will of 
" If two-thirds of NPs present reasoned opinion which object to a legislative proposal on grounds 
of subsidiarity, then the Commission will withdraw its proposal. CONV 540/03, hic Early 
Warning Mechanism - putting it into practice', 06.02.2003. CONV 630/03, summary report on 
the plenary session of March 17 and 18,21.03.2003. 
M G. Davics, 'The Post-Lackcn Division of Compctcnccs', (2003) 28 ELRcv 686-698, p. 692. 
J. Pctcrs, 'National Parliaments and Subsidiarity: Think Twice', (2005) 1 EuConst 68-72, p. 71. 
a' Report on the results of COSAC's Pilot project on the 3rd Railway Package to test the 
"Subsidiarity early warning mechanism", prepared by the COSAC Secretariat and presented to 
XXXIII Conference of community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the 
European Union, 17-18 May 2005, Luxembourg. COSAC agreed at its XXX1I meeting in The 
Vague on 23 November 2004 to conduct a 'pilot project' in order to assess how the subsidiarity 
early-warning mechanism, provided for in the TcCE, might work in practice. COSAC chose the 
Commission's 3rd Railway Package as the subject for this initiative which was launched on I 
March 2005 and completed by NPs on 12 April. In total, 14 parliamentary chambers indicated 
that they found that one or more of the legislative proposals in the 3rd Railway Package breached 
the principle of subsidiarity. In total 20 of the 31 participating parliamentary chambers mentioned 
in their reports that the Commission did not justify its proposals with regard to the principle of 
subsidiarity, rendering their task of reaching a decision very difficult (on the basis of the 
Commission's justifications) on whether proposals complied with the principle. 58 A. Cygan, 'The Role of NPs in the EU's New Constitutional Order', op. cit. n. 13, p. 167. 
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individual MPs to scrutinise their governments. " If the EWS gave NPs a veto 
power, they would probably have stronger incentive for taking the system 
seriously. Yet, the publicity of the Council legislative meetings and the direct 
provision of information from the EU institutions to the NPs arc set to improve 
oversight of ministerial conduct. Effective scrutiny will also depend on a certain 
degree of Europeanisation of the pattern of relationship between NPs, should 
they exploit their newly-found opportunities to participate in scrutiny of 
proposed EU legislation, resources permitting. In late 2005, NPs grouped in the 
COSAC network have already agreed on a scheme resembling EWS which 
would assist them in identifying legislative proposals in the Commission's 
annual work programme that could potentially be in breach of subsidiarity. "° This 
alternative plan might create a political dynamic pressuring the Commission to 
listen to NPs, although it is unlikely that the Commission will feel bound to 
endorse any initiatives resembling provisions of the `shelved' EU Constitution. 
According to Article 8 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, `the Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to 
hear actions on grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a 
legislative act, brought in accordance with the rules laid down in Article 111-365 
of the Constitution by Member States, or notified by them in accordance with 
their legal order on behalf of their national Parliament or a chamber of it'. It is 
apparent that NPs are granted no direct access to the Court. In broad terms, 
Article 8 is intended to provide a mechanism by which NPs can present their 
views on subsidiarity to the ECJ, yet the precise legal process for achieving that 
s' For instance, British MPs have been criticised by the Confederation of British Industry as being 
'asleep on the job' when it comes to scrutinising proposed EU legislation: The Guardian. 
20.8.2004. 
60 COSAC is a cooperation between committees of the NPs dealing with European affairs as well 
as representatives from the EP. At the biannual meetings of COSAC, six members represent each 
parliament. COSAC meetings normally take place in the capital of the country holding the EU 
Presidency. The scheme consists of drawing up a common list identifying Commission legislative 
proposals to be distributed to the NPs and to the EP. Participating NPs will then complete their 
scrutiny of the proposals and send any comments they have on subsidiarity or proportionality 
directly to the Commission, the EP and the Council within six weeks so that the institutions are 
made aware of specific concerns. The move was announced by Lord Grcnfcll, member of the 
House of Lords and current president of COSAC, speaking at a parliamentary conference in The 
Hague at the Second EU Conference on subsidiarity on 17 November 2005. Second Conference 
on Subsidiarity Church House, London 29 November 2005, Speech by Lord Grcnfcll, llousc of 
Lords European Union Select Committee. EUObserver'NPs to show Commission'ycllow card', 
by Mark 13cundcrman, 18.11.2005. 
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aim is not set out in the Article. The reference to the 'national legal order' goes 
to the heart of the relationship between NPs and the executive within the 
Member States, in terms of who remains in control of any application. To the 
House of Lords, 61 it would not be acceptable, and certainly contrary to the letter 
and spirit of Article 8, that the executive should remain in control of any 
application or that it could discontinue the proceedings without the consent of the 
NP. It is not also clear, how individual Member States would interpret the effect 
of the provision as an obligation to notify the action to the ECJ. 
Article 8 only comes into play once a European legislative act has been adopted. 
Hence, a NP would have recourse to the provision according to the degree of its 
input during decision-making. Namely, it would raise a subsidiarity objection, if 
the NP did not agree with its government's decision to support a proposal in 
Council, or if its government was outvoted in the Council, or if an adopted 
legislative act was in a form different from that examined by a NP at an earlier 
stage. 2 Although the Protocol ultimately leaves room for judicial interference, it 
clearly recognises the political character of subsidiarity by attributing a primary 
supervising role to NPs '3 Potentially, the prospect that a legislative act might 
give rise to a subsidiarity objection after adoption might present national 
governments with the incentive to keep NPs fully informed of any changes to an 
act during its passage. 
The constitutional position of regions was not part of the formal Convention 
debates. There was little support for entrenching regional access to the Council in 
the TeCE which will remain regulated by domestic law. Thus, ambitious 
proposals like the one from the Scottish Parliament to establish a `Regional 
Affairs Council' consisting solely of regional ministers had no chance of further 
consideration. " A positive development from the regional perspective is the 
clarification of competences, including the principle of conferral; despite the fact 
61 House of Lords, Scrutiny of Subsidiarity: Follow up Report, IS'" Report of Session 2005-2006, 
Appendix 1: Government response to previous subsidiarity early warning mechanism report, 
29.11.2005. 
62 ibid. 
6' J. Pcters, op. cit. n. 56, pp. 68-72. A similar fate befell the CoR which remained an advisory body 
along the provisions of the existing treaties. 
" European Committee of the Scottish Parliament, Report on the J uture of E urope, 6th Report 
2002, SP Paper 705. 
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that it regulates the allocation of compctenccs between the EU and the Member 
States, this may be interpreted to implicitly limit the Union's reach vis-ýl-ris the 
competence of the regions, preventing it to creep to domains preserved by 
regional competence. 65 Besides, the regional and local elements arc recognised as 
part of `the fundamental structures' expressing national identity which the Union 
must respect. `'' 
Most notably, the principle of subsidiarity refers explicitly to the regional and 
local levels in the main text of a treaty for the first time (Article 1-11(3) TcCC) 
and, as part of policing of the principle of subsidiarity through the EWS, the 
Commission must take into account the regional and local dimension, the 
possible legislative, administrative or budgetary burdens to be borne by regional 
and local authorities, before proposing legislation. 67 It remains with the NPs and 
the CoR to take up complaints about subsidiarity with the Court. This will 
effectively open a choice for regions either to act through the NPs or the Cop.. 
According to Article 6 of the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, it is 
left to NPs to consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative 
powers, but the arrangements are set to favour the regional actors that already 
participate in the national parliamentary chambers of bicameral parliaments, as is 
the case of Austria and Germany. " Still, it is doubtful whether the six-week limit 
will suffice for the examination of proposals and consultations with interested 
parties, let alone regional parliaments. 69 What the Convention failed to do is to 
put forward any propositions that would constitute recognition of the status of the 
constitutional regions (regions with legislative powers or REGLEGs). 
cs N. MacCormick, {t'ho'sAfraid of a European Constitution?, Imprint Academic, 2005, pp. 77-8. 
" Article 1-5 TcCE. Also, recognition of the principic of tcrritorial cohesion as an object of the 
solidarity expressed by membership of the Union in Article 1-3 TcCE. 
" Articles 2 and 5 of the TcCE Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality. " C. Jcffcry, 'Regions and the EU: Letting them In, and Leaving them Alone', in S. Wcathcrill 
and U. Bcrnitz (cds), op. cit. n. 19, p. 41. In other Member States, including the UK, promises have 
been made to include devolved institutions in the system: CONV526103, 'Europe and the 
Regions', 03.02.2003. 
"A number of NPs reported that the six-work period was relatively short to carry out the 1% 1101C 
process of examining proposals, making consultations and preparing reasoned opinions, 
especially when it coincided with the time a parliament was not in session. There «as also 
confusion regarding the date from which the six-weck period should start. The House of 
Commons noted that the timetable was particularly tight, if NPs %%-crc to consult regional 
parliaments with legislative powers: Report on the results of COSAC's Pilot project on the 3rd 
Railway Package, op. cit. n. 57. 
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6.4 The Commission's `EU governance' initiative: rcaching out to 
national and subnational democracies 
Any attempt made at EU level to manage the interlocking levels of competence, 
aiming inter alia at increasing the democratic legitimacy of the EU by bringing 
Europe closer to people, should be seen as a result of the cumulative influence of 
the post-Nice constitutional reform and the Commission's EU governance 
initiative. 70 In the White Paper on EU Governance (WP), " the Commission 
addressed the issue by emphasising the need to reach out to citizens through 
regional and local democracy. It pointed out that while the expansion of the 
Union's activities demanded a stronger involvement of regional and local 
authorities due to their responsibility for implementing EU policies, regions often 
felt that their function as elected, representative channels relating directly to the 
public was not appreciated. Because of the way the Union works, it does not 
facilitate multilevel `partnerships' in which national governments may fully 
involve their regions and local authorities in EU policy-making. 
The Commission sought institutional reforms that would embrace a more open, 
accountable and inclusive decision-making, appropriate for the Union's special 
nature as a polity. The normative discourse of the WP is strongly built on the 
idea of reaching out to citizens by regional and local democracy, above all, by 
increasing relations with `civil society'. A better involvement of civil society 
actors in policy-making would lead to more acceptance of EU policies, as civil 
society gives voice to the citizens' concerns and delivers services that meet 
people's needs. 72 In this context, the Union should build partnerships based on a 
70 Triggered by the Mandlkcrn Report of Scptcmbcr 2001 and the White Paper on Governance, 
the initiative consisted of a package of actions: COM(2002)275, 'European Governance: Bcttcr 
lawmaking', 05.06.2002; COM(2002)278, `Action Plan "simplifying and improving the 
regulatory environment"', 05.06.2002; COM(2002)277, 'Consultation document: towards a 
reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue containing a proposal for principles and minimum 
standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission', 05.06.2002; COM(2002)276, 
'Impact Assessment', 05.06.2002. SEC(2004)1153, Report on European Governance (2003- 
2004), 22.09.2004. 
71 COM(2001)428, op. cit. n. 22, p. 12. 
72 Civil society includes the following: trade unions and employers' organisations ("social 
partners"); nongovernmental organisations; professional associations; charities; grassroots 
organisations; organisations that involve citizens in local and municipal life with a particular 
contribution from churches and religious communities. For a more precise definition of organised 
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reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue with a wide variety of actors. The 
Commission's task would be to establish a more systematic dialogue with 
representatives of regional and local governments through national and European 
associations at an early stage of policy-shaping, to ensure that regional and local 
knowledge and conditions are taken into account when developing policy 
proposals. While respecting the existing treaty provisions, the Commission also 
favoured the implementation of certain EU policies on the basis of target-based, 
tripartite contracts with the Member States, regions and localities. Central 
governments would play a key role in setting up such contracts and would 
remain responsible for their implementation, while the designated subnational 
authorities would undertake to implement identified actions to realise particular 
objectives defined in primary legislation. Hence, the Commission suggested that 
certain policy objectives could be achieved with the use of alternative means to 
traditional legislation (e. g. coregulation) and the establishment of a culture of 
public consultation, as traditional law-making processes are either too detailed or 
insufficiently adapted to local conditions and experience. 73 
The WP opened up the discussion on the role of national and subnational actors 
along the lines of the Laeken Declaration, particularly with reference to 
participatory democracy, the culture of consultation and transparency, as well as 
the Union's regional and local dimensions. The menu of suggestions reveals a 
conception of the EU as a system of multilevel governance with multitiered, 
geographically overlapping, governmental and nongovernmental structures. The 
list of potential partners is very comprehensive, including the Economic and 
Social Committee (ECOSOC), the CoR, individual regions, cities and localities, 
trade unions and employers' associations, grass roots organisations, practically 
everything and everybody. 74 However, placed in the context of a deeper and 
wider, post-Nice debate about the future development of the EU, the WP failed 
to provide specific proposals that took account of the parallel constitutional 
civil society, sec the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on "The role and 
contribution of civil society organisations in the building of Europe", OJC 329/30,17.11.1999. 
COM(2001)428, op. cit n. 22, p. 14. " COM(2001)428, op. cit. n. 22, pp. 11,13,16,21 and 32. 74E. O. Erikscn, `Democratic or technocratic governance? '. This paper is a part of contributions to 
the JMWP 6/01 Symposium: Mountain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission 
White Paper on Governance. 
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debate on the role and exercise of competence by NPs and regions with 
legislative powers. 
The Commission proposed a variety of `soft law' instruments as `new tools of 
policy-making', which link EU decision-making to citizens qua organised 
interests as opposed to qua voters. " This culture of formal and informal 
consultative procedures, target-based, tripartite contracts, partnership 
arrangements and network-led initiatives means that the Commission could at 
any point consult subnational actors directly bypassing the governments of the 
Member States. These instruments of action depart from the traditional EU 
legislative process as well as the conventional conception of the Union as a 
multilevel system of territorial representation. In traditional decision-making, the 
principle of subsidiarity was introduced as an additional democratic device to 
assign competence to the right territorial level, to protect both regional autonomy 
recognised at national level and the Member States against `creeping' EU 
intervention. 76 The implementation of the EWS makes a provision for wide- 
ranging consultations before any legislative act is adopted with the possibility of 
taking into account the national, regional and local dimension of the action 
envisaged. Procedurally and institutionally speaking, the EWS could be seen as a 
projection of the governance reform agenda, or vice versa. 77 Still, could it be 
extended to cover the monitoring of `soft law'? The consultation process implies 
that all relevant stakeholders arc consulted. It is not always the case that national 
government ministers, acting at the Council, consult NPs, let alone regions. It 
would be even more difficult for national (and regional) parliaments to track 
down `soft law' initiatives, than to scrutinise traditional legislative proposals. As 
Stephen Weatherill rightly observes, 78 this `softer' EU-level action, which lacks 
75 Such as corcgulation, open method of coordination (OMC). V. Schmidt 'The EU - Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State? ' (2003) 91 Political Science Series. P. Lindsctli. 'Delegation is 
Dead, Long Live Delegation: Managing the Democratic Disconnect in the European Market- 
Polity', in Good Governance in Europe's Integrated Market, C. Jocrgcs and R. Dchoussc (cds), 
OUP, 2002, p. 139. 
'' S. Smismans, Law, Legitimacy and European Governance-Functional I'articipation In Soda! 
Regulation. OUP, 2004, p. 6. L. Azoulay 'The Court of Justice and the Administrative 
Governance' (2001) 4 EPL 425441, p. 428. A. Ildriticr, 'The White Paper on European 
Governance: A Response to Shifting Weights in Intcr-institutional Dccision-Making'. in JMWP 
6/01 op. cit. n. 74. 
"A. Vcrgcs, op. cit. n. 43. 
70 S. Wcathcrill, 'Better Competence Monitoring', op. cit. n. 47, p. 34. 
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immediate constitutional bite, taken with negligible respect for the principle of 
attribution of powers, would reignite anxieties about competence creep and the 
associated impoverishment - emphasis added - of the national parliamentary role. 
The Commission was criticised for attempting to provide a legitimising 
discourse, in the WP, for its existing consultation practices with the aim to 
further strengthen `the Community method' - and not the national, regional and 
local dimension - in which its role is better established. The WP was perceived 
more as a strategic `self-interest' move to defend the Commission's institutional 
prerogatives, to redress its position in the institutional balance by regaining the 
ground lost in the codecision procedure79 and generally to maximise its influence 
and discretion in matters of legislative activity. The Commission did not only 
draw attention to its policy initiation, but also sought to further strengthen that 
position based on strategic, long-term objectives. Most notably, it called for the 
right to withdraw proposals when interinstitutional bargaining (with the Council 
and the EP) undermines the original objectives of such proposal. NO On the other 
hand, there was little preoccupation with the real challenges confronting the 
Union, the Member States and their regions. While it appealed to national and 
local democracy, the WP diverted its attention from national (and regional) 
parliaments to the `civil society'. In effect, this approach diminished the 
importance of representative democracy in EU decision-making and disregarded 
the function of representative institutions as agents of democratic legitimacy 
within national systems. 
One may not ignore the fact that the WP is a blueprint of the Commission's 
broad normative conception of the future of Union as a polity, which places the 
institution at the very centre of the institutional system. It appears that the 
Commission's objective was to insulate its role, as the guardian of Community 
interests and the driving force behind European integration, from the post-Nice 
" As analyscd in Chaptcr 4, codecision cstablished the Council and the EP as colcgislators to the 
dctrimcnt of the Commission. F. Scharpf, 'Europcan Govcmancc: Common Conccrns vs. The 
Challcngc of Divcrsity' and B. Kohlcr-Koch, ''ilhc Commission White Papcr and the 
Improvcmcnt of Europcan Governance, in JMWP 6/01, op. cit. n. 74. S. Smismans, op. cit. n. 76, 
p. 27-8 and 130. M. Tsakatika, `Claims to Legitimacy: the European Commission bctu-ccn 
Legitimacy and Change', (2005) 43 JCMS 193-220, p. 211. A. I hriticr op. cit. n. 76. '0 COM(2001)428, op. cit. n. 22, pp. 21-22,28-9 and 32. 
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overhaul of the Union's institutional system which was fuelled by a desire to 
restrict the EU's constitutional reach. Often perceived as the main agent of the 
EU's `creeping competence', the Commission sought to protect itself and 
reassert its constitutional role in an environment of bold constitutional reform 
which was about to take place through intergovernmental treaty revision and, 
most importantly, thorough the novel process of the Constitutional Convention. 
6.4.1 `EU governance' debate: endorsing a broader conception of 
`reime' le its imacy 
The Union's democratic legitimacy has always preoccupied institutional reform, 
although it has been at the spotlight since the early 1990's. The traditional 
constitutional approach to reform had focused on the role of (territorial) 
representation with reference often to the parliamentary model (the EP or NPs) 
together with a rights-based approach. The EU governance debate, which 
developed at the political level in the context of the WP, broadened the discourse 
to take into account the involvement of `stakeholders' in the Union's institutional 
set up, in the form of `interest group participation' and more specifically `civil 
society involvement'. This approach widened the normative framework within 
which EU's democratic legitimacy was perceived, by placing `functional 
participation', i. e. formal structures ensuring the participation of interest groups 
in EU policy-making, 81 at the core of legitimacy deliberations. 
The discourse on democratic legitimacy has been associated with the allocation 
and exercise of powers by the EU institutions, stressing the duty to respect each 
Si The term is borrowed from S. Smismans, although used by other commcntators in academic 
scholarship. It means that people arc rcprcscntcd as members of a functional group (an 
association with a specific function, purpose), in which people associate to realise a certain 
purpose or function, c. g. economic activity. Functional participation is used instead of intcrest 
representation, because the intention is not to focus on informal lobbying activity, but on 
formalised access channels through which people have access to policy making and which 
represent more public, than private, interests. S. Smismans, op. cit. n. 76, pp. 42,4S, 47 and 78.79. 
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other's prerogatives, as enshrined in the treaties. As an institutional guarantee 
and manifestation of the `rule of law', the principle of institutional balance was 
established by the Court of Justice in Meroasi, 1 which precluded the delegation 
of discretionary powers to bodies other than those established by the treaties, on 
the ground that this would upset a fundamental guarantee contained in the 
balance of powers between the European institutions. Only in 1980 the idea of 
democratic participation entered into the legal approach to EU legitimacy. In 
14oquette the ECJ stated that the participation of the EP in the legislative process 
represented an essential fact in the institutional balance, intended by the Treaty, 
since it reflected at Community level the fundamental democratic principle that 
people should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of the 
representative assembly. 83The logic behind this reasoning appears to be that, as 
power moved away from national parliaments due to European integration, a 
parliamentary body in this new third level of authority needed to counterpart that. 
This traditional reading of institutional balance does not reflect the complex 
institutional reality of the EU which includes the gradual proliferation of formal 
and informal actors in the multilevel system of govemance. 3' Although the 
treaties have been amended, as well as construed by the ECJ, to incorporate most 
of the changes in substantive policy areas, they do not reflect the degree of 
institutional change that has actually taken place, other than in relation to the five 
`cardinal' institutions. " How do all these actors promoted by the Commission's 
governance debate fit into the concept of institutional balance? Since each 
institution represents a different constituency, at least in theory, the principle can 
be adapted to reflect the participation and representation of different 
n The Court held that '... thcrc can be sccn in the balancc of powers «hick is characteristic of the 
institutional stricture of the Community a fundamental guarantee granted by the Treaty to the 
undertakings and associations of undertakings to which it applies. To delegate a discretionary 
power, by entrusting it to bodies other than those which the Trcaty has established to effect and 
supcnisc the exercise of such power each within the limits of its own authority, would maser the 
guarantee ineffective'. Case 9/56 Mleroni v High Authority [1957 and 19581 ECR 133, p. 152. 
Case C-138/79 Roquette v Council [19801 ECR 3333, para. 33. 
" S. Smismans, 'Institutional Balance as Interest Representation. Some Reflections on Lcnacrts 
and Vcrhocvcn', in C. Jocrgcs and RDchoussc, op. cit. 11.75, p. 102. 
's G. dcBurca, 'The Institutional Development of the EU: A Constitutional Analysis', in &olution 
ofEULaw, P. Cmig and G. dc Burga (cds), OUP, 1999, p. 56. 
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constituencies within the EU process. " The participation of management and 
labour in European Social Policy, for instance, is enshrined in Articles 138 and 
139 TEC. Although not an `institution' in the strict sense and under Article 7 
TEC, management and labour's role is endorsed in other parts of the Treaty as 
representing certain interests. One might argue that a new approach to 
institutional balance could embrace new actors. 
The CFI's approach in UEAPMe may indicate a potential shift in the 
consideration of institutional balance. It declared that the participation of the 
parties `representative of management and labour' could compensate for the lack 
of parliamentary involvement (the EP) in assuring the participation of the 
people. 88 To some extent, the CFI moved beyond the precedent set by the Court 
of Justice in that it formulated the participation `through representative assembly' 
as a general requirement in legislation, whereas, to the ECJ, the democratic 
principle of parliamentary participation has always been circumscribed by the 
concrete institutional provisions of the Treaty. 89 Yet, the CFI's emphasis on the 
role of the EP in social regulation, as well as the express reference to legal 
precedent, read more as a confirmation of established case law. 90 
$6 A new reading of the institutional principle in terms of 'fair interest representation' his cqually 
been developed by Craig and dcBurca and has been suggested by Jocrgcs and Nycr. ? laus, 
institutional balance is regarded above all as a political principle, used as a normative tool to 
shape the institutional framework of the Treaty. It is not limited either to the three EU institutions 
(EP, Council and Commission), or to territorial representation, but extends to interest 
representation. P. Craig, `The Nature of Community: Integration, Democratic and Legitimate', in 
P. Craig and G. dc Burca (cds), ibid, pp. 36-41 and G. dcBunca, ibid, pp. 56 and 60. K. Lcnacrts and 
A. Vcrhocvcn, `Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for Democracy in EU Governance' and 
S. Smismans, `Institutional Balance as Interest Representation. Some Reflections on Lcnacrts and 
Vcrhocvcn', in C. Jocrgcs and R. Dchoussc op. cit. n. 75, pp. 35-6 and pp. 91-2 respectively. 
n Case T-135/96 UEAPME v Council 119981 ECRII-2335. 
Case T-135/96, ibid, para. 89: `In contrast, the second procedure, referred to in Articles 3(4) and 
4 of the Agreement, does not provide for the participation of the EP. However, the principle of 
democracy on which the Union is founded requires - in the absence of the participation of the 
European Parliament in the legislative process - that the participation of the people be otherwise 
assured, in this instance through the parties representative of management and labour who 
concluded the agreement which is endowed by the Council, acting on a qualified majority, on a 
proposal from the Commission, with a legislative foundation at Community level. In order to 
make sure that that requirement is complied with, the Commission and the Council arc under a 
duty to verify that the signatories to the agreement arc truly representative. ' 
S. Smismans, op. cit. n. 76, pp. 345 and 347. 
90 Case T-135/96, op. cit. n. 87, para. 88: 'As the case-law makes clear, the participation of that 
institution in the Community legislative process reflects at Community level the fundamental 
democratic principle that the people must share in the exercise of power through a representative 
assembly (Case C-300/89 Commission v Council [19911 ECR 1-2867, para. 20; Case C-138/79, 
op. cit n. 83, para. 33; and Case 139179 Maizena v Council 119801 ECR 3393, para. 34). In that 
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Moreover, the CFI's view in the UI. APME corresponds with the more traditional 
perception of the institutional balance in which respect for the constitutionally 
established interactions among institutions is combined with their democratic 
input. Hence, the legitimacy of the European social dialogue depends on the 
respect of a certain institutional balance, although the CFI has refrained from 
explicitly using the concept91 and from providing further guidance as to how the 
participation of social partners assures the democratic principle. The CFI has 
broken with the standard legal view which combines the 'rule of law' and 
institutional balance with the sole democratic input of the EP. To this extent, the 
UEAPME case fits well with ideas of functional democracy, the notion that 
representation can be organised at different levels with regard to a specific 
function and a broadened institutional balance which the CFI did not explicitly 
use. 92 Having said that, it is hard to devise a general rule out or a single case. 
What seems to evade the whole debate is that in decision-making processes like 
the European social dialogue, which involve consultation and negotiation with 
`stakeholders', the Commission, an institution that does not represent a particular 
constituency, plays the most crucial role, while the role of the other EU 
institutions is rather limited. It has the monopoly of initiative; stakeholders are 
free to deviate from the proposal thereafter, but if the signatory partners wish to 
see their agreement implemented, they must again solicit a proposal from the 
Commission. 93 The Commission's proposals in the WP, to the effect that EU 
decision-making should evolve beyond interinstitutional relations within the 
EU's political system to include extended participation of civil society actors, 
may not sit well with the constitutional guarantees found in legal doctrine which 
preclude the delegation of decision-making to bodies other than those which the 
regard, it should be noted that, in accordance with that case law, the democratic legitimacy of 
measures adopted by the Council pursuant to Article 2 of the Agreement derives from the 
European Parliament's participation in that first procedure. S. Smismans, op. cit. n. 76. p. 345. " S. Smismans, op. cit. n. 86, pp. 99-101. S. Smismans, op. cit. n. 76, pp. 350-1. 
n S. Smismans, op. cit. n. 76, pp. 348-9,352-3 and 354. 
Apart from the right to be informed by the Commission, the EP has no other formal role, if 
social partners decide to settle a matter by collective agreement. T he Council's role is more 
significant. While it may decide whether to implement an agreement or not, it is not able to 
amend its content. A. Vcrhocvcn, The EU in Search of Democratic and Constitutional liscory, 
Kluwer Law International, 2002, pp. 222-3. 
176 
PRESERVING OR PERVERTING DE MOCMTICLLMMtACr IfMLIN 171E J& 
treaty has established, especially if such delegation is accompanied by a wide 
margin of discretion. '" 
Despite proclamations of the need to connect Europe with its citizens, the WI' 
seems to have a limited understanding of `governance' and citizens' 
expectations, " as it focuses predominantly on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the EU decision-making system. While it lacks the theoretical reflection on what 
democratic legitimacy is and requires, at the same time it directly engages with 
questions of regime legitimacy by referring to the democratic principles of 
accountability and openness as principles of good governance by which the 
Union, its institutions and civil society actors should abide. In this context, the 
participation of civil society organisations in the policy-making process, their 
role and influence, raise issues of constitutional significance. litter alia, how they 
fit in the Union's institutional framework, whether they arc subject to the same 
procedural rules and principles that apply to all decision-makers, whether they 
provide formal channels that facilitate citizen participation. 
For instance, in the absence of parliamentary involvement, the role of social 
partners in social regulation raises concerns over their representativity, as it is not 
clear who participates on behalf of whom 9' While their influence through 
collective bargaining can be seen as a form of participatory democracy, they 
represent certain public or private interests. Therefore, the concepts of 
`participation' and `representation' are not necessarily mutually exclusive. To 
the CFI, the EU social dialogue is equated with the legislative process; 
Case 9/56, op. cit. n. 82, p. 154. 
M. Tsakatika, op. cit. n. 79, pp. 208-9. This is mirrored in the public response which regrets the 
perceived limits of the WP's understanding of `governance', which focuses predominantly on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the EU decision-making system, while it disregards the issues of 
democratic legitimacy and democratic deficit in the European integration: COM(2002)705. 
Report from the Commission on European Governance, 11.12.2002. 
"The Commission consults a large number of European workers and employers organisations on 
any new social policy proposal. In its 1993 Communication, the Commission published the 
criteria for becoming a social dialogue partner. It selected a number of organisations which 
fulfilled these criteria. Although these parties have been consulted on every proposal, so far, they 
have not played a part in the actual negotiation procedures. The Commission maintains that it 
cannot select the negotiators and leaves it to the social partners to decide. It urges the social 
partners to cooperate on this issue. COM(93)600, Communication on the Application of the 
Maastricht Agreement on Social Policy, 14.12.1993. L. Bcttcn, 'The Democratic Deficit of 
Participatory Democracy in Community Social Policy', (1998) 23 ELRcv 20-36, p. 30. 
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agreements reached through the social dialogue arc often incorporated into 
directives. To be democratically legitimate, the parties to such agreements have 
to achieve `sufficient collective representativity'7 
The membership of organisations like management and labour raises issues of 
representation, authorisation and accountability. If membership rates are taken 
into account, even if decisions are taken by unanimity, only a fraction ofworkers 
in Europe are represented and provide authorisation for their subsequent policies 
due to low union affiliation" Apart from the formal ways of participation, 
functional interests maintain many informal and ad hoc relations with the EU 
institutions. There are no obvious ways in which the accountability of functional 
interest representation can be ensured. Article 139(1) TEC stipulates that should 
management and labour so desire, the dialogue between them may lead to 
contractual relations, including agreements, but is silent as to the form 
contractual relations should take. It is difficult to capture negotiations in legal 
terms, as they operate outside the realm of binding EU rules. " The EU is based 
on a set of fixed and identifiable rules and principles and judicial remedies arc 
available to ensure respect for these rules and principles. 100 The move from 
economic to social regulation brought a radical shift. As examined in Chapter 5, 
in economic regulation the ECJ has to balance the economic objectives of the EU 
against the rights protection of individuals. In social regulation, organised 
participation retains the nature of association where there are no longer protected 
parties under EU law. '°' Individual and subjective legal protection is not only a 
sine qua iraai of legality, but an important yardstick in assessing a polity's 
democratic credentials. 
Case T-135/96, op. cit. n. 87, paras. 88-90 and 110. 
" UNICE, CEEP and ETUC, the three major players in the negotiation of the Part-time Work 
Agreement, did not represent the majority of workers and employers, leading UEAPME to 
challenge the Agreement by pleading breaches of the principles of equality, subsidiarity and 
proportionality. Case T-135/96, op. cit. n. 87. L. Bcttcn, op. cit. n. 96, pp. 30 and 32. E. Cishcr. 'Thc 
EU in the Age of Accountability', (2004) 24 OILS 495-515, p. 504. 
" A. Vcrhocvcn informs us of the terns under which contractual negotiations take place between 
UNICE and UAEPME. According to their cooperation agreement signed on 4.12.1998, both 
parties have to respect the confidentiality of negotiations and social dialogue tends to be 
monopolised by large institutional trade unions. So, negotiations take place in an opaque manner 
in violation of the principle of transparency to which the EU is bound. A. Vcrhocvcn, op. cit. n. 93, 
pp. 212 and 226-8. 
S. Smismans, op. cit. n. 76, p. 55. 
101 L. Azoulay, op. cit. n. 76, pp. 434 and 438. Case T-135/96, op. cit. n. 87. 
178 
PREnvINO OR IErIV? IlWO DEMOCMTIC W3IT1MACT ºF7rttIy 11II M ,! 
The WP on European governance has broadened the democratic legitimacy 
debate. In reaching out to national and regional democracy, it extended beyond 
the role of national and regional parliaments to embrace other stakeholders in the 
form of functional participation, yet it took the `legitimating potential' of civil 
society participation too much for granted. It may be doubted that the delegation 
of lawmaking to civil society actors, as they are currently organised, lives up to 
the promise of making the EU decision-making process more democratically 
legitimate. Other institutions have been more reluctant to engage in a discourse 
of `participatory democracy' interpreted as civil society involvement. 102 The EP 
has argued, '03 for instance, that elements of participatory democracy should be 
introduced with caution in the political system of the EU, as a structural element 
of rule of law is representative democracy. The main decisions on institutional 
reform and the future of the EU were eventually taken at the Convention and the 
2004 IGC, which did not feature most of the Commission's EU governance 
proposals. Convention members had predominantly a national or European 
electoral mandate; hence, `representative democracy' provided the normative 
framework for institutional reform. Some traces of the EU governance debate 
have emerged in the final text of the Constitutional Treaty, e. g. the meeting of 
representative and participatory democracy. 104 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how EU decision-making and the allocation of powers 
therein pervert, rather than preserve, the democratic legitimacy within the legal 
orders of Member States. Specifically, this additional level of decision-making 
which is supranational and executive-oriented, due to the institutional eminence 
of the Council, may often trigger mechanisms already found in national 
102 A. Vcrhocvcn, op. cit. n. 93, pp. 226-8. E. Fishcr, op. cit. n. 98, p. 502. S. Smismans. op. cit. n. 76, 
G2 and 131. ýý 
EP Rcport A5-0399/2001 on the Commission White Papcr on "Europcan govcnumcc. 
Rapportcur: Sylvia-Yvonnc Kaufmann, PE 304.289,15.11.2001. 
1" For a more dctailcd analysis, sec Chaptcr 7. 
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constitutional orders that erode the constitutional role of national and regional 
parliaments. Such mechanisms might have not been otherwise invoked in normal 
national legislative processes, if it had not been for the lack of institutional `fit' 
between the EU and its Member States and coordination between the EU and 
national institutions. The Member States may be able to contain the conduct of 
ministers acting in Council, but the ultimate question is not whether the Member 
States can control EU activity, but whether citizens can control the EU as well as 
their governments who combine the exercise of EU powers. The role of national 
(and regional) parliaments is quite important in this respect. The European 
Convention tried to address the issue constitutionally by proposing treaty reforms 
that would allow a direct involvement of domestic parliaments in the monitoring 
of legislative activity and its compliance with subsidiarity. 
The EU Governance initiative sought to go where no constitutional reform went 
before by directly involving civil society actors in rule-making. In view of the 
limited effect of subsidiarity, particularly in relation to regions, the Commission 
combined the issue of `where' to regulate - subsidiarity and proportionality - 
with the issue of `how' to regulate, thus blending subsidiarity with the more 
process-oriented issue of legislative quality. 105 Yet, it envisaged institutional 
reforms that sanction and enhance its institutional role supported by actors whose 
activity is not endorsed by formal constitutional rules. This approach has 
undermined the formal constitutional arrangements within the Member States 
and the relevance of national and subnational representative institutions in the 
EU legislative process. Placed in the context of the wide post-Nice debate about 
the future development of the European Union, the WP should have at least taken 
into account the backdrop of the Convention debates which featured the role of 
NPs and regions in the European architecture. 
105 D. Lazcr and V. Maycr-Schocnbcrgcr, op. cit. n. 41, p. 137. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AND THE DEMOCRATIC 
CIIALLENGE 
7.1 Introduction 
The disillusionment with the intergovernmental conference system, which 
resulted from the frustrating experience of negotiations at Nice, prompted EU 
leaders to move decisions about the future of the Union away from the 
bargaining process of diplomacy. A Constitutional Convention was convened by 
the Lacken European Council, in 2001, with the aim to invigorate the whole 
process of institutional reform to bring it closer to the European citizens. The 
keywords of the Laeken Declaration' were democracy and legitimacy; this set it 
apart from previous initiatives which were mainly concerned with the 
functionality of the decision-making process in view of enlargement? The 
Convention faced this democratic challenge in two respects. Firstly, in terms of 
its input; it was an institutional set up with widened participation and stronger 
representative basis. To assess its democratic credentials, a comparison will be 
attempted with the traditional intergovernmental process. Secondly, in terms of 
achieving institutional change, it will be explored whether the Convention stirred 
institutional reforms towards a more democratic and legitimate EU regime. 
Eventually, the outcome of the convention process, the Constitutional Treaty, 
was subjected to public approval and defeated in two referenda results. The 
remaining part of the chapter will explore whether the rejection signified: a) a 
rejection of the convention process itself; after all, the Convention may not have 
been successful in connecting with the EU citizens and b) whether the rejection 
was a protest against the content of the Constitutional Treaty, with particular 
reference to the regime envisaged therein. 
1 Lackcn Declaration-Annex 1, Presidency Conclusions, European Council Mccting in Lackcn, 14 
and 15 December 2001, SN 300/1/U1 REV 1. 
2 A. J. Mcncndcz, 'Bct«ccn Lackcn and the Dccp Bluc Sca', (2005)11 EPL 105.143. p 112. 
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7.2 The `Convention' method: reinventing institutional_reform7 
The demand for comprehensive institutional reform has been aired from 
Maastricht through to Nice. Unlike the agenda of past intergovernmental 
conferences, what typifies the constitutional debate post-Nice is a direct link 
between the issues of overarching institutional reform and democratic legitimacy. 
In this context, the Nice European Council, in its Declaration on the future of the 
Union,: ' identified four subjects that particularly needed to be tackled, namely, 
the issue of competences, the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 
simplification of the EU Treaties to make them clearer and better understood, as 
well as the role of national parliaments. A year later, the Lacken Declaration 
addressed both the substantive and the procedural dimensions of reform; 4 the 
open-ended content of its mandate seemed to endorse a far-reaching discussion 
on the Union's institutional future. 
What seemed to have acted as a catalyst was the inevitable prospect of a new, 
enlarged EU which was no longer perceived as mere rhetoric of an ambitious 
integration project. Neil Walker examines the interplay between enlargement and 
constitutionalism, arguing that the demands of enlargement have `served almost 
as mantra to prompt and focus debate on reform of the institutional structures of 
the existing Union'. 5 Enlargement has often been a consideration affecting 
discussions and negotiations on past treaty reforms, in terms of how the Union's 
institutional system would cope with the accession of new Member States. Yet, 
the latest enlargement to the east was a real challenge not only in terms of scale 
(ten new members), but also due to the huge political, cultural and social 
landscape it would create. Most notably, the new Member States had only recent 
political experience with democratic government. The Union would become a 
peculiar mix of old and new democracies. What the Union needed was to find 
not just a single theory of democracy, but its own vision of democracy. The 
3 Declaration No 23, attached to the Treaty of Nice. 
4 Thcsc included, inter alia, less umvicldy and rigid, but more efficient and open European 
institutions, so the issues to be examined were: a) compctcnccs; b) simplification of the 
legislative acts; c) more democracy, transparency and effectiveness and d) a way towards a 
constitution for the citizens: SN 300/1/01 REV 1, op. cit. n. 1. 
s N. Walkcr, `Constitutionalising Enlargcmcnt, Enlarging Constitutionalism', (2003) 9 ELI 365- 
385, p. 375. 
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realisation of the limitations of the revision exercise carried out at Nice signified 
the exhaustion of the intergovernmental approach as a method of reforming the 
treaties. ' The Lacken Council asserted that `a different approach from 50 years 
ago' was necessary to meet the democratic challenge facing Europe and the 
expectations of Europe's citizens.? This new thinking led to the reinvention of 
the whole process of institutional change; Lacken brought a new trend: the 
Convention method, a bottom-up process8 where the citizenry would generate 
proposals for treaty reform, which began its proceedings in 2002. 
In all previous treaty revisions, the notion of involving people was negligible. 
The traditional intergovernmental conference is a secretive process of interest"lcd 
bargaining between national governments which is exclusively focused on one 
kind of interest (that of national governments). As Neil Walker rightly observes, 
an IGC `unhappily combines a narrow consultative base, a protracted timescale 
and a procedure which encourages negative criticism rather than constructive 
debate'. 9 The IGC approach can be perceived as undemocratic as it may prevent 
any informed national debate on the reform agenda, if a government thinks, and 
maybe rightly so, that free flow of information may weaken its negotiating 
position. In stark contrast to all IGCs, the Convention considered the general 
European public as its audience. Most of the Convention documents were 
rendered public as they were produced and most Convention meetings were open 
' At the Nice European Council, the necessity to roach an agrccmcnt in order to wrap up the 
process had lcft many institutional issues untouched. After five days of intense diplomacy, no one 
was really satisfied with the result and the Heads of State or Government pointed immediately to 
the need for a new treaty revision. CONV 277/02, Contribution by Mr Jcns-Pctcr Bondc. member 
of the Convention. PM Tony Blair admitted that the EU could not continue to take decisions as 
important as this in this way and continued that reform gras essential so a more rational way of 
decision-making was achieved. Equally, Hans-Gort Pocttcring, leader of the centre-right 
European People's Party, noted that the IGC did not produce any results at Nice and insisted that 
another model should be tried. `The Convention about the FutureS of Europe', 01.10.2002. Jens. 
Peter Bonde, Nice Treaty Explained, 2001. Available at w1%w. euobscrvvr. eom/index. phtm/7aid 
2082; accessed 25.2.03. European Voice 6/46,2000. 
' SN 300/1/01 REV 1, op. cit. n. 1. K. Lcnacrts and D. Gcrard, 'The structure of the Union 
according to the Constitution of Europe: the emperor is getting dressed', (2004) 29 ELRcv. 289- 
322, pp. 289-290. H. Rasmusscn, `The Convention Method', (2005) 1 EuConst 141-7, p. 142. EP 
Report A5-0168101 on the Treaty of Nice and the future of the Union. Rapporicurs: deVigo and 
Scguro, 04.05.2001. 
' Tliis was not the first Convention in EU history; the convention method was used in the drafting 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, following a decision of the 1999 Cologne European 
Council, but this was the first time used to prepare an IGC. 
9 N. Walkcr, 'European Constitutionalism and European Integration', (1996) PL 266-290, p. 281. 
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to the public. 10 It marked an evolution towards a more deliberative form of 
democracy in the involvement of civil society actors (non-governmental 
organisations, the social partners, the business world, academia, etc) in the 
Convention proceedings via the Forum, where consultations would serve as input 
to the debate and as proposals for institutional reform. ' The Convention widened 
the number and type of actors involved, yet the parliamentary element was the 
most dominant; 12 it was an institutional set up characterised by a methodological 
shift to parliamentarisation. 
Had the Convention acquired a higher degree of democratic legitimacy through 
its wider membership? Although the convention method was never likely to be a 
panacea for the (real and imagined) evils of the EU, " its transparent, deliberative 
and parliamentary characters` could be said to have created a conception of a 
Union that functions democratically. Of course, any assumptions about its 
democratic legitimacy due to its parliamentary character need to be treated with 
some scepticism. Despite its ambiguous institutional nature - an ad hoc body of 
10 But not those internal to the Pracsidium. " Sec SN 1565/02, Introductory Speech by President V. G. d'Estaing to the Convention on the 
Future of Europe, 26.02.2002. Also, the importance of continuous communication with the home 
front was emphasised by the Convention Chairman V. G. d'Estaing. He hoped that at least one 
Convention member from each country would provide a brief report on the progress of their 
national debates: CONV 49/02, Reports on national debates, 13.03.2002. The Forum was divided 
into four categories and organisations were invited to select the most appropriate category %% lien 
registering: political or public authorities (including subnational level), socioeconomic interests 
(social partners, professional groups, etc), academic interests and think tanks and other civil 
society organisations, etc. A digest of contributions had been supplied to the Convention 
members in order to prepare for the first plenary session devoted to civil society, held on 24-5 
June 2002: CONV 112/02, Digest of contributions to the Forum, 17.06.2002; CONY 48/02, The 
Convention and Civil Society, 13.03.2002; CONV 167/02, Note on the plenary session, 24- 
5.06.2002; CONV 120/02, Contact groups (Civil Society), 19.06.2002. 
12 K. Lcnacrts and M. Dcsomcr, `New Models of Constitution-Making in Europe: The Quest for 
Legitimacy', (2002) 39 CMLR 1217-1253, pp. 1235 and 1238. The Convention was composed of 
15 representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States (one from each 
Member State), 13 representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the candidate States 
(1 per candidate State), 30 representatives of the national partiamcnts of the Member States (two 
from each Member State), 26 representatives of the national parliaments of the candidate States 
(two from each candidate State), 16 members of the European Parliament, 2 representatives of 
the European Commission. For a more detailed analysis on the composition and workings of the 
Convention, sec O. Duhamcl, `Convention versus IGC', (2005) 11 EPL 54-62. 
"J. Shaw, `What is a Convention? Process and Substance in the project of European constitution- 
building', (2003) 89 Political Science Series. 
14 The Convention's work was structured in three consecutive stages: the listening stage, the 
study stage and the proposal stage. The first stage lasted the longest (eight months) and was 
supposed to contribute to a thorough examination of all visions on the purpose of the EU as it 
was acknowledged that citizens felt their voice was not heard on the future of the EU: CONY 
6/02, Pracsidium, General debate, 14.03.2002. 
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men and women, with a wide mandate - its broad membership and variant 
institutional and political background with the reflection of a broad ideological 
spectrum and divergent political philosophies undoubtedly rendered the 
Convention a democratic institutional setup with a much stronger representative 
basis than the traditional intergovernmental method. '5 Although designed as a 
consultative and not a constituent assembly with a formalised institutional role, 
the Convention was an institutional environment where input from subnational, 
national and supranational levels formed a pre-established idea on the likely 
direction of treaty reform, as opposed to the purely `post-decision', `take-it-or- 
leave-it' situation presented to national parliaments, following an 
intergovernmental conference. One might add the criticism occasionally voiced 
about the internal deliberations of its steering organ, the Praesidium, which was 
not made subject to the same requirements of openness or broad representative 
basis, not to mention the lack of vote. '6 Still, the Convention represented a true 
challenge to the previous arcane process of treaty revision characterised by 
closed circles of `expert' groups. 
While the work of the Convention was, technically speaking, only an informal 
preparation of the formal revision steps provided by Article 48 TEU, it modified 
the treaty revision rules and the nature of the 2004 IGC by restricting the terms 
of the diplomatic bargaining along the parameters of the constitutional text it 
produced. '7 Hence, most of the salient issues considered by the IGC had already 
15 C. Closa, `The Convention method and the transformation of EU constitutional politics' in 
Developing a Constitution for Europe, E. O. Erikscn. J. Fossum and A. J. Mcncndci (cds), Taylor 
and Francis Ltd, 2004, p. 188. 
16 G. Stuart, The Making of Europe's Constitution, Fabian Society, Crowcs, 2003, pp. 17-18. The 
MP criticised the Pracsidium membership as self-appointed elite. Also, the Con-ention had no 
legal status to make binding decisions on behalf of the institutions rcprcscntcd by its members. 
National parliamentarians were numerically the largest group but, in terns of influence, they 
found it almost impossible to reach common views unless they supported that the EP wanted 
and in the working of the Convention they were not treated as a discrctc constituency. Consensus 
was achieved among those who were deemed to matter, the rest would not be allowwwcd to wreck 
the fragile agreement struck. On the latter criticism, J. Kokott and A. Ruth seem to disagree. A 
formal vote would have unnecessarily induced some Member States representatives to agree only 
under reservations in order to keep options open for the IGC which would have ultimately 
weakened rather than strengthened the political authority of the proposal: J. Kokott and A. Ruth, 
'The European Convention and its Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: 
Appropriate Answers to the Lackcn Questions? ', (2003) 40 CMLR 1315-1345, pp. 1316-7. 
" B. dcWittc, `Rivision', (2005) 1 EuConst 136-140, p. 137. A. J. Mcncndcx, op. cit. n. 2, p. 119. 
Giscard claimed that about 90% of the original document was retained in the final version: 
P. Lundlow, The IGC and the European Council of June 2004, EuroCommcnt Briefing Note, No 
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been debated within the Convention, a fact which created some expectation that 
any given solution would be based on arguments and not on a mere compromise 
of interests. '' The version of the Treaty finally agreed to by the I leads of State 
and Government bore a close resemblance to the Convention's draft, yet many of 
the last-minute deals on institutional provisions, such as the composition of the 
institutions and the thresholds in the new system for QMV were brokered by the 
IGC. Also, it was interstate diplomacy rather than the more supranational and 
diverse Convention which removed the final blockages on agreement. " 
Proceeding on the basis that `nothing is agreed until everything is agreed', " the 
rotating Presidency of the Council had disproportionate influence on the 
structuring of the debate, the setting of the agenda and the establishment of 
agreements among different national representatives. 21 
Arguably, the Convention endorsement as a method of institutional reform may 
be traced in the TeCE where its use is institutionalised, albeit not as a mandatory 
part of constitutional change; the formal instrument of adopting treaty 
amendments is still the IGC. The fact that the Convention would be followed by 
a classic IGC confirms that the praxis of intergovern mental negotiation remains 
crucial. 22 Although it did not make a full transition from bargaining to 
deliberation, the Convention's deliberative potential should not be 
underestimated. The publicity of the debates could compel the governments to 
publicly justify their positions not just on grounds of national interest but on 
pragmatic reasoning. It developed its own dynamic to create a fusion of the old 
3.2,29.06.2004. P. Norman, The Accidental Constitution. The Ataking of Europe's Constitutional 
Treaty, Eurocommcnt, 2005, p. 283. V. G. d'Estaing stated that this would be an indication of 
success: V. G. d'Estaing, 'The convention and the future of Europe: Issues and goals', (2003) 1 Int 
I Constitutional Law 346-354, p. 347. 
1' A. J. Mcncndcz, op. cit. n. 2, p. 119. 
" J. Shaw, 'Europe's Constitutional Future'. (2005) P. L. 132-151, p. 140. D. Dinan, 'Governance 
and Institutions: A New Constitution and a New Commission', (2005) 43 JCMS 37-54, p. 48. 
20 CIG 70/04, Presidency Note, Report on the Intergovernmental Conference, 24.03.2004, para. 6. 21 A. J. Mcncndcz, op. cit. n. 2, p. 119. For instance, The Irish Presidency's early %%ecks wcrc 
dedicated to holding bilateral meetings with all Member States, identifying issues and building 
trust. The strategy was to hold a sutlicicnt number of meetings to resolve outstanding issues but 
limit the number of issues being discussed and progressively close off items. The IGC was 
formally convened on 17 June with a number of major open issues remaining for discussion 
including the size of the Commission, voting thresholds in the Council, the number of EP seats: 
N. Rccs, 'T1he Irish Presidency: A Diplomatic Triumph', (2005) 43 JCMS 55.58, p. 56. _= Article IV-443 TcCE. P. Magncttc, 'Deliberation or bargaining? Coping with constitutional 
conflicts in the Convention on the Future of Europe', in Developing a Constitution f or Europe, 
op. cit. n. 15, p. 212. 
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and the new. The convention method can improve democratic standards at the 
agenda setting stage of an IGC, because participation, unlike a classic IGC, is not 
limited to those privileged by a process that is masked under the veil of secrecy, 
Therefore, even if the Convention was designed as a consultative and not a 
constituent assembly, its symbolic significance to institutional reform is 
undeniable. 23The argument against institutionalisation is that it adds a new layer 
to the already complicated institutional framework and decision-making. 
7.3 Institutional balance and democratic legitimacy in the TcCE 
The purpose of the Convention was to stir institutional reform towards a more 
democratic and legitimate EU 'regime'. However, institutional reform was 
discussed and realised outside the convention method, as the issue was regarded 
too contentious to be dealt with other than in plenary! " The absence of a 
Working Group on institutions did not, however, lead to more detailed 
deliberations. Aller fifteen months of Convention time and less than a month 
before its conclusion deadline, crucial proposals about institutional issues had not 
really reached the floor of the Convention. This was unfortunate in view of the 
importance that Laeken had attached to this institutional innovation (the 
Convention) as a forum of treaty reform to accommodate the enlarged Europe's 
new political and legal real ity. 2S The shadow of the imminent IGC ensured a 
debate on institutional reforms that reflected the logic of intergovernmental 
bargaining. In the absence of sufficient deliberation on institutional issues, any 
discussions took place outside the Convention framework, via a parallel process 
of negotiation dominated by the Franco-German proposal on institutional reform 
(submitted in January 2003) and, by spring 2003, the President Valerie Giscard 
d'Estaing together with the Convention's secretariat had established a virtual 
" J. Kokott and A. Ruth, op. cit. n. 16, p. 1316. 
24 CONV 277/02, op. cit. nG. 
=s H. Rasmusscn, op. cit. n. 7, p. 145. 
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monopoly over the power of proposal. 26 Apart from the recognition of the 
European Council as an EU institution in Article I_19,27 the TcCE maintains the 
overall philosophy of attribution of powers with some enhancement to the 
competence of particular actors28 in a context of a new consolidated and more 
simplified institutional framework. The Commission retains its monopoly on 
legislative initiative, the EP and the Council will continue to act as colegislators 
while the jurisdiction of the ECJ remains unaffected. On the other hand, the 
TeCE provides a better delimitation of powers as it clearly spells out and in some 
detail the functions of the EU institutions and also defines the nature and effects 
of their acts29 
The European Council's personal, elected and mandated presidency, which 
replaces the current system of six-month rotating presidencies by a full-time 
President, is without a doubt one of the major innovations in the TcCE. 10 This 
was the result of the Anglo-Spanish and the Franco-German bilateral initiatives 
on institutional reform31 which broadly advocated for a greater continuity and 
efficiency in the workings of the Council Presidency. It also conveyed the need, 
perceived by its proponents, for someone to represent Europe in the eyes of the 
world, to give the EU a sharper identity and a much-needed leadership and 
accountability. 32 An important question is how a permanent President of the 
European Council would affect institutional balance. Although the new 
presidency would fundamentally alter the institutional balance among the EU 
institutions and between the EU institutions and the Member States, this was not 
_` CONV 489/03, Contribution submitted by Mr. Dominiquc dc Villcpin and Mr. Joschka 
Fischcr, mcmbcrs of the Convcntion, 16.01.2003. P. Norman, The Accidental Constitution, 
EuroCommcnt, 2003, pp. 319 and 322. 
_' An analysis of this institutional dcvclopmcnt was provided in section 3.3.1 of chapter 3. _$ For instance, like the EP, whose legislative, budgetary, control, and electoral functions have 
been extended (sec Art I-20 (1) TcCE). 
2' The institutions' substantive functions and their balance of powcr arc contained in Articles I. 
20,1-21,1-23, I-26 and 1-29 TcCE. Articles 1.33 to 1-35 offer a list of legal instruments, as wcll 
as a distinction between legislative and non-Icgislative acts. 
30 To be elected by the Heads of State and Government for a period of two-and-a-half years: 
Article 1-22 TcCE. J. W. Sap, 'The European President', (2005) 1 EuConst 47-51. 
 CONV 740/03, Report by the Select Committee on the EU of the House of Lords, presented by 
Lord Tomlinson and Lord McLennan: `The Future of Europe: Constitutional TrcatyDra(1 
Articles on the Institutions', 15.05.2003. CONV 591/03, Contribution by Mrs. A. Palacio and Mr. 
P. Hain, members of the Convention: 'The Union institutions', 28.02.2003. CONY 489A)3, op. cit. 
n. 26. 
'= As PM Tony Blair reportedly said: P. Norman, op. cit. m26, p. 139. 
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a point in the debates, mostly because no one could tell what the change would 
amount to. 3 This compromise led to two parallel institutional models: one 
predominantly intergovernmental -a European Council headed by a powcrful 
President - and one communaulairian based on the existing Community 
institutions. 
Article I-22(1) TeCE informs us that there is going to be a long term President of 
the European Council. It tells us nothing about the division of power between the 
President of the Commission and the President of the European Council. There is 
obviously a risk of incoherence between the two Presidents whose 
responsibilities fall within the scope of the executive branch and which could 
potentially overlap, specifically in terms of the Union's representation both 
internally and internationally leading to poor visibility and complexity. 34 But 
there is more to the relationship between the Presidencies of the Commission and 
the European Council than the `sharing' of executive power. There arc also 
elements of hierarchy in planning the overall priorities for legislation. Unlike the 
current system under which the European Council merely 'provides the Union 
with the necessary impetus for its development and defines the general political 
guidelines', the Draft Constitution emphasises the European Council's role in 
establishing EU priorities as well as the EU's general political direction. This is 
subject to the caveat that the European Council shall not exercise legislative 
functions. 3-5 As analysed in Chapter 3, despite the political, rather than legal, 
undertone of the European Council's constitutional role, the institution often 
emerges as the de facto higher level decision-maker in the EU. 
The provisions concerning the Council and its relationship with the European 
Council presidency are also vital for an understanding of the President's powers 
and influence. According to Article 1-24(7) TcCE, the Presidency of the Council 
formations, other than Foreign Affairs, shall be held by the Member States on the 
" J. W. Sap op. cit. n. 30. 1 CONV 746/03, Contribution by Dini, Duff, Lcquillcr, members of the Convcntion: 'For a 
singlc presidcncy, over timt, of the Europcan Council and the Commission', 16.05.2003. P. Craig, 
'European governance: Executive and administrative powers under the new constitutional 
settlement', (2005) 3 Int J Constitutional law 407439, pp. 420-22. 
's Article 4 TEU and Article 1-21 TcCE. P. Craig, ibid, p. 420. G. 13cnmann, 'Executive power in 
the new European constitution', (2005) 3 1nt J Constitutional Law 440-447, p. 443. 
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basis of equal rotation in accordance with the conditions established by a 
European decision of the European Council. Also, paragraph 2 of the Article 
provides that the Council shall prepare and ensure the follow-up to meetings of 
the European Council in liaison with the President of the European Council (and 
the Commission). Apparently, the Article creates a legal duty on the General 
Affairs Council (GAC) to ensure that the European Council's conclusions are 
followed up and a formal mechanism for the European Council to influence the 
priorities of the EU. Even though the formal right of legislative initiative remains 
with the Commission, the obligation on the GAC to ensure that the meetings of 
the European Council are followed up may require legislation on specific issues 
deliberated on by the European Council. " Furthermore, under Article 1-24(3), 
the European Council's strategic guidelines on foreign policy are to be fleshed 
out by the Foreign Affairs Council. In this context, the same concern about the 
place of the European Council President in the institutional balance arises with 
regard to the other Union figurehead, the Foreign Minister37 lt is almost 
impossible to find an institutionally balanced solution for the attribution to the 
President of the European Council of the function of the external permanent 
representative of the Union. 
The institutional innovation of the European Council President may be seen as an 
attempt to create a notion of centralised public authority. It is often expressed 
that the EU should `speak with a single voice' recognisable by its citizens. One 
should ask, however, whether a non-directly elected president would be an 
identifiable leader and a real representative of the Union and its constituent 
elements, particularly in some Member States where a president is a weak 
political figure. Somehow, this new feature of `presidcntialism' seems to offer a 
combination of leadership capacity and clear political responsibility, despite the 
fact that the President has been granted few formal powers and will, 
x P. Craig, op. cit. n. 34, pp. 416 and 421. 
37 CONV 746/03, op. cit. n. 34. A further task of the President will encompass heading and 
managing the external rcprcscntation of the Union for CFSP matters 'at his or her level and in 
that capacity ... without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs' (Article I-21(2) TcCE). This formulation hints at potential conflicts bct w'ccn these two 
offices. W. Wcsscls, 'The Constitutional Treaty-Three Readings from a Fusion Perspectivve', 
(2005) 43 JCMS 11-36, p. 21. 
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consequently, have to carve out a real role for him or herself in practice. Besides, 
it is not apparent how decisions by a top-tier structure will address democratic 
legitimacy concerns, if the locus of decision-making is to shift further away from 
the EU citizens. An objection frequently voiced is that the office lacks 
democratic accountability. 38 
One of the aims of the Lacken Declaration was to render EU decision-making 
clearer and simpler. This has not been achieved in relation to the allocation of 
executive power. No fewer than three institutions lay claim to the exercise of 
executive authority; namely, the Commission, the Council and the European 
Council. It could be argued that accountability within a regime of shared 
executive power devoid of a single line of executive accountability will be more 
complex. In the case of the Presidents of the European Council and the 
Commission, the confusion of responsibility as between the two is accentuated 
by the fact that their respective responsibilities are not clearly defined 39 But then 
again, the structure of the European Union has metier been based on strict 
separation of powers, as it has been on notions of institutional balance. The 
major institutions represent different interests, thus it would be acceptable, at 
least in principle, for the executive power to be shared between a body 
representing state interests and another representing the Community interest, 
each of which is legitimated in different ways. The institutional system that 
emerges out of the Constitutional Treaty is structured on the same principle. 
Although the post-Convention institutional framework is more democratic in 
terms of transparency, simplification and consolidation of the legislative process 
per se, greater role for the EP and NPs, more visible competence system, etc, one 
should not evade the fact there has not been core institutional reform. The 
problem with the Convention was the lack of a single - or if any at all - 
constitutional theory of power to stir the intended reorganisation of compctcnces. 
Actually, there was no clear idea of what type of political regime the Union 
sa lI Wallacc, `Designing Institutions for an Enlarging European Union', in Ten Reflections on 
the EU Constitutional Treaty for Europe, B. dcWittc (cd. ), 2003, p. 97, CONY 703! 03, Study by 
the EUI presented by Vice-President Amato, 02.04.2003. CONY 486/03, Contribution from Ms. 
Elena Paciotti, alternate member: 'About the presidency of the European Union and its 
institutions', 15.01.2003. CONV 748/03, Summary Report of the Plenary Session, 15-6.05.2003. 
39 P. Craig, op. cit. n. 34. G. Bcrmann op. cit. n. 35. 
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should strive after. To J. Kokott and A. Ruth, more emphasis was placed on the 
nature of decision-making (simplification and transparency), because of the 
particular intricacy of the institutional debate which could be linked in part at 
least to the overarching question of the finality of European integration and the 
dispute dating back to the Fouchet plan as to which ideological conception the 
institutional design should follow. "" Eventually, the path followed was that of 
piecemeal intergovernmental bargaining with all the formerly acceptable 
conceptions about the political characterisation of the Union, citizen 
representation and the appropriate division of powers, with no reflection on the 
overall system and the long-term effect these revisions and additions might have 
on the balance of powers within the Union. 41 
Although institutional balance is a guiding principle of the EU, it depends on 
what is politically acceptable by the Member States in every revision process. 
Firm agreement on a clear design for the institutions of the EU may appear 
attractive, yet it is not a realistic prospect for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
Member States do not share a single political model, but different variants of 
liberal democracy: some unitary, some federal, some with active 
parliamentarism. Secondly, many institutional developments have emerged by a 
quite different route, through evolution and practice which is a more organic 
process (case law, interinstitutional agreements, etc). 42 Besides, Parliaments and 
people in the candidate countries were either in the process of or had recently 
been called upon to state their position on the current institutional provisions 
with a view to accession. In this climate, far-reaching changes to institutional 
structures would seem inappropriate in the eyes of public opinion in these 
countries. 43 Therefore, many Convention members generally or specifically 
expressed their attachment to the current Treaty provisions, as they emerged 
from the Treaty of Nice. And to that extent, the new document is no different. In 
J. Kokott and A. Ruth, op. cit. n. 16, pp. 1330-1. 
M. P. Maduro, `flow Constitutional Can the European Union ßc7 The Tcnsion ßct wwccn 
lntcrgovcrnamcntalism and Constitutionalism in the European Union', in Weiler and Eisgnibcr, 
(cds), Altnculand: The EU Constitution in a Contextual Pcrspcctivc. JMWP 5/04, 
ilittp: //i""v jcanmonnciprogram. org/papcrs/04l04OS01-03. ltmll. J. P. Jacquc, I'llic Principle or 
Institutional Balance', (2004) 41 CMLR 383-39 1, p. 387. 
41 II. Wallacc, op. cit. n. 38. 
" CONV 748/03, op. cit. n. 38. 
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the current revision, the aim of providing stronger political leadership clashed 
with the goal of maintaining the established institutional balance as it empowered 
the Union's executive. The consequence was, in Miguel Polares Maduro's 
words, `an aggravation of the tension between majoritarianism and 
intcrgovernmentalism in the European Union'. The TcCE reinforces certain 
majoritarian elements of the institutional system by addressing the issue of 
representation in the EP and Council, while intergovernmentalism reinforces the 
authority of the Council and the European Council through a variety of means, 
most notably, the president of the European Council. " Possibly, the ambitious 
Lacken mandate created higher expectations this time round to the extent that 
one might have ignored the real intention of the Convention, expressed by its 
President. 4s That is, to make decision-making simpler, while maintaining the 
institutional balance. 
7.3.1 The democratic underpinnings of the Union's institutional system 
Despite the limited institutional reform, the TeCE has enhanced the democratic 
aspect of the Union's value system on which its institutional framework and 
decision-making process are based. For the first time, it is clearly stated in a 
constitutional text that the EU is a democracy or at least aspires to become one 
(Article 1-2 TeCE). This means that the standard of democracy, however defined, 
is accepted as a yardstick for the assessment of the workings of the EU. Unlike 
the reference in the Nice Treaty to democracy as one of the overarching 
principles of the Union, 46 there is a separate title on 'the democratic life' of the 
EU in the TeCE, qualified by the concepts of equality, representation, 
" M. P. Maduro, op. cit. n. 41. W. Wcsscls,, op. cit. n_37, p. 19. 
's Spccch by Valcry Giscard D'Estaing, 'Mc licnry Kissinger Lccturc', Library of Congress - 
Washington, 11th Fcbruary 2003. 
" Preamble and Article 6 TEU. The principle was inserted in the Treaty of Maastricht primarily 
as a political signal to candidate countries. 
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participation. 47 The Union emerges as a democratic regime rooted in the will of 
the citizens (and States) of Europe to build a common future. " Also, the TcCC 
text promotes various democratic principles to the rank of 'core constitutional 
principles' of the Union, like the equality of citizens. f' Although it is difficult to 
apply such a simplistic equality principle to the EU, a polity of both states and 
peoples, and in relation to the European institutions, '50 the TeCE mandates the 
legislature to respect the Union's substantive values; the EU shall have an 
institutional framework which will aim to promote its values, advance its 
objectives, and serve its interests and those of the citizens and the Member States 
(Title IV, Article 1-19). 
Every citizen has the right to take part in the democratic life of the Union in 
order to follow, assess and contribute to the decision-making process of the EU. s' 
In addition to the potential of the greater indirect involvement due to the 
enhanced role of representative institutions, like NPs, the Constitutional Treaty 
also promotes avenues of direct citizen participation. Hence, under Article 1- 
47(1) TeCE, the EU institutions shall give citizens the opportunity to partake 
with their views in all areas of EU action. Further, European citizens are granted 
the right to invite the Commission to submit a legislative proposal when they 
consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing 
the Constitution. S2 This citizen initiative may be taken if at least one million 
citizens from a `significant number' of Member States - to be determined by 
European laws - put forward such a proposal and is designed to allow the citizens 
"Title VI, Articles 145,146 and 1-47 TcCE respcctivcly. 
"Article I-1 TcCE. 
" Articles I-2 and I-45 TcCE This Article is an important manifestation of the Pracsidium's 
general philosophy with regard to the institutional design of the Union. During the Convention 
discussions on institutional issues, the President cited tluccc guiding principles on %%hich all 
proposals would be based. The equality of citizens was one and remained uncontested in the 
plenary: CONV 696/03, Summary Report of the Plcn. -uy Session, 24 and 25 April 2003, 
30.04.2003. 
10 For instance, the provisions on citizen representation in the EP, as examined in Chapter 4. The 
representation system, as envisaged in the Article 190(1) EC, aims to 'ensure appropriate 
representation of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community'. Despite the 
explicit reference to 'appropriate representation' of the peoples, the current system of scat 
distribution gives disproportionate representation in favour of the smaller Member States. Article 
1-20 TcCE maintains this standard of representation and appears at odds with Article 1-44 uhich 
proclaims that 'in all its activities the Union shall observe te principle of democratic equality of 
its citizens'. 
Article 1-46(3) TcCE. 
ý3 Article 1-47(4) TcCE. 
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to take an active role within the law-making process of the EU. Ilowever, it 
should be read in context with other provisions of the TeCE. This right is only of 
an indirect nature, not mentioned among the citizens' rights (right to vote and to 
stand as a candidate at elections to the EP and at municipal elections, right to 
good administration) or in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Articles 11-39 
to I1-46). Also, this new body of one million citizens is not formally an 
institution part of the Union's institutional framework, summarised in Articles I- 
18 to 1-31. Most notably, it does not in any way compromise the Commission's 
exclusive power to initiate legislation found in Article 1-25(2). The impact and 
importance of the citizen initiative will entirely depend on the Commission's 
attitude, once it is confronted with the procedures and conditions defined by the 
implementing laws3and, of course, the will of the people to use the new device. 
Participatory democracy is mostly framed in the TeCE as civil society 
involvement, rather than direct citizen participation. According to Article 1-48, 
the Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at its level, 
taking into account the diversity of national systems. The duty on the part of the 
EU institutions to provide opportunities for citizens to partake with their views in 
all areas of EU action applies also to representative associations, but it is only 
with representative associations and civil society that the duty extends to the 
establishment of channels of dialogue. m Civil society participation does not 
necessarily equal (direct) citizen participation. Charles Taylor rightly argues that 
civil society exists where a society as a whole can structure itself and coordinate 
its actions through free associations that are autonomous from policy makers. 
These free associations unite citizens in matters of common concern and by their 
mere existence or action can affect public policy. Sometimes, however, what 
occurs is an interweaving of society and government to the point where 
distinction no longer expresses the important difference in the basis of power or 
the dynamics of decision-making. -" In the EU context, issues asocial policy, for 
instance, debated between management and labour unions in tripartite 
g A. Aucr, 'European Citizens' Initiative', (2005) 1 EuConst 79-86, pp. 80 and 83.5. s' Article I47(1), (2) TcCE. 
ss lie speaks about corporatism, when autonomous associations havc become integrated into the 
state: C. Taylor, `Invoking civil society', in Contemporary Political 1'hilosophy6vfn Anthology. 
RE. Goodin and P. Pcttit (cds), Blackwell Publishers, 1997, pp. 66.8. 
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negotiations with the Commission often take the form of corporatist negotiations. 
Then, questions about their democratic and representative underpinnings may 
emerge. 56 
The shifting of focus of treaty reform negotiations away from the traditional 
intergovernmental bargaining and towards a forum like the Convention, which 
encouraged the involvement of various actors, including non-elected, set the 
ground for institutional reform that would involve other models of democracy, 
apart from representative, a trend that had already been initiated by the EU 
governance debate. Hence, ideas of `participation' invigorated the traditional 
conceptions of representative democracy. Some traces of the EU governance 
debate have emerged in the final text of the Constitutional Treaty, for instance, 
the recognition and promotion of social dialogue, 37 the Commission's efficicncy- 
driven consultation practices. 58 Despite the explicit constitutional language, the 
TeCE marks a return to `business as usual', namely a focus on the core EU 
institutions and territorial representation, on the one hand, and a rights-based 
perspective, on the other. The debate on institutional reform was once again 
about government and not about governance, so there was less focus on civil 
society actors and more on representative institutions. " This hardly comes as a 
surprise, since the Convention members had predominantly a national or 
European electoral mandate; hence, `representative democracy' provided the 
normative framework for institutional reform and the dominant model of 
democracy for the Union's institutional system, as envisaged in the TeCE. For 
the first time, there is a clear constitutional statement that the representative 
nature of the EU is based on both the roles of the EP and the Council, although 
that has always been the traditional reading of the Treaty. " 
"As, for instance, in Case T 135/96 UE-APdfE v Council[ 19981 ECRI I. 2335. 
s' Articlc 148 TcCE: 'Tic Union rccogniscs and promotes an autonomous social dialoguc. It 
shall facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy. The Tripartite 
Social Summit for Growth and Employment shall contribute to social dialogue. Article 1-50 also 
in the context of transparency of the proceedings of Union institutions, bodies. offices and 
agencies, in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the 
Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible. 
Article I-47(1), (2) and (3) TcCE. 
S. Smismans, Law, Legitimacy and European Governance-Functional Participation In Social 
Regulation. OUP, 2004, p. 30. 
i0 Articles I-45(1) and 1-46 TcCE. 
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The use of QMV as the prevailing, formal method of decision-making tends to 
accentuate the representative character of the Union. The reference in the TcCC[ 
to consultation practices (with civil society actors) reflects aspects of the EU's 
institutional reality, but does not compromise its representative character. The 
institutional innovation of the citizen's initiative softens the otherwise strictly 
representative character of European democracy, but it has a territorial clement 
associated with representative democracy; the signers must `come from a 
significant number of Member States'. It is more the case that the 
`representative' model is reconceptualised to take into account particular features 
of the EU decision-making. 61 This tendency towards representative democracy is 
hardly unanticipated. All Member States have in common a system of 
representative democracy where representative institutions, like parliaments, arc 
regarded as pillars of democracy. Their common political culture is replicated in 
treaty revisions by institutional choices, like the ever-wider application of 
codecision, an enhanced legislative, supervisory and budgetary role for the EP, 
more involvement of NPs in decision-making. It would be unrealistic to expect 
the `masters of the treaties' (the Member States) to opt for a model of democracy 
for the Union that is not akin to their common political tradition. What is more, a 
different democratic `regime' could be potentially undesirable by the European 
public. The EU is a polity creating process in which authority and decision- 
making is shared across multiple levels of government. Governing institutions in 
the Member States are limited in how they can shape the standards by which they 
are judged. There would be little pragmatism in adapting democratic ideas to the 
EU content, if these were seriously at odds with the way in which national 
polities actually operate and the way people have accepted that their systems 
operate 62 These considerations arc significant, when one comes to think about 
the nature of the democratic regime which does and should operate in the EU. 
61 Articlc I47(4) TcCE: Citizens, no fcwcr than one million, may invitc the Commission to takc a 
legislative initiative on a particular issue. A. Aucr, op. cit. n. 53, p. 80. S. Smismans, op. cit. n. 59, 
31. ý= 
Ch. Lord and D. Bcctham, 'Legitimizing the EU: Is there a 'Post-parliamentary Basis' for its 
Legitimation? ', (2001) 39 JCMS 443-462, pp. 443-5. P. Craig. 'The Nature of Community: 
Integration, Democracy and Legitimacy', in The Evolution of EU Law, P. Craig and O. dc I3urca 
(cds), OUP, 1999, pp. 16 and 22. 
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7.4 Is the ratification crisis a challenge to the democratic le ºitiý, imac oftlie 
Union's regime? 
At Laeken, the EU leaders agreed on the need to improve and monitor the 
democratic legitimacy of the Union and its institutions to bring them closer to the 
citizens of the Member States '3 The Convention stirred an overarching 
institutional debate in order to achieve this aim. It was also in itself a soil 
institutional revolution; in comparison with past rounds of treaty revision, it 
opened up the process beyond national governments to include a wide range of 
representative institutions, civil society actors, even the public. All these 
different sources arguably brought in ideas about the type of regime that would 
result from the institutional reform. The Constitutional Treaty, the product of a 
more open process of reform, measures up to the objective of a more 
democratically legitimate EU regime, in a number of ways. It incorporates the 
EU Charter on Fundamental Rights and clear constitutional principles underlying 
the Union's institutional system and policies; it opens up the legislative Council 
to public scrutiny when legislating; it delivers a clearer allocation of 
competences, while the merging of legal personalities strengthens the idea of a 
single institutional framework. The potential of citizens having more influence at 
the European level is realised, filter alia, through the enhanced role of the EP and 
the political approach to the policing of subsidiarity to involve NPs in EU affairs, 
while participatory democracy is introduced giving citizens and their associations 
a right to be heard not only by the Commission, but by all the EU institutions 
across a range of policies. This is an attractive package in normative terms. " Yet, 
the ratification process indicated that its delivery to the public has proven 
politically problematic. 
So far, the TeCE was put to public approval in four national referenda and was 
rejected by the French and the Dutch people. " The reasons behind the negative 
results are diffuse and may have had little to do with the actual content of the 
63 SN 300/1/01 REV 1, op. cit. n. 1. 
N P. Norman, op. cit. n. 17, pp. 315-9. P. Craig, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the EU'. 
(2001) 7 ELJ 125-150, pp. 139-140. 




Treaty. It is difficult to claim that the French, for instance, devoted themselves to 
a pure exercise of exegeses of the 448 articles of the Constitutional Treaty and 
then decided to vote against it. " Post-referenda surveys have identified the 
motives behind the `no' votes as diverse, dominated by public concerns over 
domestic rather than European issues, guided by the peoples' view of their 
countries' economic and social situation who saw an opportunity to punish 
unpopular national politicians, as was the case of France, or to protest their 
disconnection with the politicians who advocated for the Constitutional Treaty, 
as was the case in the Netherlands. 67 Similar concerns were responsible for the 
minority `no' vote in the Luxembourg referendum 
" This interpretation is 
reinforced by the existence of a homogeneous profile of the `no' voters in Spain, 
France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg which is characterised by the 
sociologically poorer and less educated citizens, concerned with domestic 
" unemployment and the poor economic situation. 
Most notably, what the post-referenda surveys convey is the failure of both the 
European and domestic political classes to explain, engage, communicate and 
debate effectively. The level of information on the Constitutional Treaty played 
an important role in the mobilisation of voters; in general, non-voters claimed 
" `Tlie dead end', Lellionde, 30.05.2005. L. Milcs, `Editorial: A Fusing Europe in a Confusing 
World? ', (2005) 43 JCMS 1-9, p. 5. Even the concept of the Constitution itsclf has not been 
rejected. According to three quarters of the French respondents, the European Constitution is 
indispensable in order to pursue European construction (75%). This proposal is supported by 
90% of the `yes' voters, but also by 66% of the `no' voters. A majority of the French respondents, 
interviewed on the day after the referendum, consider that the European institutions have a good 
image (53%): Flash Eurobarometer 171, European Constitution Post-Referendum survey in 
France, June 2005. 
" Thus, the French `no' voters mentioned mainly the potentially negative effects of the 
Constitution on employment (31%), France's poor economic situation (26%), the perception of 
the Constitution as being too liberal from an economic point of view (19%), but also their 
opposition to the President of the Republic (18%). It is noteworthy that the rejection of Turkey's 
membership of the EU was mentioned spontaneously by only 6% of people tiles voted 'no': 
Flash Eurobarometer 171, ibid. `France's No is not all bad', The 17nanclal Times, 30.05.2003. 
L. Miles, ibid. P. Norman, op. cit. n. 17, pp. 309-10. Opposition to the national government or 
certain political parties and the economic situation in the Netherlands were given as reasons for 
the `no' vote: Flash Eurobarometer 172, European Constitution Post-Referendum survey in the 
Netherlands, June 2005. 
" 11c reasons for the `No' were essentially based on national issues, one being the employment 
situation, and relegated European issues into second place: Flash Eurobarometer 173, European 
Constitution Post-Referendum survey in Luxembourg, July 2005. 
" Supporters of the Constitution, on the other hand, were to be found mainly among the highly 
educated, urban elite. Flash Eurobarometer 171, op. cit. n. 60. Flash Eurobarometer 173, ibid. 
Flash Eurobarometer 168, European Constitution Post-Referendum sunny in . fain, March 2(X)5. 
Flash Eurobarometer 172, op. cit. n. 67. 
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that lack of information was the reason why they abstained. 70 The trench 
referendum result was partly founded on the popular belief that the TcCC 
contained few social values and signified a move towards a liberal Anglo-Saxon 
economic view. Apparently, French politicians failed to convey to the nation the 
message that the Constitutional Treaty is, if anything, more social than Nice" 
and that there is little modification to the overall direction of the EU due to the 
lack of consensus as to its likely direction. Also, any changes to the treaty text on 
the whole favour social Europe - from the inclusion of the EU Charter, to the 
involvement of the civil society and the provisions on the citizens' initiative. In 
the Netherlands, the fact that the main political parties advocated for the 
Constitutional Treaty and the people voted against it constitutes further evidence 
of the disengagement between the political class and the public. 72 
The Convention was meant to remedy some of the democratic failings of the 
Union's institutional system, including transparency, comprehensibility and 
accountability. The process of constitutional drafting was accessible, drafts were 
made available to the public and one of the main objectives attained by the 
process was to simplify and consolidate the text of the Treaty. But the argument 
that previously inaccessible treaty revision procedures have moved in the right 
direction did not prove politically persuasive, especially in the cases of France 
and the Netherlands, if these remained relatively elitist and partly communicated. 
One of the failings of the Convention was that institutional issues were debated 
in the margins of the process, arguably deliberately so by the Pracsidium to keep 
as much control of the process on key issues as possible. 73 And then the text 
agreed to by the Thessaloniki European Council71 was rushed to the IGC, instead 
of engaging the public first through debate. Consequently, no matter how open a 
70 Flash Eurobarometer 171, op. cit. n. 66. Flash Eurobarometer 172, op. cit. n. 67. Flash 
Eurobarometer 168, op. cit. 1169. 71 Even where those voting took care to read the text of the proposed Constitution, they 
frequently took objection to certain provisions of part 111, not realising that these reflected 
provisions of the TEC which have been in foroc for decades. G. dctlurca, 'Aller the Referenda', 
(2006) 12 ELJ 6-8, p. 6. The Guardian, 15 April 2005. P. Norman, op. cit. n. 17, chapter 19. 
L. Milcs, op. cit. n. 6. Ch. Jocrgcs, `On the Disregard for Ilistory in the Convention Process', (2006) 
12 EU 2-5, p. 3. 
72 Flash Eurobarometer 172, op. cit. n. 67. A. Samuclscn (ed). One Union Alany Polces -- The EU 
meets the people, Andcrs Samuclsen, 2005, pp. 20 and 26. 
" Gisela Stuart, op. cit. n. 16. 
74 CONV 820/03, Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 797/1/02 REV 1,27 Jure 
2003. 
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process it was, the Convention failed to generate public awareness and interest. " 
And despite its revolutionary nature, the Convention did not manage to bridge 
the gap between the elites, who negotiated and agreed on the constitutional text, 
and the European public. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the negative referenda results were a genuine 
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, let alone of the institutional system 
envisaged therein. Eurobarometer surveys show there is little knowledge of the 
content of the TeCE among citizens. They also show that a significant proportion 
of the opposition to the Constitutional Treaty is founded either on ignorance or, 
even more seriously, on an erroneous interpretation of it. Some European citizens 
thus prefer to oppose the Treaty as a precaution, not knowing its contents; others 
are opposed to it because they misunderstand its contents. 76 The French and 
Dutch electorates registered their protest against the vision of Europe they 
thought they saw incorporated in the Constitutional Treaty, but they also 
manifested a collapse of trust towards their national elites to explain, 
communicate and debate effectively on the Constitutional Treaty. 
However, the negative referenda results were at least partly due to the systematic 
failing of the Union's institutional system which lacks the political leadership to 
engage the public and create awareness on EU affairs, to create a political space 
of deliberation on EU policies and the design of the Union, to bring citizens 
closer to the Union institutions and decision-making. In Spain, despite the 
positive referendum result, a comparative analysis of voter turnout in EP 
elections and in the referendum indicates the existence of a structural abstention 
when it comes to European affairs: 70% of those who did not take part in the 
referendum did not vote in the 2004 EP elections. In that sense, it seems that 
Europe remains a political and institutional entity from which many electors feel 
's European citizens did not seem to have been moved by the apparent constitutional cnthusiasm 
of their elites. Results of this survey show that the Convention on the future of Europe remains 
unheard of for a majority of Europeans, both in the current European Union (55%) and among the 
10 adherent countries (57%): Flash Eurobarometer 142, Convention on the Future of Europe. 
23.06.2003. 
" Flash Eurobarometer 159, The Future European Constitution, February 2004. Flash 
Eurobarometer 159.2, The Future European Constitution, July 2004. Special Eurobarometer 214, 
The Future Constitutional Treaty, January 2005. 
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distant. The Spanish experience shows that in order to mobilise citizens there is a 
need for sustainable effort in informing and encouraging debate on EU issues. 
" 
Hence, rendering the Union's institutional system as well as the process or 
reviewing that system structurally more transparent, accessible, accountable and 
overall more democratic is not in itself sufficient to bring the Union closer to the 
citizens. 
The TeCE failed to remedy this situation. The EU regime envisaged by the 
Constitutional Treaty is in most respects very similar to the one that exists under 
the current treaties. The TeCE institutional reforms did not create `strategic 
leadership', at least in the sense that would make any difference in terns of 
democracy. The institutional innovation of the European Council President may 
be seen as an attempt to create a notion of centralised public authority, an 
identifiable leader, but it is unlikely that he or she will be so recognised by the 
citizens, as the role of President of the European Council overlaps with the office 
of the Commission President and the post of the EU Foreign Minister. Despite 
the fact that one of the initial aims of the Convention was to provide the EU with 
a clear political leadership, the institutional debate was defined by the objective 
of maintaining the institutional balance as envisaged in the current treaties. 
National referenda are not necessarily appropriate or particularly democratic 
participation devices to enlist the people's consent over the transformation of the 
Union's institutional structure. They are not necessarily appropriate because they 
constitute decisions made on short-term, national considerations, rather than 
considered opinions on long-term European issues. They are subject to a variety 
of extraneous factors, including attitudes towards national governments. 
Consequently, referenda targeted at European questions do not provide the kind 
of validation required for the conduct of European affairs, because it is not easy 
to disentangle the European question from strictly national issues that affect the 
result. National referenda are not even indicative of the will of the wider 
European public. Only a small minority of the Member States which have 
already ratified the Constitutional Treaty used the referendum device and almost 
77 Flash Eurobaromctcr 168, op. cit. n69. 
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all of them (with the exception of France) resorted to advisory ones. In the 
Spanish case, the lack of uncertainty regarding the actual impact of the advisory 
referendum result figured among other factors of abstention. So, the Spanish 
positive referendum result must be balanced with the fact that more than half of 
those eligible to vote did not take part in this consultation. " 
But most importantly, national referenda are not particularly democratic, for how 
may one justify that that the vote of a few thousand citizens in a single Member 
State could block over 450 million European citizens and the rest of the 
governments from adopting a constitution? 79 What about the opinions the 
ratifying Member States have already expressed. The Spanish Foreign Minister 
(Miguel Angel Moratinos) has rejected calls to change the text of the TeCE 
arguing that it is not possible to explain to the Spanish people that the text that 
they have already approved is not a valid one. 80 And they arc even less 
democratic, if they have to be repeated. Asking the French and Dutch to think 
twice is problematic because the reasons for voting `no' varied not only between 
the French and the Dutch voters, but also between different socio-demographic 
groups within those countries. It is, therefore, hard to imagine what changes 
could be introduced to the TeCE that would help to change their minds. An 
alternative approach, that would engage all European citizens, would be to hold a 
pan-European referendum. Such a referendum could stimulate EU-wide 
campaigns that would allow the same message to be conveyed to everyone, 
rather than filtered via national constitutional terms dictating the language of 
referenda, which may often be unclear or difficult. If the citizens of the Member 
States perceive their interests as being directly affected by EU decisions, they 
might finally begin to recognise the importance of participating in EU-level 
democracy, direct or indirect 81 
"Flash Eurobaromctcr 168, op. cit. n. 69. 
"A. Aucr, `Adoption, Ratification and Entry Into Force, (2005) 1 EuConst 131-135, p. 133. 
`0 `Spain against changes in Constitution text', EU Observer, 16.01.2006. 
t1 Participants in a pan-European referendum would be voting for or against the same 
treaty/outcome as everyone else. A very strong majority (85%) of European citiicns believe it 
would at the very least be useful to vote by referendum on the adoption of a new European 
constitution. A little less than half of these respondents even believe this would be a requirement: 
Flash Eurobaromctcr152, Intergovernmental Conference, December 2003. 
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In the aftermath of the `no' votes in France and the Netherlands, the European 
Council decided, in June 2005, on a `period of reflection' and then gave guidance 
to the Member Sates on the type of debate that could be organised. Namely, the 
period of reflection will be used to enable a broad debate to take place in each of 
our countries, involving citizens, civil society, social partners, national 
parliaments and political parties. 82 However, it failed to give a clear focus to the 
period of reflection and to demonstrate the will or capacity to stimulate and 
manage a European dialogue. As a result any communication initiatives at EU 
level are characterised by lack of leadership83 and they appear more as an attempt 
of individual institutions, and the Commission in particular, to sanction and 
enhance their institutional role in this whole constitutional debate. If the 
Convention is to mark the start for a new relationship between the Union and its 
citizens, the Union and its institutions must rise to the challenge and explain and 
justify what they are about. If the EU politicians cannot figure out how to be part 
of an accessible political debate on EU issues, no matter what the outcome of 
national referenda, one point is clear, in the absence of conditions of 
connectedness between European citizens and this extra level of decision making 
(EU level) the future will always be volatile for the Constitutional Treaty and the 
type of regime constituted in this document. 
n Declaration by the Heads of State or Govcnuncnt of the Member States of the European Union 
on the Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, European Council. 16 
and 17 June 2005, SN 117/05,18 June 2005. 
" On the other hand, the Commission has launched its 'Plan D' for dialogue, debate and 
democracy in Europe, but it has explicitly stated that such debate is not a 'rescue operation for 
the Constitution', but it is rather intended to stimulate a eider debate between the European 
Union's democratic institutions and citizens. It has to be seen as complementary to the already 
existing or proposed initiatives and programmes, such as those in the Ccid of education, youth. 
culture and promoting active European citizenship. Plan-D dovetails with the Action Plan on 
communicating Europe which seeks to improve the way that the Commission presents its 
activities to the outside world and the White Paper on communication strategy and democracy 
which will start a consultation process on the principles behind communication policy in the 
European Union and the areas of co-operation with the other European institutions and bodies. 
Together with Plan-D these initiatives set out a long-term plan to reinvigorate European 
democracy and help the emergence of a European public sphere, s; hcrc citizens arc given the 
information and the tools to actively participate in the decision making process and gain 
ownership of the European project. COM(2005) 494, Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions - The Commission's contribution to the period of reflection and 
beyond: Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate, 13.10.2005. SEC(2005)985, Action Plan 
to improve communicating Europe by the Commission, 20.07.2005. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the institutional environment of the Constitutional 
Convention which accommodated the latest constitutional revision process. The 
Convention was relatively open and broadly based with government 
representatives outnumbered by national and European parliamentarians. This 
created a direct link with the EU citizens along with the free flow of information. 
There was also relatively broad consultation of other EU bodies and groups from 
within civil society. The pluralism of the process was further enriched by the 
participation of both representatives of national governments as well as 
opposition parties. The reason why the Convention was revolutionary lies in the 
very nature of the European Union, inasmuch as it exists to serve both citizens 
and the Member States. At least in theory, it was the appropriate institutional 
environment to foment a profound debate on institutional reform. 
The Convention was a culmination of over a decade long concern with the 
Union's democratic legitimacy. Its instrumentality is evident in the fact that it 
presented to the IGC institutional `solutions' in the form of a Constitutional 
Treaty and not just `options' for institutional reform. The TcCE streamlines the 
EU institutions, simplifies the decision-making and, overall, it provides the 
Union's institutional structure with more stable democratic underpinnings. 
Hence, the institutional system envisaged in the TeCE is in many respects more 
democratically legitimate, than the one that exists under the current treaties. On 
the other hand, the Convention made a crucial error in failing to set up a working 
group on institutions. There was no adequate deliberation on institutional issues 
and the Franco-German proposal, created through a parallel process of 
negotiation that took place outside the Convention, became almost the only 
product on the table. This had two implications. Firstly, the Convention failed to 
generate public awareness and interest and, thus, bring the EU closer to its 
citizens. Secondly, there has not been core institutional reform, a regime change, 
a reorganisation of the balance of power that would provide the Union with clear 
political leadership. 
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Eventually, the Constitutional Treaty was put through a process of ratification 
and was defeated in two referenda. One should not overplay the impact of these 
two negative results; many Member States have ratified the TcCE before and 
since these events. They hardly indicate an unequivocal challenge to the 
democratic legitimacy of the Union's institutional system. It was more of a 
failure of national politicians to carry their populations with them. Having said 
that, the ratification bottleneck, created by the `no' votes, precipitates a political 
crisis within the EU that needs to be addressed. The negative referenda may not 
necessarily indicate a rejection of the Convention process itself or the content of 
the Constitutional Treaty, with particular reference to the regime envisaged 
therein, but they still raise fundamental questions about the ultimate role of the 
Union's institutional system and processes in facilitating the participation and 
representation of the public. It is not enough that these are structurally 
democratically legitimate. Despite the real process towards democratisation, the 
Union's institutional reality is that its system and processes lack political 
leadership with clear political accountability, identifiable by the people, who will 
give life to a European democratic space where EU issues can be debated and 
where people can express their will. In the Commission's own words, '" a place 
`where citizens are given the information and the tools to actively participate in 
the decision-making process and gain ownership of the European project'. 




Since Maastricht, the European Union has evolved into a `regime' of multilevel 
governance with a deepened and widened policy remit which oven preempts 
national competence. The `Europeanisation' of decision-making means that the 
locus of political control has shifted and the borders of the democratic (Member) 
State no longer embrace the whole spectrum of individual activity. As a result, 
the EU legislative process creates a system of legal acts adopted usually by 
qualified majority voting by institutions that are distant from the citizens of the 
Member States, but which still directly affect their lives. Inevitably, the 
redefinition of political boundaries created public anxieties about the legitimate 
and democratic underpinnings of the Union's decision-making process. 
The thesis sets out to explore the democratic legitimacy of the EU institutional 
system with reference to the two overriding principles found in the national 
political orders, that is, the `rule of law' and democracy and by focusing on 
government structures and their interrelationship. In this context, the relationship 
between the issue of institutional balance and democratic legitimacy is relevant 
to the issue of how the EU institutions interact in the decision-making process. In 
the absence of clear separation of powers in the EU treaties, the principle of 
institutional balance has acted as a substitute with the aim to provide a system of 
checks and balances that ensures that the system of governance and the exercise 
of power, therein, respect the `rule of law' and democracy or, in other words, are 
both legally and publicly controlled, thus preserving the democratic legitimacy of 
a legal order. Namely, whether the way legislative power is allocated and 
exercised is confined within constitutional limits, based on a set of fixed and 
identifiable rules and principles and judicial remedies arc available to ensure 
respect for such rules and principles. Also, whether the way legislative power is 
attributed and exercised allows for the participation of people in the legislative 
process. 
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Institutional balance, a democratic principle per se, has several manifestations in 
the system of the EU. As a legal principle, it was developed by the Court of 
Justice, on the one hand, to inhibit the EU from exceeding its lawful competence 
and, on the other hand, to inhibit the EU institutions from encroaching on each 
other's prerogatives. In the Court's case law, institutional balance is an 
expression of the `rule of law' principle, which requires the exercise of power to 
reach a stage of equilibrium among the institutions, so as to avoid concentration 
of unlimited power in a single authority. Broadly, the phrase is intended to 
convey the impression that there is a reassuring symmetry among the respective 
powers and roles of the main institutions (the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission). As a political principle, it reflects the institutional reality 
of the EU in that each institution represents a different constituency, as well as its 
special nature as a union of states and people (e. g. the Council represents the 
Member States and the EP represents the people). 
In assessing the democratic legitimacy of the EU, emphasis was placed both on 
individual institutions and the overall decision-making process. Undoubtedly, the 
EU is founded on the `rule of law'. It is not merely a creation of law validly 
constituted by sovereign states according to international treaties, but also its 
institutional system, its objectives and policies are governed by law and the law 
is the means of enforcing its authority; its weapon is the law it creates. Although 
in its inception the Union was not intended to be a democratic entity, democracy 
has become one of the overarching principles of the polity and it is a value at the 
very essence of its regime. Yet, the legitimate and democratic underpinnings of 
the system have not been devoid of criticism. For instance, there are aspects of 
the institutional system that are not always reflected in formal constitutional 
arrangements which are said to challenge its normative foundations. Also, the 
bypassing of democratic channels when decisions take place outside the formal 
institutional framework is exacerbated by the dominance of executive institutions 
in the sphere of decision-making to the exclusion of more regular channels of 
democratic decision-making, such as the European Parliament and national 
parliaments. This diminishes the meaningful and equal opportunity of individuals 
to influence policy outcomes within their national orders, because of the distance 
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between the place where decisions are taken and the place where decisions affect 
them. 
Hence, the thesis explored whether satisfactory constitutional control is not 
necessarily synonymous with inclusion within the treaty framework and whether 
there are other procedural guarantees in the system to ensure that there are limits 
to the allocation and exercise of legislative power. In addition, it sought to audit 
the quality of the European democracy, to establish how the Union performs 
against the defining features of democratic rule, that is, public control and 
political equality, but also key principles by which the democratic rule is 
realised, like accountability, openness, representation and responsiveness, 
(electoral) authorisation, rights protection, which seek to provide a scale, an 
`index' of democracy. Representation entails that decision-makers should be 
representative of the governed at least in the sense of being institutionally 
constrained to consider the needs and values of the public. Authorisation is 
attained through the appointment of decision-makers into public ollice, which 
provides a publicly expressed consent for their subsequent policies, while 
responsiveness indicates the aligning of public policy with public preferences. 
Last but not least, accountability ensures that the terms on which power is 
authorised are duly observed and openness warrants that information is available 
about how power is exercised when taking decisions. 
The Union's formal institutional system, as evolved, is based on an `institutional 
triangle' supported, arguably, by a constitutionally unrestricted Court: the 
Commission monopolises the legislative initiative, while the EP and the Council 
act as colegislators. However, its overall philosophy with regard to the balance of 
power has changed little since the Treaty of Rome (1957); although legislative 
and executive powers are not formally separated, the system does favour 
executive over parliamentary institutions. This has had a number of implications: 
a strong role for the Council, a dominant role for the European Council, the 
undermining of the parliamentary element with detrimental impact on national 
legal orders, a system obscured with too many executive actors, one that hovers 
between supranational ism and intergovernmentalism. 
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To be more precise, the Council has always been at the centre of decision. 
making both as a strong executive and legislator, while, over time, it has come to 
share legislative and delegated executive powers with the Commission and the 
Parliament, but has never been subjected to parliamentary control at EU level. A 
scrutiny of the composition and function of the institution was deemed necessary 
in the context of democratic legitimacy, as both issues can attend to questions of 
representation, authorisation, accountability and transparency. The existence of 
specialised Council compositions across which the legislative work of the 
Council is currently spread and the various delegations of power within and away 
from the Council mean that it is an institution of uncertain external boundaries as 
well as internal complexity, which makes it difficult to determine with certainty 
whose interests it represents and how it allocates political accountability. The 
TeCE provision that the legislative Council should deliberate publicly will entail 
a degree of separation between the Council's legislative and executive functions 
and will render its workings more transparent, which is not currently the case. 
Also, voting in the Council is complicated, exacerbated by the pillar structure of 
the Union and the plethora of instruments to be adopted. 
One might argue that all these concerns pertaining to the Council's dominant role 
in the Union's institutional system may be offset by the indirect mandate it 
receives through the democratic and legitimate governments of the Member 
States. On closer inspection, the indirect link between the Council and individual 
citizens may in fact generate democratic deficit in the EU legislative process. 
Participation in the EU decision-making process via the Council has strengthened 
the Member States governments' position in relation to other sovereign bodies, 
especially national (and regional) parliaments in the sense that they have 
acquired normative powers that they would not normally have in their own 
country without parliamentary control or authorisation. This had the added effect 
of eroding the separation of powers in national political systems, that is, the 
power of national parliaments to `check and balance' their governments. 
Moreover, the lack of institutional `fit' between the EU and its Member States 
means that EU decision-making endorses institutional bias, because it operates 
to the benefit of certain groups to the exception of others. The norm that central 
governments represent their state in Council - the EU's predominant legislative 
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body - means that central governments predominate 
in the EU; while they 
monopolise formal representation, they also acquire influence over legislative 
powers that were previously exercised by regional governments. 
The Council's dominant role in the Union's legislative process has undermined 
the parliamentary element also at the European level. All Member States have in 
common a system of representative democracy where parliaments arc regarded 
as pillars of democracy. Although the parliamentary system is standard reference 
in reflections on the institutional architecture of the European Union, the EU is 
not a parliamentary system. The democratic deficit in the EU decision-making 
process has been attributed over the years partly to the minimal legislative role of 
a directly elected, supranational institution, the European Parliament. It is the 
only supranational institution that receives a direct mandate and it has also been 
set up to constitute the democratic component, at least since direct elections were 
introduced. To this extent, the EP can be regarded as the democratic pillar of the 
Union. Yet, its significance in terms of democratic legitimacy is not the same as 
in the case of national and regional parliamentary institutions. Due to its form 
and function, the EP differs considerably from its national counterparts and, as 
such, it provides a poor model of representative democracy; it has not yet fully 
developed either as a representative body or as an institution of political 
authority. The lack of linkage between public preferences and constitutional 
decisions by the EP as well as the `second order' character of European elections 
significantly diminish the EP's capacity to command public assent. An elected 
majority in Parliament does not necessarily express the policy preferences of the 
majority of citizens. The EP has been the biggest beneficiary of institutional 
reforms. If the attribution of powers were reorganised to reflect an even stronger 
legislative role for the EP, that would aggravate public anxieties about the 
weakening of national and regional parliamentary control. Thus, the democratic 
content of decision-making at EU level cannot be reduced to the degree to which 
the EP has a say. 
No fewer than three institutions lay claim to the exercise of executive authority; 
namely, the Commission, the Council and the European Council. And among 
them, the European Council holds the dominant position. From the perspective of 
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democratic legitimacy, the European Council's role is problematic. Currently, its 
lack of institutional status means that it is not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ, and consequently to the rule of law, unless it encroaches on actions taken 
by the EU institutions under the EC Treaty. Its role has been constitutionalised 
by the TeCE, but as political rather than legal. Also, its decisions are not subject 
to parliamentary control at either the EU or national level. The notion of 
`institutional balance' which rests on a trialogue between the Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission detracts from the fact that the European Council 
often emerges as the de facto higher level decision-maker in the EU, as its 
responsibilities are so comprehensive it can be regarded as the institution with 
the highest authority in the Union. The institutional innovation of the European 
Council presidency, in the TeCE, creates a complex regime of shared executive 
power devoid of a single line of executive accountability, as the respective 
responsibilities between the President of the European Council and the President 
of the Commission could potentially overlap. Then again, the structure of the 
European Union has never been based on strict separation of powers, as it has 
been on notions of institutional balance, thus it would be acceptable, at least in 
principle, for the executive power to be shared between each institution 
representing different interests. But, there is more to the relationship between the 
presidencies of the Commission and the European Council than the `sharing' of 
executive power. There are also elements of hierarchy in planning the overall 
priorities for legislation. The increasing agenda-setting by the European Council 
may be seen as an effort to take over the role constitutionally held by the 
Commission. 
The executive dominance in the Union's institutional system as well as the 
proliferation of actors who `share' the executive functions, both supranational 
(the Commission and the Council) and intergovernmental (the Council and the 
European Council), mean that the system is a constant battle between 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. This in itself has a number of 
implications. The Union's multilevel decision-making occurs through a complex 
and interwoven pattern of intergovernmental and supranational structures that 
reveal a hybrid organisation (the EU) of intrinsic complexity. The rules that 
regulate the exercise of legislative power arc not themselves based on consistent 
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and often visible criteria across the Union pillars; the fragmentation of decision- 
making means that the institutions arc subject to diverse roles, principles and 
voting rules. Therefore, the legislative process appears quite complex and non. 
transparent at times. The application of different principles across the Union 
pillars, the varying and ambiguous voting rules, institutional roles and multiple 
avenues of influence, create uncertainty and unpredictability as to the actual 
boundaries of exercise of power by the EU institutions. Under the Constitutional 
Treaty, the merging of the pillars and the endowment of the Union with legal 
personality is set to clarify the Union's institutional architecture and legal status. 
But the incorporation of the second pillar into the general legal framework of the 
TeCE is of formal significance only, since most formal intergovernmental 
features of cooperation under CFSP remain intact. For that reason, it would be 
appropriate to say that, under the Constitutional Treaty, the Community method 
is a synthesis of the supranational and intergovernmental elements of decision- 
making. 
The treaties govern interinstitutional relations only with regard to the basic 
principles of the operation of the specific legislative procedures and set out the 
general competences of the institutions. Yet, it is envisaged from the outset that 
the institutional system of the Community would include a Court of Justice with 
the express duty to ensure observance of the `rule of law'. Legislative power can 
be legitimate to the extent that its acquisition and exercise conform to established 
law and are limited by it. To this end, the Court has established grounds of 
review of legislative acts adopted by the EU institutions to ensure that legislative 
power is exercised in constitutionally acceptable terms both as an objective 
guarantee of legality and a subjective safeguard for the individuals affected. In 
this context, the Court carries out procedural scrutiny of the legislative process to 
ensure that institutions act within the remit of conferred powers, but also with the 
procedural guarantees found in the treaties. Also, by adjudicating `institutional 
balance', the European courts subject EU decision-making to a test of 
`democracy', as an unwritten principle of higher law, which regulates the 
relationship between the EC institutions and against which the legitimacy of EC 
acts may be reviewed. Democracy issues raise intricate questions not only about 
the exercise of legislative power, but also about the protection afforded to 
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individuals as to the effects of legislative outcomes, pursuant to the 'rule of law' 
principle. Hence, respect for fundamental human rights is a condition of legality 
of Community law and, thus, also a ground of review. I lowever, there is no 
intersection point between the protection of individual rights and institutional 
guarantees when individuals challenge the validity of legislative acts. While the 
Court has proclaimed that, where they have the right to participate in the 
legislative process, individuals may be granted standing on grounds of 
democracy, it has denied them standing on grounds of breach of the institutional 
balance -a 'principle' judicially proclaimed as intrinsic to the principle of 
democracy. 
The treaties equipped the Court with far-reaching powers to enable it to 
discharge its duty to ensure that the law is observed. The Court interpreted this 
duty widely and its `principles' discourse imposed a constitutional 'ethos' on the 
Union's institutional system with characteristics quite akin to the liberal 
democratic traditions shared among the Member States: open government, 
democracy, rule of law, human rights protection and division of powers, even if 
in minimalist terms. With respect to fundamental rights, the Court's 
jurisprudence may be justified due to the lack of fundamental rights protection 
under EU law. With respect to institutional principles, too creative an 
interpretation of the Union's institutional design was less justified, especially as 
the division of functions between the institutions are by and large dealt with in 
the Treaty. The inference is that the Court employed institutional principles and 
fundamental rights to institutionally position itself in the decision-making 
process. By using institutional principles in its jurisprudence, the ECJ delineated 
the institutional position of the EU institutions within the EU institutional 
system. By using fundamental rights, it defined its own institutional position vis. 
a-vis the other EU institutions. So, by incorporating general principles of law into 
the Imv to be observed, the Court created a constitutional regime of division of 
powers in an institutional system where control over legislative activity remains 
central to its mandate. 
The empirical reality of the evolving interinstitutional relations is that, as the 
treaties govern only the basic principles of the operation of the specific 
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legislative procedures and set out the general compctcnccs of the institutions, 
there is much room for different interpretations of the institutional roles and the 
application of legislative procedures. So, due to the opcncndcdncss of the 
treaties, the actual machinery of law-making may be ad hoc and unconstrained 
by formal rules. The institutions frequently use all the political and legal means 
available to increase their impact on the decision-making process and to defend 
their prerogatives. For the most part, institutional change yielded by successive 
treaty amendments has not been so much the result of formal negotiations, but 
rather represents the sanctioning of established informal practices, like the use of 
interinstitutional agreements (IIAs). Quasi-formal and informal procedures may 
emerge around decision-making and even if influenced by the formal treaty 
environment, they are not fully determined by it, as they originate from and are 
enforced by the institutions themselves. In this context, the proliferation of `sott' 
law instruments is a point of concern, since it is less clear what requirements 
actually apply to their adoption, how their use fits in with the formal, legally 
binding instruments and how they affect the legal position of individuals. 
Institutional balance is not a static concept; it evolves over time as the Union's 
founding treaties are adapted and construed by the European courts, by the 
gradual proliferation of formal and informal actors as well as institutional 
practice. The treaties reflect the degree of institutional change that has actually 
taken place only in relation to the five `cardinal' EU institutions (the Council, the 
Commission, the EP, the ECJ and the European Council) and the Court's 
democratic reading of the institutional balance did not extend further to take 
account of all institutions that represent a different constituency as part of the 
formal constitutional and informal institutional reality of the EU. The 
Commission took the institutional lead, in the post-Nice EU governance debate, 
to propose that institutional reform should be broadened to take into account the 
involvement of `stakeholders' in the Union's institutional set up, in the form of 
`interest group participation' and more specifically `civil society involvement'. 
However, the Commission was criticised for attempting to provide a legitimising 
discourse for its existing consultation practices with the aim to further strengthen 
`the Community method', in which its role is better established, and also for 
wishing to bypass the formal legislative process dominated by the codecision 
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procedure, which preserves a strong legislative role for the i? t' and the Council. 
Any adaptation of the concept of institutional balance to embrace civil society 
actors, their participation in the decision-making process, their role and 
influence, raise issues of constitutional significance. For instance, how they fit in 
the Union's institutional framework, whether they arc subject to the same 
procedural rules and principles that apply to all decision-makers, whether they 
provide formal channels that facilitate citizen participation. Some traces of the 
EU governance debate have emerged in the final text of the Constitutional 
Treaty, like the recognition and promotion of social dialogue, the Commission's 
efficiency-driven consultation practices, but reforms placed less emphasis on 
civil society actors and more on the cardinal EU institutions which arc part of the 
formal institutional framework and akin to the common political culture of the 
Member States. 
The peculiarities of EU dccision"making described so far, such as the complexity 
of the pillar structure, the proliferation of acts and instruments that can emanate 
from informal practices of the institutions (and other actors), the obscurity 
regarding the European Council's role and the Council's internal workings, raise 
real concerns about the existence of adequate and visible normative controls as to 
the rules regarding the particulars of dccision"making and the limits of 
institutional activity. Satisfactory constitutional control is not necessarily 
synonymous with inclusion within the treaty framework, but the absence of 
observable norms or standards governing institutional practice and the increasing 
difficulty in identifying which institutions arc politically responsible for 
decisions hinder, rather than facilitate, citizen understanding of the EU system. 
Even if there arc still safeguards in informal institutional practice and channels of 
cooperation, such `checks and balances' on their own only deliver controlled 
government not publicly controlled government. Thcrcforc, the signatories of the 
Lacken Declaration, annexed to the Conclusions of the European Council, aware 
of the close link between the legitimacy of the European project and the 
democratic guarantees to its exercise, invited the Convention to reflect on 
different ways to increase the democratic legitimacy of the Union. 
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The Convention was an institutional set up with widened participation and 
stronger representative basis. It was believed that the public would somehow 
authorise the redesign of the Union's institutional structure by being involved in 
the actual reform debate, rather than just being asked to ratify a treaty designed 
purely through the obscure system of intergovernmental conferences. But as the 
institutional debate eventually took place in the margins of the process, the 
Convention failed to connect with the public. The Constitutional Treaty delivers 
a more democratically legitimate EU regime, in a number of ways. The structural 
simplification of the treaties improves the comprehensibility of the system. 
Greater transparency is recognised formally as part of the democratic life of the 
Union, but what appears more notable as regards the functioning of the 
democratic process, is the novel principle of 'publicity', that is, the general 
'active' duty to legislate in public and to publish legislative material. There is a 
more visible competence system which also reflects, to a certain extent, both the 
formal and informal aspects of EU decision-making in terms of representation of 
different constituencies. The potential of citizens having more influence at the 
European level is realised through the enhanced role of representative 
institutions, like NPs, through avenues of direct participation as well as by the 
general right for every citizen to take part in the democratic life of the Union in 
order to follow, assess and contribute to the decision-making process ofthe EU. 
The TcCC reinforces the democratic aspect of the Union's value system on 
which its institutional framework and decision-making process arc based. It 
promotes various democratic principles to the rank of 'core constitutional 
principles' of the Union, like citizen equality. It provides for a democracy that is 
based on human rights strengthened by the incorporation of the EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights in the treaty text. Thus, the TcCC offers a blueprint for a 
schcmc of government within Europe that is both limited (clearer allocation of 
power), more democratically answerable and accessible to its citizens. Some 
institutional innovations, like the open deliberations of the legislative Council 
and the 'yellow card' procedure, are already part of institutional practice. Even if 




institutional system' and a real progress towards dcmocratisation. The liU has 
come a long way to develop into an eminently democratic political institutional 
system, bearing in mind that, in its inception, it was not intended as a democratic 
organisation. As a system in constant evolution, it is a sort of 'unfinished' 
democracy with improvements facilitated in every treaty rcform, 2 but any 
expectation that it would ever arrive at a stage of structural perfection in terms of 
democracy is an unattainable ideal; no national political system Inas ever 
achieved that either. Besides, it is doubtful that it would turn the Union into a 
fully-fledged democracy. Although the institutional framework emerges 
structurally more democratic in every treaty reform, the EU constantly faces the 
challenge of complex ratification processes since Maastricht. 
The reasons could be traced to the fact that even if the constitutional or 
procedural features of democracy arc met, these alone arc not enough to meet the 
popular aspects of democracy one finds in a system of government with a 
popularly authorised leadership, direct political accountability vfx-c}-W. 1 citizens 
and the formal function of opposition. The overall scheme of the Union's 
institutional system remains problematic, because the distance between the place 
where decisions arc taken and the place where decisions affect us is as wide as 
ever. There is lack of political leadership with clear political accountability, 
identifiable by the people, who will give life to a European democratic space, 
where EU issues can be debated and where people can express their will. The 
institutional innovation of the European Council President may be seen as an 
attempt to create a notion of centralised public authority, but it is not apparent 
how decisions by a top-tier structure will address democratic legitimacy 
concerns, if the locus of decision-making is to shift further away from the hU 
citizens. 
Anothcr paradox of the systcm is that white the Commission has the cxccutive 
functions of a national govcrnmcnt, it is not the Union's political govcrnmcnt; it 
lacks a political base, political accountability and, thus, visibility with the 
W. Wcsscls, 'The Constitutional Treaty-T1inx Rcadings from a Fusion PcrspcCti%, c'. (2(x)5) 43 
JCMS 11-36, p. 11. ' l. Gcrkmth, 'Representation of Cititcns by the CP'. (20A3) I EiuConsi 73.78. p. 7K. Il. tallan. 
'The European Union: a dislinctivc modci of In cmationalirazion'. (199)x) 5 7EIP 233.233, p. 241. 
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citizens. Its governmental role is further disputed by the existence of multiple 
executive actors, especially the President of the European Council. If the TcCE 
enters into force, the EU will emerge as a 'two-headcd' power structurd To a 
certain extent, the Commission has lost its political neutrality as its members and 
President arc formally approved by the EP. A direct linkage between the election 
of its President and the outcome of the EP elections would further enhance its 
political base. This does not require any treaty reform; all that is nccdcd is for 
political parties contesting the European elections to nominate their candidates, 
allowing the voters to consider the choices by somehow linking EI' candidates to 
the candidates for the Commission presidency, while the elected MEt's will have 
to approve the nomination put forward by the European Council. 
Moreover, there is no European political space that will give life to a European 
democratic area in which opposing points can be heard; there is no forum of 
political debate reflecting ordinary people's concerns. Political representation 
and control need to happen at the place where decisions arc taken. i'roccdural 
improvements, such as the opening up of the deliberations of the legislative 
Council, may bring greater transparency to the workings of the EU institutions 
and may expand public knowledge of European issues, but within the Council - 
and the European Council - it is national rather than common European interests 
that arc heard. Because of its political neutrality, the Commission has not been 
particularly eager to host public debates, at least not until its recent initiative for 
dialogue, debate and democracy in Europe. Even so, such initiatives arc 
characterised by lack of leadership and they appear less of a genuine effort to 
engage into a debate with the public and more of an attempt by individual 
institutions to promote their institutional significance in major European issues. 
As for the European Parliament, which for many years has been a place where 
national interests arc fought over, it has not yet developed into a chamber for 
European debates which mirrors the role played at national level by national 
3 hic Strauss-Kahn Rcport, 11uIlthng a political F rtp+c"SO prnlxxaaLr /+r I on'W'x )Pkt. 
April 2004. pp. S 1 and 58. 
COM1(21X05) 494, Communication from the Commission to the Council. the Euun=, 
harliamcnt. the European Economic and Social Committcc and the Committcc or the 11Cgions " 
I'lan"D for Dcmocracy. Dialoguc and Dcbatc, 13.10.2005. SI: C(2(K)3)'J$3. Action Plan to 
improve communicating Curopc by the Commission, 20.07.2003. 
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parliaments. And when political debate does take place, only rarely it is rcpottcd 
to the general public by the media. S 
Currently, it is the Member States that decide the procedure for treaty ratification 
and it is national politicians who set the terms ofthe domestic political dcbatc on 
European questions. The democratic performance of the EU varies across 
institutions and levels of governance, but the all important perception of the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions is mediated through national 
political classes, combating where necessary the prejudices and over- 
simplifications of the tabloid press. ` The detrimental implications ofthis state of 
affairs to the latest ratification process were analysed in Chapter 7. Besides, the 
question is not whether Member States can control the EU institutions, but 
whether citizens can control the EU institutions as well as their national 
governments who combine to exercise EU powers. The Union needs to advance 
towards a 1; 'uropcair political life. 
At the time of writing, the future of the Constitutional Treaty remains undecided. 
There is no shortage of proposals, ranging from the need to reassess the method 
of institutional change to possibly rethink the raison d'clrc of the EU enterprise, 
and so on. Finding the best path ahead for the EU is undeniably a challenging 
task, but one need not `reinvent the whccl'. The negative referenda results raise 
fundamental questions about the ultimate role of the Union's institutional system 
and processes in facilitating the participation and representation of the public. 
But what post"rcfcrcnda assessments also show, from the Maastricht all the way 
to the TcCE ratification process, is that national democracies have been going 
through a crisis of confidence similar to the EU. People respond negatively, 
because they feel they arc not duly represented and heard by their national 
institutions. To deal with their fear of the divine, the Grccks and Romans 
personified their gods to comprehend their demeanour, but what they naturally 
saw reflected back was all the weaknesses of human nature. This projected 
anthropomorphism led to a misapprehension of the divine and made people even 
more distrustful of and oflcn angry and frustrated with the gods. With all its 
' he Strauss-}ahn Ftcport. op. cit. n. ). p. 3W. 
i Ibid, p. 30. 
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dcfcicncies, the Union has fallen victim to the same fallacy of personification. 
The average European public has little awareness of the w. its processes and 
institutions, usually filtered through national politics and media. So, it attributes 
to this vague system of governance features that typify national democratic 
governments, but what it sees reflected back is all the (laws of national 
democracies. It is a fact of human nature to project the familiar onto the 
unknown. The Roman gods never existed, but the Union does and, as long as it 
aspires to be a union of both states and peoples, it has a duty to form European 
awareness, to create an authentic 'democratic life of the Union', a virtual - not 
just structural - democracy, where political representation and control takes 
place. In the absence of conditions of connectedness between European citizens 
and this extra level of decision making (EU level) the future will always be 
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